Showing posts with label Grounds for opposition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Grounds for opposition. Show all posts

Monday, 4 November 2013

T 1297/11 – Mind Your Words


Admissibility of the ground of lack of novelty

[2.1] In its notice of opposition, the opponent requested revocation of the patent as a whole under A 100(a) for lack of novelty and inventive step.

[2.2] It is stated in the minutes of the oral proceedings (OPs) before the opposition division (OD) that, at the start of the OPs, the OD asked the opponent “whether he would be further pursuing the novelty objection raised in the Notice of Opposition” and that “the Opponent replied that he was dropping his novelty objection, preferring to move immediately to the question of the presence of inventive step” […].

[2.3] The board considers that, by way of this declaration, the opponent expressly renounced its challenge to the patent on the ground of lack of novelty.

The ground of lack of novelty is thus a fresh ground of opposition which cannot be considered in the appeal proceedings, since the proprietor […] objected to its re-introduction (see G 10/91).

[2.4] The OD also understood this declaration to mean that the ground of lack of novelty was withdrawn, since the appealed decision is silent with respect to novelty. In fact, the OD held that the parties agreed that the subject-matter of claim 1 differed from A2 only in that the longitudinal was supported by the projections […].

[2.5] [The opponent] did not contest the correctness of the minutes but rather the above interpretation of its declaration. [The opponent] argued that its declaration just meant that, to shorten the OPs, the opponent had preferred to move directly to the question of inventive step and not to argue against novelty orally, whereby the opponent had reserved its right to present its novelty objection if need be. Thus, according to [the opponent], the above declaration was a conditional withdrawal of its novelty objection and not a binding withdrawal. In fact, the declaration being open to interpretation, the OD should have clarified whether or not the opponent abandoned the ground of lack of novelty.

This argument is not convincing. On its ordinary and plain reading the above declaration by the opponent made it clear that the opponent dropped, i.e. abandoned, its objection of lack of novelty. Thus, no further clarification was required by the OD.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Friday, 16 August 2013

T 208/11 – Just Pondering


This decision deals with an allegedly late-filed ground for opposition.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2.1] According to its own statements, the [opponent] has raised the ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(c) for the first time during the oral proceedings (OPs) before the Opposition Division (OD). However, this submission is not mentioned in the impugned decision or in the minutes of the OPs. The [opponent] has requested a correction of the minutes, but the OD has dismissed this request in its communication dated December 14, 2010. This communication shows that the OD was of the opinion that the [opponent] had neither made a “formal” request nor submitted detailed arguments supporting [the ground for opposition] and that it was for that reason that it decided to dismiss the request.

[2.2] According to the declaration in lieu of oath by Dr A. (D33), who had accompanied the professional representative to the OPs, “the request was dismissed by the chairman and the introduction of the ground for opposition into the proceedings was not admitted”. The representative of the [patent proprietor], who had also taken part in the OPs, has not contested that the [opponent] had raised the new ground for opposition. He only declared that he could not recall the details of the discussion.

[2.3] In view of this situation, considering the facts and the evidence, the Board of appeal has come to the conclusion that the ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(c) has been raised during the OPs but that the OD has exercised its discretional power pursuant to A 114(2) and decided not to admit this objection.

[2.4] The argument of the [patent proprietor] according to which it was not possible to introduce new grounds for opposition after the expiry of the time limit for filing an opposition is not in line with the established case law of the Boards of appeal (see G 9/91 [16]), according to which under certain circumstances the OD may, in application of A 114(1), consider a ground for opposition raised by the opponent after the expiry of the time limit for filing an opposition or even introduce a new ground of its own motion. It is true that in the present case the OD has not made use of this possibility, but this does not alter the fact that the new ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(c) was adduced during the opposition proceedings and, therefore, does not constitute a new ground that had been put forth for the first time during the appeal proceedings (cf. T 986/93 [2.4]).

[2.5] In its decision G 9/91 mentioned above the Enlarged Board of appeal has defined the conditions for an examination of grounds for opposition invoked after expiry of the time limit for filing an opposition by stating that there had to be prima facie relevant reasons for the grounds for opposition to be relevant and [that those reasons] would make it impossible to maintain the patent in its entirety or partly.

In the present case the amendment concerns a feature that is not disclosed in the original application as filed. The [opponent] has provided credible reasons […] that there is no support for this amendment in the application. The Board is of the opinion that the ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(c) to be prima facie very relevant.

The Board may take into account a ground for opposition which the OD has not admitted in application of A 114(2) if [the Board] is of the opinion that the OD has exercised its discretion wrongly (cf. T 986/93 [2.4] and T 620/08 [3.4]). In the present case neither the impugned decision nor the minutes of the OPs before the OD contain indications regarding the new ground for opposition or its dismissal, so that it is not clear according to which criteria the OD has exercised its discretion. The communication […] dismissing the requested correction of the minutes only refers to formal criteria such as a corresponding request or a lack of substantiation. It does not mention factual criteria that led to the dismissal of the new ground. Apparently the OD has not examined the question as to whether the new ground is to be considered prima facie relevant or not. Thus the decision of the OD not to take into account the new ground was not taken in a correct way.

In view of these circumstances and the fact that the Board considers the new ground for opposition to be prima facie very relevant, this ground is taken account of in the proceedings. For the sake of efficient proceedings and with the approval of the parties the Board has decided to decide itself on this ground within the framework of its powers under A 111(1).

As you might have guessed, the requests were found not to comply with A 100(c) / A 123(2) and the appeal was dismissed.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Friday, 5 July 2013

T 1142/09 – Fresh Indeed


In this appeal against the rejection of an opposition, Board 3.3.05 had to deal with a late filed ground for opposition: lack of inventive step.

I found the decision interesting because it limits/qualifies to some extent the application of the principle set out in T 131/01.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1.5.1] The ground for opposition that the claims lacked inventive step was raised after the [expiration of] the nine-month time limit for filing an opposition and submitted when document D2 was filed on February 10, 2009. The [opponent] only submitted arguments concerning the lack of novelty with respect to D2. It added the remark that in view of the same facts and reasons the subject-matter of the patent did not involve an inventive step.

The Opposition Division (OD) considered the ground for opposition that the claims lacked inventive step not to have been substantiated and, therefore, did not introduce it into the proceedings.

It has to be examined whether the decision of the OD not to introduce the fresh ground for opposition [that the claims lacked] inventive step into the proceedings was correct.

According to T 1002/92 the examination of the prima facie relevance of a fresh ground for opposition presupposes that “facts and evidence” supporting this ground are submitted. “The mere stating of a fresh ground without any indication of the fresh facts, evidence and argument supporting it would obviously be inadmissible, either within or after expiry of the opposition period.” (see T 1002/92 [3.2])

In the present case [the opponent] did not submit any arguments regarding inventive step because, according to the [opponent], this would be self-contradictory in a situation where there had been a novelty objection based on the same document. T 131/01 is based on a similar case: both novelty and inventive step had been mentioned as grounds for opposition within the nine-month time limit for filing an opposition, but only the objection of [lack of] novelty had been substantiated. In this case the Board of appeal reached the conclusion that the examination of inventive step presupposed novelty, which was indeed contested by the opponent, and that in such a case it was not necessary to explain the objection of lack of inventive step in detail. If this objection is later on raised in detail, this did not amount to a fresh ground for opposition (see T 131/01 [3.1]).

However, the present situation is different. Here even the substantiation of the objection of [lack of] novelty was quite scanty, and, therefore, it is quite questionable whether the condition established in T 222/85 – according to which the contents of such notice have to be sufficient for the opponent’s case to be properly understood on an objective basis [headnote 2] – is satisfied. As in the present case – contrary to the case underlying T 131/01 – novelty has not been discussed in detail, the skilled person cannot understand which features could be relevant for inventive step in case the novelty objection was not successful.

The discussion of novelty in the letter dated February 10, 2009, does not contain any indications regarding the claims that are understood not to be novel, nor does it contain an analysis of the features of the claims. It is not explained (thematisiert) at all why and where the amounts indicated in the method according to claim 1 of the opposed patent or the parameters indicated in claim 7 of the opposed patent are (allegedly) disclosed in combination with the other features in D2. Thus the skilled person does not know to which claim the objection refers and which features are disclosed where.

Also, the supplementary written submission of February 10, 2009, does not explain differences with respect to the opposed patent, which is another difference with respect to the case underlying T 131/01 (see also T 131/01 [3.2]).

In order for a ground for opposition to be considered to be substantiated, the OD and the patent proprietor also have to be able to review the ground for opposition that has been invoked without further investigations (see T 453/87 [2.2]). This condition is not fulfilled in the present case for the ground for opposition that the claims lack inventive step.

To sum up, [the Board] notes that the letter dated February 10, 2009 is not suitable for allowing [the Board and the patent proprietor] to understand the argument of the [opponent] regarding inventive step.

Thus the ground for opposition [that the claims lack] inventive step is to be considered unsubstantiated and, in line with T 1002/92, the prima facie relevance of the patent document D2 does not have to be examined. The decision of the OD in this respect is correct.

The OD has decided to introduce D2 into the proceedings because this document was considered to be more relevant for the question of novelty than D1. However, this does not mean that D2 was considered to be prima facie relevant in all respects (insgesamt).

Thus the ground for opposition [according to which the claims lack] inventive step is a fresh ground for opposition.

As the patent proprietor has not given its approval for the examination of the ground for opposition [that the claims lack] inventive step, this ground cannot be examined (see G 10/91 [18]).

Thus lack of novelty was the sole ground for opposition to be examined.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 28 February 2013

T 567/10 – Half A Loaf Is Better Than None


What can be done during appeal proceedings when a claim of the opposed patent lacks novelty but novelty is not a ground for opposition, and the patent proprietor objects to it being introduced?

The headnote of G 7/95 says that

“in a case where a patent has been opposed under A 100(a) on the ground that the claims lack an inventive step in view of documents cited in the notice of opposition, the ground of lack of novelty based upon A 52(1), A 54 is a fresh ground for opposition and accordingly may not be introduced into the appeal proceedings without the agreement of the patentee. However, the allegation that the claims lack novelty in view of the closest prior art document may be considered in the context of deciding upon the ground of lack of inventive step”.
This decision presents us with such a case.

Claim 1 as granted (and maintained by the Opposition Division) read:
A sealed package (1) for pourable food products, having at least one removable portion (4), and a closable opening device (2) in turn comprising a frame (5) defining a pour opening (6) and fixed to said package (1) about said removable portion (4), a cap (7) fitted to said frame (5) to close said pour opening (6) and movable to free the pour opening (6), and pull-off opening means (8) housed in said frame (5) and comprising a rigid plate (9) attached to said removable portion (4) and extractable from the frame (5), by pulling action, together with at least part of said removable portion (4); characterized by also comprising a pull-tab (16) of sheet material interposed between said removable portion (4) and said plate (9) and attached to both.

[1.2.1] All figures of D1 show an opening device 1 applied on a packaging container 2 of the type which is manufactured from a continuous laminated web material, with a core of paper or paperboard to which thermoplastic layers and possibly aluminium are laminated […].

[1.2.2] In […] D1 it is further stated that
“[o]n the upper side of the packaging container 2, a hole 3 or a hole indication has been made. This hole 3 or hole indication is normally covered from beneath by a thermoplastic strip for purposes of realising a liquid-tight package. At the same time, the outer side of the package is provided with a corresponding outer strip 4. Normally, these work stages are already carried out on production of the packaging material and the packaging material is delivered ready to the filling machines, provided with the above described hole 3 with each respective covering strip”.
[1.2.3] The above-mentioned passage of D1 defines that when the packaging material is delivered to the filling machines the hole 3 is already provided with an inner thermoplastic strip covering said hole 3 from the inside and with an outer strip 4 covering said hole 3 from the outside. This means that the two strips have to be fixed to each other so that when pull is exerted on the outer strip 4 in order to unseal the hole 3 said outer strip 4 detaches from the outside of the packaging material removing at the same time the thermoplastic strip covering the hole 3 on the inside. Otherwise an additional tearing action for the lower thermoplastic strip would be needed for freeing the hole 3, which is nowhere described in D1 and would not make any sense.

[1.2.4] The outer strip 4 further has a free unsealed portion 5 which is attached to the surface area 11 of the heel 10, see column 3, lines 8 to 11 and column 4, lines 10 to 30. Through this attachment the inner thermoplastic strip covering the hole 3 on the inside is connected via the free unsealed portion 5 and the outer strip 4 to the surface area 11 of the heel 10. In the closed stage shown in figure 9 the surface area 11 of the heel 10 is positioned within the space defined by the pouring element/frame 7.


In the nearly complete opening stage shown in figures 11 and 12 the heel 10 is extracted from the element/frame 7 with the main portion of the strip 4, obviously together with the main portion of the inner thermoplastic strip attached to it.


[1.2.5] Accordingly, D1 discloses in its embodiment shown in figures 8 to 12 (using the terminology of claim 1 of the patent in suit) a sealed package (packaging container 2 and opening arrangement 1) for pourable food products, having at least one removable portion (the thermoplastic strip covering the hole 3 from the inside), and a closable opening device (1) in turn comprising a frame (7) defining a pour opening and fixed to said package about said removable portion, a cap (9) fitted to said frame to close said pour opening and movable to free the pour opening, and pull-off opening means (10) housed in said frame and comprising a rigid plate (11) attached to said removable portion and extractable from the frame by pulling action, together with at least part of said removable portion, and also comprising a pull-tab (4,5) of sheet material interposed between said removable portion and said plate and attached to both.

[1.2.6] The Board cannot follow the [patent proprietor’s] arguments, that since
a) in claim 1 of the main request the pull-off opening means is listed as an element of the opening device in addition to the frame and the cap,
b) the whole disclosure of the patent in suit only refers to solutions having the pull-off opening means separate from the cap, and
c) the description does not contain any information hinting that the cap and the rigid plate of the pull-off opening means could be incorporated into one single structural element,
the person skilled in the art would not understand the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request to be also encompassing a solution having the rigid plate as an integral part of the cap, for the following reasons.

[1.2.7] Neither claim 1 of the main request nor the description of the patent in suit excludes the pull-off opening means being part of the cap. Moreover, the fact that in claim 1 the pull-off opening means, the frame and the cap are listed as three distinct elements does not exclude that these elements may be interconnected with each other or even that they may be integral with each other. Only the specific embodiment depicted in the figures shows specific pull-off opening means 8 being non-integral with the cap. This, however, cannot have a limiting effect as far as it concerns the pull-off opening means claimed in claim 1.

[1.2.8] Since according to point [1.2.5] above the sealed package according to the embodiment of D1 shown in its figures 8 to 12 discloses all the features of the sealed package of claim 1, the sealed package according to claim 1 cannot involve an inventive step.

[1.2.9] The Board has to take recourse to the above unusual formulation since the original opposition was only based on the ground of opposition of lack of inventive step based on D1 with application of the teaching of D2 being obvious. In application of decision G 7/95 [7.2], the Board had to decide the question whether D1 is disclosing or not all the features of claim 1 as a question of inventive step, since the [patent proprietor] did not give its consent to the introduction of the ground of lack of novelty, raised by the [opponent] for the first time on appeal.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 12 February 2013

T 1306/08 – Let Us Distinguish


[3.1] The respondent argued that A 100(c) had not been cited as a ground for opposition and, making reference to decision G 9/91, concluded that the board was not competent to examine whether or not the amendments are in accordance with the requirements of A 123(2).

The board wishes to emphasise that, in so far as subject-matter of the European patent extending beyond the content of the application as filed is concerned, a distinction has to be made between the ground for opposition according to A 100(c), which concerns amendments made in the pre-grant phase, and amendments made in the course of opposition or appeal proceedings.

Regarding the latter alternative, decision G 9/91 [19] notes:
“In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should finally be confirmed that in case of amendments of the claims or other parts of a patent in the course of opposition or appeal proceedings, such amendments are to be fully examined as to their compatibility with the requirements of the EPC (e.g. with regard to the provisions of A 123(2) and (3)).”
As the objections raised by the appellant concern subject-matter amended in the course of the opposition and appeal proceedings, the board concludes that it is competent to examine them.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 4 December 2012

T 2233/09 – Objects In A Drawer


The opponent filed an appeal after the patent had been maintained in amended form.

In what follows the Board deals with the admissibility of new grounds for opposition:

[1.1] The [opponent] raised in the statement of the grounds of appeal an additional ground of opposition, namely lack of disclosure according to A 100(b) EPC 1973.

However, A 100(b) EPC 1973 was not one of the grounds of oppositions raised by the Opponent within nine months of the publication of the mention of the grant of the patent, as required by A 99(1) EPC in conjunction with R 76(2)(c).

Moreover, it is established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO that new grounds of opposition not submitted within said time limit of nine months can be introduced into the appeal proceedings only with the consent of the Patent Proprietor (see G 10/91 [3]).

Since in the present case the patent proprietor did not consent to the introduction of this new ground of opposition […], it is to be rejected as inadmissible.

[1.2] The [opponent] argued in the statement of the grounds of appeal that claim 1 extended beyond the content of the original parent application of which the patent in suit is a divisional.

The Board notes that A 100(c) EPC 1973 was also not one of the grounds of opposition raised by the opponent within the time limit of nine months, as required by A 99(1) in conjunction with R 76(2) (c).

Moreover, even though the granted claim 1 had been modified during the opposition proceedings before the Opposition Division and the compliance of the amended claims with A 123(2) was considered in the decision under appeal, the present objection, which was never raised at first instance, does not concern an extension beyond the content of the application as originally filed, i.e. the compliance with the requirement of A 123(2), but a different legal ground, namely an extension with respect to the original parent application of which the patent in suit is a divisional, i.e. a compliance with the requirement of A 76(1) EPC 1973.

Therefore, it concerns a legal objection which is equally covered by A 100(c) EPC 1973 but is different from A 123(2).

The Board notes in this respect that the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO decided in G 7/95 [6, 7.1] with respect to the different legal grounds covered by A 100(a) EPC 1973 that legal grounds covered by the dispositions of A 100(a) which have not been substantiated in due time can only be introduced into the proceedings with the consent of the patent proprietor.

The Board thus finds that the same principle must apply similarly to A 100(c) 1973 EPC, which concerns both the extension beyond the content of the original application (A 123(2)) as well as, in case of a divisional application, the extension beyond the content of the original parent application (A 76(1) EPC 1973).

Since in the present case no objections with respect to A 76(1) EPC 1973 had been substantiated during the opposition proceedings, such a new legal ground can be introduced in the appeal proceedings only with the consent of the patent proprietor.

Since, the patent proprietor did not consent to the introduction of this new ground of opposition […], it is to be rejected as inadmissible.

[1.3] For the reasons mentioned above the decision T 922/94 [2.2], cited by the [opponent], referring to the power of the Board to consider the compliance with the requirement of A 123(2) of claims amended during the opposition proceedings, cannot apply to the present case.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

NB: The decision was also discussed on Le blog du droit européen des brevets (here).

Tuesday, 20 November 2012

T 1592/09 – Because It’s There


This is an appeal of the opponent after the patent had been maintained in amended form by the Opposition Division (OD).

In what follows, the Board discusses the question of whether the ground of insufficiency of disclosure was already in the proceedings.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2.1] In the present case the objection of the opponent regarding insufficient diclosure was discussed by both parties several times during the proceedings before the OD (see the minutes of the oral proceedings […]).

[2.2] In its decision G 10/91 [16] the Enlarged Board of appeal has acknowledged that an OD may, in application of A 114(1), examine a belated ground for opposition that is not covered by the notice of opposition. However, this examination requires that, in a first step, the OD, of its own motion [or] upon request by the opponent or a third party, admits and thus introduces the ground for opposition into the opposition proceedings, in conformity with the criteria for relevance given in G 10/91 [16]. If this has happened, the OD will, in a second step, carry out the examination and thus “of course decide whether such ground of opposition prejudices the maintenance of the opposed patent”, see G 1/95 [5.2].

[2.3] The minutes of the [oral] proceedings and the impugned decision do not contain any explicit statement in respect of whether the late filed ground for opposition of insufficient disclosure was admitted and thus introduced into the proceedings or not. In such a situation the introduction of this ground for opposition can result from the fact that the reasons for the decision contain substantiated statements regarding that matter.

[2.4] In point 3.3 of its decision the OD refers, in an unambiguous and sufficient way, to the legal and factual framework of the ground for opposition according to which the skilled person can “can carry out” (thereby implicitly mentioning [the German version of] A 100(b)) a waterstop device according to claim 1 having the claimed features (claims 1 and 4 as granted) without exercising any inventive activity and that in this context “the proportions … can be adapted … by the skilled person … by trial and error” (i.e. the submission of facts and evidence for justifying the enablement).

It is irrelevant in this context whether, as argued by the [patent proprietor], the treatment of enablement was carried out under the heading “Inventive step”, because an appealable decision is defined by the substance of its content and not by its form.

[2.5] Thus the Board comes to the conclusion that the ground for opposition under A 100 (b) already was in the proceedings. Therefore, the examination of this ground for opposition by the Board does not constitute a “fresh” ground within the meaning of the opinion G 10/91 of the Enlarged Board of appeal, cf. G 1/95 [5.3]).

[2.6] Moreover, in the present case it implicitly follows from the examination of the belated ground for opposition in point 3.3 of the decision on the opposition that [the OD] apparently had been found to be prima facie sufficiently relevant and, therefore, had been – rightly –admitted and introduced into the proceedings beforehand, in compliance with the criteria for relevance [defined] in G 10/91 [16].

The fact that the margin of discretion of the OD for admitting and introducing belated grounds for opposition apparently was applied in a correct way in the present case was not discussed, let alone challenged, by the [patent proprietor] during the appeal proceedings. It only had discussed whether the ground for opposition of insufficient disclosure indeed was part of the decision of the OD and, therefore, of the proceedings.

Also, the statements of the parties on insufficiency of disclosure, as recorded in the minutes of the [oral] proceedings before the OD held on March 20, 2009, do not contain any hint that the introduction of this ground for opposition – in contrast to the introduction of new documents, see point 3.8 of the minutes – was disputed by the [patent proprietor] but had nevertheless – perhaps wrongly – taken place when the decision on the opposition was made. Point 5.7 of the minutes only contains a neutral statement of the [patent proprietor] according to which “insufficiency of disclosure was to be considered as a late filed ground for opposition”. During the [oral] proceedings before the Board the [patent proprietor] had another opportunity of commenting this issue.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Saturday, 6 October 2012

T 1959/09 – Not Fresh


This decision contains an obiter dictum on fresh grounds which is a useful reminder of the relevant case law:

[6] [… T]he Board notes in passing that there appears to be no basis in G 10/91 for the general assumption that a ground of opposition raised against an independent claim may not subsequently be raised by the opponent against another independent claim, falling within the scope of the opposition, since otherwise a new ground for opposition would thereby be introduced. T 514/04 does not mention and elucidate the relevant passages in G 10/91 which support this assumption. Actually, G 10/91 appears to regard a new ground for opposition as being a “ground for opposition not covered by the statement pursuant to R 55 (c) EPC” (1973) (see G 9/91 [15-16]; G 10/91 and G 9/91 relate to consolidated proceedings), no indication being given in that decision which would justify the inference that this should be construed far more broadly as meaning any ground of opposition in respect of a specific given claim which was not covered by the statement pursuant to R 55(c) EPC 1973 (see in this respect T 1523/08 [2.1]). The Board takes the view that, as the present case abundantly demonstrates, the aforementioned assumption cannot be generally valid, but rather depends on the nature of each specific case under consideration.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 7 June 2012

T 620/08 - The Relic


When grounds for opposition are raised for the first time after the time limit for filing oppositions has expired, the Opposition Division (OD) has some discretion not to admit them. However, even then a Board of appeal can later admit this very ground – even if the patent proprietor refuses its approval – if it comes to the conclusion that the OD had not exercised its discretion in a reasonable way.

The present decision not only reminds us of these principles but also has some interesting statements on how to deal with definitions provided in the description of a patent.

[3.1] The [opponent]’s opposition was originally only based on the ground of lack of inventive step. With letter dated 6 July 2007 the opponent filed documents D3-D7 and argued that the subject-matter of the patent in suit lacked novelty in view of documents D3, D4 and D7.

[3.2] The OD decided not to admit the late-filed ground for opposition, since it found that none of the documents D3, D4 or D7 was prima facie relevant for the question of novelty. In the decision under appeal, under the point “Novelty”, the OD set out in detail the reasons why it considered that the subject-matter of the patent in suit was novel over these documents, which then led to its decision not to admit the late-filed ground for opposition. The [opponent] challenged the finding of the OD with regard to document D7. The objection of lack of novelty over documents D3 and D4 was not maintained.

[3.3] The [patent proprietor] argued that since it was not admitted into the proceedings by the OD, the objection of lack of novelty was a fresh ground for opposition which could not be introduced without the agreement of the patentee and cited the decision G 7/95 in support of this argument. Approval was not given.

[3.4] According to the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal (see G 10/91 [headnote3] and G 7/95), fresh grounds for opposition may be considered in appeal proceedings only with the approval of the patentee. As can be derived from the Enlarged Board of Appeal’s argumentation G 10/91 [18], the term “fresh ground of opposition” means a ground which is relied upon for the first time in appeal proceedings (T 986/93 [2.3]). This, however, is not the case here. Novelty as a ground for opposition was relied upon and discussed during the opposition proceedings and forms a major part of the decision under appeal (T 986/93 [2.4]).

Furthermore, a Board of Appeal is at least not barred from considering a late-filed ground for opposition which has been disregarded by the OD pursuant to A 114(2), if it is of the opinion that the OD exercised its discretion wrongly in this respect (T 986/93 [headnote]). The procedural decision of an OD to disregard submissions forms an essential element of its decision-making process and as such belongs to the issues subject to review when the final decision of the OD is challenged on its merits (T 986/93 [2.4]).

[3.5] The OD considered that the moiety -NHC(=O)(CH2)(CH2)phenyl present in compounds 54a, 126, 129 or 130 did not fall within the definition of the residue R**(1) of claim 1 of the patent in suit, because the term “amino” was not to be construed broadly such as to encompass the aforementioned moiety.

In its reasoning the OD recognised that, in principle, “the claims should be read giving the words the meaning and scope which they normally have in the relevant art, unless, in particular cases, the description gives the words a special meaning by explicit definition or otherwise”. In this context, the OD also recognised already that paragraph [0055] of the patent in suit might be understood as giving the term “amino” such a special technical meaning.

Thus, the OD was already aware of the fact that, at first glance, lack of novelty over the disclosure of document D7 might be an issue, which, if established, could prejudice the maintenance of the patent in suit. It should thus have admitted this ground for opposition.

Nevertheless, the OD considered that the term “amino” had no such special technical meaning for two main reasons:

Firstly, the broad definition of amino in view of paragraph [0055] of the patent in suit would have made the more specific definitions in claim 1, like -N(C1-C3alkyl)-C(=O)(C1-C3 alkyl), -NH-C(=O)-NH-(C1-C3 alkyl), -NH-C(=O)-N(C1-C3alkyl)-C(=O)-NH(C1-C3 alkyl), C1-C3 alkylamino, etc., redundant, so that the skilled person attempting to make technical sense of the claim would expect that the term “amino” had its normal meaning.

Secondly, the originally filed application was directed to a very broad class of compounds and paragraph [0055] was related to said broad class. The skilled person reading the description and the considerably restricted claims would realise that paragraph [0055] was a “relic” of the originally filed description which did not apply to the restricted set of claims as granted.

[3.6] The OD’s first reason that the skilled person would understand that claim 1 would not contain at the same time a broad definition and a more specific definition encompassed by the broad definition is inconsistent with the facts. Claim 1 of the patent in suit obviously includes other examples for the simultaneous presence of broad and specific (i.e. redundant) terms, for example the term “-CF3” and the term “haloalkyl”. Other examples are the term “carboxy”, which refers to a group “-C(=O)O-”, and “carboxyl”, which refers to a group C(=O)OH, or “sulfonyl”, which refers to a group “-SO2-”, and “-SO2-(C1-C3)”. Thus, for the skilled person redundancy of terms is a feature of the present claims and no reason to attribute to a term a meaning other than that given to it in the patent in suit by explicit definition. Nor does the presence of redundant terms render present claim 1 technically meaningless.

The second reason of the OD is also not supported by the facts. It is not apparent at all from the patent in suit itself that paragraph [0055] should be understood as a “relic” of the original application which does not apply to the claims of the patent in suit. Under the heading “Brief Summary of the Invention” the patent in suit refers to the compounds according to claims 1 and 3. This section is followed by a section with the heading “Detailed Description of the Invention” which starts with a clear “Definition of Terms”, including the term “amino (see paragraphs [0016]-[0054]). Paragraph [0055] refers to substituents of the “above terms”, which the skilled person would understand as applying to all the terms mentioned in paragraphs [0016] to [0054]. There is nothing in the patent in suit indicating that this paragraph was to be ignored. Also, the skilled person wishing to establish what is disclosed in the patent in suit is not required to consider the application as filed or consult the file history of the patent. However, even if the skilled person had done so in the present case, all he would have learned was that the original value Q, which was defined as “one or more rings”, was restricted to a oxo-pyridine ring which could be unsubstituted or substituted by R**(1). This restriction did not concern the definition of the terms as set out in paragraphs [0016]-[0055]. This is also apparent in the fact that neither the applicant nor the Examining Division considered it necessary to restrict or amend the “Definition of Terms”.

[3.7] Thus, in view of the specific meaning of the terms given in the patent in suit, it appears to the Board that there are prima facie reasons for believing that the claimed subject-matter might not be novel over the disclosure of document D7. The Board therefore concludes that the OD did not exercise its discretion in a reasonable way and, therefore, erroneously decided to disregard novelty as ground for opposition. As a consequence, the Board is not barred from considering the issue of lack of novelty over document D7.

[3.8] Concerning novelty of the claimed subject-matter, the Board agrees with the OD’s opinion that the claims should be read giving the words the meaning and scope which they normally have in the relevant art, unless the description gives the words a special meaning by explicit definition. Being a legal document a patent may be its own dictionary. It may define technical terms and determine how a skilled person has to understand a specific word when used in the description or the claims. Thus, the description may give a word or an expression, even an unequivocally clear one, which has a generally accepted meaning, a different meaning than the generally accepted one by explicit definition (T 556/02 [5.3]; T 416/87 [5]; T 500/01 [6]).

[3.9] In the present case, the description of the patent in suit contains an entire section of over two pages with the heading “Definition of terms” at the beginning of the section with the heading “Detailed Description of the Invention” in which the meaning of the terms used in the patent in suit is explicitly defined (paragraphs [0016] to [0055]), including a definition of the terms “alkyl” and “amino”. It is, furthermore, made clear that these definitions apply throughout the complete patent specification, see the expression “the term … as used herein” in all the paragraphs [0016] to [0054]. Alkyl, for example, is defined as C1-C12 straight or branched saturated chain radicals, amino as NH2, both being optionally substituted (paragraphs [0016], [0040] and [0055] of the patent in suit).

It would, therefore, be clear for any skilled reader that in the present case the meaning of any of these terms used in the description or the claims may differ from the meaning the skilled person would normally attribute to them. The Board sees no reason in the present case to disregard these unambiguous and explicit definitions for a proper understanding of the claims and to consider instead the generally accepted definition of alkyl, i.e. a moiety with the formula CnH2n-1 with n being an integer >=1 and amino, i.e. NH2.

Accordingly, in the present case the specific definitions given in the description of the patent in suit will be taken into account in the examination of novelty over document D7.

Please note, however, that not all the Boards share this understanding of the role of definitions as you can see here or here. I hope that sooner or later a Board will refer the question to the Enlarged Board (although I am not convinced that this will happen).

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To have a look at the file wrapper, click here.

Thursday, 12 April 2012

T 1519/08 – Not Necessarily


The joint opponents filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to reject the opposition.

The opposition had been based on the ground of lack of inventive step.

I found the decision noteworthy because it contains interesting statements concerning an allegedly implicit ground for opposition and on claim interpretation.

Ground for opposition under A 100(c) EPC 1973

[3.1] The ground for opposition under A 100(c) EPC 1973 was raised by the joint appellants with a letter of 25 June 2008 […] after the expiry of the time limit laid down in A 99(1). It thus constitutes a fresh ground and was not admitted into the procedure by the OD […].

[3.2] The joint appellants held that a ground for opposition could also be implicit (decision T 455/94). In the present case, paragraph B1 of the notice of opposition concerned the definition of the invention according to claim 1 of the granted patent, whereas paragraph B1.1 dealt with the issue of lack of clarity of claim 1. The observation in paragraph B1 that paragraph [0006] of the granted patent was incorrect because claim 1 did not comprise an essential feature of the invention, namely “an array made up of a plurality of grouped stacks of sheets having cut out fluidic elements thereon”, should therefore be understood as implicitly relating to the ground for opposition of A 100(c) EPC 1973. It was held that it could be inferred from this observation that the general “array” of claim 1 included non-stacked arrangements of fluidic elements which were not originally disclosed.

In the Board’s view, this argument is not convincing because the observation in paragraph B1 mentioned above does not necessarily imply an objection under A 100(c) EPC 1973. Rather, it may be understood as an objection concerning an inconsistency between claim 1 and the description of the granted patent under A 84 EPC 1973 which, however, is not a ground for opposition.

[3.3] The joint appellants also submitted that the OD did not duly exercise its discretionary power to decide whether to admit the ground for opposition under A 100(c) EPC 1973 into the procedure, because it did not sufficiently deal with the arguments produced by the joint appellants (decision T 736/95). It could indeed be inferred from the minutes of the oral proceedings (OPs) of 27 June 2008 before the OD (paragraph 2.3) that this issue was only briefly dealt with, despite the fact that the interpretation of the term “array” was a recurrent theme throughout the whole opposition proceedings.

The Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) held in decision G 10/91 [headnote 1] that
“An OD or a Board of Appeal is not obliged to consider all the grounds for opposition referred to in A 100 EPC [1973], going beyond the grounds covered by the statement under R 55(c) EPC [1973]” (underlining added).
With particular regard to the opposition proceedings the EBA stated that
“In principle, the OD shall examine only such grounds for opposition which have been properly submitted and substantiated in accordance with A 99(1) [EPC 1973] in conjunction with R 55(c) EPC [1973]. Exceptionally, the OD may in application of A 114(1) EPC [1973] consider other grounds for opposition which, prima facie, in whole or in part would seem to prejudice the maintenance of the European patent” ([headnote 2]; underlining added).
In the present case, the OD, in the exercise of its discretionary power acknowledged in G 10/91, held that the ground under A 100(c) EPC 1973 was not prima facie relevant and therefore disregarded it […]. The Board does not have any criticism against the OD’s approach. The fact that in the OPs before the OD this issue was only briefly dealt with corresponds to a prima facie assessment and cannot, as such, be considered as a procedural deficiency.

With regard to the appeal proceedings the EBA unequivocally held that
“Fresh grounds for opposition may be considered in appeal proceedings only with the approval of the patentee” ([headnote 3]; underlining added).
In the present case, the respondent explicitly withheld its approval […].

[3.4] For these reasons, the ground for opposition under A 100(c) EPC 1973 is not admitted into the procedure.

As mentioned above, the Board also made an interesting statement on claim interpretation when discussing the objection of lack of inventive step against the main request:

Ground for opposition under A 100(a) EPC 1973 in connection with A 56 EPC 1973 …

[5.1] As a step preliminary to the assessment of whether the subject-matter of claim 1 of the granted patent is inventive, the question of how said claimed subject-matter should be understood was considered. The discussion specifically concerned the feature (a) which relates to “an array of fluidic elements, at least some of the fluidic elements comprising fluidic amplifiers, the array having a face plate and a back plate” (reference numerals omitted).

[5.1.1] An interpretation of the claimed subject-matter may be made by taking into account the whole context of the disclosure of the patent (decision T 467/02 [2.3]). The claimed expression “array of fluidic elements” is defined in column 6 (lines 1-4) of the granted patent by stating that “an array of fluidic elements will include several stacks, each of which has at least one, and preferably several, fluidic elements”. Moreover, with regard to the claimed “fluidic elements” it is noted that the description of the granted patent only discloses embodiments in which the fluidic elements are cut out of a sheet.

[5.1.2] On the other hand, an ambiguous text may be construed against the interest of the person responsible for drafting it, i.e. the respondent in the present case, and in favour of the person on whom it is legally imposed, i.e. the joint appellants as members of the public in the present case (decision T 151/05 [3.2.2]). This would plead for a wide interpretation as advocated by the joint appellants. Thereby, although a claim must not be interpreted in a way which is illogical or does not make any sense, the description cannot be used to give a different meaning to a claim feature which in itself imparts a clear credible technical teaching to the skilled reader (decision T 1018/02).

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 13 March 2012

T 1260/08 – Prima Facie Is Enough


Each of the two opponents filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the opposed patent in amended form.

On October 17, 2011, the Board summoned the parties to oral proceedings (OPS) to be held on December 20, 2011.

In a letter dated November 18, 2011, opponent 2 raised new grounds of revocation against the patent as maintained by the OD.

The Board would not admit those grounds into the proceedings, for the following reasons:

*** Translation of the French original ***

[2] In its letter of November 18, 2011, opponent 2 argues that the subject-matter of claim 1 as maintained extends beyond the content of the application as filed, and thereby violates A 100(c) EPC 1973. Even if the objection refers to the amendment of claim 1 carried out in the course of the opposition phase, which means that the case law of the Boards of appeal does not prohibit that such an objection be taken into account (see e.g. T 227/88 [3]; T 922/94 [2.2]), the Board nevertheless considers that this objection could most certainly have been filed at an earlier stage of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, as emphasized by the [patent proprietor], not only had this aspect not been mentioned during the opposition phase, but it had not even been raised by [opponent 2] in its statement of grounds of appeal.

Article 12(2) RPBA, however, stipulates that
“The statement of grounds of appeal and the reply shall contain a party’s complete case. They shall set out clearly and concisely the reasons why it is requested that the decision under appeal be reversed, amended or upheld, and should specify expressly all the facts, arguments and evidence relied on. …”
Therefore, the Board, exercising the discretionary power conferred to it pursuant to article 13 RPBA, and taking into account the fact that the admission of the new ground raised by [opponent 2] would run contrary to the principle of procedural economy to which this article refers, concludes that this ground is inadmissible.

It is true, indeed, as pointed out by [opponent 2] in the course of the OPs, that the Board has the duty to examine of its own motion whether the amendments of a patent in the course of opposition or opposition appeal proceedings comply with the requirements of the EPC. In the course of inter partes proceedings, however, this duty, which is a consequence of A 114(1), is limited to a prima facie examination of the amended documents, i.e. a sort of pre-examination that will lead to a genuine (véritable) examination of the amendments only if the [pre-examination] suggests that these amendments are indeed such that they create a presumption of non-conformity with the requirements defined by the EPC (see T 263/05 [7.15]).

In the present case, the additional feature concerning the bending of the first branch, which has been introduced by the [patent proprietor] during the opposition proceedings, exactly corresponds to a passage found in column 4, lines 52 to 57 of the application as published. The question of whether it is indeed possible to “detach” this effect of the structural feature of fitting (encastrement) of the free end 46 of the first branch 40 – which are indeed associated in the cited passage – belongs to a more substantive examination which clearly exceeds the limits of the prima facie examination that is required under the present circumstances. As a matter of fact, the question raised requires [the Board] to determine to which extent the skilled person would indeed have considered that the proposed geometry was the only one that could be envisaged or whether, to the contrary, he would have understood without further ado that a great number of alternatives were equally suitable.

Finally, the conclusion according to which the introduced feature indeed satisfies, at first sight, the requirements of the EPC, and in particular those of A 123(2), is supported by the fact that neither the OD nor the [opponents] had considered the proposed wording to be problematic when it was introduced. In this respect, the statement of [opponent 2] according to which it had only realized at a very late stage of the appeal proceedings that there was problem related to a possible generalisation of the subject-matter of the application, confirms the non-immediate nature of the objection raised.

The Board concludes that the late filed ground is inadmissible.

The Board finally dismissed the appeals.

To read the whole decision (in French), click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 15 September 2011

T 1900/07 – No More


The patent under consideration was opposed on the grounds of lack of novelty (in particular over A 54(2) document D1 and A 54(3) document D4). Lack of inventive step was mentioned but not substantiated.

In its decision, the Opposition Division (OD) discussed the legal framework of the opposition and made the following statement:
“Legal framework of the present opposition

The legal framework of an opposition case is defined solely by (i) the extent to which the patent is actually opposed and (ii) the grounds upon which it is opposed.
With respect to the first criteria, the opponent stated in his notice of opposition […] that patent in suit is opposed in its entirety. The claims as granted comprise two independent claims : claim 1 relating to a composition consisting of (a), (b) and (c).and claim 11 relating to a dietary supplement for the prevention of inflammatory processes and articular disorders consisting of an admixture of (a) and (b), wherein the wording of features (a) and (b) are identical for both claims. On the subsequent pages of the notice of opposition, the indication of facts, evidence and arguments concern exclusively the subject-matter of claim 1. The proprietor, relying on the principles set out in G 9/91, argued that the second independent claim was outside the remit of opposition proceedings.

The Division notes that there is an inconsistency between, on one hand, the general statement at the beginning of the notice of opposition, and the subsequent pages of the notice of opposition on the other hand, which relate solely to one of the two independent claims. The Division considers the patent in suit was actually opposed in part only, despite the general statement mentioning that the patent was opposed as whole. In the present case, the patent in suit relates to two different chemical entities (as defined in claims 1 and 11), which only partly overlap. and allowing to the opponent to amend serious inconsistencies in his notice of opposition with respect to the extent of the opposition after expiry of the nine-month period fixed by Art. 99(1) EPC is contrary to the basic concept of post-grant opposition under the EPC.

With respect to the second criteria, the opponent has indicated that the grounds for opposition were lack of novelty and inventive step […]. In the notice of opposition, no facts, arguments or evidence with respect of inventive step were brought forward. Instead, in the last paragraph of the notice of opposition, it was mentioned that
“Aus verfahrensokonomischen Gründen soll die Diskussion der erfinderischen Tatigkeit zurückgestellt werden bis Patentansprüche vorliegen, die zumindenstens das Kriterium der Neuheit erfüllen.”
Such a statement cannot be considered to fulfill the requirements of R. 55(c) EPC. As the alleged lack of inventive step is not sufficiently substantiated and as the Division fails to see any reason why it should be introduced under Art. 114(1) EPC on the basis of the documents cited in the procedure, this ground of opposition is not part of the present proceedings. […]

In summary, the legal framework of the present opposition procedure is limited to the substantive examination of the independent claim actually opposed by the grounds actually supported by fact, evidence and arguments, namely novelty of independent claim 1 as granted. …”
The OD then found claim 1 of the patent as granted not to be novel over both D1 and D4 and maintained the patent in amended form.

Both the patent proprietor and the opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the OD. The patent proprietor requested the patent to be maintained as granted.

In its statement of grounds of appeal, the opponent raised novelty objections (based on D1, D3 and D4) but also inventive step objections (based on D9 in combination with D10 and D11 as well as on D8 together with the common general knowledge of the skilled person). Documents D8 to D11 had only been filed together with the statement of grounds of opposition.

The Board found claim 1 as granted to be novel.

What will it do with the inventive step objections?

[1] The OD decided that, as a result of the content of the notice of opposition, the legal framework of the opposition was limited to the substantive examination of novelty of claim 1 as granted […].

[2] The legal framework of an opposition case is defined by the extent to which the patent is actually opposed and by the grounds on which it is opposed.

[3] Regarding the extent to which the European patent is opposed, the opponent on page 1 of the notice of opposition, dated 13 August 2004, requested to revoke the patent in its entirety.

The grounds for opposition were indicated on page 2, first paragraph, of the notice of opposition, as being A 100(a) in combination with lack of novelty (A 54) and lack of inventive step (A 56). However, on the following pages the opponent only substantiated the ground for opposition in accordance with A 100(a) in combination with A 54 with regard to claim 1 as granted.

The only statement referring to the requirements of A 56 […] read (my translation):
“For the sake of procedural economy the discussion of inventive step is postponed to the stage at which the claims on file fulfil at least the criterion of novelty.”
[4] As far as the extent of an opposition is concerned, if an opponent requested revocation of the patent in its entirety, it is sufficient to substantiate the ground for opposition in respect of at least one claim of the patent for the requirements of R 76(2)(c) (R 55(c) EPC 1973) to be met. R 76(2)(c) does not refer to claims but rather requires that the notice of opposition should contain a statement of the extent to which the patent was opposed (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 5th Ed., 2006, VII.C.5.2.1(b)).

[5] The ground for opposition under A 100(a) in combination with A 56 has not been substantiated within the time limit prescribed in A 99(1) as required in R 76(2)(c). This ground for opposition, which has also not been introduced into the proceedings by the OD under A 114(1) in accordance with the principles set out in the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal G 10/91 [16], was not part of the opposition procedure […].

[6] Although not arguing against this issue of the OD’s decision, [the opponent], in the appeal procedure […] submits evidence and arguments substantiating an objection of lack of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter. Thus, A 56 is a “fresh ground for opposition” (see G 10/91 [18]) which in appeal proceedings can be considered only with the approval of the Patentee. As can be seen from Patentee’s written submissions it does not approve the introduction of this fresh ground for opposition.

[7] Thus, in summary the Board decides with regard to the legal framework of the present opposition/appeal procedure that the patent in suit was opposed in its entirety under A 100(a) on the ground of lack of novelty (A 54) and no more.

Finally the patent was maintained as granted.

Note that the present reasoning is not contrary to T 131/01, because the inventive step objections were not based on D1 but on documents that were new in the proceedings. The Board might have discussed inventive step (or remitted the case) had the opponent based its inventive step attack on A 54(2) document D1 he had used for the novelty attack.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.