Showing posts with label Double patenting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Double patenting. Show all posts

Monday, 26 November 2012

T 2402/10 – Seeing Double


When dealing with this appeal against the revocation of the opposed patent, the Board had to deal with the question of double patenting and offers us an overview over the relevant case law.

[8] Although not being a ground for opposition, the [opponent] objected to double patenting, since claim 1 of the patent-in-suit was amended during the opposition/appeal proceedings in such a matter that its scope was fully encompassed by the scope of the claims of the patent EP 0 364 417 B granted from the grandparent application. The subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent-in-suit was not substantially different from the subject-matter of the combination of claims 1, 9 and 14 of EP 0 364 417 B for the contracting state AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, GB, IT, LI, LU, NL, SE or of the combination of claims 1 and 15 for the contracting states ES and GR.

In G 1/05 and G 1/06 [13.4], the Enlarged Board of Appeal accepted that a principle of prohibition of double patenting existed on the basis that an applicant had no legitimate interest in proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter. This requirement of “same subject-matter” was followed in the established case law of the technical boards of appeal regarding the question of “double patenting” (see e.g. T 1391/07, [2.5]; T 877/06 [5]; T 1708/06 [6]; T 469/03 [4.2]).

In the present case, claim 1 of the patent-in-suit requires a treatment in a human being and a dose of 0.1 to 30 micrograms of 13,14-dihydro-17-phenyl-18,19,20-trinor-PGF2alpha-isopropyl ester in 10 to 50 microlitres of the composition. These technical features are not required by any claim of EP 0 364 417 B. It follows that due to these technical distinguishing features the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent-in-suit is not the same as that of claim 14 of EP 0 364 417 B.

Since EP 0 364 417 B and the patent in suit claim different subject-matter, the question of double patenting cannot arise.

[The opponent] nevertheless referred to the headnote of T 307/03 which stipulates that a double patenting objection can also be raised where subject-matter of the granted claim is encompassed by the subject-matter of the claim later put forward.

The Board, however, sees no reason to depart from the mandatory requirement of “same subject-matter” invoked in the decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06 and in the established case law in relation with double patenting to claims on the mere ground that the subject-matter of the claim later put forward is already encompassed in a granted claim.

This argument of the [opponent] must thus be rejected.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 31 January 2012

T 1491/06 – Just Overlapping


Need a reminder on how (most) Boards deal with double patenting? Here we go.

The applicant filed an appeal against the decision of the Examining Division (ED) to refuse his (divisional) application.

The ED refused the application on the grounds that the claims filed by the then applicant with the letter of 1 August 2003 were identical to the claims granted in the parent application, which was not allowable since double patenting was prohibited under A 125. The ED further considered that the prohibition of double patenting could also be regarded as a specific case of the general concept of legitimate interest in the proceedings, which itself was a generally recognised principle of procedural law.

The Board found the new main request not to be a case of double patenting:

[3.1] Prohibition of double patenting the subject-matter of the same claims as those of the parent patent was the sole ground for refusing the present application […].

[3.2] In its decisions in cases G 1/05 and G 1/06 handed down on 28 June 2007 the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) held obiter (see point [13.4] of the identical Reasons):
“The Board accepts that the principle of prohibition of double patenting exists on the basis that an applicant has no legitimate interest in proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter if he already possesses one granted patent therefor.”
The board in decision T 1391/07 [2.6], referring to the above decisions of the EBA, saw no basis for extending the existing practice to “cover claims not defining the same subject-matter but conferring ... a scope of protection overlapping with each other only partially in the sense that some, but not all of the embodiments notionally encompassed by one of the claims would also be encompassed by the other one of the claims.” The present board agrees with this view.

[3.3] Whether the subject-matter of the single claim (claim 1) of the main request, as amended during the appeal proceedings, is the same as subject-matter claimed in a patent already granted to the appellant is therefore decisive.

The subject-matter claimed in the parent patent

[3.4.1] Claim 1 in the parent patent essentially relates to an apparatus for pre-processing a set of transform coefficients, comprising an accumulator, parity judgement means, parity inverting means to provide a parity-inverted transform coefficient such that the parity of the sum would be odd, and means for providing the transform coefficients as a set of transform coefficients which is error-immune when subject to the inverse orthogonal transform.

Claim 1 according to the main request in the present case relates to a sum-oddifying circuit for processing a block of DCT coefficients comprising an accumulator, a parity judgment circuit and a parity inverter, in order to output a block of sum-oddified DCT coefficients to prevent a mismatch error when the block is inversely orthogonally transformed.

Thus these claims essentially differ in that transform coefficients in general are processed according to claim 1 of the parent patent, whereas DCT coefficients are processed according to claim 1 of the main request on file. The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is a particular instance of an orthogonal transform. As a result, claim 1 according to the main request is at least in this respect distinct from claim 1 of the parent patent.

[3.4.2] DCT coefficients are recited in dependent claim 2 of the parent patent, however with the additional limitation that the parity inverting means (corresponding to the parity inverter (28) in claim 1 according to the main request) is adapted to invert the parity of one of the transform coefficients other than the transform coefficient representing the DC component.

[3.4.3] As a result, the subject-matter of present claim 1 is not the same as the subject-matter of either of claims 1 or 2 in the parent patent.

The subject-matter in other applications by the same appellant

[3.5.1] In the decision under appeal no objection of double patenting was raised with respect to the grand parent application No. 94 907 708.5, which matured into European patent No. 0 638 218. Dependent method claim 2 of this grand parent patent sets out DCT coefficients in a step having in substance the same further limitation as dependent apparatus claim 2 of the parent patent […]. As a result, the subject-matter of present claim 1 is not the same as the subject-matter of claim 2 of the grand parent patent.

[3.5.2] Further European patent applications No. 10 011 642.5 and No. 10 011 843.9 have been filed by the appellant as divisional applications of the present application. However, no patent has been granted so far on the basis of these later-filed applications. Consequently, no issue of double patenting arises in the present case.

[4] In conclusion, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request is different from subject-matter of a patent already granted to the appellant. Hence claim 1 overcomes the grounds for refusal and the decision under appeal is to be set aside.

[5] The ED raised other objections during the examination proceedings, for instance lack of novelty and inventive step. These objections were not addressed in the decision under appeal. In view of these objections, of the amendments to claim 1, and of the pending further divisional applications, the board considers it appropriate to grant the appellant's request that the present application be remitted to the ED for further prosecution on the basis of the main request.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

NB: Other interesting decisions on double patenting can be found here and here.

Saturday, 1 May 2010

T 1423/07 – Double Patenting And Internal Priority


The present decision deals with the refusal of an application on the ground of unallowable double patenting. I owe the knowledge of this decision – which is not yet available on the DG3 site – to the EPLaw Patent Blog.

[2] In the present case, the double patenting arises from a European application (= contested application) which claims priority from an earlier European application which was granted (= document D1). The claims of the two documents are identical and all the Designated Contracting States of D1 are also designated in the contested application.

[2.1] The examining division (ED) refused the application on the basis of the Guidelines. The relevant passage C-IV, 6.4 (June 2005) reads as follows:
“The EPC does not deal explicitly with the case of co-pending European applications of the same effective date. However, it is an accepted principle in most patent systems that two patents cannot be granted to the same applicant for one invention [emphasis added by the board]. It is permissible to allow an applicant to proceed with two applications having the same description where the claims are quite distinct in scope and directed to different inventions. However, in the rare case in which there are two or more European applications from the same applicant definitively designating the same State or States (by confirming the designation through payment of the relevant designation fees) and the claims of those applications have the same filing or priority date and relate to the same invention (the claims conflicting in the manner explained in VI, 9.1.6), the applicant should be told that he must either amend one or more of the applications in such a manner that they no longer claim the same invention, or choose which one of those applications he wishes to proceed to grant. Should two applications of the same effective date be received from two different applicants, each must be allowed to proceed as though the other did not exist.”
The EPC does indeed not contain any explicit provision which would prohibit double patenting. By invoking an “accepted principle in most patent systems that two - patents cannot be granted to the same applicant for one invention”, the above passage of the Guidelines makes reference to A 125 as a basis for not allowing double patenting. Therefore what has to be evaluated is whether a European application can be refused for double patenting on the basis of A 125.

[2.2] A 125 stipulates that 
“in the absence of procedural provisions in this Convention, the EPO shall take into account the principles of procedural law generally recognised in the Contracting States”. 
This means that in order to base the refusal of a European application on A 125, each of the following criteria must be met: 

(a) it must be a matter of procedural law;
(b) the principles of general law invoked must be generally recognised in the Contracting States;
(c) there must be an absence of procedural provisions in the EPC.

Re (a): 

[2.2.1] In decision T 587/98, which concerns double patenting arising from a divisional application, the board concluded that A 125 was not applicable, as prohibition of conflicting claims would be a’ matter of substantive law rather than a matter of procedure (see [3.6] of the reasons). However, double patenting also comprises procedural aspects. Reference is made to the minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference of 1973, M/PR/I, point 665, page 62, which confirm the procedural aspects of double patenting. The relevant passage reads as follows:
“In connection with A 125, it was established at the request of the United Kingdom delegation that there was majority agreement in the Main Committee on the following: that it was a generally recognised principle of procedural law in the Contracting States that a person can be granted only one European patent for the same invention in respect of which there are several applications with the same date of filing.”
The board concludes that refusal of a European application for double patenting comprises both procedural aspects as well as matters of substantial law so that A 125 is applicable.

Re (b): 

[2.2.2] The evaluation of the principles of general law generally recognised in the Contracting States reveals that the majority of the Contracting States do not allow double patenting in a situation where there is both a national patent and a European patent designating the same Contracting State. Thus, section 73(2) of the UK Patents Act 1977 reads:
“If it appears to the comptroller that a patent under this Act and a European patent (UK) have been granted for the same invention having the same priority date, and that the applications for the patents were filed by the same applicant or his successor in title, he shall give the proprietor of the patent under this Act an opportunity of making observations and of amending the specification of the patent, and if the proprietor fails to satisfy the comptroller that there are not two patents in respect of the same invention, or to amend the specification so as to prevent there being two patents in respect of the same invention, the comptroller shall revoke the patent.”
In France, this situation is governed by Article L 614-13 of the Code de la Propriété intellectuelle:
“Where a French patent covers an invention for which a European patent has been granted to the same inventor or to his successor in title with the same filing date or the same priority, the French patent shall cease to have effect at either the date on which the period during which opposition may be filed against the European patent expires without opposition having been filed or the date on which the opposition proceedings are closed and the European patent is maintained. However, where a French patent has been granted at a date later than either of the dates, as appropriate, laid down in the foregoing paragraph, such patent shall not take effect. The subsequent lapse or annulment of the European patent shall have no effect on the provisions of this Article.”
Most Contracting States have provisions similar to the French law, i.e. the national patent ceases to have effect in case of double patenting with a European patent. These Contracting States include Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey. Double patenting in this situation is also not allowed in Ireland where, as in the United Kingdom, the national patent is revoked in such a case, and in Macedonia as well as in Lithuania. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Sweden, simultaneous protection by a national patent and a European patent is not excluded (see National law relating to the EPC, 14th ed., table X).

In view of the fact that double patenting involving a national patent and a European patent is not possible in the great majority of the Contracting States (27 out of 35), it has to be concluded that this principle of law is generally recognised in the Contracting States.

However, this exclusion of double patenting concerns a very specific situation in the post-grant procedure, i.e. a situation where, as mentioned above, a granted national patent and a granted European patent claim the same invention. It does not relate to double patenting in the pre-grant stage involving a patent already granted and a patent application going through the grant process.

A European patent application can be refused under A 97(2) or, as in the present case, under A 97(1) EPC 1973 if it or the invention to which it relates does not meet the requirements of the EPC. If therefore the application is refused for double patenting, the absence of subject-matter already claimed in a granted European patent by the same applicant must be a requirement that the European application must meet in order to be granted. The refusal of a European patent application based on A 125 therefore requires the existence of principles of law generally recognised in the Contracting States which refer to the pre-grant procedure and which allow the refusal of a national patent application for double-patenting. 

Such provisions exist in Ireland and in the United Kingdom: 

Section 31(5) of the Irish Patents Act 1992 reads: 
“Where two or more patent applications for the same invention having the sane date of filing or the same date of priority are filed by the same applicant or his successor in title, the Controller may on that ground refuse to grant a patent in respect of more than one of the applications.”
Section 18(5) of the UK Patents Act 1977 reads:
“Where two or more applications for a patent for the same invention having the same priority date are filed by the same applicant or his successor in title, the comptroller may on that ground refuse to grant a patent in pursuance of more than one of the applications.”
However, no further patent convention in the Contracting States could be found in which the refusal of a patent application for double patenting is provided for. The German patent law does not contain such a provision either. However, case law does exist in Germany for not granting patent applications in case of double patenting on the ground that there is no legitimate interest (see BPatGE 21, 223). Thus, the headnote in case BPatGE 21, 223 reads:
“There is no legitimate interest in granting several patents arising from applications from one and the same applicant with identical contents and priority dates.” [translation by the board]
[2.2.3] To summarise: There is a general principle of law generally recognised in the Contracting States for not allowing double patenting arising from a granted national patent and a granted European patent, but this does not provide a basis for refusing a European application under A 97(2) or Article 97(1) EPC 1973 at the pre-grant stage. In view of the fact that only two national patent conventions of the Contracting States and the case law of a third Contracting State provide a basis for refusing a patent application for double patenting, there is no principle of law generally recognised in the Contracting States for refusing a European patent application on the ground of double patenting.

[2.2.4] In the present case, where double patenting is caused by internal priority, the number of Contracting States providing a basis for refusing an application for double patenting is further reduced to two, as the German case law, which denies a legitimate interest, does not apply for the following reasons:

[2.2.4.1] A 63(1) stipulates that “the term of the European patent shall be 20 years from the date of filing of the application”. The relevant date for calculating the 20-year term is not the priority date but the filing date (see in this context also Article 4bis(5) of the Paris Convention). This means that the refusal of the contested application deprives the appellant of almost one year of protection, since the starting date for calculating the 20-year term is shifted from 21 July 2003 (filing date of the contested application) to 25 July 2002 (priority date of the contested application = filing date of D1). Therefore, the appellant has a legitimate interest in the grant of the contested application. In this context it is noted that the presence of two identical sets of claims in a granted patent and in a patent application of the same applicant is not a sufficient reason for denying a legitimate interest. All the rights arising from these documents, including the period of patent protection, have to be taken into consideration. As a consequence, the German case law is not relevant in the present case.

[2.2.4.2] According to the German patent law, an earlier application from which a subsequent application claims priority is deemed withdrawn with the declaration of priority according to § 40(5) . This means that double patenting arising from an internal priority cannot occur according to German law, as the earlier application cannot proceed to grant. It is important to note that it is the earlier and not the subsequent application claiming priority from the earlier application that cannot proceed to grant. In this way, the legitimate interest of the applicant in terms of the period of protection is guaranteed.

[2.2.5] As a consequence, irrespective of whether or not the EPC lacks procedural provisions in connection with double patenting […], A 125 does not provide a basis for refusing a European application on the ground of double patenting.

A 60

[2.3.1] In decision T 307/03 […], it was decided that A 60 provided a basis for refusing a European application for double patenting. A 60 stated that “The right to a European patent shall belong to the inventor or his successor in title”, from which it could be deduced that under the EPC the principle of double patenting applied, as the inventor or his successor in title had a right to the grant of one and only one patent from the EPO for a particular invention as defined in a particular claim. Once a patent had been granted, this right to a patent had been exhausted and the EPO was entitled to refuse to grant a further patent to the inventor or his successor in title for the subject-matter for which he had already been granted a patent (see [2.1] of the reasons). The fact that the EPC did not contain any specific provisions relating to double patenting was not decisive, as the legislator could not be expected to have made provisions to regulate what would on grounds of economics alone be a very rare occurrence. The board could recognise no legitimate interest in anyone having two or more identical patents with the same claims and the same priority dates (see [2.3] of the reasons). A 60 is integrated into Chapter II of Part II of the EPC, which concerns “Persons entitled to apply for and obtain a European patent - Mention of the inventor”, and it is the purpose of A 60 to define to whom the right to a European patent belongs. This board cannot see how A 60 could serve as a basis for refusing a European application under A 97(2) for double patenting, it cannot agree that A 60 can be interpreted such that the inventor or his successor in title has a right to the grant of one and only one patent from the EPO for a particular invention, with the consequence that claims comprising subject-matter included in the claims of an already granted patent of the same applicant are refused no matter whether or not the applicant has a legitimate interest in the grant of the subsequent application. Contrary to the reasoning applied in decision T 307/03, this board is convinced that the fact that the EPC does not contain any specific provisions relating to double patenting is decisive: in the absence of such provisions, a refusal of a European patent application for double patenting is not possible irrespective of whether or not double patenting is a rare occurrence.

[2.3.3] It could be argued that in such a case the rights to the patent granted on the basis of the earlier application could be given up. However, this argument is futile, as the EPC does not provide a basis therefor: the priority right of the EPC does not include a provision corresponding to § 40(5) of the German law, which would prohibit the grant of the earlier application and thus prevent double patenting in a case of internal priority in the first place (see [2.2.4.2] above). Furthermore, there are no means of forcing an applicant to abandon an already granted patent as a prerequisite for granting the subsequent application either.

[2.3.4] As a consequence, the contested application cannot be refused under A 60 for double patenting.

[2.4] Double patenting as understood in this decision requires that the parties of the conflicting patents or patent applications are identical. In the present case, the patentee of D1 is Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GmbH (BIP). BIP also filed the contested application as international application WO 2004/011006 on 21 July 2003, which entered the European phase as EP 03 771 064.7 on 12 January 2005. In the Declaration of Assignment dated 27 April 2007, BIP assigned, transferred and set over the entire right, title and interest in and to the above-mentioned protective rights, including priority rights of EP 03 771 064.7 to Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH. The transfer was registered by the EPO on 4 May 2007. No transfer was effected in connection with D1. In view of the above transfer, the patentee of D1 and the applicant of the contested application are no longer identical. As a consequence, the present case resembles the situation described in the last sentence of the paragraph of the Guidelines mentioned above, which explains that where two applications of the same effective date are received from two different applicants, each must be allowed to proceed as though the other did not exist. Formally, therefore, double patenting as defined above no longer exists.

The board is aware that such a unilateral transfer of rights might in certain Contracting States not be allowable under all circumstances. Thus, Article L 614-14 of the French Code de la Propriété intellectuelle reads:
“Where a French patent application or a French patent and a European patent application or a European patent have the same filing or priority date, cover the same invention and belong to the same inventor or to his successor in title, those parts which are common may not be transferred, pledged, mortgaged or their exploitation rights assigned independently of each other on pain of nullity.”
However, this is a question of the subsequent national phases, for which the board is not competent. As a consequence, the application cannot be refused for double patenting, as the parties of the conflicting patent documents are not identical.

Decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06

[3] According to Article 21 RPBA a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) shall be made if a board considers it necessary to deviate from an interpretation or explanation of the convention contained in an earlier opinion or decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal. In point [13.4] of decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06, the EBA accepts that the principle of prohibition of double patenting exists on the basis that an applicant has no legitimate interest in proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter if he already possesses one granted patent therefor. However, point [13.4] of said decisions concerns double patenting in connection with divisional applications. With divisional applications the filing date and, as a consequence, the 20-year term according to A 63(1) are the same as with the earlier application(s) on which the divisional application(s) is/are based. Therefore, the present case differs from this situation in that it concerns double patenting arising from internal priority where the conflicting documents have different filing dates. As a consequence, the board concludes that the present decision is not in contradiction with decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06, so that a referral to the EBA according to Article 112(1) (a) is not necessary.

Reimbursement

[4] The ED, being bound by the instructions given by the Guidelines, acted correctly in refusing the present application. Nevertheless, the application was refused under A 97(1) EPC 1973 for non-compliance with a non-existent requirement of the EPC. The refusal therefore infringed the applicant’s fundamental right that there should be a legal basis for any requirement relied on to invoke A 97(1) EPC 1973. Since the appellant was obliged to file the present appeal to overcome this refusal, the board judges it to be equitable that the appeal fee should be reimbursed.

This is a major decision; it would definitely deserve a publication in the OJ. I am particularly happy to see that the A 60 argument is refuted. Basing the prohibition of double patenting on the wording of A 60 is seriously questionable from the exegetical point of view.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Tuesday, 27 April 2010

T 877/06 – Differences Avert Double Patenting Issue


[5.1] The objection of possible double patenting was raised by the respondent with respect to the auxiliary requests submitted by the appellant with letter of 30 October 2009.

In this regard, the respondent drew in particular attention to divisional application EP 1 795 246, in the name of the appellant.

[5.2] Granted claim 1 of said European patent EP-B-1 795 246, which stems from a divisional application of the application underlying the patent in suit, is directed to an air cleaner including a housing having a housing compartment and a removable cover and further comprising a removable and replaceable filter element arrangement positioned in the air cleaner housing comprising a coiled media construction, a seal member and a frame arranged around one of the first and second ends of the coiled media construction; the frame having a depending lip, further including a projection having a tip portion projecting axially from one of the first and second flow faces, and including a step providing a transition area between the cross-sectional width of the depending lip and the smaller cross-sectional width of the tip portion; the tip portion of the frame having an outer circumferential surface; the tip portion of the frame being an annular sealing support for the seal member; the seal member being positioned on, and being supported by, the tip portion of the frame (highlighting by the board).

The subject matter claimed in claim 1 of said European patent EP-B-1 795 246 thus differs from the subject matter in accordance with claim 1 of the main request of the patent under appeal firstly in that it relates to an air cleaner, and not to a filter element arrangement; and secondly, as regards the filter arrangement which forms part of the said air cleaner, at least by the claim features highlighted above.

[5.3] In decision T 1391/07 [2.6-7], the board saw no basis for extending the practice of prohibition of “double patenting” to cover claims not defining the same subject-matter but conferring a scope of protection overlapping with each other only partially in the sense that some, but not all of the embodiments notionally encompassed by one of the claims would also be encompassed by the other one of the claims. The lack of legitimate interest of an applicant in obtaining two patents for the same subject-matter - as invoked by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06 - could not be invoked when the scopes of protection conferred by the respective subject-matters overlap only partially with each other as there was no manifest objective reason to deny the legitimate interest of the applicant in obtaining a protection different from - although partially overlapping with - that of the parent patent already granted. Accordingly, the board concluded that the mere fact that the scope of protection notionally conferred by the claim in suit would partially overlap with that of the granted parent patent did not prejudice the grant of a patent.

[5.4] In view of the substantial differences identified under point [5.2] above resulting in, if at all, only a partial overlap in the respective scopes of protection conferred by EP-B-1 795 246 and the opposed patent, the board concludes that no issue of double patenting arises with respect to the claims of the main request.

I for one am happy to see that T 307/03 (where the Board held that a double patenting objection can be raised also where there is only an overlap of the subject matter claimed in distinct applications) appears to be more and more isolated. Some more decisions of the present kind, and we will be able to say that T 307/03 was a “one off” decision.

To read the whole decision, click here.