Thursday, 21 February 2013

R 1/12 – There Are Limits


As any human interaction, oral proceedings (OPs) before a Board of appeal (BoA) can go dead wrong. The present petition for review shows that, as a rule, petitions for review will not allow to remedy such situations, unless the petitioner has extensively made use of the double-edged sword of R 106. There are also some very clear and fundamental statements as to what the right to be heard really encompasses.

The patent proprietor had filed the petition after BoA 3.2.08 in decision T 467/09 had dismissed its appeal against the revocation of its patent by the Opposition Division.

The petitioner pointed out that its right to be heard had been violated. Among other things, the chairman had interrupted its attempt to illustrate the meaning of a claim feature by citing passages of the patent and told it to “Stop reading the description to me!” (“Hören Sie auf, mir die Beschreibung vorzulesen !”). Moreover, the petitioner had made the following oral request when resuming the proceedings after a pause:
“The applicants (sic) declare that they do not agree with the decision of the BoA according to which the novelty of claim 1 on file is only based on the feature “plastics” and that, when inventive step was discussed, [the appellants] were not allowed to explain the synergy between the individual features of the claim on file in the context of a combination invention, and that [they] consider this to be a violation of the right to be heard.”
According to the petitioner, the oral request that this objection be cited in the minutes had been refused by the chairman without any justification “while the whole BoA laughed out loud” (unter lautem Gelächter der gesamten Beschwerdekammer).

What will the Enlarged Board (EBA) do with such a mess?

*** Translation of the German original ***

Admissibility of the request – R 106

[1] Among all the events which, in the eyes of the petitioner, justify, alone or in combination, a violation of the right to be heard, only one – i.e. the non-admission of submissions regarding the synergy of the features in claim 1 as filed during the OPs – corresponds as to its content to a complaint that has been formally expressed before the BoA, regardless of whether it was worded according to its assertion or according to the version that is recorded in the (corrected) minutes.

[2] The petitioners did not assert, and their presentation of the facts of the case does not support the assumption that they, or their representative, respectively, had raised an objection within the meaning of R 106 in view of the further alleged misconduct of the BoA, and in particular, the chairman, which had led to a “fundamental” violation of the right to be heard. Nor did they assert or is it apparent that they or their representative, respectively, had been hindered from raising an objection within the meaning of R 106 against the further conduct of the proceedings by the chairman and the behaviour of the members of the BoA before the decision was issued.

[2.1] It is clear that the persons taking part on behalf of the petitioner, and in particular the representative, found the way in which the chairman conducted the proceedings problematic, and that the course of the proceedings and even more so their outcome were unsatisfying to them. However, the right to be heard does not mean – not least also under the national law of their home country and country of their seat, respectively – the right to filing submissions that are unlimited as to duration and content. Rather, the deciding body has to decide on which grounds it wishes to base the decision and which facts, evidence, and arguments it considers relevant for the decision (entscheidungserheblich). It is only in respect of these [issues] that the parties to the proceedings have to be granted the right to be heard (A 113(1)) by being given the opportunity to comment, it being understood that the extent of this opportunity has to be sufficient (taking into account the written submissions).

[2.2] Insofar as the petitioner had the intention to assert a substantial procedural violation of the right to be heard based on these [events], they would have had to raise formal and specific objections during the OPs (R 4/08, R 7/08), and indeed could have done so. The same holds true for the further criticism expressed by the petitioner […]. However, for whatever reason, the petitioners have omitted to raise objections within the meaning of A 112a(2)(c).

[2.3] The formal objection, which was confirmed in the decision of the BoA via the request for correction of the minutes […], clearly and exclusively refers to the (asserted) non-admission of submissions regarding the synergy of individual claim features in the course of the OPs. Considering the moment at which it was raised, it cannot possibly have referred to the subsequent conduct of the proceedings and the compliance of the appeal proceedings as a whole with A 113(1).

[2.4] The fact that a specific submission of the petitioner regarding inventive step had not been perceived and understood (sinnerfassend wahrgenommen) and taken into account in the reasons for the decision […] could qualify as a circumstance that the petitioner could only have realized when it had received the decision to be reviewed. Therefore, a corresponding objection could not have been raised during the appeal proceedings.

[3] Thus the present request for review under A 112a is clearly inadmissible to the extent to which it does not refer to the objection that has been incorporated into the minutes […].

[4] As far as this objection is concerned, it may be doubted, in view of the order and the reasons for the decision for correcting the minutes, whether the further requirement under R 106 was fulfilled, i.e. that the “objection … was … dismissed by the BoA”. However, it view of the following considerations this does not have to be examined any further.  

Allowability of the request

[5] Considering the objection against the non-admission of submissions on the synergy between individual features of the claim filed during the OPs:

[5.1] For the right to be heard to have been granted, it is not decisive whether a party had the opportunity to comment on all factual and legal questions it considers important. Rather, the right to comment within the meaning of A 113(1) refers to the grounds on which the decision is based. The latter are determined by the deciding body. Possible mistakes made by the deciding body concern the correctness of the decision as to its substance, but they do not constitute a violation of A 113(1), very much like the limitation or the refusal of the possibility to comment on factual or legal questions that are not essential to the (main) grounds on which the decision is based. Quite to the contrary, a fair, economical and appropriate conduct of the proceedings almost requires the chairman to prevent statements that get out of hand (ausufernd), that are not relevant (any more) or that are repetitive, on behalf of any party. This also holds true for comments as to the substance [of the case]. An example that often occurs in practice is the submission of further comments as to the relevance of a claim feature within the framework of the discussion of inventive step, if this question has already been exhaustively discussed when novelty was examined. The fact that parties have their own view on which submissions are necessary or useful (in view of a successful course of the proceedings) is natural and legitimate. However, the fact that the chairman does not comply with them at all, or only partially, or not at once, does not per se lead to a violation of the right to be heard. What has to be ensured, in order for the right to be heard to be granted, is that [the parties] have an appropriate opportunity to comment on the grounds on which the decision is subsequently based, and only on them.

[5.2] In the decision to be reviewed [the BoA] denied the existence of an inventive step in view of the closest prior art and the problem to be solved that results from it […]. When doing so, the BoA has not limited itself to give its reasons […] but has also explained why it could not endorse the arguments of the petitioners, in particular on the synergetic interaction between the claim features […]. The BoA rightly refers to the request for correction of the minutes […], i.e. the statement repeated in the decision on the appeal “The core of the claimed invention consists in …” […]. Moreover, […] the reasons for the decision deal with the argument of the appellant as to why the inventive step was based on a “synergetic interaction between the plastics of the bending rail (Biegeschiene) and the other features of the invention”.

[5.3] Such a thorough discussion of the arguments of the petitioners is not a requirement for the right to be heard within the meaning of A 113(2) to have been granted, but it constitutes (further) evidence for it. This also holds true for the wording of the objection raised during the Ops, as asserted by the petitioner (synergy between the individual features “within the meaning of a combination invention, in the context of the discussion of inventive step”), which is more narrow as to its content.

[5.4] Thus [the EBA] notes that the objection against the non-admission of submissions, which, according to the minutes of the proceedings, has been raised by the petitioners long before the end of the OPs, has not led to a violation of the petitioners’ right to be heard (within the meaning of A 113(1)) on the grounds of which the decision to be reviewed was based.

[6] The further objection mentioned above […] is not allowable either. In case the BoA had not “perceived and understood” (sinnerfassend wahrgenommen) a specific submission of the petitioners on inventive step and had not taken it into account in the reasons for the decision, this does not amount to a violation of the right to be heard but may affect the correctness of the decision as to its content. […]

To the extent to which the petition for review is not dismissed as clearly inadmissible, it is dismissed as clearly unallowable.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Wednesday, 20 February 2013

T 1663/12 – A Drop-Dead Appeal


In the present case the patent proprietor filed a request for re-establishment into the time limit for filing a notice of appeal.

The factual situation was as follows (sorry for the length, but I find the modus operandi interesting):

Mr Adrian F. had worked for 26 years in the law firm representing the appellant but had retired from the partnership on June 30, 2011. As a number of significant cases that he was handling were still pending at the time of his retirement, he continued to deal with these cases, as a consultant of the law firm.

Since he did not visit the offices of the law firm daily, but on a regularly basis, a system was put in place that ensured that a partner was kept informed of what was happening on a case and that all information was passed promptly to Adrian F. The latter still had access to documents saved on the server and to the email system of the law firm and, on a daily basis, got the so-called prompt list showing all due dates which had been registered in the firm’s software (Inprotech). Copies of his outgoing emails were printed and passed to a partner. All documents and due dates were electronically registered and checked by the Records Department.

The appellant explained that the failure to file the notice of appeal had been caused by a docketing mistake in the law firm during sorting of the incoming mail.

Incoming mail was typically received between 11 am and 1 pm. All incoming mail was sorted initially by Mr Duncan H., a senior member of the Records Department, with the assistance of another senior member, Mr Andrew S. when there was a particularly large amount of mail to be sorted. The mail was stamped, identified and mail involving a “drop-dead” deadline (such as revocation decisions) was singled out; all other mail was put into the relevant mail baskets. Any delivery card and acknowledgment sheet would be detached and pinned to the back of the communication.

As soon as all the mail had been sorted, the front page of all the “drop-dead” communications that had been separated out from the rest of the incoming mail was photocopied and the copies were given to the Manager of the Records Department, Ms Tricia L. In this way she was kept informed of all the “drop-dead” communications. She went through these on the next working day, after the communications had been processed by the Records Department, and checked that the deadlines had been correctly docketed in Inprotech.

After the copy of the first page of the “drop-dead” communication had been made, a tick was placed on the bottom left hand corner of the original communication to confirm that the copy of the front page had been given to Tricia L. The original “drop-dead” communication was then put into the mail basket of the appropriate section of the Records Department. “Drop-dead” communications would therefore always be on top of the rest of the mail in the relevant mail basket. The basket of sorted mail was then given to the head of the relevant Records section (i.e. the team leader).

In the case of European patent applications and patent opposition cases, Andrew S. was the team leader. He reviewed all the mail to check for anything requiring immediate processing because of an immediate deadline e.g. filing instructions where there was an imminent deadline. Such urgent mail was processed first (involving entry of details into the database and passing urgently to a partner for action). Revocation decisions did not fall into the category of urgent mail requiring immediate attention. After urgent mail had been separated by the team leader, the remaining mail was passed to one of the experienced clerks in the relevant section to be processed on the following working day.

The first step in the processing involved checking that the reference was correct and, if not, marking it up with the correct reference. This was done on each item of mail. The responsible clerks in relation to EPO communications were Mr Richard W. and Mr Elliott G. Having completed their checks, they then passed the mail to another clerk, Ms Grace B., who was responsible for retrieving the relevant file. The file with the mail attached to it was then passed to another clerk, Ms Medinat N., for further processing, including input of any due dates into Inprotech. If the file was not in the central filing system in the Records Department (e.g. if it was in the room of one of the attorneys), the mail was passed back to Richard W. and Elliott G. without the file. They were responsible for the further processing of mail in such cases.

When Richard W. or Elliott G. were processing a revocation decision, they needed to arrange for the physical file to be retrieved from the relevant attorney so that the revocation decision could be processed appropriately (including applying a sticker to the front of the file indicating that the case was in appeal proceedings). In order for the file to be retrieved, one of them would mark the top right hand corner of the decision with a tick and the initials of the person who had the file and then pass the communication to Grace B. so that she could retrieve the file from this person. Once Grace B. had retrieved the file, it was passed to Medinat N. for processing of the revocation decision.

Inprotech automatically calculated the deadlines for filing the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds (plus the 10 days) when the date of the revocation decision was entered. Medinat N. would then mark up the front of the communication in red with any relevant due date so that it was immediately apparent to the relevant partner/attorney. Where the communication was a revocation decision, Medinat N. would also place a sticker on the front of the physical file indicating that the case was in appeal proceedings.

Once Medinat N. had completed her processing work, she would initial the receipt stamp that the mail sorters had placed on the communication and it was then passed to the responsible partner with the file, clipped to the front of the file or bound to the front of the file with an elastic band. In the case of revocation decisions, the delivery card and acknowledgment sheet were clipped to the top of the communication so that the responsible partner could immediately sign, date and return these to the Records Department for sending back to the EPO.

After the mail has been processed and due dates docketed in Inprotech, Tricia L. went through the copies she had been given of the “drop-dead” communications and checked for each case that deadlines had been correctly docketed. Inprotech generated daily prompt lists for all attorneys and trainees (i.e. fee earners), showing the due dates for the cases for which that attorney was responsible. In the case of due dates for filing a notice of appeal from a revocation decision, the due date would start to appear on the prompt list from the day after the decision was entered into Inprotech (i.e. about two months in advance of the due date). The prompt lists were emailed to the attorneys every morning. Andrew L.’s prompt lists were emailed to all the partners every Monday.

The communications under consideration were received on 8 May 2012, i.e. the first working day after a public holiday in the UK. There was therefore a particularly large volume of mail on that day and as a result Andrew S. assisted Duncan H. with sorting the mail.

The minutes were received on 8 May 2012 and had been duly stamped with the receipt stamp when it was processed as incoming mail. The reference on it had been corrected by Elliott G. to show the correct opposition file reference, the receipt stamp had been initialled by Richard W. and Dr Paul H.’s initials had been marked at the top right hand corner of the page, by Richard W., to indicate that Paul H. was the responsible partner. No due date was marked on the front of the minutes in red, or was docketed in Inprotech, as no due date is associated with minutes. There were no markings on the revocation decision, which indicated that it has not been seen during the mail sorting or by the Records Department and has not been processed at all. In consequence, no due date was docketed in Inprotech.

The patent proprietor believed that the revocation decision must have been stapled to the back of the minutes, and that the stapling was done in such a way that it was not readily apparent that there were two separate communications - the second being a “drop-dead” communication. The revocation decision must have remained stapled to the back of the minutes when the minutes were subsequently processed by Richard W.

Paul H., who was handling the prosecution work for the divisional patent application of the patent under consideration, did not recall whether he noticed the revocation decision. He signed and dated the delivery card and acknowledgment letter with the date that was stamped on the minutes but did not review the documents that were being acknowledged. After dealing with the acknowledgments, he passed the file to the secretary Ms Sandra W. with instructions to email the EPO communication to Adrian F. In order to do so, Sandra W. needed to scan it and, therefore, to remove any staples so that the document could go through the paper feed tray. In doing this she would have seen there were two documents and sent them as two separate, named attachments. For unknown reasons, Adrian F. did not look at the attachments to the email.

On May 16, he received an email from Ms Melanie B., an employee of the patent proprietor, informing him that she had found the decision on-line and sought confirmation of the due dates. She attached a copy of the decision and other documents from the EPO website. Adrian F. replied on the next day; he explained the deadlines (July 12 and September 12, respectively) and announced a draft statement of grounds for the end of July. When Melanie B. explained that this was too late, Adrian F. concentrated to the statement of grounds, rather than on the filing of the notice of appeal. He did not notice that the deadline for filing the notice of appeal was not on his prompt list.

It was in the course of email exchanges with his client on July 16 to try to fix a time for discussion of the EPO appeal, that Adrian F. suddenly realised that the notice of appeal had not been filed.

It is hardly surprising that the Board rejected the request for re-establishment:

Admissibility of the appeal

[3] Pursuant to A 108, first sentence, a notice of appeal must be filed within two months after the date of notification of the decision appealed, and pursuant to the second sentence of this provision no appeal is deemed to have been filed until the fee for appeal has been paid. In the present case, the time limit for filing a notice of appeal and paying the appeal fee expired on 12 July 2012 (R 126(2) and R 131(2) and (4)). The notice of appeal together with the debit order for the appeal fee were indisputably received on 19 July 2012. Therefore, the appeal should be deemed not to have been filed according to A 108, second sentence, unless the appellant’s application for re-establishment can be allowed.

Appellant’s request for re-establishment of rights

[4] The request for re-establishment of rights complies with the formal requirements of A 122(1) in conjunction with R 136(1) and (2). The cause of non-compliance was removed in the evening of 16 July 2012 when the appellant’s representative realised that he had not arranged for the notice of appeal to be filed. The request for re-establishment together with the debit order for the required fees was filed on 25 July 2012 and, therefore, within the prescribed two-month time limit.

Jurisprudence on the requirement of “all due care”

[5] In accordance with A 122(1), an applicant has his rights re-established upon request if he was unable to observe a time limit vis-à-vis the EPO “in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken”. Where the applicant has authorised a professional representative to represent it before the EPO, the “all due care” requirement applies to the professional representative (see e.g. decision J 3/93 [2-2.1]). It is the established case law of the Boards of Appeal that in a large firm this “all due care” requirement is only fulfilled if the non-compliance with the time limit results from an isolated mistake within a normally satisfactory system for monitoring time limits (see e.g. decision T 428/98 [3.3]) and if at least one independent cross-check is built into the system (decision T 1726/08 [13]). The systems used for the monitoring of time limits may include the use of specialised computer systems or software. However, whether any system fulfils the requirement of “all due care” depends on the individual circumstances of each case (see e.g. decision T 902/05 [6]). If the representative has entrusted to an assistant the performance of routine tasks such as noting time limits, the same strict standards of all due care are not expected of the assistant as are expected of the applicant or his representative. A culpable error on the part of the assistant made in the course of carrying out routine tasks is not to be imputed to the representative if the latter has himself shown that he exercised the necessary due care in dealing with his assistant. In this respect, it is incumbent upon the representative to choose for the work a suitable person, properly instructed in the tasks to be performed, and to exercise reasonable supervision over the work (see e.g. decision T 1465/07 [18]).

“All due care” under the circumstances of the present case

[6] Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, the Board is not satisfied that the appellant’s monitoring system was sufficient to meet the requirement of “all due care” under A 122(1) as applied by the Boards of Appeal. In particular, the Board does not share the appellant’s opinion that a combination of exceptional circumstances led to the result that the time monitoring system of its large firm failed in an excusable way. Rather, the Board assesses these “exceptional” circumstances as an indication that [the law firm’s] time monitoring system lacked reliability under the circumstances of the present case.

[7] Although there is no proof that the revocation decision had been stapled to the back of the minutes, the Board accepts in favour of the appellant that this indeed happened at the EPO. However, this may be undesirable but it is not a faulty handling of the outgoing mail because it is common practice to staple items of outgoing mail together and any recipient of an official letter must be aware of this practice and is not freed from his duty to read all the sheets of a document.

[8] In the following the Board will discuss and assess the decisive processing steps as described by the appellant with regard to the requirement of “all due care”.

[9] The fact that the revocation decision passed through so many hands without being identified as such indicates that these persons were not sufficiently instructed that mail must be read completely and thoroughly, or that no effective cross-check was performed.

[10] In the present case, the first mistake happened when the clerk [Andrew S.] assisted [Duncan H.] with sorting the incoming mail and neither of them identified the revocation decision possibly stapled to the back of the minutes.

[11] Consequently, [Andrew S.] was not able to carry out an independent cross-check of this first sorting when acting as team leader of the Records Department, because the Board cannot exclude the possibility that it was he who made the first mistake.

[12] [Tricia L.] could not perform any cross-check because she did not get the copy of the cover sheet of the revocation decision.

[13] Even if the experienced clerks [Richard W.] and [Elliott G.] were only concerned with checking the correct reference numbers of the documents, they should have flicked through all the pages to do their job properly and could then have identified the revocation decision.

[14] The appellant claimed that [Medinat N.] would have been entrusted with crosschecking the first mail sorting, and referred to the statement in [Paul H.’s] declaration that: “The file with the mail attached to it is then passed to another experienced clerk, [Medinat N.], for further processing, including input of any due dates into Inprotech”. The Board is not convinced that [Medinat N.] receipted the file in the present case because [Richard W.] initialled the receipt stamp on the minutes instead of [Medinat N.] But even if [Medinat N.] did indeed perform this cross-check, that would be a further clerk who failed to read the documents completely and thoroughly. The failing of several clerks is an indication that they were not sufficiently instructed in performing their tasks, and not regularly supervised. In this regard the Board agrees with the [opponents] that [Adrian F.’s] and [Paul H.’s] declarations are not properly substantiated. It is not sufficient to declare that a clerk is one of the most senior and experienced clerks, or familiar with revocation decision, without showing in detail how his day-to-day work is supervised.

[15] In the Board’s view the series of failures continued when [Paul H.], one of the appellant’s representatives, got the paper file and signed the delivery card and acknowledgment letter with the date that was stamped on the minutes, but without reviewing the documents that were being acknowledged. The appellant explained this failure by the fact that the documents had to be communicated as soon as possible to [Adrian F.], the attorney responsible for managing this case. The Board does not agree with this view. The signing of an acknowledgment letter is a highly important legal action in the patent application procedure and must not be performed without reviewing the documents received. That was the reason why this task was correctly allocated by [the law firm] to an attorney and not to an experienced clerk. The appellant rejected the Board’s preliminary opinion that the cause of the mishandling of the revocation decision also had to be seen in the shared responsibility between [Paul H.] and [Adrian F.] because of [Adrian F.’s] pre-agreed overall responsibility to manage the case. However, signing the acknowledgment letter and reviewing the documents to identify their nature cannot be separated. A correct processing of the documents would have required that either [Paul H.] or [Adrian F.] both signed and identified the documents.

[16] A further failure happened when ]Adrian F.] got [Sandra W.’s] email indicating that [the law firm] had received two documents, the minutes and the revocation decision of the present case, and did not open and read the attached documents and did not carry out his own checks to ensure that the dates had been properly docketed. It is undisputable that [Adrian F.] would have noticed the missing ticks and due date markers on the cover sheet of the revocation decision if he had read the scanned documents. In his declaration [Adrian F.] stated inter alia that:
“I make a point of checking due dates on EPO communications by the Records Department. This almost invariably happens in the context of reporting the communication to the client. In the present case, I did check the deadline for appeal, but I did so in the context of responding to [Melanie B.’s] email. I therefore had in front of me the copy of the Decision, which she had provided, rather than the copy attached to [Sandra W.’s] email. That meant that I did not see the absence of due date markings by the Records Department on the Decision.”
The Board holds that it is a serious mistake not to work on the basis of [the law firm’s] own documents and it is not in accordance with the proper discharge of a professional representative’s duty to make decisions without proofreading one’s own documents. In addition, [Adrian F.] was not entitled to rely on [Sandra W.’s] statement in the email of 25 July 2012 that the minutes and the revocation decision were attached to the email without checking the documents and at least verifying the correct receipt stamp date, because this date could have triggered a later time limit for filing an appeal (R 126(2)). This handling of incoming mail is not a mere isolated error but a systematically flawed way of processing a case.

[17] Furthermore, on 16 May 2012, [Adrian F.] was explicitly instructed by his client to file an appeal but he delayed the preparation of the notice of appeal due to other tasks, without checking whether the due date had been properly recorded either by consulting up in Inprotech or at least by reviewing the electronic documents of [the law firm]. Filing an appeal is a highly critical legal act, and it does not correspond to “all due care” for the responsible attorney only to rely on a normally satisfactory functioning of a system, without making sure that he would be reminded of the date if necessary (see similar decision T 439/06 [8,10]).

[18] Lastly, the [opponents] were right to point out that the appellant cannot argue that the time monitoring system of [the law firm] worked reliably for many years, because [Adrian F.] left the partnership in June 2011 and no longer visited its offices on a daily basis. Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the Board holds that this organisational change weakened the existing time monitoring system in such a way that it failed in the present case (see point [15] above).

[19] The appellant further argued that in assessing the requirement of “all due care” under A 122(1) it should be borne in mind that the notice of appeal was filed only a short time after the due date and that the public should have been aware that an appeal would be filed. The present Board does not share the appellant’s opinion that the principle of proportionality can be applied when assessing the requirement of “all due care” under A 122(1). Rather, it takes the view that the requirement of “all due care” means that only circumstances which happened before the time limit expired can be considered or, in other words, the obligation to exercise “all due care” must be assessed in the light of the situation as it stood before the time limit expired (see decisions T 1465/07 [16], and T 439/06 [15]).

[20] In considering the requirement of “all due care” under A 122(1), the Boards have ruled in numerous decisions that the circumstances of each case must be looked at as a whole (see e.g. decision T 1465/07 [18]). In the present case, looking at the whole series of failures and mistakes which took place, the Board sees no basis to argue that the failure to meet the appeal time limit could be considered an isolated mistake in a well-functioning time monitoring system.

Final conclusions

[21] As, therefore, the circumstances of the present case do not satisfy the requirement of “all due care” pursuant to A 122(1), the request for re-establishment must be refused. Consequently, both the notice of appeal and the payment of the appeal fee were belated and the appeal is deemed not to have been filed pursuant to A 108, first sentence, EPC. Furthermore, as there is no appeal in existence, the appeal fee must be reimbursed (J 21/80 [4], T 493/08 [7]).

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 19 February 2013

T 1760/08 – An Obvious Regime


As you certainly know, G 2/08 has opened the door to dosage regime patents by finding that “where it is already known to use a medicament to treat an illness, A 54(5) does not exclude that this medicament be patented for use in a different treatment by therapy of the same illness”. However, the Enlarged Board (EBA) also added that patentability was “subject to compliance with the other provisions of the EPC, in particular novelty and inventive step”, and this might prove fatal to many dosage regime claims, as it did in the present case.

The patent proprietor filed an appeal against the revocation of the opposed patent by the Opposition Division (OD). Claim 1 of the sole request before the Board read:
Use of valaciclovir or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof in the manufacture of a medicament for oral administration for the suppression of recurrent genital herpes in a human host and for administration to said human host at a once daily dose of 500 mg of the valaciclovir or the salt thereof. (additions to claim 1 as granted are underlined).

A 123, A 83, A 84 and A 54

[2] The board has no reason to disagree with the findings of the OD with respect to A 123(2) and A 54.

Claim 1 of the request as amended with regard to claim 1 as granted has its basis in the application as filed in original claim 1, redrafted in second medical use format. Oral administration is disclosed as a preferred embodiment [… in] the application as originally filed and all parts of the description are directed to oral dosage forms, in particular all examples and every specific disclosure in the overall text. The 500 mg dosage is disclosed as one of three embodiments in original claim 2 and on page 3, line 1.

The claim thus fulfils A 123(2).

The OD’s point of view with respect to the claimed dosage regimen is in line with the decision of the EBA G 2/08. Therefore, the board also does not deviate from the OD’s conclusion on novelty.

By introducing of the amendments with regard to claim 1 as granted, the scope of the claim is narrowed. The requirements of A 123(3) are fulfilled.

Claim 1 of the request, relating to well-defined features such as a dosage of 500 mg or once daily administration, is clear and concise.

Based on these features, it can be carried out by the person skilled in the art.

Claim 1 of the request thus fulfils the requirements of A 84 and A 83.

A 56

[3.1] The subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent in suit relates to the

(a) use of valaciclovir in the manufacture of a medicament
(b) for oral administration
(c) for the suppression of recurrent genital herpes in a human host
(d) at a once daily dose
(e) of 500 mg.

[3.2] Document D5 represents the closest state of the art.

The disclosure of this document relates to the

(a) use of aciclovir in the manufacture of a medicament […],
(b) for oral administration […]
(c) for the suppression of recurrent genital herpes in a human host […]
(d) at a twice or four times daily dose […],

and discloses
  • that there is another active compound that can replace aciclovir […] because of its improved pharmacokinetic profile, with the result that for treatment of herpes zoster and genital herpes advances were achieved “with simpler thrice daily (zoster) and twice daily (genital herpes) oral regimes compared with the five times daily dose frequency recommended for oral aciclovir, and without compromise to the excellent safety profile which characterizes acyclovir” […] and 
  • that for treatment of herpes zoster instead of 800 mg aciclovir five times daily, 1000 mg valaciclovir was administered thrice daily […] and for treatment of acute genital herpes instead of 200 mg aciclovir five times daily, 1000 or 500 mg valaciclovir twice daily was used […].
[3.3] There is no evidence on the file of the patent in suit that the use of valaciclovir for administration to a human host at a once daily dose of 500 mg according to amended claim 1 in suit exhibits an unexpected improvement over any dosage to be derived from the better bioavailability of valaciclovir. The dosage can be derived from the above-mentioned parallels and the recommended twice or four times daily administration of aciclovir for suppression of genital herpes given that, after oral administration, valaciclovir is readily absorbed and then undergoes almost complete (99%) hydrolysis to aciclovir […] such that the active substance after administration of valaciclovir is aciclovir anyhow.

Example 12 consequently indicates that administration of valaciclovir in a dosage of 250, 500 or 1000 mg once daily shows better results with a rising amount of the compound. 500 mg is an arbitrary choice from these alternatives.

[3.4] In the absence of evidence indicating a particular effect of the dosage of 500 mg, the problem to be solved has to be defined as

the provision of an alternative use of valaciclovir for the preparation of a medicament for oral administration for the suppression of recurrent genital herpes in a human host.

[3.5] With regard to example 12 of the patent in suit, the board is satisfied that this problem is solved by the use of valaciclovir according to claim 1 of the main request.

[3.6] In line with the overall aim of document D5 of reducing the frequency of administration […], it is outlined in context with suppression that it was “well recognised in medicine that, for prophylaxis, once daily regimens are optimal and ensure better compliance” […] and that the higher bioavailability of aciclovir from valaciclovir ensures that plasma aciclovir levels exceed the in vitro IC50 for clinical HSV (herpes simplex virus) strains with once- or twice daily dosing regimens […].

Thus, based on the recommended twice or four times daily administration of aciclovir for suppression of genital herpes from the state of the art, only a “frequency” of once daily administration of valaciclovir is to be derived for this suppression therapy from document D5.

The dose, as the single remaining feature of claim 1 of the request on file, can be determined from routine experiments without any inventive effort.

[3.7] Consequently, the board concludes that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request does not involve an inventive step (Article 56 EPC).

[4] Under these circumstances, the additional arguments of the appellant cannot hold.

As set out under point [3] of this decision, the teaching of document D5 establishes that valaciclovir would also allow reduction of administration frequency in suppression of herpes genitalis, given that figure 3 sets out “simulated plasma aciclovir concentration profiles following multiple oral doses of valaciclovir or acyclovir” taken from document D8. Therefore, the overall consequence of document D5 remains the same in view of the considerations on plasma levels of aciclovir according to document D8.

Even document D16 casts no doubt on the conclusions from the content of document D5, because it relates to aciclovir therapy (while document D5 starts from the new opportunities arising from the superior characteristics of valaciclovir) and because, even there, a once daily therapy for suppression of herpes genitalis was not excluded but was set out as a possibility in particular circumstances […]. […]

The appeal is dismissed.

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The file wrapper can be found here.

Monday, 18 February 2013

T 107/09 – Truth On This Side Of The Ocean …



In his Pensées, Blaise Pascal noted:
“On what shall man found the order of the world which he would govern? Shall it be on the caprice of each individual? What confusion! Shall it be on justice? Man is ignorant of it. Certainly had he known it, he would not have established this maxim, the most general of all that obtain among men, that each should follow the custom of his own country. The glory of true equity would have brought all nations under subjection, and legislators would not have taken as their model the fancies and caprice of Persians and Germans instead of this unchanging justice. We should have seen it set up in all the States on earth and in all times; whereas we see neither justice nor injustice which does not change its nature with change in climate. Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth. Fundamental laws change after a few years of possession; right has its epochs; the entry of Saturn into the Lion marks to us the origin of such and such a crime. A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.”
The present decision shows that Pascal’s observation also holds true in patent law.

The Board had to decide on an appeal by the patent proprietors against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the opposed patent in amended form.

One of the core questions before the Board was whether the claims were entitled to the priority.

NB: All legal provisions refer to the EPC 1973.

[6] The assessment of inventive step hinges on the question whether or not document D3 constitutes prior art pursuant to A 54(2). In the decision under appeal it was held that it does, because the subject-matter of claim 1 cannot claim priority from the US application No. 835,799 […].

The board also comes to the conclusion that the subject-matter of claim 1 cannot claim priority from the US application No. 835,799, but by a line of reasoning which differs from that of the OD.

[7] A 87(1), inter alia, stipulates that the right to priority for the purpose of filing a European patent application can only be enjoyed insofar as the earlier application and the later European application disclose the “same invention”.

[8] In its decision G 2/93 [5] and particularly in decision G 2/98 [9] the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) held that the expression the “same invention” means the “same subject-matter”. In G 2/98 [9] the EBA established further that – in agreement with the standard applied for determining the disclosure content of documents in the context of novelty and amendments in a European patent application or patent – “subject-matter” is considered as “disclosed” in an earlier application if the skilled person can derive it directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the earlier application as a whole.

[9] Furthermore, following the principle that a document must contain an “enabling” disclosure for it to be considered to be detrimental to the novelty of claimed subject-matter, it was also established by the case law that the requirement in A 87(1) that there be the “same invention” implies that the earlier application must disclose the invention claimed in the later European application in such a way that a skilled person can carry it out (see for example Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 6th edition 2010, V.B.3).

[10] It follows from the considerations in points [8] and [9] above that for the purposes of determining the right to priority from an earlier application for a later European application, the assessment of the disclosure content of the earlier application is made in accordance with the EPC and its interpretation by the case law (see for example also EPÜ: Münchner Gemeinschaftskommentar, eds.: Beier, Haertel, Schricker; 15th edition, April 1991, Art. 53, Moufang, R., marginal note 151).

[11] Present claim 1 relates to “[a] soluble ligand which comprises at least a binding portion of an immunoglobulin molecule, in which the immunoglobulin molecule is capable of competitively inhibiting the binding of monoclonal antibody MR1 as produced by a hybridoma cell line deposited with the ATCC and assigned accession number HB 11048, to CD40CR molecule, [...].”

[12] The patent at issue discloses that for the generation of the immunoglobulin molecules, the binding portions of which are then to be used for generating the soluble ligands according to claim 1, the immunization is carried out with D1.6 cells, i.e. I-Ad-restricted, rabbit Ig-speific Th1 cells (paragraphs [0076] and [0087]). These cells have embedded in their membrane the CD40CR. Thus, the immunization results in immunoglobulins (antibodies) binding to membrane components of D1.6 cells including any immunoglobulins binding to the CD40CR, i.e. it results not in just those which are “capable of competitively inhibiting the binding of monoclonal antibody MR1 as produced by hybridoma cell line deposited with the ATCC and assigned accession number HB 11048”.

[13] Thus, in order to reproduce the invention characterized in claim 1, the antibody MR1 is indispensable for the skilled person to be able to select from all of the produced immunoglobulins those having the property of being “capable of competitively inhibiting the binding of monoclonal antibody MR1 as produced by hybridoma cell line deposited with the ATCC and assigned accession number HB 11048.”

[14] As to the question of whether or not the US application No. 835,799 provides an enabling disclosure for the subject-matter of claim 1, the appellants neither argue that this US application discloses itself a process by which a hybridoma cell line with the properties of the hybridoma cell line deposited with the ATCC and assigned accession number HB 11048 could be made, nor that such a process belonged to the common general knowledge, nor that the antibody MR1 or the hybridoma cell line “HB 11048” were publicly available at the date of filing the US application No. 835,799.

Thus, the “written” disclosure in the US application No. 835,799, even if supplemented by common general knowledge, would not enable the skilled person to carry out the invention characterized in claim 1.

[15] For inventions which use biological material and where a mere written description is not sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to carry out the invention, the EPC foresees in R 28 that this deficiency can be made good by a valid deposit of the biological material at a recognized depositary institution.

[16] However, R 28 is concerned with the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure in relation to a European patent application.

It is stipulated in R 28(1):
“If an invention involves the use of or concerns biological material which is not available to the public and which cannot be described in the European patent application in such a manner as to enable the invention [...].” (emphasis added).
Thus – and this is also a view taken in the legal literature (see for example EPÜ: Münchner Gemeinschaftskommentar, eds.: Beier, Haertel, Schricker; 15th edition, April 1991, Art. 53, Moufang, R., marginal note 151) – there are no explicit provisions in the EPC as to when a deposit of biological material has to be made in relation to an earlier application in order to ensure that a later European patent application can enjoy the right to priority from that earlier application.

[17] However, the EBA has held that the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure must be complied with at the date of filing of the European application or – in relation to an earlier application from which priority is claimed – at the date of filing of that earlier application (see decision G 2/93 [10] and decision G 1/03 [2.5.3]).

In its decision G 1/03 [2.5.3] the EBA states:
“The same must apply if sufficiency of disclosure is at stake. When an application for a patent is filed, the process of making the invention has to be completed. The requirement of sufficiency of disclosure ensures that a patent is only granted if there is a corresponding contribution to the state of the art. Such a contribution is not present as long as the person skilled in the art is not able to carry out the invention. Therefore, the decisive date for fulfilling the requirement has to be the date of filing or priority, as the case may be. Deficiencies in this respect cannot be remedied during the proceedings before the EPO.” (emphasis added).
[18] Thus, the board judges that if the deposit of biological material is necessary for the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure to be fulfilled for a “priority application”, the deposit of this material must have been made no later than the date of filing of that earlier application.

[19] The above cited case law is reflected in the “Notice of the European Patent Office dated 18 July 1986 concerning European patent applications and European patents in which reference is made to microorganisms” (OJ 1986, 269). It is stated in point 8:
“Where a European patent application claims the priority of a previous application in accordance with A 87 to 89, the general conditions covering disclosure of the invention in the previous application apply to the micro-organism. In particular, if an invention, in order to be sufficiently disclosed, requires the deposit of a micro-organism culture to supplement the written description, the culture must have been deposited not later than the date of filing of the previous application. The depositary institution and the legal statute under which the micro-organism is deposited must comply with the requirements of the country in which the previous application has been filed. The previous application must also refer to this deposit in a manner enabling it to be identified.” (emphasis added).
[19.1] The position taken in this “Notice” from the year 1986 was later confirmed in relation to the EPC 2000 by a “Notice” of 7 July 2010 concerning the same subject (“Notice from the European Patent Office dated 7 July 2010 concerning inventions which involve the use of or concern biological material”, (OJ 2010, 498); see point 1.4).

[20] The view that, if a later European application claims the right of priority from an earlier application, the deposit of biological material has to have been made not later than the filing date of the earlier application is also endorsed in the legal literature (see for example EPÜ: Münchner Gemeinschaftskommentar, eds.: Beier, Haertel, Schricker; 15th edition, April 1991, Art. 53, Moufang, R., marginal note 150).

[21] In the present case – and this is undisputed – the hybridoma cell line producing the antibody MR1 has been deposited with the ATCC on 22 May 1992, i.e. only after the filing date of the US application No. 835,799.

[22] The appellants argue that it should be sufficient for ensuring a valid right to priority that the deposit of biological material is made at latest at the date of filing of the later European patent application in view of R 28(1) which explicitly refers to the “date of filing of the application”.

[22.1] However, the appellants’ reference to R 28 does not convince the board because this Rule lays down the requirements for a valid deposit in relation to European patent applications (see point [16] above).

[23] In a further line of argument the appellants refer, on the one hand, to A 87(2) stating that “every filing that is equivalent to a regular national filing [...] shall be recognized as giving rise to a right of priority” and, on the other hand, to case law in relation to US patent applications – “In re Lundak”, 773F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985) – according to which “[t]he enablement requirement of §112, first paragraph does not require such assured access to a microorganism deposit as of the filing date; what is required is assurance of the access (...) prior to or during pendency of the application, so that, upon issuance of a U.S. patent on the application, the public will, in fact, receive something in return for the patent grant”.

The appellants therefore argue that, since a deposit in relation to a US application is not necessary at its date of filing, but must only be made at the latest before the grant of the corresponding patent, the US application No. 835,799 at issue here complies with the requirements of US patent law. It must therefore be considered as a regular national filing and thus, in accordance with A87(2), must give a right to priority.

[23.1] However, what A 87(2) and the complementing A 87(3) – which reads “[b]y a regular national filing is meant any filing that is sufficient to establish the date on which the application was filed, whatever may be the outcome of the application” – merely set out is that the date of filing of an application that may give rise to a right to priority under the EPC is accorded in accordance with national law for the purposes of A 87(1). It cannot be inferred from these provisions that the standards of national law are applied in relation to other requirements of a potential priority application, for example, in relation to criteria for determining the disclosure content of such an application. As observed in point [10] above, whether an earlier application and a subsequent European application disclose the “same invention” is assessed in accordance with the EPC and not, in respect of the earlier application, in accordance with the law of the state in which this earlier application is filed.

Therefore, the reference to A 87(2) does not convince the board either.

[23.2] In the light of the citation from the decision of the Federal Circuit “In re Lundak” (see point [22] above) the board accepts that, when it comes to the point in time when a deposit of biological material has to be made in order to fulfil the sufficiency-requirement according to the EPC and the enablement-requirement according to US patent law, the provisions according to the EPC were stricter than those of the US law.

[24] It is thus undeniable that in a situation where a deposit of biological material was necessary for a disclosure in an earlier application to be accepted as being “sufficient”, this had the consequence depicted by the appellants, namely that an applicant who filed an application at the US patent office had, already when drafting the US application, to take account of the requirements to be complied with in countries or regions that were eligible for filing subsequent applications claiming the priority of the first application. That may be inconvenient for applicants for European patents claiming priority from US applications, but it is the consequence of the distinct provisions of the two legal regimes.

[24.1] The board notes however that it was and is not uncommon when drafting potential priority applications that differences in the patent laws of different countries and/or their interpretation have to be taken into account. Another such example appears to be the different interpretation of the disclosure content of “closed ranges” of numerical parameters according to German and European patent law practice (although this may be harmonised if the principles developed by the German Federal Supreme Court in its decision “Olanzapin” (BGH X ZR 89/07) should be applied to “closed ranges”). While according to the present German jurisprudence the indication of a closed range by a start and an end point is considered as disclosing all intermediate points within this range (see Patentgesetz mit EPÜ, ed.: Schulte, R.; 8th edition, 2008; § 3, marginal note 104 and the decisions referred to therein by reference to foot note 232), this is not necessarily considered to be so according to the case law in relation to the EPC (see for example the decisions cited in Case Law, 6th edition 2010, I.C.4.2). If this difference is not taken into account when drafting and filing a German application, this may have the consequence that a later European application claiming only an intermediate point or intermediate part of the complete range disclosed in the earlier German application may not be allowed to rely on that earlier application for claiming priority.

[25] To sum up, the board comes to the conclusion that, due to the failure to deposit the hybridoma cell line producing the antibody MR1 no later than the filing date of the US application No. 835,799 (see point [21] above), this US application does not provide a disclosure which is sufficient for the skilled person to carry out the invention claimed in present claim 1. Therefore, the requirement of the “same invention” according to A 87(1) cannot be considered as being fulfilled (see point [9] above). Hence, claim 1 cannot enjoy the right of priority from the US application No. 835,799.

[26] In decision T 542/95 the opponent had objected to the right of priority based on the argument that a deposited hybridoma, that was referred to in the claims and that would be essential for carrying out the invention, had not been deposited at the priority date. The board dealing with that case acknowledged the claim to priority because the remaining features in the claim characterized the subject-matter in a unique manner such that feature relating to the hybridoma could “now be regarded as a mere surplus definition”. Thus, the circumstances of that case are different from those in the present one insofar as in the present case the hybridoma is considered as essential for carrying out the invention (see points [11] to [13] above).

[27] It follows from the foregoing observations that the relevant date for determining the state of the art pursuant to A 54(2) is the filing date of the European application. Hence, document D3 constitutes prior art in accordance with A 54(2).

The Board then found the claim to correspond to an arbitrary selection and, consequently, to lack inventive step.

The appeal was dismissed.

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Saturday, 16 February 2013

T 340/10 – Add, Don’t Replace


In this appeal against the revocation of the opposed patent the Board – as so often – found late filed requests to be inadmissible:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1.3] In the present case the Opposition Division (OD) had informed the [patent proprietor] before the oral proceedings (OPs) that it agreed with the opinion of the opponent according to which the main request of October 14, 2009, as well as the auxiliary request filed on the same day (and having the same claim 1) was not novel over document D1 […]. The [patent proprietor] then replaced both requests by a new main and auxiliary request […]. The decision of the OD to revoke the patent was taken on the basis of the requests that had been filed during the OPs […].

[1.4] In the course of the OPs the [patent proprietor] could not have any doubt that the main and auxiliary request of October 14, 2009, would be dismissed on the ground of lack of novelty. In this situation it has taken the decision to remove these requests from the proceedings, which has had the effect that the OD did not have to decide on the novelty of the requests of October 14, 2009. The fact that the [patent proprietor] has again filed the main request which it had removed from the proceedings via an intentional procedural act clearly contradicts its earlier behaviour. The Board is of the opinion that there would have to be good reasons for admitting this request of which the opponent could rightly expect that it would not be pursued.

[1.5] In its statement of grounds of appeal, the [patent proprietor] argues that the decision of the OD to revoke the patent was justified by the lack of novelty of the main and auxiliary request of October 14, 2009. This is also what the [patent proprietor] has set forth during the OPs.

[1.6] The Board does not agree. The decision of the OD to revoke the patent is clearly based on the fact that the requests filed during the OPs held on December 15, 2009 as main and auxiliary request violate A 123(2) […]. It is true that the OD explains in the “Reasons for the decision” that the requests of October 14, 2009, lack novelty. However, the Board is of the opinion that these indications are not part of the decision because these requests had been withdrawn and, as a consequence, the OD did not have to decide on these requests. The OD was aware of this because in the impugned decision it refers to the fact that the requests of October 14, 2009, had been withdrawn by the [patent proprietor] and the request that were now on file (nunmehr geltend) and on which the decision is based were the requests that had been filed during the OPs on December 15, 2009 […]. It clearly follows from both the minutes and the impugned decision that the OD has not made an interlocutory decision on the novelty of the main and auxiliary request of October 14, 2009 […].

[1.7] Moreover, the [patent proprietor] argued that the withdrawal of the requests of October 14, 2009, was due to an error. The new requests had been filed in view of the decision of the OD regarding lack of novelty and had to be understood as auxiliary requests. The filing of the new requests did not express the intention to remove the requests of October 14, 2009, from the proceedings. In this context the [patent proprietor] again referred to the fact that there had been a decision of the OD on the novelty of the requests of October 14, 2009, as could be seen from the minutes […].

[1.8] The Board is not persuaded by the arguments of the [patent proprietor].

[1.8.1] First, it has to be noted that, contrary to the opinion of the [patent proprietor], the minutes do not show either that the OD has decided on the requests of October 14, 2009.

[1.8.2] Point 1 of the minutes reflects the requests of the parties. The [patent proprietor] had requested that the patent be maintained in amended form on the basis of one of the requests of October 14, 2009. According to point 2 of the minutes these requests were discussed and the opponent invoked a lack of novelty. Point 3 of the minutes shows that after deliberation the OD has merely indicated to the [patent proprietor] that it agreed with the opponent as far as novelty was concerned. Moreover, it is stated that the [patent proprietor] was given some time to draft new requests.

[1.8.3] Point 4 of the minutes makes clear that the [patent proprietor] has filed new requests in response to this conclusion and that the OD has admitted these requests into the proceedings.  The requests are added to the minutes. The [patent proprietor] clearly has labelled them as “main request” and “auxiliary request”. The OD has understood them to be the requests now on file, which is logically consistent.


Under these circumstances the Board cannot see any objectively understandable (objektiv nachvollziehbar) reasons why these requests should have been considered to be additional auxiliary requests, contrary to their clear labelling. Moreover, the [patent proprietor] never requested the minutes to be corrected, nor has it ever pointed out that its filing of the requests on December 15, 2009, had been misinterpreted.

Moreover, the [patent proprietor] was represented by a professional representative, who may be expected to have performed procedural acts (here: the filing of a new main and auxiliary request) that correspond to his intentions and to be fully aware of the consequences of his way of proceeding. The Board is of the opinion that the retrospective argument that this was a mistake cannot justify the admission of the main request into the proceedings.

[1.9] Thus the Board has exercised its discretion by not admitting the main request of the [patent proprietor] into the proceedings.  

I would say that in view of Article 12(4) RPBA and the case law of the Boards, it is much wiser to add auxiliary requests and request the OD to take decisions on the preceding requests rather than replacing requests which the OD has stated not to be patentable, but on which it has not taken a formal decision yet. You might be inclined to avoid adverse decisions by withdrawing requests, but this inclination may prove fatal when you arrive before the Board of appeal.

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The file wrapper can be found here.