Friday, 22 March 2013

J 7/12 – Last Minute Risks


This is an appeal against the refusal of the Examining Division (ED) to grant re-establishment.

The applicant’s PCT application (earliest priority: November 2005) had entered the European phase in May 2008.

In a letter dated January 7, 2010, the EPO informed the applicant’s representative that the renewal fee for the fourth year, which had fallen due on November 30, 2009, had not been paid and that it still could be paid within six months of the due date, provided that an additional fee was also paid within that period (i.e. on or before May 31, 2010, “de ultimo ad ultimo”).

A communication of loss of rights was sent to the representative on July 8, 2010.

On July 28, 2010, the applicant filed a request for re-establishment.

The representative explained that the applicant had requested him to pay the fee by fax, on May 31, 2010. The order was received at 5 o’clock p.m. but there was a fax problem causing the fax not to be printed out. The problem was discovered on June 1 only because the office staff was surprised to see that apparently no faxes had been received during the night.

The ED considered that the requirement of all due care had not been complied with and refused re-establishment.

The applicant then filed an appeal.

Readers familiar with re-establishment case law will not be surprised that the appeal was not successful.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[3] As explained in great detail in the communication [NB: annexed to the summons to oral proceedings before the Board] a request for re-establishment can be granted when an applicant, in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, was unable to observe a time limit vis-à-vis the EPO (A 122(1)).

According to the established case law the duty of due care enshrined in A 122 concerns both the applicant and the representative (J 3/93 [2.1]; T 381/93 [6]; J 17/03 [5]; J 1/07 [4.1,7]; cf. Case Law, 6th edition, 2010, VI.E.7.3.1), the due care required on behalf of the representative depending on the relationship between him and his client (J 19/04 [9]; J 1/07 [4.1]).

[4] As correctly stated in the impugned decision, the representative has clearly and in due time informed the applicant of the fee being due. The reminder sent by the representative on April 9, 2010, contained all the information that was needed; it also bore the indication “final time limit”. It clearly follows from the letter that the representative could only pay the renewal fees if he was instructed to do so by the applicant. The representative received the required funds together with the corresponding instructions.

It follows that the applicant alone had the duty to take all due care required by the circumstances for the time limit for paying the fees to be met. However, the fact that the representative did not make any mistake does not protect his client from the consequences of its own errors or negligence (J 3/93; T 381/93; J 16/93; J 17/03).

[5] The argument that the applicant could not have known which time limits [, if not met,] would result in the irrevocable loss of the application is not sufficient for establishing that all due care had been taken. This ignorance rather proves the need to be more careful and, therefore, to act much earlier than on the last day of the additional period (Nachfrist). According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal, ignorance or wrong interpretation of a provision of the EPC cannot justify re-establishment. Incidentally, this principle also applies to individual applicants that are not represented (J 2/02).

[6] Moreover, as mentioned during the oral proceedings, anybody who puts himself in a situation where he cannot be sure that the required action can be taken in due time takes the risk that his legal request (Rechtsbegehr) will be unsuccessful (cf. J 16/92).

In the present case the order to pay (Zahlungsanweisung) has only been transmitted in the late afternoon of the last day for paying the renewal fee and the additional fee. By acting in this way, the [applicant] (almost) completely exhausted the additional period. Such action is per se acceptable, but it creates a risk that is to be borne (also) by the [applicant], namely that errors may occur during the receipt and execution of its instructions. Under these circumstances the [applicant] would have had to enquire of the professional representative or his clerk whether the instructions had been received and had been (or would be) carried out in due time (T 1289/10; J 16/92). This requirement does not amount to an unduly high standard for due care on behalf of the applicant, as extensively argued by the [applicant] - both orally and in writing. Rather, it only corresponds to the due care that is required in the applicant’s own interest and reflects the concrete circumstances. The requirement to enquire (Erkundigungsobliegenheit) thus results from both the fact that the applicant, by exhausting (Ausreizen) the time limit has created the particular risk that delays in transmission may lead to a failure to miss the time limit, and from the fact that – in contrast to last-minute transmissions directly to the Office – the instructions of the applicant to its representative still lie in the sphere of the applicant and that the interposition (Zwischenschaltung) of the representative naturally generates further transmission risks.

[7] For the above reasons the requirements of A 122(1) and R 136 have not been met and, consequently, the appeal has to be dismissed.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 21 March 2013

T 584/09 – Merry Swapping


Some time ago, I dedicated a post to the successful petition for review R 21/11 and mentioned that Board of appeal (BoA) 3.3.01 had changed its composition of its own motion because the former chairman would retire in early 2013. This retirement had a domino effect, as the present decision shows: the two remaining members of the Board recused themselves.

The original decision had been taken by P. Ranguis (chairman), G. Seufert and D. Rogers.

The petitioner had asked the Enlarged Board (EBA) to order a change of composition, but this request was refused.

P. Ranguis retired on March 1, 2013.

G. Seufert and D. Rogers then recused themselves in order to avoid the appearance of partiality.

The following decision on their exclusion was taken by the Board in the following decision: C.M. Radke (chairman), J.-B. Ousset (rapporteur) and C.-P. Brandt.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1] Pursuant to A 24(1) members of the Boards of appeal may not take part in a case in which they have any personal interest, or if they have previously been involved as representatives of one of the parties, or if they participated in the decision under appeal. If, for one of the reasons mentioned in paragraph 1, or for any other reason, a member of a BoA considers that he should not take part in any appeal, he shall inform the Board accordingly (A 24(2)).

[2] Apparently the self-recusations that are to be examined here are not based on a reason for exclusion pursuant to A 24(1). In particular the decision of the BoA of February 3, 2011, is not a decision of the previous instance within the meaning of this provision [NB: contrary to the English version of A 24(1), the German version refers to a previous instance (Vorinstanz)]. However, the reason given [by the self-recusing members], i.e. [the wish] to avoid the appearance of partiality based on the necessity to answer the same questions once more, may qualify as “any other reason” within the meaning of A 24(2).

[3] Pursuant to A 24(4), first sentence, the BoA shall decide as to the action to be taken in such cases. As the opponent has correctly stated […], a self-recusation, therefore, does not automatically result in the Board member concerned being excluded from the proceedings. Such an exclusion can only result from a decision of the Board in its composition pursuant to A 24(4), second sentence, on whether the replacement of the Board member is justified. In its present composition the Board is entitled to decide whether the technically competent member (G. Seufert) and the legally competent member (D. Rogers), who originally were in charge of the appeal proceedings, are excluded from participating in the appeal proceedings that are to be resumed.

[4] In principle the requirement of fair and impartial proceedings does not prohibit members of the BoA from deciding again on the submissions of parties. This can happen, for instance, when a case is remitted to the first instance and the same Board composed of the very same members who had taken the first decision is competent for deciding on the appeal against the subsequent first instance decision (cf. J 15/04 [8]).

[5] However, there is a general legal principle that nobody may decide on a case in which one of the parties may have good reasons to suspect him/her to be biased. A 24(2) serves this principle as it requires a Board member who believes that (s)he cannot take part in the proceedings for such a reason to inform the Board. This avoids situations where the circumstances underlying the self-recusation become public at a later stage of the proceedings and shed doubt on the process leading to the decision or even the decision itself. As a consequence, it is of paramount importance that after a decision of a BoA pursuant to A 24(4) on the self-recusation of a Board member neither the public nor any party may consider that there is a serious possibility or even a mere appearance of partiality (cf. J 15/04 [13]).

[6] It is true that neither during the petition for review proceedings under A 112a nor subsequent to the communication by the Board dated December 14, 2012, the petitioner has provided any concrete indications (Anhaltspunkte) clearly suggesting or actually justifying that there may be reasons to fear partiality of the original Board members, nor does the Board see any such indications. This notwithstanding, having pondered the particular circumstances of the present case, for the following reasons (see point [7]) and in view of the general principle explained above (see point [5]) the Board considers the self-recusations under consideration to be justified.

[7] As a matter of fact, when, as in the present case, members of the BoA justify a self-recusation by invoking a reason which as such could possibly justify an exclusion based on a partiality concern (Besorgnis der Befangenheit), then this reason should, as a rule, be respected by the decision on the replacement of these members because one has to assume that these members know best whether a partiality concern might arise (cf. J 15/04 [13]). In the present case this conclusion is further suggested by the fact that the petitioner in the petition for review proceedings did indeed request to replace the members involved in the decision of February 3, 2011, because otherwise they would have to decide on the same questions once more.

[8] Thus the Board comes to the conclusion that, considering the requirement of impartiality in proceedings before the BoA that underlies A 24, and in view of the fact that their members, who have a judicial function, have to avoid even the appearance of possible partiality, it is justified to replace the original technically and legally competent members of Board 3.3.01 in the proceedings that are to be resumed in the present case because of their declaration of self-recusation.

[9] This outcome does not contradict decision R 21/11 of the EBA in which the EBA refused the request to replace the members of the BoA who had participated in the decision that has been set aside, because in this respect the factual situation has changed in a decisive manner subsequent to the decision of the EBA. The EBA based its decision on the assumption that in principle the members of the BoA who had participated in the decision of February 3, 2011, which has been set aside, were also available for the proceedings that were to be resumed, and this was the only reasonable assumption at the time of the decision. Moreover, the EBA has also established that within the framework of the request to maintain the impugned patent the only question to be decided was whether in case of an admission of the second Mehlhorn expert opinion into the appeal proceedings this additional evidence would make a difference (R 21/11 [30]). As this request had not been dealt with before, there was no need to decide a second time on the same questions.

[10] The opponent could only have invoked legitimate expectations created by the decision of the EBA concerning the composition of the BoA if the facts underlying the decision of the EBA had remained unchanged, which is not the case, be it only because a change of chairman had become necessary afterwards.

[11] As a matter of fact the EBA has expressly pointed out that a replacement of the former members would mean that a Board in a new composition would have to repeat the appeal proceedings in order to reach a final decision (R 21/11 [30]). However, this is precisely the situation created by the retirement of the chairman P. Ranguis on March 1, 2013. The change of chairman as such already requires the appeal proceedings to be repeated, even if the originally appointed legally and technically competent members remained in the proceedings. These members then would have to decide once again on the same questions in the present appeal proceedings, which was to be avoided by means of the self-recusations.

[12] Insofar, and contrary to the opinion of the opponent […], it is irrelevant which reasons (retirement, partiality concerns) require the BoA member to be replaced. What matters is that before taking a final decision on the appeal the member must be able to form an opinion based on his/her proper perception, study (Kenntniserlangung) of the factual situation and assessment of all relevant questions. This presupposes that it may be necessary to discuss and assess afresh all questions that are relevant for the decision on the appeal, even though they have been dealt with and decided by a Board in different composition in the course of the preceding appeal proceedings. This also encompasses the participation in oral proceedings at the end of which the final decision of the newly composed BoA on the appeal as a whole is taken and announced.

[13] The Board is unable to endorse the opinion of the opponent according to which the principle of res judicata (i.e. of legal effect and legal binding) would hinder the BoA, when resuming the proceedings, in a partially or completely new composition, to decide once more on the questions that have already been dealt with and decided during the preceding appeal proceedings. The reasons are of a legal nature.

[14] It is true that a petition for review pursuant to A 112a is an extraordinary legal remedy and has no suspensive effect (A 112a(3)), i.e. the filing of the petition as such does not have any effect on the legal force of the impugned decision. This being said, it follows from A 112a(5) in connection with R 108(3) that if the petition succeeds, the EBA sets aside the decision and re-opens proceedings before the BoA. It may then order that the composition of the members be modified.

[15] The wording of these provisions does not express the idea that in a situation where the decision of the BoA is set aside the BoA […] is bound by the factual or legal statements that have been made in the preceding decision, which has been set aside. This is fully in line with the unambiguous and explicit will of the legislator as expressed when the provisions governing petitions for review under A 112a. Accordingly, if the petition is allowed, the decision of the EBA setting aside the decision of the BoA and re-opening the proceedings overturns the “res judicata effect”, i.e. the formal legal force of the decision of the BoA (OJ EPO, Special edition 4/2007, on A 112a, p. 126-131, and in particular points 10, 17, and 19, and expressly referring to A 112a(5) in connection with R 108(3)). Moreover it is expressly stated in this context that consequently the result of the second appeal proceedings may be the same as in the first appeal proceedings, or different (ibid., point 19). The legal fact (Rechtstatsache) that in a case where the petition is allowed, the decision of the BoA is set aside and the appeal proceedings are re-opened pursuant to A 112a(5) in connection with R 108(3), the res judicata effect of the first decision of the BoA is broken or overturned by means of a “cassatory” decision and that, as a consequence, the reversal of the decision in the second appeal proceedings is possible, has also been expressly confirmed in the legal literature (see Günzel, GRUR 2009, 269, 270; Messerli, GRUR 2001, 979, 981; Joos/Schmitz in Singer/Stauder, EPÜ, 6th edition, A 112a, marginal numbers 5 and 20). The EBA in its decision R 21/11 manifestly and without further ado based its reasoning on this fact when it declared that “replacing the previous members would mean that a BoA in new composition would have to carry out afresh the whole appeal proceedings … in order to come to a final decision” (R 21/11 [30]). This statement would not make any sense if one had to assume as a res judicata effect for the second appeal proceedings.

[16] For the above reasons the Board cannot endorse the opinion of the opponent acoording to which the principle of legal security would require a limitation of the BoA’s entitlement to take decisions, within the framework of the re-opened proceedings, to the so far unanswered question whether the second Mehlhorn expert opinion was to be admitted and, if so, whether it was relevant, and, therefore, excluded the possibility for the BoA to decide the questions that had already been dealt with once more, and possibly differently.

[17] Thus in the end there are no decisive reasons not to replace the original technically competent member G. Seufert and the original legally competent member D. Rogers by a deputy.

[18] The BoA, therefore, comes to the conclusion that Ms. G. Seufert and Mr. D. Rogers are to be replaced by Mr. J.-B. Ousset and Mr. C.-P. Brandt, respectively.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

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Wednesday, 20 March 2013

J 15/12 – To Miss, Or Not To Miss, …


… that is the question.

This is an appeal against the decision of the Receiving Section (RS) to refuse the applicant’s request for a replacement of drawings under R 56(3).

The application under consideration was filed on June 25, 2010, claiming the priority of a GB patent application. The request for grant of a European patent was accompanied by 15 claims, 13 description pages and one sheet of drawings labelled “Fig 1A.” and “Fig 1B.”. In the description reference is made to Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.

On June 29, 2010, the applicant filed two sheets of drawings consisting of Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 and stated that the drawings filed with the application were incorrect and did not correspond to the specification. On August 5, 2010, the applicant filed a letter stating the following:


The RS was of the opinion that R 56 allows the filing of missing drawings, but not their replacement, without losing the earlier filing date. Figs. 2, 3 and 4 were obviously missing drawings, whereas Fig. 1 was not an obviously missing drawing, since it was present in the application documents as filed on the date of filing. As a consequence, the RS refused to accept Fig. 1 as a missing drawing within the meaning of R 56. It also decided that for the publication of the European patent application according to Article 93 EPC, the documents as originally filed would be used together with Figures 2, 3 and 4 filed on June 29 and August 5,2010.

The applicant filed an appeal against this decision.

[2] R 56 reads in relevant parts:

“(1) If the examination under A 90(1) reveals that parts of the description, or drawings referred to in the description or in the claims, appear to be missing, the EPO shall invite the applicant to file the missing parts within two months. …

(2) If missing parts of the description or missing drawings are filed later than the date of filing, but within two months of the date of filing or, if a communication is issued under paragraph 1, within two months of that communication, the application shall be re-dated to the date on which the missing parts of the description or missing drawings were filed. The EPO shall inform the applicant accordingly.

(3) If the missing parts of the description or missing drawings are filed within the period under paragraph 2, and the application claims priority of an earlier application, the date of filing shall, provided that the missing parts of the description or the missing drawings are completely contained in the earlier application, remain the date on which the requirements laid down in R 40(1) were fulfilled, where the applicant so requests and files, within the period under paragraph 2:

(a) a copy of the earlier application, unless such copy is available to the EPO under R 53(2); ...”

[3] In the present case in the description as filed reference is made to Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 […]. However, no drawing labelled “Fig.1” was part of the application received on 25 June 2010. Drawing Fig. 1 together with drawings Figs. 2, 3 and 4 were filed by the applicant under R 56(2) of its own volition and were received on 29 June 2010, and a copy of the earlier application, which contained Figs. 1, 2 3 and 4, was received on 5 August 2010; both dates are within the time limit of two months from the filing date (25 June 2010). Consequently, pursuant to R 56(3) the date of filing remains 25 June 2010, i.e. the date on which the requirements of R 40(1) were fulfilled. The incomplete application documents filed originally are to be completed by the missing parts, which must be added to the text of the application filed originally.

[4] The RS correctly states that R 56 does not allow any replacement of drawings. An interpretation of R 56 that some, or all, of the application documents that were originally filed in order to obtain a filing date could be amended, replaced or deleted would indeed be incorrect (see decision J 27/10 [8-18]).

However, the filing of drawing Fig. 1 does not replace any Fig. 1 filed earlier in a legal sense.

R 56(1), first sentence, refers to drawings referred to in the description or in the claims, which appear to be missing. Hence, where a drawing referred to in the description is missing in the application documents as filed. R 56 is applicable and the said drawing can be filed later in accordance with the procedure laid down in R 56.

As set out above, no drawing labelled “Fig.1” was part of the application received on 25 June 2010. The drawings “Fig.1A” and “Fig.1B” are not a “Fig. 1” as stated in the decision under appeal and therefore the later filing of “Fig. 1” is not a replacement of the aforementioned figures but constitutes the filing of a figure referred to in the description but missing from the application documents as filed.

[5] The Board therefore concludes that Fig. 1 has to be treated as a missing drawing in accordance with R 56(3) and (2). Fig. 1 must be added to the application documents already filed, with no ensuing change of the original filing date of 25 June 2010. Consequently, the EPO will also have to provide for a publication of drawing Fig. 1.

I understand this to mean that if the originally filed figures had been labelled “Fig. 1”, then they could not have been replaced by the ‘new’ “Fig.1”.

Also, although the decision is silent on this matter, I would think that the Figures 1A and 1B still are part of the application as filed and can only be deleted via an amendment.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 19 March 2013

T 1906/11 – What Really Counts


Both the patent proprietor and the opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 of the patent as maintained read (amendments with respect to claim 1 as granted are highlighted):
Scale (1) having a supporting plate (4) for receiving a mass to be weighed and having an electrical
switching device (16, 24) for choosing or selecting a function of the scale (1), characterized in that the
switching device (16, 24) has a capacitive proximity switch having an electrode (18, 28, 38, 44) which is arranged on the supporting plate (4) for monitoring the ambient capacitance of the electrode (18, 28, 38, 44), wherein the electrode (18, 38, 44) is located under the supporting plate and wherein the choice or selection of a function performed with the electrical switching device consists in switching on the scale.
The Board dismissed the main request of the patent proprietor for lack of inventive step and then examined the claims of the patent as maintained by the OD. The part on compliance with A 123(2) is not without interest.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[4.2.1] The opponents have criticised that the feature that has been added to claim 1, according to which “the electrode is located under the supporting plate”, represented an inadmissible intermediate generalization, because this feature meant that any unspecified electrode could be located under the supporting plate. There was no corresponding disclosure in the original patent application, where the only electrode said to be located under the supporting plate was an electrically conductive printed layer.

[4.2.2] The discussion between the parties concerning the opponent’s attack under A 123(2) mainly concentrated on the question whether the amendment of claim was an intermediate generalization within the meaning of e.g. T 1067/97, which had been cited by the opponent.

However, the Board is of the opinion that this question is irrelevant in the present context. Whether an amendment qualifies as “intermediate generalization” or rather as “omission of an originally disclosed feature” or “multiple selection from two groups of alternative features” does not allow to draw a conclusion on whether this amendment is admissible under A 123(2). The only relevant question is whether the skilled person who is confronted with the amended version of the application or the patent, as compared to the skilled person who was only aware of the originally disclosed version, would find additional, technically relevant pieces of information in the amended version. Only when it is possible to find such additional, technically relevant pieces of information can there be a violation of the requirements of A 123(2).

[4.2.3] The Board agrees with the opponents insofar as present claim 1 as amended, which now defines an electrode that is not specified any further to be located under the supporting plate, clearly teaches the skilled person to locate an electrode of any kind (Beschaffenheit) under the supporting plate.

[4.2.4] As to the nature and location of the electrode, the following hints are found in the original application (paragraphs refer to the application as published):
“In principle there are no limitations with respect to the design (Ausbildung) of the electrode. However, it is particularly advantageous for the electrode to have an electrically conductive printed layer on or under the supporting plate” (cf. paragraph [0007])

“According to another advantageous development (Weiterbildung) of the invention the electrode comprises a sputtered layer that is electrically conductive in at least part of its area, on or under the supporting plate” (cf. paragraph [0008]).

“… it is suitable if the electrode comprises an electrically conductive metal element mounted on the support plate.” (cf. paragraph [0010]).
Moreover, the figures show two embodiments:

The first embodiment, shown in Figures 1 and 2, comprises an electrode 18 that consists in an electrically conductive printed layer 32 provided under the support plate (cf. paragraph [0015]), as well as a second electrode 28 consisting in a sputtered layer (cf. paragraph [0016]), which according o the figure is provided on the upper surface of the support plate.


The second embodiment, represented in Figure 3, has an electrode that consists in a metal element glued to the bottom of the support plate (cf. paragraph [0017]). 


Thus the original documents as filed disclose, in various places of the description and the drawings, electrodes that are arranged under the support plate and which consist in an electrically conductive printed layer, an electrically conductive sputtered layer, or a metal element that is glued [onto the support plate]. Considering this plurality of variants that are said to be advantageous embodiments, the skilled person would understand that in principle there is no limitation regarding the design of the electrode on the bottom surface of the support plate, and that the electrode can be of any kind, respectively. This fact is also expressly stated in paragraph [0007] of the description.

The fact that claim 2 as originally filed referred to a design of the electrode that was apparently considered to be particularly advantageous – i.e. a printed layer – cannot be understood to delimit the whole disclosure, as the opponents believe.

[4.2.5] From the above comparison between the technical teaching which the skilled person receives from claim 1 as amended on the one hand and from the documents as originally filed on the other hand, and their agreement, [the Board] has to conclude that the technical teaching introduced by the amendment and which allegedly was an addition [to the original disclosure], was already present in the application [as filed], which means that there is no violation of the requirements of A 123(2).

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Monday, 18 March 2013

T 1849/12 – Bad News For Early Birds


The present case is somewhat unusual. It raises the question whether an applicant has the right to have its application granted before the expiry of the 18-months-period. The treatment of the admissibility of the appeal is also quite interesting.

The application under consideration was filed on July 21, 2011.

On May 7, 2012, the applicant’s representative had a telephone interview with the Examiner. The Examiner appears to have told the representative that in principle there was no obstacle to grant the patent but that he could not do so before having carried out a “topping-up” search in order to detect A 54(3) prior art, in conformity with the Guidelines (C-IV 7.1).

On June 28, 2012, the applicant’s representative repeated the request for an early grant. He pointed out that there was no legal basis in the EPC for refusing a request for an early grant. It was up to the applicant to bear the risk of there being undetected A 54(3) prior art. The representative also invoked a recent article by M. Wilming in epi Information 1/2011, p. 31. He requested an appealable decision and explained that in the absence of such a decision the applicant might file an appeal anyway.

On July 17, the ED sent a communication wherein it explained that the Guidelines were in line with the EPC and that there was no legal basis for an appealable decision.

The applicant then filed an appeal.

How did the Board react?

*** Translation of the German original (available here) ***

Competence and composition of the Board of appeal

[1.1] First it has to be examined to which Board of appeal the EPC refers the present case.

[1.2] The impugned communication deals both with the main request of the applicant to allow the patent to be granted as soon as possible, by immediately issuing a R 71(3) communication, and with the auxiliary request to issue an appealable decision in case the ED was not willing to grant the patent without delay […]. Thus the communication directly concerns the moment at which the ED decides to grant the European patent, i.e. the decision to grant (cf. G 8/95 [4-5]). Therefore, the Board is of the opinion that the impugned communication of the ED concerns the grant of a European patent within the meaning of A 21(3)(a) and that the Technical Board of appeal in its composition pursuant to A 21(3)(a) is competent to decide on the present appeal.

[1.3] In view of the particular nature of the case the Board in the above composition has considered it to be necessary to decide on the appeal in a composition pursuant to A 21(3)(b) (Article 9 RPBA).

Admissibility of the appeal

On the qualification of the impugned decision as a decision

[2.1.1] Pursuant to A 106(1) decisions of the departments referred to in this provision are appealable. In the present case, however, the appeal is not directed against a formal decision but against what the ED has referred to as “communication”. As the term “decision” is not defined in the EPC, the question arises whether the impugned communication, notwithstanding its designation, qualifies as an appealable decision. It has been established in the case law of the Boards of appeal that the answer to this question does not primarily depend on the form or the title of the document, but on its content, which has to be assessed in its procedural context. In particular, a document such as the impugned communication in the present case does qualify as a decision when it finally settles the relevant factual situation with respect to a party.

[2.1.2] In view of its contents, the appellant considers the communication of the ED dated July 17, 2012, to be an appealable decision because it satisfies all the features of an appealable decision cited in decision T 1181/04 [2.4] […].

The Board cannot endorse this point of view. At least two of the four criteria are not satisfied in the present case. The first instance novelty assessment expressly had not been terminated yet, in view of A 54(3) prior art, and thus the factual examination had not yet been terminated, so that the subsequent proceedings did not depend on the decision of the applicant alone.

Moreover, the factual situation of the case underlying decision T 1181/04 significantly differs from the present situation in that the ED already had issued a communication pursuant to A 51(4) EPC 1973 (nowadays, R 71(3)), which, under the circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned above qualified as a decision. In the present case, however, the ED had refused to (immediately) issue a communication pursuant to R 71(3). Therefore the question whether (and if so, which of) the cited criteria can be used for the assessment of the admissibility of the appeal, in terms of double relevant facts in civil proceedings, can be left unanswered.

[2.1.3] However, the Board shares the opinion of the appellant that its request for a R 71(3) communication being issued immediately has been dealt with conclusively in the impugned communication and has been refused in a final manner by the ED. This is because, within the framework of the examining proceedings, the ED has made a final and legally binding statement on the request of the appellant, which, as to its content, has the nature of a decision within the meaning of A 106(1).

As this decision has resulted in the refusal of the request of the appellant to have the patent and the rights under A 64 related to it granted soon, [the appellant] is also adversely affected.

Admission of the separate appeal

[2.2.1] Pursuant to A 106(2), a decision which does not terminate proceedings as regards one of the parties can only be appealed together with the final decision, unless the decision allows a separate appeal.

The EPC does not contain an explicit provision [that allows to determine] in which cases a separate appeal against so-called interlocutory decisions has to be allowed.  Rather, the legislator has given the deciding department discretion to decide [on that matter], according to its duties (Travaux préparatoires to the EPC 1973, Report on the second session of the Coordination Committee, May 15-19, 1972, document BR/209/72, point 67).

It is undisputed that a first instance department which, in application of the EPC, has to take discretionary decisions has a margin of discretion which the Board of appeal has to respect. The Board may only should only overrule the way in which a first instance department has exercised its discretion if it comes to the conclusion either that the first instance department in its decision has not exercised its discretion in accordance with the right principles, or that it has exercised its discretion in an unreasonable way, and has thus exceeded the proper limits of its discretion cf. G 7/93 [2.5-6]).

[2.2.2] The impugned communication of the ED, which is to be qualified as a decision, does not terminate the examination proceedings with respect to the appellant. The ED has expressly refused the auxiliary request of the appellant for an appealable decision and has justified this by referring to the lack of an appropriate legal basis.

When doing so, it apparently has not sufficiently taken account of the fact that the request of the appellant, to allow the patent to be granted soon, by immediately issuing a R 71(3) communication, could not have been granted in a meaningful way in case a successful appeal had been filed after the final decision on the grant. Thereby it has adversely affected [the appellant] by issuing its communication, in a way that cannot be remedied by means of an appeal after the final decision.

[2.2.3] Nor could the appellant avail itself of another legal remedy provided by the EPC against the impugned communication. Under these circumstances, the ED should have allowed a separate appeal because only an appeal could offer the appellant an opportunity to remedy the adverse effect within the framework of a judicial examination of the refusal of its request. This is all the more so because the EPC does not provide for an appeal against inaction of the EPO (cf. J 26/87).

[2.2.4] Thus the Board comes to the conclusion that the ED, when refusing the request that an appealable decision be issued has insufficiently taken account of an essential aspect and has exercised its discretion in an erroneous way. Therefore, the communication of the ED is to be considered to be separately appealable.

[2.3] As the appeal satisfies all the other requirements of A 106 to A 108 and R 97 and R 99, it is admissible.

Allowability of the appeal

[3.1] A 97(1) regulates the grant of a European patent as follows:
“If the ED is of the opinion that the EP application and the invention to which it relates meet the requirements of this Convention, it shall decide to grant a EP […].”
Thus the grant of a patent presupposes that the ED has reached the opinion that the requirements of the EPC are met. In the present case, however, the ED has expressed in the impugned communication dated July 17, 2012 (point 1) that it was not yet of the opinion that the application under consideration satisfied all the requirements of the EPC, including the requirement of novelty with respect to A 54(3) prior art. Thus it did not have the possibility and the right to proffer the possibility of a grant by issuing a communication under R 71(3). In contrast to the opinion of the appellant, the ED has no margin of discretion in this respect.

Whether the appellant renounces the novelty assessment with respect to A 54(3) prior art and is ready to bear the risk that may result from it, i.e. that the resulting patent is not legally valid, is irrelevant in this context, because this would mean that the applicant had the right to choose whether its application should be examined before grant – and if so, in regard of which requirements. However, there is no support for [this approach] in the EPC. Rather, the EPC provides for a mandatory examination with respect to all the requirements of the EPC before a patent can be granted. It is only when the ED is of the opinion that all requirements that are to be examined are fulfilled that it may arrange for a grant. In this context, it has to be noted that the EPO has to guarantee the interests of both the applicant and the public and that the public must be able to rely on the fact that it actually does. The fact that it often happens that prior art that has not been taken account of during examination proceedings, for various reasons, is cited in opposition proceedings does not alter this duty. The very fact that the opportunity to file an opposition against a granted patent is offered to any person emphasises the interest of the public that only valid rights be maintained and shows that the applicant cannot decide on the requirements of the EPC that are to be used in the examination of its application.

Moreover the requirement of novelty with respect to A 54(3) prior art is not of secondary importance, as the applicant appears to believe. Rather, the requirement of lack of novelty with respect to A 54(3) prior art constitutes both a ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(a) and a ground for revocation pursuant to A 138(1)(a).

[3.2] The argument of the appellant based on A 93(2), which expressly stipulates that the EP application shall be published at the same time as the specification of the EP when the decision to grant the patent becomes effective before the expiry of the 18-month period of eighteen months from the date of filing, cannot succeed either.

As a matter of fact, A 93(2) only regulates the possibility of granting a patent before the expiration of the 18 months. Even if the relevant Travaux préparatoires, the decision T 276/99 cited by the appellant or the Guidelines A-VI 1.1 are taken into account, this provision does not state that the applicant is entitled to having the patent granted at a time and under conditions of its choice. Therefore, the grant of a patent before the expiration of said period is not excluded, provided the ED has reached the conviction that the application satisfies all the requirements of the EPC. However, as this was not the case here, the possibility of granting a patent before the expiration of the 18-month period, which is mentioned in A 93(2), is out of the question. In this context the Board does not see any contradiction between the provisions of A 93(2) and A 97(1).

[3.3] Finally, the appellant points out that to a large extent the EPO was already aware of the unpublished prior rights pursuant to A 54(3) before the 18-month period had expired. As far as PCT applications were concerned, 18 months after their filing or priority date, respectively, it was not established whether they would enter into the European phase within 31 month after their filing or priority date, respectively, and, therefore, become prior art at all. It was only at that later date that a translation was available, without which the contents of PCT applications of e.g. Japanese or Chinese origin – and, as a consequence, their relevance for the novelty assessment – could not be determined.

The Board cannot endorse this point of view.  According to A 153(5), in connection with R 165, international applications filed under the PCT constitute potential A 54(3) prior art. If the EPO is not in charge of their treatment during the international phase, then they are only available to the Office after their publication, because the EPO acting as Designated Office does not make use of the possibility of systematic early transmission under Article 13(1) PCT. Thus it is only 18 months after the filing or priority date, respectively, that the ED can have a complete picture of potential prior rights. If under these circumstances it reaches the conviction that the subject-matter of the claims to be examined is novel, then it may issue a R 71(3) communication, without there being any need to wait for a complete translation or an effective entry of the prior international applications into the European phase. To this extent the practice of the EPO not to proffer the possibility of a grant earlier than 18 months after the filing or priority date, respectively is quite understandable under said circumstances.

[4] Moreover, the Board wishes to point out that according to A 99(1) the nine-month time limit for filing an opposition is triggered by the publication of the mention of the grant of the EP in the EP Bulletin. If this moment was situated well before the end of the 18-month period pursuant to A 93(1), then the prior art pursuant to A 54(3) that is relevant for the granted patent would not be completely available to the public at the time of grant. Potentially novelty-destructive prior art would only emerge during the time limit for filing an opposition although it might be relevant in view of the ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(a). This would significantly complicate the assessment of the validity of the patent by third parties, and, consequently, their decision whether an opposition should be filed. In the worst case scenario the time limit for filing an appeal could expire before all A 54(3) prior rights were publicly available, which would constitute a considerable systematic disadvantage and would run counter to the intentions of the legislator regarding opposition proceedings, which have been mentioned under point [3.1]. […]

The appeal is dismissed.

NB: The Board has also prepared take-away headnotes:

When the ED refuses a request that is limited in time (zeitlich gebunden) then it has to allow for a separate appeal if this is the only way to remedy any adverse effect (see point [2.2]).

The decision whether the requirements of the EPC are fulfilled and whether the patent may be granted lies exclusively with the competent ED (see point [3.1]).

I find this decision quite stimulating. I personally agree with the legal conclusions of the Board, but I also find the applicant's criticism of the Guidelines to be justified: for some mysterious reason, A 93(2) appears to envisage the possibility of a grant before the 18-month time limit, whereas the Guidelines seem to prohibit it. This has a slight ultra vires flavour.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German) or have a look at the file wrapper, just click here.

Saturday, 16 March 2013

T 1413/08 – There Are Alternatives


Claims 1 and 2 on file in this examination appeal case read (in English translation):
1. A replaceable liquid filter, particularly for the lubricating oil of an internal combustion engine, comprising a substantially cup-shaped housing (12) with a concentrically disposed outlet opening (17) for the filtered liquid and at least one inlet opening (16) for liquid to be filtered, and
a filter element (18) disposed in a sealing manner between the inlet opening (16) and the outlet opening (17), wherein the housing (12) is connected to a top plate (14), and the top plate (14) is connected to an end plate (13), characterised in that the top plate (14)
encloses a displacement space (24) which is disposed in a feed chamber in a part which mates with the replaceable liquid filter, so that the inlet opening (16) in the top plate (14) is disposed in the area of the displacement space (24), wherein a backflow check valve (26) is disposed in the area of the displacement space (24), such that liquid cannot leak from the replaceable liquid filter (10) when the filter is detached.

2. A replaceable liquid filter, particularly for the lubricating oil of an internal combustion engine, comprising a substantially cup-shaped housing (12) with a concentrically disposed outlet opening (17) for the filtered liquid and at least one inlet opening (16) for liquid to be filtered, and a filter element (18) disposed in a sealing manner between the inlet opening (16) and the outlet opening (17), wherein the housing (12) is connected to a top plate (14), and the top plate (14) is connected to an end plate (13), characterised in that a volume contour (35), preferably made of metal, is connected to the end plate (13) and the top plate (14), which comprises the inlet opening (16) on the one hand and extends into the cylinder head (11) on the other hand, thereby forming a displacement space (24), wherein a backflow check valve (26) is disposed in the area of the displacement space (24), such that liquid cannot leak from the replaceable liquid filter (10) when the filter is detached from the cylinder head (11). (my emphasis)
The Board inter alia had to decide whether it was justified to have two independent product claims.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[4] The Board is of the opinion that the subject-matter of independent product claims 1 and 2 define alternative solutions for the problem defined under point [3.3] [i.e. to provide a replaceable liquid filter where the amount of liquid that is released when the filter is disassembled is reduced]. As in particular the characterising apparatus parts according to these alternative solutions are different and do not correspond to each other, apart from their suitability to solve the problem, the Board can accept that it is inappropriate to cover the alternatives by a single claim. Thus the situation corresponds to one of the exceptions provided in R 43(2)(c) according to which the European patent application may contain more than one independent claim of the same category.

Moreover, the inventions according to claim 1 or 2 have the technical relationship that is required by R 44. It is expressed in the corresponding particular technical features which characterise the subject-matter of claims 1 and 2, respectively and which define a contribution which the respective claimed invention makes over the prior art.

Thus the requirement of unity of invention is fulfilled (A 82).

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Friday, 15 March 2013

T 1785/10 – Worthy Of Trust


In this case the Board had to decide whether technical drawing D8 had been made available to the public before the effective date of the opposed patent.

Click to enlarge

*** Translation of the German original ***

Request for a hearing of witnesses

[2.1] In a letter dated November 5, 2012, the [opponent] requested that the witnesses Arne Hermsen and Olaf Brockmann be heard. These witnesses had already been proposed in the notice of opposition dated November 13, 2008, but the Opposition Division had not heard them. The Board is of the opinion that – because of the circumstances of the alleged disclosure, in particular of D8, without any obligation to maintain secrecy – it is appropriate to hear the witnesses under A 117(1)(d).

[2.2] During the oral proceedings (OPs) before the Board, the [patent proprietor] requested the Board not to hear the witnesses. However, all the arguments presented by the [patent proprietor] in this context did not concern the question of whether a hearing would make sense, but the assessment of the written evidence already before the Board.

[2.3] Thus the Board decided to hear the witnesses Arne Hermsen and Olaf Brockmann on the assertion of the [opponent] according to which documents D8 and D9 had been made available to representatives of the Seondo company in May 1996 without there having been any obligation to maintain secrecy.

The status of document D8 as prior art

[3.1] During the OPs held on December 8, 2012, the Board has heard the witnesses Hermsen and Brockmann, both of which are employees of the [opponent]. The witnesses have described the circumstances under which the documents which are referred to as D8 and D9 in these proceedings were made available to representatives of the Korean company Seondo in early 1996.

[3.2] It all began with a round trip to various countries of Southeast Asia of the chief marketing director of the [opponent], Dr Voss, towards the end of 1995. The purpose of this trip was to establish new commercial contacts in order to strengthen the then rather weak commercial relationships to companies in these regions. It is in this context that a contact to the Korean company Seondo was established. This company was then dealing with a project of the state-owned Korean energy supplier KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation). This project concerned the installation of 25.8 kV switchboards. In January 1996 there was a first meeting with representatives of the Seondo company, in the course of which the technical options that the [opponent] could offer were presented, i.e. purely cast resin insulated transformers, which were part of the standard production, as well as metal-encased transformers, none of which satisfied Seondo. The [opponent] was asked to prepare a proposal that was in line with the needs of Seondo and that would also be approved by KEPCO. This is what happened; finally drawing D9 was sent as a proposal solution to Korea. In March Seondo then asked [the opponent] to present this design with a primary circuit fuse (primärseitige Sicherung), which resulted in drawing EKM-Ps-96/08 being sent to Korea. However, Seondo sent the feed-back that KEPCO would not approve this solution because the device was too voluminous. There was a further meeting in May where a solution was sought in collaboration with Seondo, because the [opponent] was very much interested in concluding a deal. During this conversation the drawing referred to as D8 (drawing EKM-Ps-96/08 with handwritten remarks) was used as a basis for the discussions with Seondo. Finally a different technical solution was found and then also approved by KEPCO; however, only few of the corresponding devices were ordered and delivered. There was no concern of secrecy or confidentiality during the whole negotiations; the representatives of the [opponent] had not even considered this [issue].

[3.3] The Board is of the opinion that this factual situation is established on the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses Hermsen and Brockmann. Their statements corresponded to each other as to the core issues insofar as the factual situation was the same. The witnesses are consistent and plausibly describe the attempts of the [opponent] to gain a foothold on the Asian market, to adapt the existing offer and to tailor it to the needs of potential customers. In this context the approval of the product by the state-owned energy supplier KEPCO was always an underlying matter of concern. The statements are also consistent with the contents of the few documents on file regarding this context, i.e. D10, D11, D12, and D15.

[3.4] The arguments of the [patent proprietor] directed against the trustworthiness of the witness statements are not suitable for raising doubt on the trustworthiness of the witnesses or the credibility of their assertions.

[3.4.1] The [patent proprietor] first pointed out that the events mentioned by the witnesses had occurred more than 16 years earlier and expressed doubts that somebody could actually remember events belonging to the professional sphere so long after they had occurred. In this context the witness Hermsen has declared that this project had been his first big project in Southeast Asia, that he had put a great amount of time and energy into it and that it finally had ended in a disappointing manner because only few devices had been sold. The Board finds this declaration to be plausible. It is understandable that somebody would remember a big project at the beginning of his professional career which has had such an outcome, even after many years.

[3.4.2] The Board does not consider the alleged disagreement between the date 27.02.96 mentioned on D8 and the assertions of the witnesses to be a contradiction. Rather, this date confirms that the drawing EKM-Ps-96/08 was made by the technicians of the [opponent] on the company’s own initiative and not as a reaction to the invitation on behalf of Seondo (see also D12) received in March 1996. That this date is correct is also confirmed in D16.

[3.4.3] The Board does not attach much importance to the alleged disagreement regarding the handwritten remark on document D10. This is a minor issue that can hardly be clarified any more and that does not raise doubts regarding the declarations of the witnesses.

[3.4.4] Nor does the Board attach any importance to the fact that the [opponent] later filed an application (D7) which also contains the solution shown in D8. The witness Brockmann has declared in this context that he did not know the reasons [for this filing]; it was not part of his duties to decide on what would be the object of patent applications. In this context the Board notes that one can imagine many reasons why something that is not patentable from the start would be the object of a patent application, even if the applicant is well aware of the situation. However, such considerations are merely speculative and are not suitable for raising doubts regarding the statements of the witnesses.

[3.5] Thus the Board holds that the factual situation was such that the existence of a secrecy agreement was rather unlikely. This is because the present situation does not correspond to a collaboration between two companies in view of the development of a new product but to sales negotiations the first purpose of which was to tailor a product so that it would fit the expectations of the customer. The main issue was to create the basis for doing business at all. In this context the Board notes that a secrecy agreement, if such an agreement had been desired, would only have made sense if KEPCO had been included as well, because KEPCO had to examine and approve the design. However, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to include this [organism].

[3.6] If, according to the declarations of the witnesses, there was no explicit secrecy agreement, and if, considering the circumstances, such an agreement was not to be expected, then there is even less reason to assume a “tacit” secrecy agreement. The fact that D8 and D9 mention the DIN34 (cf. D17) cannot alter this conclusion. Thus the Board holds that documents D8 and D9 were part of the state of the art at the priority date.

The claimed subject-matter was then found to lack novelty and the patent was revoked.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.