Wednesday, 19 October 2011

R 23/10 – Just Disagreeing


The opponent filed a petition for review after Board 3.2.08, in decision T 1440/08 (also reported on this blog), had maintained the patent in amended form. According to the opponent, the Board had violated its right to be heard by completely misunderstanding one of its arguments.

The petitioner also filed an article by Rüdiger Zuck (GRUR Int. 2011, p. 302) to support its opinion that the EPC did not require the Boards to interpret rules for the application of an extraordinary remedy (such as petitions for review under A 112a) in a strict and narrow (streng und eng) manner.

The Enlarged Board (EBA) found the petition not to be clearly inadmissible and then examined its allowability:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2] The EBA is of the opinion – without having to depart from its previous case law and in agreement with the established case law of the Boards of appeal and of national jurisdictions (by which, however, it is not bound) – that for the right to be heard within the meaning of A 113(1) to be granted, it is not sufficient that the parties have the opportunity of commenting (on the facts and considerations that are relevant for the decision) but these comments must also be taken into account, i.e.  examined as to their relevance for the decision (see R 19/10 [6.2] cited by the petitioner, who agrees).

[3] This legal understanding is not in conflict with the decisions of the EBA according to which it is sufficient for the purposes of A 113(1) that the party concerned was aware of the arguments put forward by the adverse party, had an opportunity to answer them, and makes no contention that the Board of Appeal refused to hear them (see in particular R 18/09 [12]): this statement refers to cases where it had to be examined whether a party had not commented (on facts and considerations relevant for the decision) because it had been hindered from doing so by objective obstacles (as found in R 7/09) or by the way in which the Board had conducted the proceedings.

[4] The present case contrasts with this situation because there is no doubt that the petitioner had the opportunity to express its opinion and has also done so. The petitioner rather points out that its submissions relating to a matter decisive for the factual decision (i.e. the teaching of document D21 […]) have been completely misunderstood by the Board and, as a consequence, have not been taken into account in the decision making process.

[5] The Board accepts [the argument of] the petitioner [according to which] the – correct, as the petitioner admitted – presentation of its relevant submissions [in the decision …] is only an indication (Indiz) for the fact that [the petitioner’s] factual submissions have been taken into account in compliance with A 113(1). However, in order to [make the EBA] doubt or even state the contrary – here: that the Board nevertheless had misunderstood the relevant submissions of the petitioner and, as a consequence, had not taken it into account as it should have – there have to be concrete and unambiguous indications in the decision under consideration.

The Board also accepts that such a review (Überprüfung), even if it refers to “facts” in a very general sense, does not constitute a review (“evaluation” (Wertung)) of the factual correctness of the decision.

[6] The petitioner argues that the fundamental (ursächlich) misunderstanding is to be found in that, in contrast to the explanations under point 5, last paragraph on pages 18 and 19 of the reasons for the decision, it had never argued that D21 taught that the clutch disk was to be inclined (angestellt).

[7] In the place cited the following is said on the disclosure of D21:
“D21 discloses a clutch wherein the contact pressure plate is slightly inclined … When transferring this teaching to the torsional vibration damper according to D2 the skilled person would also incline the clutch disk such that …

The prior art does not disclose that the design (Gestaltung) of the clutch disk gives rise to problems, so that D21 cannot incite the skilled person to transfer the inclination of the clutch disk to the flywheel mass element. As said documents only disclose (if at all) that a plane contact pressure plate is inclined, they cannot incite [the skilled person] to provide a concave course or a return (Rücknahme) towards the flywheel mass element …”
[8] Apart from the fact that these explanations cannot only be understood such that only D21 teaches that a clutch disk is to be inclined (whatever that means from a technical point of view), the petitioner is not mentioned at all in this passage. Therefore, one can at most conclude from this passage that the Board has not adopted the point of view of the petitioner, or simply that, having considered the whole relevant prior art (including D2) that it has found auxiliary request 2 to involve an inventive step and, consequently, decided against the petitioner. Therefore, there is no factual or textual indication that these statements and conclusions were based on a different understanding of the relevant submissions of the petitioner than the one (correctly) exposed in point IV d) of the decision. The assertion of the petitioner that in the present case the Board had misunderstood the explanations of the petitioner that were relevant for the decision and, therefore (or for what reasons ever), had not taken them into account as would have been required by the right to be heard (A 113(1)) does not have any support.

[9] Therefore, the decision on the present petition does not require the Board to dwell on the question of whether a misunderstanding of the kind alleged by the petitioner, if established, could at all qualify as violation of the right to be heard within the meaning of A 112a(2)(c) or whether it had to be considered as error – which as a matter of principle is not open to review in proceedings under A 112a.

Nor is there any reason to review the allegedly too “strict” interpretation or application of the grounds for setting aside [a decision] established by A 112a, as requested by the petitioner. It is indeed true and legitimate that as a rule, a petition under A 112a is filed with the objective of obtaining that the decision taken by the Board of appeal be amended with regards to content in favour of the petitioner. However, A 112a has not changed the fact that the Boards of appeal alone are the last instance for assessing facts (Sachinstanz) in proceedings under the EPC. The EBA cannot deviate from this fact, even by means of interpretation. It rather has to limit itself strictly (strikt – und insofern “streng”) to the exhaustive [list of] grounds provided by the EPC. The factual correctness of the facts and conclusions on which the decision to be reviewed is based cannot – not even indirectly – be object of a review under A 112a. Only the Boards of appeal can, possibly after setting aside the decision and re-opening proceedings pursuant to A 112a(5), decide on that matter – as a matter of principle the EBA is not competent to do so.

ORDER

For these reasons it is unanimously decided that:

The petition for review is rejected as clearly unallowable.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 18 October 2011

T 2006/09 – Point Of Reference


Most readers of this blog will be aware of the % trap: specifying percentages without defining what exactly is meant (per cent by weight, by volume …) may kill a patent application or a patent, as the case may be. The present decision presents us with an interesting variant of this problem.

The applicant filed an appeal after the Examining Division had refused the application under consideration.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read:
1. A liquid ink jet ink comprising a solvent and a coloring component, dispersed in the solvent, a photo acid generating agent, generating an acid upon irradiation with light, and wherein the solvent contains at least one kind of a solvent that is polymerized in the presence of an acid, which at least one solvent is an aromatic oxetane compound,
wherein an alicyclic epoxy compound and an aliphatic or alicyclic oxetane compound having a valency of at least 2 are added,
wherein the aromatic oxetane compound is present in an amount of 0 to 40 parts by weight, wherein the alicyclic epoxy compound is added in an amount of no larger than 50 parts by weight,
wherein the total amount of oxetane compound is at least 40 parts by weight based on the total amount of liquid ink,
wherein the total amount of the compounds having an alicyclic and an aromatic skeleton is at least 30 parts by weight.
The Board concentrated on the clarity of the claim:

[4] According to A 84, the claims must define the matter for which protection is sought. A consequence thereof is that the claims must be clear in themselves when read by the person skilled in the art, without any reference to the content of the description (see T 2/80 [2] and T 1129/97 [2.1.2]).

[4.1] Claim 1 of each request defines the amounts of several components or group of components by ranges given in “parts by weight” without indicating a common amount of reference (such as 100 parts by weight of the solvent or of the total ink). In the absence of such a common amount of reference, the weight of one part by weight of a first component may differ from the weight of one part by weight of a second component, thereby rendering the ranges vague and the claims unclear.

[4.2] The appellant argued that it was evident to the person skilled in the art that the “parts by weight” in the claims referred to 100 parts by weight of the solvent, except for the total amount of oxetane derivatives […]. However, the appellant has provided no evidence in support of this argument; nor does the board see any reason why the person skilled in the art might not equally consider the “parts by weight” to be based on 100 parts by weight of the total ink.

[4.3] Although any reference to the content of the description cannot overcome this objection of lack of clarity of the wording of the claims […], the board would like to emphasise that even if such a reference to the description was made, it would not have helped to remove this lack of clarity. On page 29, lines 12 to 18, 22 to 28 of the application as originally filed, the expression “parts by weight” is based on the weight of solvent. However, it is mentioned on page 39, lines 10 to 15 that when the solvent consists of the epoxy compound alone, then the amount is based on the entire liquid ink. On page 45, lines 21 to 25, the minimum amount of 40 parts by weight of the total addition amount of oxetane compound is based on the amount of liquid ink. Furthermore, the amount of kneaded mass referred to in this part of the description (see page 112, lines 12 to 14) is based on an epoxy compound.

Consequently even if the content of the description was considered, the content of said description would not provide the person skilled in the art with the appropriate information allowing him to remove the lack of clarity in the claims. […]

[4.5] Hence, the board concludes that claim 1 of each request on file contravenes A 84.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

There is a nice French summary of this decision on Le blog du droit européen des brevets.

Monday, 17 October 2011

T 1244/08 – Having Second Thoughts


The patent proprietor filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) revoking the opposed patent.

After having been summoned to oral proceedings (OPs) to be held on July 7, 2011, the patent proprietor, in a letter dated April 5, 2011, declared that he had decided to abandon the patent, that he did not accept the patent as granted and did not propose any amended text, and, consequently, that there was no reason to hold OPs.


A few days later, on April 11, the patent proprietor declared that contrarily to his earlier declaration, he did not wish to abandon the patent and that, therefore, the OPs should be maintained.


During the OPs, the patent proprietor argued that the wording of his letter dated April 5 was not a withdrawal of the appeal and that it did not have an immediate legal effect. A withdrawal of an appeal had to be clearly worded as such. The declaration of April 5 did not indicate that the appeal was withdrawn. This declaration comprised four parts, i.e. (1) the declaration of the intention to abandon the patent under consideration; (2) the intention not to accept the patent as granted; (3) the intention not to amend its text; and (4) the intention to waive OPs. None of these parts qualified as a withdrawal of the appeal. As a matter of fact, the EPO was not competent for deciding on the abandonment of a patent.

According to the patent proprietor, the fact that he did not accept the patent only indicated that he did not wish to have the patent maintained as granted. The fact that he did not propose an amended text at a given stage of the proceedings did not exclude that he would do so later on. He also pointed out that waiving OPs was a mere procedural act.

Moreover, his declaration that he did not accept the patent as granted and that he did not propose an amended text required the Board to issue a decision that the patent was revoked. As long as this decision had not been issued, the patent proprietor could make up his mind. The case law based on the immediate effect of a declaration of withdrawal did not apply because the declaration of April 5 was not a withdrawal of the appeal. Decision T 73/84 had pointed out that only a revocation could ensure legal certainty and that, therefore, proceedings ought to be terminated as quickly as possible by a decision. Insofar as legal certainty could only be safeguarded after a revocation of the patent, this implied that the patent proprietor could retract as long as the Board had not issued its decision. Therefore, the patent proprietor had the right to withdraw his declaration dated April 5 and the Board had to pursue the appeal proceedings.

Well, as you might have guessed, the Board did not find these arguments persuasive:

*** Translation of the French original ***

[2] In his letter sent to the EPO on April 5, 2011, the [patent proprietor] has declared:
“the L’Oréal company having decided to abandon the above-mentioned patent, it does not accept the patent as granted and does not propose any amended text. Consequently, the OPs to be held on July 7, 2011, are not necessary any more.”
However, in his letter dated April 11, 2011, the [patent proprietor] had made the request to withdraw this declaration. The [opponents] are of the opinion that the declaration of April 5 qualifies as a declaration of withdrawal of the appeal, which is irrevocable, whereas the [patent proprietor] pleads that this letter was only a letter of intent without any immediate legal effect.

[3] All the parties admit that a declaration of withdrawal of the appeal is irrevocable and has immediate effect. Therefore, the question to be decided is whether the declaration dated April 5, 2011, qualifies as a declaration of withdrawal of the appeal which immediately puts an end to the appeal proceedings.

[4] It clearly and unambiguously follows from the wording of the declaration dated April 5, 2011, that the [patent proprietor] unrestrictedly and unreservedly renounced his patent, which had already been revoked by the OD (A 113(2)). There could not be any doubt on the intention of the [patent proprietor] expressed in his declaration, i.e. that his patent remained revoked for good and that he, therefore, showed no more interest in the appeal proceedings.

According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal (T 18/92, T 481/96, T 1003/01, T 53/03), a declaration of a patent proprietor having filed an appeal after the patent had been revoked by an OD, stating clearly and unambiguously that he was not interested any more in the pursuit of the appeal proceedings qualifies as a declaration of withdrawal of the appeal.

Consequently, the Board comes to the conclusion that the declaration dated April 5 2011 qualifies as a declaration of withdrawal of the appeal, which puts an end to the appeal proceedings with immediate effect, resulting in the decision of the OD revoking the patent becoming final (définitive). As a consequence (dès lors), a subsequent request aiming at the retraction of this declaration and the pursuit of the proceedings is inadmissible.

[5] The [patent proprietor] has pointed out that the withdrawal of the appeal had to be expressly worded as such and that nothing in the different parts of the declaration dated April 5 indicated that it was a withdrawal of the appeal.

However, the Board cannot endorse an interpretation based on splitting the declaration. A declaration makes sense only if it is taken as a whole. As a matter of fact, the declaration shows clearly and unambiguously that the [patent proprietor] was not interested in pursuing the appeal proceedings. Such a declaration leaves no doubt on the intention of the [patent proprietor] and has to be considered equivalent to a declaration of withdrawal of the appeal, regardless of the terms used.

This argument of the [patent proprietor] has to be dismissed.

[6] According to the [patent proprietor], following decision T 73/84, a declaration that [the patent proprietor would] not propose an amended text obliged the Board of appeal to issue a decision. As long as this decision had not been issued, he could most certainly retract.

However, the circumstances of the present case differ fundamentally from the circumstances of the case underlying decision T 73/84 cited by the [patent proprietor]. In the present case, the patent has already been revoked by the OD, whereas in case T 73/84 the OD had rejected the opposition and, therefore, maintained the patent as granted. In a situation where the patent is maintained by the OD, a request by the [patent proprietor] aiming at having his patent revoked cannot qualify as a withdrawal of the appeal because it would result in having the patent maintained, i.e. the opposite effect of the effect sought by the [patent proprietor]. The decision of the OD has to be set aside by a decision of revocation by the Board of appeal.

This argument of the [patent proprietor] also has to be dismissed. […]

The appeal proceedings are terminated. The patent remains revoked.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Saturday, 15 October 2011

T 1126/09 – What Would My Robot Do?


The patent proprietor appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division revoking its patent.

Claim 1 before the Board read:
Method for manufacturing concrete products on at least one casing table, characterized by
(A) the use of at least one program-controlled robot (48) which
(B) on said casing table (20),
(C) picks up, from a store (30),
(D) edge forming profiled casing elements (10) that can be magnetically fixed
(E) by means of integrated permanent magnet elements (14);
(F) precisely positions them on said casing table (20); and
(G) then activates the permanent magnet elements (14).
The Board found this claim to lack inventive step:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2] It is undisputed that, as discussed during the oral proceedings (OPs), the skilled person to be taken into account in this case, where a program-controlled and, therefore, programmable, robot interacts with edge forming profiled casing elements (EPE), is to be considered to be formed by a team comprising a person that is skilled in the field of the manufacture of EPE, and another person skilled in the use of program-controlled robots of the kind under consideration. Therefore, the team to be considered, which will be referred to as the skilled person, has to be deemed to have technical knowledge and to be familiar with standard practices both in the field of plant construction (Anlagenbau) and in the field of programming of robots to be used in such plants.

[3] Claim 1 according to the main request concerns a method for manufacturing concrete products on at least one casing table.

In this method a program-controlled robot having features (A) to (G) is used. This robot picks up EPE that can be magnetically fixed (feature D), precisely positions them on the casing table (feature F) and then activates the permanent magnet elements (PME; feature G).

The EPE that can be magnetically fixed (feature D) used in this method have integrated PME (feature E) that can be activated according to feature G.

Thus the method according to claim 1 comprises the use of at least one program-controlled robot for handling EPE each of which has integrated PME.

Closest prior art

[4.1] it is undisputed that […] the method for manufacturing concrete products disclosed in D1 is the closest prior art for the subject-matter of claim 1 of all the request s on file.

[4.2] The known method concerns the manufacture of concrete products on at least one casing table wherein, as in feature A, at least one program-controlled robot is used […]. This robot positions EPE that can be magnetically fixed on the casing table, as in features B and D.

In the known method the PME are distinct from the EPE. The robot first positions them on the casing table and then positions EPE on top of the corresponding PME […].

Distinguishing features

[5] It is undisputed that the method according to claim 1 […] differs from the method according to D1 in that the EPE have integrated PME (features D and E) and, as far as the use of program-controlled robots is concerned, in that it is the EPE which can be magnetically fixed that are picked up from a store and precisely positioned (features A and C to F). A further distinguishing feature results from the fact that the integrated PME of the EPE are activated by the robot (feature G).

Problem

[6] The above mentioned distinguishing features have the following effects:

On the one hand, the method is improved by increasing the precision of the positioning of the EPE. As EPE having integrated PME are used, the number of elements that have to be handled is reduced and the EPE and the PME are maintained in a constant relative position.

On the other hand, the reduction of the number of elements that have to be handled also leads to the effect that the set-up times (Rüstzeit) are shortened and that the handling of the EPE is simplified.

Based on these effects, the problem underlying the method according to claim 1 […] can be formulated to consist in providing an improved method wherein the set-up times are significantly shortened and wherein the handling of the EPE is perceptibly simplified.

Solution

[7] It is apparent that the above mentioned problem is solved by the interaction between the robot and the EPE that can be magnetically fixed and which have integrated permanent magnets, as defined in claim 1 […].

Consideration of further prior art D2

[8.1] According to the impugned decision, starting from the method using a program-controlled robot according to D1, document D2, which discloses an edge forming profiled casing element having integrated PME, is to be taken into account. […]

[8.2] The [patent proprietor] considers this view to be wrong. It contests that document D2, which has been cited in the application that has resulted in the opposed patent […], is to be considered as further prior art together with the method according to D1 when the presence of an inventive step is to be assessed.

[8.2.1] The [patent proprietor] is of the opinion that there is no indication for using the edge forming profiled casing element known from D2, which is disclosed only in the context of manual handling, in a method such as that of D1, where EPE are handled using a program-controlled robot.

[8.2.2] This was also supported by D10 which presents the actual development. This document explains that it was already known to use EPE having integrated PME such as those of D2 in a method for manufacturing concrete products. However, in this method, the EPE had deliberately been handled manually because apparently serious difficulties were to be expected when using a program-controlled robot […].

[8.3] The Board believes the reasons for the impugned decision to be correct and cannot endorse the opinion of the [patent proprietor].

The Board is of the opinion that the skilled person starting from the method according to D1, wherein EPE and PME are handled separately, is almost obliged to take into account the use the EPE having integrated PME from D2, e.g. in order to improve the degree of automatisation and the precision of the method or to solve the problem mentioned above […]. The advantage resulting from the reduction of the number of the elements to be handled (EPE with separate PME according to D1 vs. EPE with integrated PME according to D2) is manifest.

It may be added that the serious difficulties encountered when using EPE according to D2 in a method using a program-controlled robot according to D1 have not found any expression in a feature of claim 1 […] nor does the opposed patent report measures that have allowed to overcome these problems.

Consequently, as these difficulties have no basis in claim 1 to be assessed, they cannot be taken into account. It is not possible to consider that they prevent the skilled person from using the EPE according to D2. Moreover, such difficulties would not be insurmountable because the skilled person to be considered here is part of a team comprising a person skilled in the field of robots […]

For this reason alone (lack of corresponding features in claim 1) the argument that such difficulties are reported in D10, which presents the actual development, cannot succeed.

For the sake of completeness, the Board would like to add that this argument is not persuasive. In this context, it is not necessary to discuss whether D10 as a single document can be representative for the actual development of the field under consideration. Even if one assumes, in favour of the [patent proprietor] that this is the case, it is necessary to take into account the whole disclosure of D10 concerning the technical development. When doing so, one finds, as has been pointed out by the Board during the OPs, that D10 mentions a lack of experience in the use of a casing robot as a particular circumstance justifying the manual handling disclosed therein. The possibility of retrofitting with a casing robot is expressly mentioned in this context […]. Therefore, the disclosure of D10 does not allow to draw any conclusion that technical difficulties would have prevented the skilled person from improving the method according to D1 by using the EPE having integrated PME known from D2.

[8.4] D2 discloses, as duly considered in the impugned decision and mentioned in the application underlying the opposed patent, that an EPE that can be magnetically fixed (according to features D, E, and G) can be activated by a release button.

As far as the disclosure of D2 regarding the handling of the EPE that can be magnetically fixed is concerned, the Board is of the opinion that the [patent proprietor] is right in pointing out that this document only gives indications concerning the handling of EPEs in general […] and provides details only for manual deactivation […] of the integrated PMEs.

Obviousness

[9.1] According to the opinion expressed in the impugned decision, which the Board endorses, the method of claim 1 does not involve an inventive step when starting from the method according to D1 and taking into account the EPEs known from D2 […].

[9.2] The Board is of the opinion that when the problem-solution approach for assessing inventive step is applied, which the [patent proprietor] has not objected to, one has to assume that the skilled person to be considered […], based on the method for manufacturing concrete products according to the closest prior art D1 […] and trying to solve the problem […] of improving (e.g. regarding the precision of positioning of the EPEs on the casing table) and simplifying the method and of reducing the set-up times, would replace the two elements to be handled in D1 (the EPE and the separate PMEs) by the single element of D2 (i.e. the EPE with integrated PMEs) and would activate the PMEs with the existing robot.

Therefore, the method according to features A to F of claim 1 is to be considered obvious over documents D1 and D2, as discussed in the OPs.

[9.3] The [patent proprietor] is of the opinion that, irrespective of the above statement, which it has not objected to any more in the end, the method of claim 1 involves an inventive step.

The main argument of the [patent proprietor] is based on the fact that neither D1 nor D2, nor their combination (Gesamtschau) gives an indication for proceeding along features A to F taking into account feature G, according to which the PMEs are activated by the at least one program-controlled robot.

According to the [patent proprietor] the purpose of the robot used in the method of D1 is to position the PMEs and, in a distinct step, the EPEs (which do not comprise PMEs). Leaving aside the serious difficulties to be expected […], this known method may encompass the possibility that when EPEs according to D2 are used, they are picked up from a store and are precisely positioned on the casing table by using the at least one program-controlled robot (according to features A, C, and F). However, there was no indication in D1 for subsequently activating the PMEs according to remaining feature G of claim 1.

The same was true for D2 because this documents only refers to manual handling of EPEs with integrated PMEs. Consequently, there was no hint in this document tat the integrated PMEs were to be activated by means of a robot.

[9.4] The Board is of the opinion that the impugned decision has correctly addressed this argument by stating
“… that in principle robots are used in industry for replacing human activities, which allows to save time and costs. In the present case, it is unthinkable that the skilled person, which already uses a robot in all steps of the casing method would not at least try to have the PMEs activated by the robot.”
The Board is of the opinion that the last sentence of this citation is crucial in the present case. The skilled person, who is familiar with the idea expressed in D1 to use “a robot for all steps of the casing method” will at least consider having the PMEs according to features A and G activated by the robot, be it only to keep the degree of automation known from D1. When doing so, the skilled person cannot ignore the need for activating the PMEs after having positioned an EPE on the casing table (according to feature G), which is inherent to the PMEs of D2 because of the integrated PMEs.

The Board finds the [patent proprietor’s] argument, according to which the skilled person would provide a manual actuation by pressing a release button 18 for activating according to D2, to be unpersuasive.

Rather, the Board is of the opinion that the skilled person would provide that all the steps of the method, and, therefore, also the activation of the PMEs, are carried out by the existing program-controlled robot, thereby following the method of D1. The Board believes that this is all the more true as, according to the manual procedure of D2, the activation of the PME can be obtained by simply exerting pressure on the release button of the corresponding PME by the program-controlled robot.

[9.5] Regarding the use of the program-controlled robot known from D1 for handling the EPEs according to D2, the [patent proprietor] was of the opinion that the skilled person would expect serious difficulties which could only be overcome through development work that was considerable both from a temporal and from a financial point of view […]. This was particularly true for the activation of the PMEs according to feature G of the invention.

These difficulties would have prevented the skilled person from extending the use of the program-controlled robot in the method according to D1 to the activation of the PMEs according to features A and G.

The [patent proprietor] has not substantiated the difficulties he had invoked, nor provided evidence for them, although the Board had requested him to do so. As the Board is of the opinion that the facts of the present case do not indicate such difficulties and as neither a feature of claim 1 nor an indication of the opposed patent provide an indication that such difficulties had to be overcome, the argument based on them cannot be taken into consideration when assessing inventive step.

As far as this argument is concerned, the Board can only endorse the opinion expressed in the impugned decision according to which the use of the robot as defined in claim 1 may not be trivial but that problems arising in this context and corresponding solutions are not mentioned in claim 1 or in the rest of the patent […].

Regarding the suitability of integrated PMEs according to D2 for activation by robots according to features A and G, it is undisputed that the requirements for an activation by use of a robot are fulfilled even without any modification of the robot because each integrated PME of the EPE according to D2 has a pull-off element (Abziehorgan) 10 for manually deactivating by pulling up this element […], which means that the activation is obtained in reverse order by pushing down this element.

[9.6] Therefore, the method according to claim 1 […] does not involve an inventive step when starting from the method according to D1 and taking into account the EPEs known from D2 (A 56).

[9.7] This holds true even when the remaining arguments of the [patent proprietor] are taken into account.

[9.7.1] One of the arguments is based on the opinion that when inventive step is to be assessed, one has to take into account that, according to the “could-would approach” it is not sufficient for denying the presence of an inventive step that the skilled person, starting from the closest prior art (here: D1) and taking into account further prior art (here: D2) could arrive at the method according to claim 1. Rather, [it has to be examined] whether he, starting from the method according to D1 and taking into account document D2 would indeed arrive at the method according to claim 1. This was not the case because neither D1 nor D2 contained an indication pointing towards such a result based on the combination (Gesamtschau) of documents D1 and D2.

[9.7.2] The Board is of the opinion that according to the “could-would approach”, when inventive step is to be assessed, it has to be examined, in each individual case, to which extent the skilled person, starting from the closest prior art and taking into account the effect of the features that distinguish [the claim] from this prior art, or the objective technical problem that can be derived from [this effect], respectively, had good reason (Veranlassung) to adduce further prior art and to apply its teaching to the method / the device of the closest prior art, or, in other words, whether there is any apparent indication (Anhaltspunkt) pointing towards a combination of the teachings of the documents under consideration.

As mentioned during the OPs, the Board does not share the point of view of the [patent proprietor] according to which such an indication had to arise from one of the documents D1 or D2. As also mentioned during the OPs, and contrary to the opinion expressed by the [patent proprietor], this also holds true for method steps which the skilled person to be taken into account in the present case may be expected to carry out when using EPEs according to D2 in the method according to D1, using the existing program-controlled robot.

In the present case, where the teachings of documents D1 and D2 are combined when inventive step is assessed, the Board is of the opinion that the examination according to the “could-would approach” at first concerns the question whether the skilled person, starting from the method according to D1 with EPEs and permanent magnets which are arranged separately, can be expected, within the framework of his technical know-how and in order to solve the objective problem, to replace these two elements, which are to be handled separately by means of the robot in the known method, by a single element, i.e. the EPE having PMEs according to D2. This question is answered in the affirmative for the reasons mentioned above in section [9.2].

The indication that leads the skilled person to taking into account the EPE according to D2 in the method according to D1 results from his fundamental endeavour to simplify the existing method within the framework of the problem to be solved, for instance, as here, by reducing the number of elements that are to be handled by the robot (D1: EPEs and separate PMEs; D2: EPEs with integrated PMEs) and, as a consequence, the set-up time needed for the handling. The same holds true for the part of the problem that concerns the improvement of the method; it is apparent that the reduction of the number of elements to be positioned contributes to say improving the method by means of an increased positional precision.

The further question raised by the [patent proprietor] in this context, to which extent, when starting from the combination of the teachings of D1 and D2, there was an indication to activate the PMEs according to features A and G by means of the program-controlled robot is also to be answered in the affirmative for the reasons given above in section [9.4]. The indication – in this case for taking into account the technical knowledge of the skilled person, see section [2] above – is found in the fundamental endeavour of the skilled person to (further) automatize, here at least with the goal of reducing the set-up times according to a part of the problem.

[9.7.3] According to a further argument of the [patent proprietor] the economic success that was due to the solution according to the invention, should not be disregarded when assessing inventive step.

In the present case, this argument cannot lead to another conclusion, because the result of the examination using the problem-solution approach does not leave any doubt. For the sake of completeness it may be added that this argument cannot be taken into account also because there are no concrete and established facts that would support it.

Finally the appeal was dismissed.

NB: If you find the English translation cumbersome here and there, it might just be that it is faithful to the original :-).

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Friday, 14 October 2011

T 1810/08 – High And Low


Only the opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 as granted read:
1. A polyurethane latex composition, said composition comprising a polyurethane aqueous dispersion that has less than 20 percent pendant chains by weight based on total weight of solids, said polyurethane aqueous dispersion being free of volatile solvent and being suitable for being dried to form a pressure-sensitive-adhesive composition.
Claim 1 as maintained read:
1. A polyurethane latex composition, said composition comprising a polyurethane aqueous dispersion prepared from a formulation which includes high molecular weight monols and/or a stochiometric excess of polyols such that the polymer terminates in unreacted polyol chains which are not connected to other polymer molecules and which contains less than 20 percent pendant chains by weight based on total weight of solids, said polyurethane aqueous dispersion being free of volatile solvent and being suitable for being dried to form a pressure sensitive-adhesive composition. (my emphasis)
The Board found this claim to lack clarity:

[2.1] Claim 1 of the main request and auxiliary request 1 refers to a polyurethane latex composition comprising a polyurethane aqueous dispersion. By way of amendment after grant, the requirement has been introduced into claim 1 of both requests that this dispersion has to be prepared “from a formulation which includes high molecular weight monols”. Since the amendment has been made after grant and is based on a passage from the description, it has to be examined whether the amendment meets the requirements of A 84.

[2.2] There is no information in claim 1 of the two requests as to what molecular weights are embraced by the term “high molecular weight”. Moreover, no evidence was provided by the [patent proprietor] to establish that the skilled person, on the basis of his common general knowledge, would know what molecular weights are covered by this term.

[2.3] The [patent proprietor] argued that the term “high molecular weight” was defined in the description of the opposed patent and that, on the basis of this definition, the term in claim 1 was clear. The [patent proprietor] in particular relied on the statement in paragraph [0038] of the opposed patent that the molecular weight of a low molecular weight mono-functional active hydrogen compound is less than 600 atomic mass units. The [patent proprietor] argued that this definition of low molecular weight could only mean that the term “high molecular weight” in claim 1 of both requests referred to a molecular weight of 600 or more atomic mass units.

However, as is confirmed by decision T 1129/97 [2.1.2-3], it is the claim as such that has to be clear. For this reason alone, the [patent proprietor’s] argument must fail.

Moreover, it cannot be excluded that an intermediate molecular weight range exists in between the low molecular weight of less than 600 atomic mass units disclosed in the description of the opposed patent and the high molecular weight referred to in claim 1 of both requests. Consequently, the [patent proprietor’s] assumption that high molecular weights start where low molecular weights end does not necessarily hold true. No definition of high molecular weights can thus be derived from the description of the opposed patent. Also for this reason, the [patent proprietor’s] argument cannot succeed.

[2.4] Therefore, claim 1 of the main request and auxiliary request 1 lacks clarity with regard to the term “high molecular weight monols”. These requests thus are not allowable.

Consequently, the patent proprietor had to get rid of the unclear feature. However, as he had not filed an appeal, he faced a reformatio in peius problem. 

Auxiliary request 3 is interesting because its treatment by the Board makes us revisit the rules that govern this situation. 

Claim 1 of this request read:
1. A polyurethane latex composition, said composition comprising a polyurethane aqueous dispersion prepared from a formulation which includes high molecular weight monols and/or a stochiometric excess of polyols such that the polymer terminates in unreacted polyol chains which are not connected to other polymer molecules and said polyurethane aqueous dispersion being free of volatile solvent molecules and which contains less than 20 percent pendant chains by weight based on total weight of solids and being suitable for being dried to form a pressure sensitive-adhesive composition which is tacky due to being prepared by including a mono-functional active hydrogen oligomer with the reactants during the synthesis of the prepolymer or alternately reacting the oligomer with the prepolymer after the prepolymer has been prepared and/or a stochiometric excess of polyols such that the polymer terminates in unreacted polyol chains which are not connected to other polymer molecules. (my emphasis)
The Board finds this request to violate the prohibition of reformatio in peius:

[4.1] The prohibition of reformatio in peius implies that an amendment effected during appeal proceedings, which would put the opponent and sole appellant in a worse situation than if it had not appealed, must be rejected (G 4/93 and G 1/99). Therefore, in appeal proceedings where the opponent is the sole appellant, claim amendments that broaden the claim with regard to the corresponding claim found allowable by the OD are normally to be rejected.

Where a patent which has been maintained in amended form would however have to be revoked as a direct consequence of an inadmissible amendment held allowable by the OD, the proprietor, without violating the prohibition of reformatio in peius, may be allowed to file requests, as follows:
(a) in the first place, with an amendment introducing one or more originally disclosed features which limit the scope of the patent as maintained;
(b) if such a limitation is not possible, with an amendment introducing one or more originally disclosed features which extend the scope of the patent as maintained, but within the limits of A 123(3);
(c) finally, if such amendments are not possible, with a deletion of the inadmissible amendment, but within the limits of A 123(3) (see the headnote of G 1/99).
[4.1.1] In the present case, the feature “... prepared by including a mono-functional active hydrogen oligomer ...” was substituted in claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 for the feature “... prepared from a formulation which includes high molecular weight monols ...” in claim 1 of the request found allowable by the OD.

It is thus a mono-functional active hydrogen oligomer rather than a high molecular weight monol that is to be used as reactant according to claim 1 of auxiliary request 3. Apart from monols, the term “mono-functional active hydrogen oligomer” additionally covers e.g. mono-functional amines or thiols. This implies that by the amendment of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3, this claim has been broadened with regard to claim 1 of the request found allowable by the OD. This amendment thus puts the appellant (opponent) in a position that is worse than it was in under the contested decision. The amendment therefore goes against the prohibition of reformatio in peius.

[4.1.2] The [patent proprietor] argued that the amendment had been carried out in order to meet the board’s objection under A 84 raised against the term “high molecular weight monols”. Therefore, in the [patent proprietor’s] view, the amendment corresponded to one of the three options considered in G 1/99 not to violate the principle of reformatio in peius.

As has been set out above, this claim, by way of the amendment in claim 1 of auxiliary request 3, has been broadened compared to claim 1 of the request held allowable by the OD. The [patent proprietor’s] amendment thus corresponds to the second option referred to in G 1/99.

According to this decision, this second option does not violate the prohibition of reformatio in peius if a limitation according to the first option is not possible. In the present case, the first option would however have been available to the [patent proprietor]. More particularly, the [patent proprietor] could equally have restricted the high molecular weight monols in claim 1 of the request held allowable by the OD on the basis of the specific high molecular weight monols disclosed in the examples of the application as filed, e.g. the 1800 molecular weight hetero ethylene oxide/propylene oxide monol of example 1. Thereby, one or more originally disclosed features would have been introduced into claim 1 of the request held allowable by the OD which at the same time would have limited the scope of the patent as maintained.

As the first option thus would have been possible, the second option chosen by the [patent proprietor] does not escape the prohibition of reformatio in peius. In line with G 1/99, the amendment of the high molecular weight monol to a mono-functional active hydrogen oligomer in claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 therefore violates the prohibition of reformatio in peius. […]

Obviously, things would have been much easier for the proprietor if he had filed an appeal. Unless you are not adversely affected by the decision, never let the opponent be the only one to appeal.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 13 October 2011

J 19/10 – On Time Limits


The present decision deals with a late filed divisional application.

The mention of the grant of the “parent” application was published on April 2, 2008.

The divisional application was received at the EPO after that date.

With letter dated April 14, 2008, the applicant contended that a postal strike had taken place in the Munich area at least on April 1, 2008; he therefore assumed that the first divisional application had been filed in due time.

On April 24, 2008, the applicant was informed by the Receiving Section (RS) that European the late filed application was not being processed as a European divisional application.

On May 2, 2008, the applicant filed another divisional application (second generation divisional application with respect to the “parent application”).

The applicant requested an appealable decision pursuant to R 112(2). He submitted that the finding of loss of rights was inaccurate because in view of the postal strike the first divisional application had been filed in time and therefore should be treated as a divisional application. If the postal strike did not result in the first divisional being regarded by the EPO as having been filed in time as an auxiliary request he asked for further processing in relation to the filing of the first divisional.

In response, the RS informed the applicant that the alleged postal strike could not have any relevance in the present context, because R 134(2) clearly applied to periods (time limits) only and thus was not applicable. R 36(1) did not set a time limit but a condition for the filing of a divisional application, namely the pendency of the earlier European patent application (see e.g. J 24/03 [4]). The present European patent application could therefore not be processed as a divisional application. The auxiliary request for further processing also referred to the failure to observe a time limit. Consequently, further processing was not available either.

The applicant maintained all requests. He argued that J 24/03 was not applicable to the present case, because former R 85(2) EPC 1973 referred to a “time limit”, whereas new R 134(2) referred to a “period”. The applicant further submitted that R 134(2) was more generally applicable than A 122. He concluded this from the fact that A 122 EPC 1973 was not applicable to priority-claiming applications, whereas R 85(2) EPC 1973 (R 134(2)) was.

On April 27, 2010, the RS issued a decision rejecting all the applicant’s requests.

The applicant then filed two appeals against this decision, one for the first generation divisional (case J 19/10) and another one for the second generation divisonal (J 26/10).

Before the Board, the appellant maintained all arguments previously made in this matter. Furthermore, he argued that the wording “The time limit for filing divisional applications must be observed” used in the examination report dated 19 July 2006 on the “parent” application would lead a reasonable addressee to conclude that there was a time period in which divisional applications could be filed and hence, that this period could be extended, e.g. in the case of a postal strike. By not allowing him an extension, the decision under appeal had violated the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.

The Board first criticized the RS for having issued one single decision for both divisional applications. It then deals with the subject-matter of the appeal.

NB: For reasons that I do not understand the Board has decided to hide the application numbers and to replace them by XXXXXXXX and YYYYYYYY. In order to make the decision more readable, I rather refer to the “divisional” application and to the “parent” application.

[3] The subject-matter of the present appeal is the request to set aside the noting of loss of rights in respect of [the “divisional” application] (main request), the request for further processing in respect of [the “divisional” application] (auxiliary request) and the request that [the “divisional” application] be treated as a divisional application of [the “parent” application].

Main request

[4] The request that the noting of loss of rights be set aside is allowable if the decision of the RS of 24 April 2008 that [the “divisional” application] would not be processed as a European divisional application of [the “parent” application] was incorrect. However, that is not the case.

[5] According to R 36(1), a divisional application may be filed relating to any pending earlier European patent application. Where the earlier application proceeds to grant, an application is pending up to but not including the date of publication of the mention of grant in the European Patent Bulletin (Notice dated 9 January 2002, OJ EPO 2002, 112; J 24/03 [4]; J 7/05 [2.1]; G 1/09). Therefore, the parent application was no longer “pending” pursuant to R 36(1)  when [the “divisional” application] was filed as a divisional application on 2 April 2008. This fact is not disputed by the appellant.

[6] However, the applicant contended that a postal strike took place in the Munich area at least on 1 April 2008 and consequently assumed that [the “divisional” application] should be deemed to have been filed in due time according to R 134(2) and could be treated as divisional application. R 134(2) reads as follows:
“If a period expires on a day on which there is a general dislocation in the delivery or transmission of mail ..., the period shall extend to the first day following the first day of the interval of dislocation ...” (emphasis added).
Therefore R 134(2) is applicable only if the wording “... to any pending earlier European patent application ...” pursuant to R 36(1) imposes a period, i.e. a time limit (emphasis added).

[7] In several earlier decisions, the boards of appeal have ruled that the wording “... to any pending earlier European patent application...” in R 36(1) does not set a period/time limit, but rather sets a condition; see e.g. J 10/01 [15-20], J 24/03 [4], J 18/04 [2.1], J 7/05 [3] and G 1/09 [3.2.4]. In view of this established case law, particularly the very thorough and detailed reasoning in J 18/04, the board sees no reason to take a different approach in the present case. Nor is it convinced by the arguments brought forward by the appellant.

[7.1] The argument of the appellant that J 24/03 was not applicable to the present case, because former R 85(2) EPC 1973 referred to a “time limit” whereas new R 134(2) referred to a “period” is legally not sustainable in the light of the documents underlying the introduction of the EPC 2000. Special edition No. 5 OJ EPO 2007, 200, under “R 134” refers the reader to “Explanatory remarks 2002: CA/PL 5/02 Rev. 1 Add. 1”. In “Chapter V - R 85 EPC 1973” (corresponding to R 134(2)) of these “Explanatory remarks” it is noted that “Amendments are purely editorial”. Therefore, no legal consequences can be inferred from the replacement of “time limit” in R 85(2) EPC 1973 by “period” in R 134(2). In this regard reference is also made to J 18/04 [21] where the board found that in R 83 EPC 1973 (“Calculation of time limits”) the term period was the only logical substitute for the term time limit throughout the wording of the rule.

[7.2] Furthermore, the appellant contends that R 134(2) is more generally applicable than A 122. He concludes this from the fact that A 122 EPC 1973 was not applicable to applications claiming priority, whereas R 85(2) EPC 1973 was applicable in such cases. This may be so, but it results from the fact that A 122 and R 134(2) have differently worded requirements. Aside from that, A 122 EPC 1973 was not applicable to applications claiming priority (period of twelve months), because re-establishment into the time limit referred to in A 87(1) EPC 1973 was explicitly excluded in A 122(5) EPC 1973, whereas R 85(2) EPC 1973 did not comprise such an exclusion. By contrast, the EPC – including A 122 and R 134(2) – draws no distinction with regard to the concept of “time limit”. In the absence of any indications to the contrary, if a term has the same wording it must be assumed to have the same meaning.

[8] Finally, the appellant argues that an extension of the “period for filing a divisional application” has to be allowed due to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. He infers this from the fact that in non-unity communications from the EPO, e.g. in the examination report dated 19 July 2006 concerning [the “parent” application], the standard wording “The time limit for filing divisional applications (R 25(1) EPC 1973) must be observed” is used.

[8.1] According to the case law of the boards of appeal, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations governing the procedure between the EPO and applicants requires that communications addressed to applicants must be clear and unambiguous, i.e. drafted in such a way as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee (G 2/97).

The board is not satisfied that the appellant can rely on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, even if it is assumed in the appellant’s favour that the examination report of 19 July 2006 contained misleading information in mentioning a time limit to be observed pursuant to R 25(1) EPC 1973. At least three of the above-mentioned decisions (see point [7]) finding that R 25(1) EPC 1973 (R 36(1)) does not set a time limit but a condition, namely J 10/01, J 24/03 and J 18/04, were issued well before the notification of the examination report dated 19 July 2006. Here the board would refer in particular to J 24/03 and J 18/04, which were published in the Official Journal of the EPO and substantiated that finding in considerable detail.

[8.2] In view of this jurisprudence of the Legal Board of Appeal, the appellant’s professional representative could not simply rely on the legal accuracy of the wording of the information in the examination report of 19 July 2006. The relevant information was obviously intended only to remind the applicant, as a courtesy service, of the need to file a divisional application in respect of that part of the invention which was held to lack unity. This assessment is also supported by the wording of the respective passage of the communication of 19 July 2006 […], informing the applicant that
“The subject-matter to be excised may be made the subject of one or more divisional applications”
and thus just provided as a recommendation or hint as to how to overcome the non-unity objection raised by the examining division. Unreserved reliance on the correctness of the said information is all the more unjustified since the professional representative must or should have known that EPO examiners do not normally handle procedural issues such as valid filing dates, which are generally dealt with by the RS.

[8.3] In the present case the professional representative could be expected to be familiar with procedural matters in general, and the boards’ detailed and consistent jurisprudence in particular (see J 5/02 [3.2]); T 267/08 [5.2.1]). He has also to be aware that any questions relating to the filing date should be clarified with the RS (see J 2/08 [55]). Taking all these circumstances into account it cannot be assumed that a reasonable addressee would and could justifiably conclude that there is a time period in which divisional applications can be filed and that such a period can be extended in the case of a general dislocation of mail services within the meaning of R 134(2).

[9] Since for the reasons stated above R 36(1) does not set a “period/time limit” and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations does not apply, R 134(2) (requiring a “period”) is not applicable. Thus the question whether there was a “general dislocation in the delivery or transmission of mail” within the meaning of R 134(2) can be left undecided. Hence, the main request that the noting of loss of rights be set aside cannot be allowed.

Auxiliary request

[10] As an auxiliary request the appellant seeks further processing of [the “divisional” application] as a divisional application from [the “parent” application] pursuant to A 121. However, A 121(1) also requires that
“... an applicant fails to observe a time limit ...” (emphasis added).
Since, as has been stated above, the EPC draws no distinction with regard to the concept of “time limit” and in the absence of any indications to the contrary, this term must be assumed to have the same meaning in A 121(1) as in R 134(2). Due to the fact that R 36(1) does not set a “period/time limit” A 121(1) is not applicable to this case either. Consequently, the auxiliary request too must fail for this reason alone.

[11] Since both the main request and the auxiliary request are rejected, [the “divisional” application] cannot be treated as a divisional application.

Request for refund of fees

[12] The board considers that the request for “a refund of all refundable fees” submitted with the faxed letter dated 16 May 2011 fails to make clear either its scope and its content and is not admissible. Thus, this request cannot be dealt with and has to be disregarded. In the absence of any substantiated request by the appellant it is not up to the board to identify which fees in the first-instance and appeal proceedings might be refundable. Since the request is clearly and explicitly directed to “refundable” fees, it a priori does not encompass a possible reimbursement of the appeal fee, because in the present case the appeal fee is obviously “not refundable” pursuant to R 103(1)(a). […]

The appeal is dismissed.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

As already mentioned, there is also a parallel case (J 26/10).

Wednesday, 12 October 2011

T 840/09 – Can’t Complain


Only the patent proprietor filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the opposed patent in amended form, according to the main request on file. The appellant argued that he was adversely affected by the finding of the OD that the priority claim was not valid.

*** Translation of the French original ***

[1] The present appeal does not aim at a modification of the impugned decision as such but only at the acknowledgement of the validity of the priority claim […] to French patent application n° 0304203.

[2] In said decision the OD has established that the patent under consideration as amended according to the main request of the patent proprietor, complied with the requirements of the EPC (and could, therefore, be maintained provided that the conditions laid down in the Implementing Regulations were fulfilled – A 101(3)). The OD has given reasons for this decision. Among the reasons regarding novelty it has considered that the patent could not validly claim the priority of April 4, 2003, which is the filing date of French application FR 0304203.

[3] However, this consideration of the OD does not prevent the decision from having been taken in full conformity with the (main) request of the patent proprietor, and it does not appear in the order (dispositif) of the decision. It simply constitutes a ground (motif) which as such does not have res judicata authority and which does not bind any national jurisdiction.

Contrary to the argument of the appellant […] it is not a “decision which makes it possible to invoke (rend opposables) [against the patent] all documents that have been published between the priority date and the effective filing date, as well as all disclosures, public uses etc. having taken place during that same period of time.” Rather, it is a reasoning supporting the decision which as such has granted, within the framework of an interlocutory decision, the whole (main) request of the patent proprietor as filed before the OD.

[4] In agreement with the established case law of the Boards of appeal (see T 84/02 as an example among a great number of decisions), such a ground, even if it is not in favour of the patent proprietor, does not adversely affect him and, consequently, cannot be challenged pursuant to A 107.

[5] The appellant has referred to decision T 73/88 where the following is stated:
“In the event of an appeal being filed by an opponent, however, if the patentee wishes to contend that such adverse reasoning was wrong [in the case under consideration, to overcome the objections against [the validity of] the priority claim, as in the present case] he should set out his grounds for so contending in his observations […] in reply to the statement of grounds of appeal, by way of cross- appeal.”
He has argued that this sentence showed that the question of whether a priority claim is valid is a claim (prétention) of the patent proprietor because it can be the object of a cross-appeal, and that granting or refusing this right is a substantive decision with regard to a claim of the patent proprietor and not just a simple ground of the decision. Decision T 84/02 cited by the opponents and by the Board and decision T 73/88 are, therefore, contradictory, and, moreover, contrary to balance between the parties.

The Board admits that the expression “by way of cross-appeal” does not fit very well into the procedural system of appeals under the EPC. However, the cited sentence is directed at means of defence of the patent proprietor in the case where an (admissible) appeal has been filed by the opponent. It does not deal with the requirements of A 107 regarding an appeal filed by the patent proprietor and, therefore, it does not support the present argumentation of the patent proprietor. […]

The appeal is inadmissible.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 11 October 2011

J 23/10 – Sound Of Silence


The applicant filed a request for re-establishment after it had been informed that its application was deemed to be withdrawn as a consequence of the non-payment of the renewal fee for the third year.

The applicant submitted that the notice drawing its attention to A 86(2) EPC 1973 had been received by Ms R., an employee of the applicant, who had written back to the EPO asking for substantiation of the annuity due date. Since she had not received any reply, she had assumed everything was in order and no further action was needed. The applicant had planned to pay the renewal fees via CPA. CPA got monthly lists of hundreds of cases. However, the present case was not included in these lists. The applicant was encountering severe problems with the interface between its internal software and CPA.

After a communication sent by the Receiving Section, the applicant filed an affidavit of Ms R. in which she explained that prior to April 2006 the applicant’s patent data were electronically exchanged with CPA and automatically entered onto CPA’s records. Owing to a change in the applicant’s software system, after April 2006 the patent data were sent by herself and manually entered by CPA in their records. She could not say why she had not informed CPA. She could simply guess that she had overlooked this particular number when preparing the relevant lists. Furthermore, since she was puzzled by the exact meaning of the communication pursuant to A 86(2) EPC 1973, she had written back to the EPO for clarification. As she had not received an answer, she had understood that the communication had been sent to her firm by accident and did not need to be acted upon.

The Receiving Section refused the request for re-establishment.

Did the Board allow it?

Allowability of the request for re-establishment

[4] According to A 122(1), an applicant can have his rights re-established only if he has sufficiently shown that in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, he was unable to observe the time limit. Under the established case law of the boards of appeal, an isolated mistake within a normally satisfactory system is excusable. The applicant or his representative must plausibly show that a normally effective system for monitoring time limits prescribed by the EPC was established at the relevant time in the office in question (see references in “Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 6th edition 2010”, VI.E.7.3.3 a)).

[5] In the present case, it has not been shown that the applicant had such a satisfactory system in place. Monitoring of renewal-fee payments was performed by the use of a computer system which contained a great amount of data. Based on the date of filing of an application, this system calculated the due dates for the renewal fees. Every month a report was run in this database and a spreadsheet was generated which listed all the applications for which renewal fees had to be paid within the near future. This list was sent to CPA which then paid the fees due. In the case of a PCT application, the system only calculated the due date for the renewal fee once the “NP-filing date” had been coded, which for unknown reasons had not been done in the present case. This mistake obviously went unnoticed, which seems to imply that the thirty-one month time limit for entering the regional phase before the EPO was not monitored.  

For a system to be satisfactory, it must include a reminder system for an upcoming time limit which has to be met. Since the coding for entry into the European phase had not been performed, the system should have sent a warning that action had to be taken. If such a mechanism had been in place it would have been realised that the only procedural act still outstanding was payment of the renewal fee. Moreover, because no due date for the renewal fee had been calculated, the application did not get onto the list for CPA. At that stage, the next mistake happened. The representative explained during the oral proceedings that Ms R. should have checked the list for completeness based on the data of the parent application (i.e. the PCT application). It seems that this was her essential task at this stage, because the report and the corresponding spreadsheet were generated by the software system. In her affidavit, Ms R. stated that she guessed that she had overlooked this particular application number, which seems to imply that she had not performed her tasks properly. Summarising the above, the Board is of the view that the non-payment was caused not by an isolated mistake but by a series of mistakes which all went unnoticed, so that it cannot be said that the system in place was satisfactory.

[6] Irrespective of the applicant’s system, all due care was not taken, given that the applicant still had the possibility of paying the renewal fee within the additional period under A 86(2) EPC 1973 after receipt of the EPO’s notice of 17 April 2007 and it did not take the necessary action. By the notice of 17 April 2007, the applicant was clearly informed that the renewal fee had not been paid in due time and that it could still be paid within an additional period.

When Ms R. received this notice, all due care would have required checking the files in order to find out why it had not been paid. By doing so the mistake would have immediately become evident. Instead, Ms R. wrote to the EPO, enquiring about the due date.

The representative submitted that from a US applicant who is not necessarily familiar with the European patent system no other reaction could be expected. It was not necessary to provide a procedure in case the EPO erroneously sent a communication directly to the applicant instead of to the European representative.

In the Board’s view, it is indeed not necessary to have a specific procedure for such a situation, but a reasonable reaction which could have been expected of anybody would have been to check the situation based on the applicant’s own files. It cannot reasonably be assumed that, if no reply is received to an enquiry made with the EPO, everything is in order. This applies even more, if one is not familiar with the European patent system and if the applicant has the relevant information at hand to clarify the situation, either by checking its own records or by asking the appointed European representative. Simply believing, as was submitted by the representative, that the notice of 17 April 2007 did not concern the present application, and that no further action was required does not meet the requirement of all due care.

[7] The applicant maintained that the confusion arose because the EPO had sent the notice dated 17 April 2007 to the applicant itself, instead of to the appointed European representative. If it had sent the notice to the representative, the mistake would not have happened. It also would not have happened if the EPO had replied to Ms R.’s enquiry. Therefore, the principle of good faith applied.

[8] The principle of good faith implies that measures taken by the EPO should not violate the reasonable expectations of the parties to the proceedings.

It is to be noted that the notice drawing attention to the additional period under A 86(2) EPC 1973 is a voluntary service. Hence, the applicant cannot derive any claims if this communication is either not sent (see J 12/84) or not sent to the correct addressee.

The question remains whether based on the fact that the Office had not replied to Ms R.’s enquiry (at least not to herself) she could reasonably assume that everything was in good order and no further action was necessary. The protection of the legitimate expectations of users of the European patent system requires that the user must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on erroneous information received from the EPO or on a misleading communication (G 2/97 [4.1] summarising the previous case law).

In the present case, the Office did not give incorrect information but Ms R. drew incorrect conclusions from the fact that the Office did not reply to her. Furthermore, from Ms R.’s enquiry it was not apparent that she was under the impression that the fee did not have to be paid at all, but only that she was puzzled about the due date. As set out above, Ms R., who was a patent prosecution paralegal, could easily have established the situation by looking into her own records or consulting the European representative. Therefore, the principle of good faith does not apply.

Exclusion from file inspection

[9] According to R 144(d) in conjunction with Article 1(2)(b) of the decision of the President concerning documents excluded from file inspection (Special edition 3/2007 OJ EPO, 125), documents or parts thereof can be excluded from file inspection if their inspection would be prejudicial to the legitimate personal or economic interest of natural or legal persons.

The applicant’s representative explained that from the spreadsheet printout it could be seen that Microsoft paid the renewal fees for certain applications for which they were not the registered applicant. These applications had been transferred to them but this had not been made public. It was still the assignor who was mentioned in the register. In the Board’s view, this is information about internal relationships between the parties concerned, the publication of which could be prejudicial to their economic interests, while being irrelevant for the assessment of the patent application as such and therefore to be excluded from file inspection. Moreover, the content of the list did not play any role in the Board’s decision.

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