Tuesday, 13 April 2010

T 25/09 – It’s Party Time


The present decision also deals with a not so common request: the opponent requested that the patent proprietor not be allowed to withdraw auxiliary requests considered during oral proceedings (OPs) and that the Board express its opinion on these requests.

[30] Proceedings before the Boards of Appeal are governed by the principle of party disposition under which a public authority or court normally may not continue proceedings if the procedural act which gave rise to the proceedings (such as the filing of an appeal) has been retracted, unless procedural laws specifically permit continuation (G 8/91 [5]). Such exceptions are set forth, in particular, in R 70(1) (no withdrawal of the request for examination) and in R 84(2) (possible continuation of opposition proceedings after withdrawal of the opposition). There is no similar exception that would allow the continuation of the appeal proceedings with respect to claim requests withdrawn in appeal proceedings.

The principle of party disposition is of particular relevance for inter partes proceedings (see, e.g., T 240/01 [6]). It means, for example, that a department of the EPO is not allowed to decide on a non-pending application (T 1409/05 [3.2.26]). The Boards of Appeal do not intervene of their own motion, but only at the request of the appellants (T 60/91 [9.3]). Referring to the principle of party disposition, the Enlarged Board of Appeal confirmed that the appeal proceedings are terminated after the appeal is withdrawn in so far as the substantive issues are concerned (G 8/91 [4,5], see also decision G 2/91 [6.1]). This applies also in cases where a third party who intervened during appeal proceedings is interested in the continuation of the proceedings (G 3/04 [10]). The principle of party disposition (in German “Verfügungsgrundsatz” or “Dispositionsmaxime”) also allows that the patent proprietor changes the order of auxiliary claim requests or introduces new claim requests and thereby avoids that certain requests are examined. Such changes of the order of auxiliary requests were made – and were not contested – during the OPs in the present case.

[31] Not only an appeal in its entirety but also part of an appeal can be withdrawn if the appeal could initially have been accordingly limited in conformity with R 99(1)(c) and R 99(2) (see J 19/82 [4]). In the present case, [the patent proprietor] could have refrained from filing the auxiliary requests in question. Consequently, [the patent proprietor] should be allowed to withdraw individual auxiliary requests filed in the course of the appeal proceedings. For the Board, it is not relevant whether the Board has discussed the relevant requests with the parties and/or whether the Board has given its opinion on such requests as long as the debate has not been closed in accordance with Article 15(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Appeal (RPBA) and no decision has been announced (see below point (35)). Opinions given by the Board in appeal proceedings regularly trigger the filing of new requests, the admissibility of which will then be examined under Article 13 RPBA. Likewise, the withdrawal of requests – which normally does not raise any issues under Article 13 RPBA – must be possible as a reaction to an opinion given by the Board.

[32] In the Board’s view, it does not matter whether [the patent proprietor] filed the auxiliary requests in question as appellant or as respondent to the appeal filed by [the opponent]. In inter partes proceedings, the principle of party disposition applies to the procedural acts of both parties (see also T 240/01 [6]).

[33] Under A 113(2), the EPO shall examine, and decide upon, the European patent application or the European patent only in the text submitted to it, or agreed, by the applicant or the proprietor of the patent. This provision not only specifies an aspect of the right to be heard; it is also relevant in the context of party disposition. It has been concluded from A 113(2) that a Board of Appeal has no authority to order the grant of a patent containing claims which are different from those submitted by the applicant (T 32/84 [19]). The principle that a patent may not be granted or maintained with claims to which the proprietor has never consented or to which the consent has been withdrawn applies to all procedural situations. If the patent proprietor in appeal proceedings withdraws its approval of the text of the patent as granted and declares that he will not be submitting an amended text, the appeal proceedings have to be terminated and the patent has to be revoked without any substantive examination (T 73/84 [3,5]). Accordingly, the withdrawal of the approval with respect to individual claim sets (filed as auxiliary requests) must result in the termination of the proceedings with respect to such claim sets. [The patent proprietor], by withdrawing his requests, withdrew his consent to the respective claim wording. In this context, any decision of the Board on the allowability of requests withdrawn by the patent proprietor would be completely pointless since a withdrawn request could never form the basis of a maintained patent.

[34] The principle of party disposition (which implies the right to withdraw an appeal in its entirety or in part) and the provision of A 113(2) imply, in the Board’s judgment, that [the patent proprietor], being the patent proprietor, must have the right to withdraw any of its claim requests filed in the course of appeals proceedings.

[35] A withdrawal of an appeal cannot have any effect on the decision if the appeal is withdrawn after the decision has been announced by the Board at OPs in accordance with R 111(1) (see T 1033/04 [3]). E contrario, an appeal may be withdrawn at any time before the decision is announced. When [the patent proprietor] withdrew part of its requests during the OPs, no formal decision had been announced yet on these requests. This fact was pointed out by the chair – and was not disputed – when the request was discussed. [The patent proprietor] was therefore allowed to withdraw part of its auxiliary requests in view of the status of the proceedings. The Board has to reject the request of [the opponent] that the withdrawal of claim requests of [the patent proprietor] considered during OPs shall not be allowed.

[36] If [the patent proprietor] is allowed to withdraw auxiliary requests before a final decision is taken, there is no room for any opinion or reasoning given by the Board on such withdrawn requests in the written decision. In view of R 111(1), decisions need to be given and reasoned only on admissible requests which are pending after the debate is closed.

[37] Any opinion or reasoning given by the Board on claim requests withdrawn during the proceedings would, in effect, constitute declaratory judgments or obiter dicta (i.e., findings which do not support the formula of the decision, see T 473/98). There is no basis in the EPC for any declaratory judgment. [The opponent] may therefore not request any formal decision on any claims which are not part of a pending request.

The Board agrees with [the opponent] that the Board may give comments or obiter dicta on points which need not to be decided in order to arrive at the final decision. The Board would not exclude that such obiter dicta may even comment on claims which do not form part of a pending request. However, it lies within the discretion of the Board to include or not to include such obiter dicta in the written decision. Any interest of [the opponent] in such obiter dicta which may arise in the course of pending or future application, opposition, infringement or invalidity proceedings cannot justify that obiter dicta (which may not have any relevance for any proceedings on the present patent before the EPO) are included in the final decision of the present proceedings. Even if a divisional application contains claims identical to claims forming part of withdrawn requests in the present proceedings, such claims in a divisional application could not be accepted or rejected on the basis of res iudicata if they were commented only in obiter dicta in the present proceedings.

Likewise, the Board does not accept the position of [the opponent] that the public interest would require the requested opinions on withdrawn claim requests. Third parties may not claim any right to learn about the Board’s opinion on claims that are not part of a pending request.

[38] For these reasons, the request that the Board expresses its opinion on withdrawn auxiliary requests has to be rejected.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Monday, 12 April 2010

T 25/09 – IP Rights Do Not Frighten The Skilled Person


[13] [The patent proprietor] argued that the skilled person trying to solve the problem […] would not turn to document D1B […]

The skilled person had several reasons not to turn to document D1B. Firstly, the use of the method disclosed therein was the intellectual property of the Patent Proprietor of document D1B. A skilled person, knowing that other purification processes were not protected by patent law, would not have chosen the process of document D1B. […]

[14] With regard to [the patent proprietor’s] argument that the skilled person would not have considered the teaching of document D1B because patent rights to be observed would have prevented him to do so, the Board firstly remarks that it is not aware of any legal basis, neither in the EPC nor in any other national or international law, which could form a basis for the conclusion that the disclosure in a patent should be disregarded for the assessment of inventive step, and secondly is convinced that this view is not supported by the usual and common approach how to consider the state of the art. To intellectually consider a certain teaching in a piece of prior art for the technical solution of a given technical problem is not hampered by the fact that carrying out commercially this teaching might be forbidden by patent rights, which furthermore might not even be valid.

It is also to be noted that the priority date of document D1B is 1981 whereas the priority date of the patent in suit is 2001.

We shall come back on this decision tomorrow.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Saturday, 10 April 2010

T 879/09 – An Allowable Intermediate Restriction


The EPO has the reputation of being extremely severe in the application of A 123. In the present case, the application was rejected by the Examining Division (ED) because the Division considered the amendment to be an unallowable “intermediate generalisation”. The decision is of some interest because the Board partially reverses that finding. Therefore, the case allows to see both amendments that are acceptable to the Board and amendments that are not. However, the example will be fully appreciated by mechanically skilled readers only.

The application concerned a robotized device for moving an object.

Claim 1 as filed read:

Robotized device to move an object (12), comprising manipulator means (14) having gripping elements (16) lying on a determinate plane of manipulation (P), first motor means (22) with which a first movement unit (25) is associated, in turn associated with said manipulator means (14), and second motor means (23) with which a second movement unit (26) is associated, in turn associated with said manipulator means (14), said first movement unit (25) and said second movement unit (26) defining with the respective first and second motor means (22, 23) and with said manipulator means (14) a pantograph mechanism, characterized in that at least one of said movement units (25, 26) comprises connection means (31, 34, 35, 37) able to keep said gripping elements (16) substantially parallel to said plane of manipulation (P) during the functioning of said pantograph mechanism.


During examination, the applicant introduced a great number of features concerning the first movement unit 25 from the single embodiment. The amended claim was rejected by the ED as being an intermediate generalisation because two features of the embodiment were missing.

[2.1] The ED objected in the decision under appeal that it had not been specified in claim 1 that the tubular element 32 was made of carbon and that the pair of tie-rods 34 was rigid, arguing that these features were inextricably linked to the other features disclosed in the specific embodiment that had been incorporated into claim 1. […] 

[2.1.2] A patent application describes an invention in general terms together with one or more detailed embodiments. In order to overcome an objection of lack of novelty and/or inventive step the applicant often adds some but not all the features from the detailed embodiments to the general disclosure. This results in an object that lies between the original general disclosure and the detailed embodiments. This is called an “intermediate generalization” in the patent jargon, although a more proper naming would be “intermediate restriction” to make clear that it is in fact a restriction from the more general original disclosure (T 461/05 [2.3]). 

[2.1.3] Such an intermediate restriction or generalization is permissible under A 123(2) only if the skilled person would recognize without any doubt from the application as filed that characteristics taken from a detailed embodiment were not closely related to the other characteristics of that embodiment and applied directly and unambiguously to the more general context (T 962/98 [2.5]).

Material of the tubular element

[2.1.4] The ED did not give reasons for the finding in the decision under appeal that the features that the tubular element was made of carbon and that the first movement unit comprised a pair of rigid tie-rods were inextricably linked to the other features of the embodiment of the invention.

[2.1.5] On the first point, the board agrees with the appellant applicant that a skilled person would understand that the feature “a tubular element 32 made of carbon” […] is not related to solving the problem addressed by the invention, namely to design a robotized manipulator whose surface stays parallel to the same plane when moved around. In fact, the skilled person would recognize immediately and without any doubt that the material of the tubular element is irrelevant for the present invention. As the test mentioned in point 2.1.3 above is fulfilled, not specifying the material of the tubular element 32 in claim 1 does not offend against A 123(2).

Rigidity of the tie-rods

[2.1.6] For the second point, namely the rigidity of the tie-rods, the working principle of the robotized device has to be understood. The gripping element 16 is kept substantially parallel to the same plane of manipulation through the combined use of
(a) a first parallelogram defined by the pivoting axis on armlet 35, the rotation centre Z1 of the first rotor 22b and pivoting axis A and B on toggle lever 31, and
(b) a second parallelogram defined by pivoting axis A and C on toggle lever 31 and the pivoting axis of the tubular element 32 and the first rod 37 on manipulator 14 (see figures 5 and 6 below).


[2.1.7] This combination assures that the angle between a line joining the pivoting axis on armlet 35 and the rotation centre Z1 of the first rotor 22b (imaginary line 1) and a line joining the two pivoting axis on manipulator 14 (imaginary line 2) is fixed, since line AB on toggle lever 31 is always parallel to line 1 and line AC is always parallel to line 2 due to the presence of the first and second parallelograms, while angle BAC defines the angle between the imaginary lines 1 and 2. As the manipulator 14 is still free to move in a circle around the toggle lever 31, the spatial position of the manipulator 14 is determined by the rotor of the second motor means 23 and the second movement unit 26.

[2.1.8] A tie-rod, however, is a slender structural unit used as a tie and (in most applications) capable of carrying tensile loads only; it can be articulated or flexible. Rigidity is therefore not an implicit feature of a tie-rod and has to be explicitly stated. 

[2.1.9] The feature that “a variation of an angular position of said rotor 22b is transformed in a movement of said two first arms 30 parallel to said two tie-rods 34” does not implicitly disclose that the tie-rods are rigid nor is it sufficient to specify the existence of the first parallelogram, since a parallel movement between arms 30 and tie-rods 34 would not result in a parallelogram if the length of the tie-rods, i.e. the distance between the pivoting axis on armlet 35 and pivoting axis B on toggle lever 31, is not fixed (e.g. if a telescopic tie-rod is used).

[2.1.10] As the first parallelogram is only realized with “rigid” tie rods 34, the feature “rigid” cannot be dissociated from the other features relating to the construction of the first arms and has therefore to be specified in claim 1, as it is now the case.

[2.2] The ED further objected that the feature that “the mounting reciprocal configuration of arms, tie rods, first rod and tubular element were such that a variation of an angular position of the first rotor was transformed in a movement of the two first arms parallel to the two tie-rods, a movement of the tubular element parallel to the first rod, and a movement of said manipulator that always maintained the gripping means lying on a plane substantially parallel to the plane of manipulation” had no explicit basis in the originally filed application.

[2.2.1] Although it is usually sufficient for fulfilling A 123(2) that an amendment has an explicit basis in the application as filed, this is in no way necessary. The test for deciding whether an amendment contains subject-matter extending beyond the content of the application as filed is whether the skilled person would be presented with information which is not directly and unambiguously derivable from what was presented by the application as filed, even when account is taken of matter which is implicit to a person skilled in the art (Guidelines C VI-5.3.1, December 2007).

[2.2.2] The objected feature specifies that when the first rotor 22b moves
a) the two first arms 30 move parallel to the two tie-rods 34 and
b) the tubular element 32 moves parallel to the first rod 37 so that
c) the movement of the manipulator always maintains the gripping means lying on a plane substantially parallel to the plane of manipulation.

This is thus nothing more than saying that each of the two elements (30/34 on one hand and 32/37 on the other) are the opposed sides of a parallelogram, since their lengths are fixed. Stating that the manipulator always maintains the gripping means lying on a plane substantially parallel to the plane of manipulation is nothing more than the direct consequence of the combined action of both parallelograms, as explained in points 2.1.6 and 2.1.7.

[2.2.3] The objected feature is therefore directly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed. […]

[2.4] The board finds, for these reasons, that the requirement of A 123(2) is fulfilled. 

To read the whole decision, click here.

Friday, 9 April 2010

T 394/06 – Substantiated Doubts Required


[20] It is established case law of the boards of appeal that if an application is objected to for lack of sufficient disclosure, these objections have to be based on serious doubts which are substantiated by verifiable facts (T 19/90).

[21] In its decision, the examining division (ED) has argued that the claimed subject-matter relating to vaccines based on the CASB7439 polypeptide was not sufficiently disclosed in accordance with A 83. There was no evidence derivable from the application or provided by the applicant that the sequences of the application had a therapeutic effect if used to treat a patient suffering from or susceptible to carcinoma, whereby the carcinoma is colon cancer or other colon-associated tumours or diseases. […] 

[22] The board notes that in its argumentation the ED, rather than applying it, has inverted the principle developed in the case law of the boards of appeal whereby it would be required to raise serious doubts which are substantiated by verifiable facts. Already for this reason the argumentation of the ED must fail to substantiate an objection under A 83.

[23] The board notes furthermore that even if the approach taken by the ED were adequate the [applicant’s] arguments […] convincingly show compliance of the application with A 83 in the relevant aspects.

[24] In particular, the [applicant] has shown that there is no reason to doubt that CASB7439, considered to be an intranuclear transcription factor, would not be suitable for producing vaccines for treating carcinoma patients. The [applicant] persuasively argued that in fact intranuclear proteins were constantly turned over in the cell and mechanisms existed which allowed such proteins to be processed and presented in MHC Class I complexes on the surface of cells including tumour cells. This was also true for transcription factors. Also other transcription factors could be used as an immunotherapeutic antigen (D10) and could naturally elicited immune responses in humans (D11 and D12). These data therefore showed that the epitopes contained in these transcription factors were presented to the immune system in an accessible way. Furthermore, document D13 presented data showing that CASB7439 was indeed effective as an immunotherapeutic treatment in a mouse tumour cell challenge model.

[25] All the submissions of the [applicant] therefore support the conclusion that the disclosure of the application is sufficient. On the basis of the facts of this case, there are no serious doubts substantiated by verifiable facts which could justify an objection that the inventions was not sufficiently disclosed.

[26] In view of the above considerations the board is satisfied that the claimed invention complies with the requirements of A 83. 

To read the whole decision, click here.

Thursday, 8 April 2010

T 516/09 – Assistant Going Crazy


It is one of the worst nightmares of a patent attorney to have an assistant who does not do what he/she is asked to do and even starts hiding facts and notifications. This appears to have happened in the present case where an application was deemed to be withdrawn because a communication under A 96(2) EPC 1973 was never answered. The decision deals with the request for re-establishment under A 122.

[VI] The appellant essentially submitted that the loss of right was due to an isolated mistake in a normally satisfactory monitoring system and that therefore re-establishment of rights should be allowed.

He described the monitoring system in his office as follows:

Every mail, e-mail or fax from external parties or offices arrives at the central mail receiving department of the office. Here a stamp with a time-limit indication is put on the front page of the printed mail and registered in a central register. The appellant did not explain how the central register actually works.

From the mail department, all mail goes to his desk or to another attorney’s desk according to the availability of either one of them for a first checking.

After that the letter and the file are sent together to the department responsible for the file concerned. The assistant of the department presents the incoming mail, e-mail or fax together with the file to the responsible attorney. The attorney decides what needs to be done and gives the file back to the assistant with the corresponding instructions. If a request for extension of time-limit has been sent, the client is informed and the new deadline is communicated to him.

There is a strict rule in the office that for each and every signature the file must be presented to the signatory. But under some circumstances it can happen that a letter is signed without the file. This can happen if somebody stores the file in the wrong place or if the file is in the annuity or accounting departments which are in another building. Under such circumstances, it is checked whether the letters have been sent to the right addressee and whether an answer has been received by checking the database of the office containing the letter sent and the correspondence received.

A cross-check or another supervision system has not been described.

The representative in this case submitted that in general after he has given instructions to the assistant he does not check the file any further but waits until a reaction on his action is given by the client or a third party. The system is based on trusting the assistants and the staff, assuming that they will do their job properly. The attorney assumes that the assistant will show him the incoming mail, e-mail, fax or put through the phone calls, execute his instructions properly and present him the file when necessary. On the other hand he claims to have a personal electronic reminder-system that reminds him of the files that have to be checked on a particular day or for specific reasons. Furthermore, so called “hot files” are put on a table in the department and the assistant and the attorney check them from time to time. “Hot files” are files in which a further extension of time-limits is no longer possible. A more detailed description of the monitoring system has not been submitted.

In the present case, the assistant presented a request for extension of the time-limit to the representative three times without the paper file, giving restructuring in the office as the reason. She informed the representative that the time-limit extension was necessary because no instructions had been given by the client although the client was reminded that instructions are required. In all cases the representative signed the requests.

He declared during oral proceedings that the third time he asked for time-limit extension he was well aware of the fact that he would not get a further extension and was waiting for the notice of loss of rights.

The attorney submits that he could not check the paper file because it could not to be found, but he checked the electronic mail on the assistant’s computer on which he could see the e-mail reminding the client about the time-limit. Of course, no acknowledgment of receipt of the e-mail was in the file, but he submits that he had no reasons to assume that the assistant could have lied. On the other hand, he submits that it is very unlikely that he signed three requests for extension of time-limit without seeing the file. Although he does not remember when he checked the file, he considers that the central mail receiving department or the department to which the file was assigned would have discovered if requests for extension of time-limits were signed without checking the paper file and would have undertaken counter-measures. Therefore, it has to be assumed that he checked the file.

He assumes that the assistant presented to him a “constructed file” in which the instructions from the client and the communications of the office were not present. In fact, the assistant had taken out of the file all the enquiries from the US agent and all communications of the Office including the notice of loss of rights and the notice on the refund of the renewal fee and hidden them between other papers. The assistant also intercepted all calls from the US representative. When the notice of loss of rights was received the assistant did not inform the attorney either and did not put the notice in the file. The time-limit for filing a request for further processing was registered by the central mail receiving department but, upon expiry of the time-limit, the assistant informed that department that the client had not given instructions and that the time-limit was to be deleted from the register. The attorney was not informed of all these actions. The central mail receiving department abandoned the application without requiring a confirmation from the attorney. This is possible in the office because it is not unusual that clients do not give instructions on the file or do not pay and in these cases the applications are abandoned.

The representative submits that he had no reasons to think that the file he saw was not the real file, that he also had no reasons to call the client and ask for instructions because it is usual that clients do not give instructions even after having received reminders, that he also had no reasons to check the file in the electronic database of the EPO because often it takes months before the EPO answers requests for extensions of time-limits. After having filed the third request for extension of the time-limit he was aware of the fact that this request was very likely to be refused and the file was put on the table dedicated to “hot files” and this was a sufficient measure to monitor the file because this meant that the file would be checked from time to time. He could not say how often the “hot files” had been checked. In any case, since the assistant had taken out of the file all communications from the EPO, it was impossible for him to recognise what happened. Even if he had seen that the fee was reimbursed, he had considered that this was not unusual because clients often pay fees twice. He did not ask the US representative to get a copy of the lost or misplaced file because this would be embarrassing for himself or his office.

The representative was informed of the loss of rights only on 14 November 2005 when the US representative of the applicant called him late in the evening. This call to enquire why the application was deemed to be withdrawn according to the EPO online register was not intercepted by the assistant because she had gone home. At this moment the representative started an intensive search for the paper file, found the hidden papers and discovered what had happened. At that moment he also realised that the assistant was probably having mental problems and dismissed her immediately.

The assistant responsible for the file had been working in the representative’s office since 1 June 2002 and was a responsible person, who had never made a mistake before. The attorney had no reason not to trust her. He never recognized any negligence concerning her duties while she was working with him. He cannot explain why she acted as she did. He assumes that she had mental health problems.

He considered that he applied all due care required by the circumstances because it is not possible to implement a monitoring system that enables someone to discover such unusual behaviour. An attorney has to trust his assistant and cannot check everything himself. Since one and the same person was acting all the time and in both cases in which the problems arose, it has to be considered that it was an isolated mistake in a normally satisfactory monitoring system.

The representative compared the present case with the case decided in J 7/99, in which the representative gave up prosecuting the application due to a mental block and with the case decided in J 2/98, in which the representative had mental health problems.

Here is the reaction of the Board:

[2] The request for re-establishment of rights into the time-limit to request further processing is not allowable because it was not shown that the time-limit was missed despite all due care required by the circumstances has been applied (A 122).

[2.1] Primarily it is up to the applicant to show due care. If third parties act for him by virtue of the delegation implicit in the appointment of the professional representative, the applicant who has delegated the duty to exercise all due care has to accept their actions on his behalf (see J 5/80).

The representative in his turn can delegate routine tasks to assistants. In this case, it is incumbent upon the representative to choose for the work a suitable person, properly instructed in the tasks to be performed, and to exercise reasonable supervision over the work. If the representative is able to prove that he did so, he can succeed in re-establishment (see J 5/80). The jurisprudence considers that the representative has discharged his burden of proof, when it is proven that the time-limit was missed due to an isolated mistake in a normally satisfactory system for monitoring time-limits.

[2.2] It results from the submissions of the representative that the system in his office was principally based on the assumption that staff would follow the rules of the office and the instructions given by the attorney, but it has not been shown to the Board, considering the so implemented system, how possible failures could be detected and remedied in due time.

Even considering in favour of the appellant that all delegated tasks were routine tasks and assuming that all submissions were proven, it results from the submissions that, in the present case, it was possible for the assistant to act several times, on her own motion, in an inappropriate and detrimental way, over a period of time of more than one year and even to give instructions to other employees or departments which led to the abandonment of the application without any warning being activated by the system or countermeasures adopted by staff. In particular, it was apparently possible at least in two cases (the present one and the case concerning Euro-PCT application No. 00917730.4) that the assistant ordered, and the central mail receiving department responsible for time-limits deleted, the time-limits for further processing after the issue of a notice of loss of rights - an action which had fatal consequences for the applications - without the responsible representative and the client being informed and their approval being requested. It was not submitted that a cross-check system or other measures have been implemented in order to avoid such critical situations.

Even if it was one and the same person acting, it cannot be said that the time-limit was missed due to an isolated mistake. The time-limit was missed due to a series of measures taken by the assistant on her own motion which were not detected over a period of more then one year because, according to the submissions in the present case, neither cross-check nor other supervisory mechanism was present in order to avoid wrong behaviour of employees or failures in the proper execution of their duties, particularly when the employees are acting on their own motion.

Even if it is assumed in favour of the appellant that the assistant had mental health problems, the decisions cited are not relevant because in those cases it was the representative himself who could not exercise his functions properly due to mental health problems. In the present case, it is not submitted that any physical or mental health problem would have prevented the appellant’s representative from monitoring a file or supervising an employee’s work.

The Board holds therefore, that it was not shown that the supervision of the work of the assisting staff was sufficient to avoid repeated failures. It has therefore not been proven that all due care required by the circumstances was applied.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Wednesday, 7 April 2010

T 378/08 – Imprecise But Clear


[5.2] Claim 5 is amended over claim 14 as granted by reciting that the aluminium alloy of the workpieces is a corrosion-resistant precipitation hardened high-strength aluminium alloy. This feature is disclosed, in a general context (thus also applying to the embodiment according to claim 5), [in] the application as filed.

The [opponent] objected to this feature under A 84 as introducing no clear limitations.

It is accepted that the terms “corrosion-resistant” and “high-strength” are relative terms. However, their lack of precision does not entail a lack of clarity within the meaning of A 84.

The skilled person is indeed aware that precipitation hardened aluminium alloys are generally regarded as high-strength aluminium alloys (precipitation hardening in fact is one of the most widely used mechanisms for the strengthening of metal alloys). The skilled person is also aware that some aluminium alloys can be classified as corrosion-resistant due to their corrosion-resistant properties. The skilled person thus understands the meaning of the above-mentioned terms in the given context so that the claim as now worded is susceptible of an interpretation which strikes an appropriate balance between legal certainty and fair protection. 

To read the whole decision, click here.

Tuesday, 6 April 2010

T 378/08 – Oral Proceedings Aren’t Boot Camps


[2.1] The presence of the person accompanying the professional representative of the respondent at the oral proceedings (OPs) was announced by letter dated 23 October 2009. The last paragraph of this letter reads as follows:

“Please be informed that I will by accompanied by Mr. M. Beck who has a bachelor in law and is preparing for the EQE. I assume that you will allow him to make oral submissions during the hearing, under my continuing responsibility and control”.

The letter did not specify the subject-matter of the proposed oral submissions.

During the OPs the professional representative specified that the accompanying person would present arguments in respect of inventive step. She submitted that the accompanying person had followed the case in the past and had excellent technical knowledge of the matters at issue. Moreover, since the accompanying person was preparing for the EQE, he should be given a training opportunity. 

[2.2] The Board, having regard to the requirements set out in G 4/95 for an accompanying person to be allowed to make oral submissions, rejected the respondent’s request for the following reasons.

The letter of 23 October 2009 did not include a formal request to allow the accompanying person to make oral submissions and in any case the generally-worded statement of the respondent did not specify the subject-matter of the proposed oral submissions (G 4/95 [headnote points 2(b)(i) and (ii)]).

More details were given for the first time at the OPs. At that time the professional representative, however, did not convince the Board of the presence of exceptional circumstances justifying the accompanying person to make oral submissions, and the appellant did not give its agreement to the making of the oral submissions requested (G 4/95 [headnote point 2(b)(iii)]).

No reasons were given why the professional representative herself might not be in a position to fully present her case on inventive step. Furthermore, although it is not denied that OPs before the EPO might, under appropriate circumstances, provide a possible training opportunity for prospective professional representatives (e.g. when they are present as members of the public), this must remain subordinate to the conduct of OPs in accordance with its true purpose, which does not include the training of future professional representatives. 

To read the whole decision, click here.

NB: This decision has also been commented by Laurent Teyssèdre.

Monday, 5 April 2010

T 775/07 – Is It Essential ?


One of the must-know decisions for EQE candidates is T 331/87 wherein the Board defined the so-called “essentiality test”, which allows to check whether an amendment that comprises the deletion of features from a claim is allowable. The present decision shows how this test may be applied in real life.

Once again the EPO confirms its reputation of being extremely strict on “new matter”.

[2.1] In the present case, the feature that the hands-free towel dispenser comprises “a solar panel for energising said control circuitry” (feature f)) has been removed from claim 1 as originally filed.

An amendment that deletes a feature from an independent claim is only allowable if the skilled person would directly and unambiguously recognise that
i) the feature in question was not explained as essential to the invention,
ii) the feature is not indispensable for the function of the invention in the light of the technical problem it serves to solve, and
iii) replacement or removal requires no real modification of other features to compensate for the change (Guidelines C-VI, 5.3.10 and decision T 331/87). In the present case at least the third criterion is not fulfilled.

[2.2] As described in the application as filed […] the solar panel is utilised for energising the control circuitry […]. No other alternative power source for energising the control circuitry is disclosed in the application as filed.

The removal of feature f) i.e. the solar panel for energising the control circuitry from claim 1 as originally filed requires modification of the feature d) (an electric power source for powering said dispensing means) since in that case the electric power source should also be used in place of the solar panel for energising the control circuitry.

The [patent proprietor] argued that a battery is already provided for powering the dispensing means, i.e. the motor of the dispenser […] and that it would therefore be obvious for a skilled person that this battery could serve as an alternative power supply for the control circuitry. However, only what is directly and unambiguously derivable from the originally filed application, taking into account matter which is implicit (not merely obvious) to a skilled person can serve as a basis for an amendment.

In the case of a battery used to power the dispenser, it is not implicitly disclosed that the battery is also used to energise the control circuitry, since no other alternative power than the solar panel is disclosed in the application as originally filed. Nor would such an interpretation be unambiguously derivable for the person skilled in the art. […] 

[2.4] The [patent proprietor] argued that there was no functional or structural relationship between the control circuitry and the solar panel inasmuch as the jamming problem was concerned. He further referred to decision T 962/98 to illustrate that an intermediate generalisation (from solar panel to power supply) could be admissible under A 123(2).

The Board cannot agree with this point of view. In the present case, the subject-matter generated by the amendment from “solar panel” to the more general “power supply” involves added subject-matter, because no other power supply than the solar panel has been originally disclosed for energising the control circuitry. The fact that the control circuitry could be energised by an unspecified power supply is clearly new information which is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the originally filed application.

[2.5] Accordingly, the removal of the feature “solar panel” in claim 1 of the main request and of the fourth auxiliary request contravenes the requirements of A 123(2) (A 100(c)). 

To read the whole decision, click here.

Saturday, 3 April 2010

T 911/07 – Miss M. May Make Mistakes


The present decision deals with a request for restitutio in integrum (A 122). The professional representative had filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the opposed patent in amended form but his assistant, Mrs. M., although instructed to pay the appeal fee, had omitted to do so.

The decision, although not very exciting in itself, gives a nice overview over the actual case law concerning re-establishment in situations where a professional representative has entrusted certain routine tasks to an assistant.

[4] A 122 provides for an applicant who, in spite of all the due care required by the circumstances having been taken, was unable to observe a time limit vis-à-vis the EPO, thereby losing a right or other redress, to have his rights re-established upon application subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, above, being met. It is the established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal that A 122 is intended to ensure that, in appropriate cases, the loss of substantive rights does not result from an isolated procedural mistake within a normally satisfactory system (J 2/86 and J 3/86).

[5] Whether or not a request for re-establishment of rights may be allowed, depends on whether or not the applicant can show that all the due care required by the circumstances of the particular case was in fact taken to comply with the time limit. With respect to due care, the following principles relevant to the present case were laid down by the Board in J 5/80:

[6] (1) When an applicant is represented by a professional representative, a request for re-establishment of rights cannot be acceded to unless the representative himself or herself can show that he or she has taken the due care required of an applicant or proprietor by A 122(1).

(2) If the representative has entrusted to an assistant the performance of routine tasks, the same strict standards of care are not expected of the assistant as are expected of the applicant or his representative.

[7] As regards the foresaid first condition, the Appellant relied on a computerised time limit monitoring system by which the time limits were checked by himself and his assistant. The Appellant gave proof of these facts by his own sworn statement, the declaration of his assistant and a hard copy of a monitoring list of the computer system. In the Board’s view, this reminder system can be assessed as normally satisfactory to ensure compliance with time limits under the EPC. The double check by the representative and its assistance can be considered a cross check as required by the established case law. There was no need to monitor the time limit for the payment of the appeal fee separately. For the Board it is credible that in the representative’s firm, unless otherwise ordered, the assistant signed and added EPO Form 1010 to the notice of appeal whereby payment of the appeal fee was ensured by reduction from the deposit account. Even if the examples of the EPO Forms submitted by the Appellant do not clearly show whether or not they were signed by an assistant, the statement of the representative and his assistant seems to provide convincing proof that the general rule existed at least in the department where the Appellant’s representative worked.

[8] In the present case, the question arises whether or not the representative’s duty of care relating to the filing of the appeal ceased when he handed over the notice of appeal to his assistant. As a rule, the representative is not obliged to monitor that the outgoing mail is made ready for posting and delivered to the postal service. Such a task can be entrusted to an assistant because the issuance of a letter causes no difficulties. Although the payment of the appeal fee is a crucial event in the appeal proceedings which normally needs special care, the Board can accept the Appellant’s submission that in the monitoring system of its firm the task to file EPO Form 1010 together with the notice of appeal can be considered a routine work which can be trusted to an assistant because no legal or factual difficulties are to be expected in performing this. 

[9] As regards the lower standard of care for assistants as mentioned in point 6(1) above, the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal (J 5/80; T 191/82; T 43/96) only excuses under A 122(1)  a singular mistake or error of the employee when this person had been suitable selected, properly instructed and reasonably supervised. In this regard the Board sees no reason to question the statements made by the representative and his assistant. According to these statements, the assistant was well trained and long experienced in the tasks of a patent assistant and in particular fully acquainted with all deadlines and fees to be paid in proceedings before the EPO. The fact that the notice of appeal was filed in due time allows the conclusion that a clear order was given by the representative and that the assistant’s omission to add EPO Form 1010 to this notice was a singular mistake within an otherwise satisfactory system and which could not be detected by the representative in the circumstances of the present case. As regards the routine work of adding EPO Form 1010, the Board holds that in the present case the representative could rely on the oral confirmation from the assistant that the notice of appeal was filed and no further supervision was required. 

[10] As all requirements pursuant to A 122(1)-(3) are fulfilled, re-establishment of rights can be granted. Consequently, the appeal is admissible pursuant to A 106 to A 108. 

Alas, the requests were finally found to lack inventive step and the appeal was dismissed.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Friday, 2 April 2010

T 1533/07 – Don’t Lump Together Novelty And Priority


It is a vital thing for a European patent attorney to have a perfect command of the concepts behind novelty and priority (“same invention”). The present decision demonstrates in a very pedagogic manner that these concepts, albeit not unrelated, must not be mixed up with each other. In other words: the novelty test is not to be used in the assessment of the validity of a priority claim.

Claim 1 according to the main request read:

A lining or shape element for means of transportation, comprising at least one microperforated sheet absorber having a proportion of hole area of from 0.2 to 4%, wherein the holes of said microperforated sheet absorber for the microperforation have one or more diameters within a range of from 0.05 mm to 2 mm and one or more interhole distances within a range of from 1 mm to 20 mm, and at least one foam and/or non-woven absorber at a spatial distance from a reverberant wall.

[6] According to decision G 2/98 [9] of the Enlarged Board of appeal the expression “same invention” in A 87(1) EPC 1973 is to be interpreted narrowly and the priority of a previous application in respect of a claim is to be acknowledged only if the person skilled in the art can derive the subject-matter of the claim directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the previous application as a whole. This means that a particular embodiment cannot validly claim the priority of a generic embodiment disclosed in a previous application if the previous application does not disclose the particular embodiment. It follows that if the subject-matter of the claim comprises ranges of values or specific values, these ranges or values have to be comprised directly and unambiguously in the previous application on which the priority claim is based (see T 136/01, T 788/01). This requirement is not fulfilled in the present case because the upper limit of 4 % for the proportion of hole area is neither disclosed in [the first priority document] nor deductible from [this document] using common general knowledge. As the priority of [said document] is not validly claimed (A 87(1) EPC 1973) document D1a as a whole is prior art under A 54(3) for claim 1 […] because of its date of publication.

The argument of the [patent proprietor], according to which the validity of the priority claim directly results from the alleged ground that the range of values of from 0.3 to 4% and the value of 4% for the proportion of hole area is not novel in view of the ranges 0.3 to 10% and 0.5 to 5% disclosed in [the first priority document], is in contradiction with the principles of decision G 2/98 and misconceives the essence (Wesen) of this decision. These principles, which clearly require the unambiguous disclosure of the presently claimed subject-matter in the previous application, have been developed in order to create a safe legal situation for the assessment of the validity of priority claims. This safety was not provided by the prior case law and its criteria, as has been shown in G 2/98.

For instance, in the present case, it is not directly apparent why a proportion of hole area of 4% would not be novel in view of the ranges of values disclosed in the [first priority document]. On the other hand, a proportion of hole area in the range of 0.3% to 4% is clearly not novel in view of the ranges of values disclosed in the [first priority document] because the lower limits of 0.3% are the same, irrespective of the upper limit. It remains unclear why in such a case the priority of the [first priority document] was validly claimed, as submitted by the [patent proprietor], because the ranges of domains are clearly different, due to the different upper limit.

[7] The subject-matter of claim 1 is not novel over D1a. […] The proportion of hole area of the sheet absorber according to D1a lies between 3% and 10%. As a consequence, a proportion of hole area of between 0.3 and 4% […] is known from D1a. […]

[8] There is one more thing to be said with respect to the submission of the [patent proprietor]. Contrary to the opinion of the [patent proprietor], the use of the criteria which, according to the established case law, are used for the assessment of a selection invention (see T 279/89) were not applied in an inconsistent manner in the assessment of validity of the priority claim (see paragraph [6] above) and in the assessment of novelty of claim 1 with respect to D1a (see paragraph [7]). As a matter of fact, this was not even possible in the present case because the subject-matter of claim 1 cannot possibly be a selection invention, since D1a discloses a concrete and explicit embodiment having values which all are comprised in the claimed range of values. As in the assessment of said questions well defined, different and established criteria have been applied, wherein the concept of selection invention is irrelevant, it is not apparent where a contradiction arises.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

Thursday, 1 April 2010

T 1533/07 – Insolvent Yet Alive


The present decision deals with another case of bankruptcy during opposition proceedings; it contains some interesting statements on a little known rule: R 84.

[2] The [opponent’s] request for a suspension of the proceedings, based on an analogous application of R 84(2), the wording of which is identical to the wording of R 60(2) EPC 1973, cannot be granted, for the following reasons.

The opposition proceedings can be continued by the EPO of its own motion if the opponent dies or loses its legal capacity (R 84(2)). This rules allows to continue the opposition proceedings without the participation of the heirs or the legal representative of the opponent, which is in the interest of speedy proceedings. Therefore, it is not necessary to wait for the identification of the heirs and the acceptance of the heritage or the appointment of a legal representative (see Singer/Stauder, Europäisches Patentübereinkommen, 4th edition, Article 101, paragraph 70 et seqq. [NB : paragraph 84 et seqq. in the 3rd English edition]).

In the present case, on September 1, 2009 the German district court in Worms decided to open insolvency proceedings against the opponent, who is a legal person, and to appoint a liquidator (Insolvenzverwalter). Together with the opening of the insolvency proceedings the court decided to bar the debitrix from disposing of its present and future assets (Vermögen) during the insolvency proceedings. The administrative powers and the power of disposal were transferred to the appointed liquidator (see also § 80(1) and § 35 of the German Insolvency Regulations (InsO)). Therefore, the [opponent] has lost the administrative powers and the power of disposal concerning its assets, to which the opponent status belongs (see also G 4/88). However, there is no loss of legal capacity of the opponent as mentioned in R 84(2), first sentence (see Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ, 8th edition, introduction, paragraph 176) so that this rule could at most find an application by analogy.

The Board is of the opinion that in the present case even an analogous application of R 84(2) is not to be considered, because a liquidator has been appointed and named in the decision opening the insolvency proceedings. Therefore, the situation corresponds to none of the cases governed by this rule.

According to German insolvency law the appointed liquidator is party as of right as a consequence of the decision to open the insolvency proceedings (see decision of the BPG dated Mai 21, 2007 – 27 W (pat) 37/06, BIPMZ 2008, 26). Therefore, the appointed liquidator has become a party to the present proceedings by means of a legal change of party (im Wege gesetzlichen Parteiwechsels) and has replaced the opponent and appellant. Thus the proceedings were to be continued with the liquidator as party as of right (kraft Amtes) (see also T 917/01).

The arguments brought forward in favour of a suspension of the proceedings in analogous application of R 84(2) did not persuade the Board. Moreover, the possibility of such an analogous application appears doubtful because it would be in conflict with the purpose of the rule as explained above.

The question may be left aside whether in order for the proceedings to be complete, in view of the grounds for opposition and the cited prior art, which allegedly could not be evaluated without extensive investigations of the Board, submissions, and therefore, the presence, of the liquidator or his representative in the oral proceedings were required. The liquidator had been appointed as of September 1, 2009, by decision of the court. Therefore the Board is of the opinion that there was enough time for preparing the oral proceedings summoned for October 6, 2009 and, as the case may be, for a consultation with the previous appointed representative whose power of attorney issued by the opponent had lapsed pursuant § 117(1) InsO by the opening of the insolvency proceedings, and for issuing a power of attorney for a representative. As a matter of fact, the liquidator has issued a power of attorney to the representative who previously acted in the present proceedings, before the oral proceedings, so that the representative was able to argue the case.

The open question as to which companies and domains of the conglomerate of companies subsumed under the name of the opponent are to be continued as such may be relevant for the insolvency proceedings. However, this question could not be taken into account in the present proceedings because it would have considerably delayed the proceedings, which is neither in the interest of speedy proceedings nor acceptable (zuzumuten) to the [patent proprietor].

I shall come back on this decision tomorrow.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

Wednesday, 31 March 2010

T 1333/07 – You Can Disprove Effects Without Experiments


[5.1] During the oral proceedings (OPs) before the Board, the [patent proprietors], after having been informed that the main request was not considered allowable, pointed out that if the reason for the rejection of the main request was the lack of evidence for a technical effect, then it regarded this finding of the Board as amounting to a fundamental violation of A 113, because the superior technical effect of the claimed screw extruder had not been challenged by the opponent on the basis of any substantive data and the existence of such an effect was challenged for the first time by the Board during the OPs without acceding to the [patent proprietors’] request to remit the case to the Opposition Division (OD) to afford the [patent proprietors] an opportunity to provide such evidence.

[5.2] The [patent proprietors’] assertion that the technical effect had never been challenged by the [opponent] is not in agreement with the facts.

[5.2.1] This point, i.e. the absence of a technical effect due to the use of multiple thread starts, was raised by the [opponent] in the Statement of Grounds of Appeal.

[5.2.2] Moreover, the Board in its preliminary opinion dated 22 July 2009 observed that it was to be discussed during the OPs, inter alia, what was the problem to be solved and whether the problem was actually solved within the whole claimed area. 

[5.2.3] The [patent proprietors] even commented on this issue in its letter of 25 March 2008 […] Finally, this issue was discussed in detail during the OPs before the Board. 

[5.3] In view of these facts, the Board can only come to the conclusion that the [patent proprietors] had sufficient opportunity to defend themselves against the attack of the [opponent] based on the absence of a technical effect of the claimed subject-matter, which it duly did before and during the OPs.

[5.4] Insofar as the [patent proprietors] relies on the lack of experimental data in the argument of the [opponent], it is noted that, according to the Boards’ case law, alleged advantages which the patent proprietor asserts, without offering sufficient evidence to support the comparison with the closest prior art, cannot be taken into consideration in determining the problem underlying the invention and therefore in assessing inventive step (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 5th edition, 2006, I.D.4.2). Additionally the evidence on file in fact challenges the assertions of the [patent proprietors]. As to the [patent proprietors’] argument that in opposition proceedings the burden is on the Opponent to disprove any effect accepted by the granting authority, this obligation has been met, as set out above. The Board notes in this respect that in order to meet this obligation it is sufficient to establish a reasonable case, which does not necessarily require experimental evidence. In the Board’s judgment, the [opponent] has met this obligation by casting considerable doubt on the unsupported allegations of the patent in suit.

[5.5] Article 12(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) states that the Statement of Grounds and the reply shall contain a party’s complete case. Amendments to a party’s case are only possible under the conditions of Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA. The request to be allowed to present new evidence in further proceedings before the OD would be contrary to Article 13(3) RPBA. Consequently, the Board refused the [patent proprietors’] request for remittal of the case to the OD for further prosecution.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Tuesday, 30 March 2010

T 1333/07 – Credible Cause ?


In a recent post we have seen a decision examining the credibility that a given problem had indeed been solved. Once it is established that the problem has been solved, it remains to be demonstrated or at least made credible that the claimed features are at the origin of the effect.

[4.2.5] The Board agrees with the Respondents that the extruders used in the examples of the patent in suit show improved efficiency when compared with those of D2.

There is however no evidence that this improvement is due to the distinguishing feature of the claim, namely the number of thread starts. On the contrary the comparison between experiments 10 and 11 discussed above undisputedly question that this is the case.

[4.2.6] In addition to the results in the patent, the Respondents relied during the oral proceedings on paragraph [0007] of the specification in order to establish that an increase of performance has been achieved. According to this paragraph it was possible to dramatically increase the performance of an extruder when used in the manufacture of ice cream by:
(a) operating with a pitch angle which is outside what has been used up until now in the manufacture of ice cream,
(b) operating with screws which have more than one thread start, whereas up until now screws with only one thread start have been disclosed, and
(c) operating with extruders which are much shorter than what has been used up until now.

[4.2.7] The Board notes: that feature (a) is not a distinguishing feature of the claimed extruder; that the results in the Table of the patent question the affirmation of the Respondents that feature (b) is responsible for the increased performance of the extruder; and that feature (c) is not a feature of the subject-matter of Claim 1 of the main request.

With respect to feature (b) the Board notes furthermore that, in the absence of supporting evidence, an improved performance of an extruder having a screw with more than one thread start over an extruder with a single threaded screw is not per se credible, because given the complexity of the parameters influencing the rheological properties in an extruder, this feature by itself can in all probability not be assumed to influence the cooling performance in the desired fashion independently of other parameters.

The Board thus concludes that an improvement of the efficiency of the extruder relating to the distinguishing feature of the invention is not derivable from the patent in suit.

Reformulation of the problem and its solution

[4.3.1] In view of the above, an improvement of the energy efficiency of the extruders according to Claim 1 cannot be acknowledged as the objective technical problem underlying the invention as claimed in the main request. As a consequence, the problem has to be reformulated in a less ambitious manner, not involving such improvement. 

[4.3.2] The objective problem can thus be reformulated as the provision of further screw extruders for the manufacture of ice cream. 

[4.3.3] It is not disputed that this less ambitious problem is solved by the claimed single screw extruders having between 2 and 6 thread starts according to Claim 1 as it is an alternative design when compared to that of D2.

Obviousness

[4.4.1] The question which remains to be decided is whether this solution involves an inventive step, that is to say, if in view of the reformulated problem the claimed subject-matter is obvious or not.

[4.4.2] In the absence of an improvement of the efficiency of the extruder, the use of a screw extruder with more than one thread start is regarded by the Board as obvious for the skilled person and therefore lacking inventive step.

[4.4.3] The reason for this conclusion is that it is undisputed that multiple thread starts are well known in the design of screw extruders (see, for instance, D40). Moreover extruders with multiple thread starts have already been used in the manufacture of ice creams, for instance in Example 1 of D7.

[4.4.4] As this finding was not disputed by the Respondents, who even admitted during the oral proceedings that if the improvement of the efficiency of the extruder was not accepted, there was no inventive step in the use of a screw with multiple thread starts, no further comments are needed.

[4.5] For the reasons set out above the subject-matter of Claim 1 of the main request lacks inventive step.

Normally this less-ambitious-problem situation precedes the revocation of the patent for lack of inventive step. In the present case, however, the third auxiliary request (claiming a screw extruder with a screw having between 2 and 6 thread starts and a screw length/screw diameter ratio of between 2 and 10) was found to involve an inventive step, not because it solved a more ambitious problem, but because use of such screws was not known or suggested in the prior art.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Monday, 29 March 2010

T 392/07 – On Juxtaposition


In the present case the examining division rejected the application, since the claimed method of identifying an integrated circuit (IC) was a juxtaposition or aggregation of features known from the prior art and did therefore not involve an inventive step. The Board comes to the same conclusion.

[3.2] The method of claim 1 differs from the identifying method disclosed in D5 in that the IC is additionally marked with a machine readable optical identification code which corresponds with the electronic identification information.

[3.3] The applicant argued that it was the objective technical problem to create a technique which enabled traceable identification of the individual IC chips through the various manufacturing process steps […]. The board understands this statement of the problem as being directed to the identification of the ICs and not to the identification of the IC chips, as the latter are not a feature of claim 1 and, in particular, since an identification mark on the IC can hardly be seen once the IC is encapsulated in its housing.

[3.4] Document D8 discloses a dense bar code, particularly useful in the identification of semiconductor wafers and/or chips in very large scale IC manufacturing processes where space on chips and wafers is at a premium.

[3.5] Documents D5 and D8 hence disclose tools for identifying ICs either electronically, as in D5, or optically, as in D8. They are concerned with the tools themselves, i.e. how the coding of the information is done in each case. When to use these tools, whether or not to use more than one tool and how to combine these tools when more than one is used, these questions are left open in these documents to the discretion of the skilled person facing a specific situation.

[3.6] The board considers that a skilled person, having the task of providing a further identification on the IC, would use the optical identifier disclosed in D8, as it is an identification method specifically designed for identifying ICs. Both identifiers, the electronic and the optical, correspond forcefully with each other, as they identify the same object. They are two pointers pointing to the same spot. Thus the functional interrelationship between both markers adduced by the appellant applicant is nothing more than the consequence of both markers identifying the same circuit. The board is unable to imagine how two identifying markers of the same object could not correspond to each other.

The problem allegedly underlying the present invention, namely traceable identification of the individual IC’s through the various manufacturing process steps, is independently solved by the electronic and the optical identifiers. They differ in that for reading the former electric contact with the IC is required, while for the latter it is not. A more appropriate formulation of the problem would be therefore allowing contactless traceable identification of the individual IC’s. To this problem an optical identification code is a straightforward solution.

[3.7] The applicant argued that the use of both identification marks provided a greater security than the prior art approaches and had thus a synergistic effect. Apart from the fact that the application does not disclose any security concerns, the board is unable to recognize how the security would be improved by providing two points of attack. In order to interpret a code the coding has to be known. This applies to the electronic and optical identifiers of the prior art as much as to the double system of the application. The board cannot recognize any added security in the claimed identification scheme, since the information encoded in each identifier is revealed when it is decoded. As in the prior art, each identifier encodes the information independently from the other, since one identifier has not to be decoded for accessing the other identifier. The [applicant’s] argument that by decoding only one of the identifiers only a part of the encoded information is revealed is true, but nothing else could have been expected, since by breaking a code only the part of a message encoded with that code is revealed.

[3.8] The appellant applicant further argued that the provision of the optical marking allowed identifying the IC even when the electronic information could no longer be accessed due to failure of the circuit. This, however, only underlines the independence of both identifiers and refutes the presence of a synergistic effect.

[3.9] In the board’s view, the identifying method of claim 1 is an aggregation of features which are in themselves known from documents D5 and D8. Although most inventions are formed by features which are in themselves known from the prior art, for a finding of non-obviousness these features would have to interact with each other to provide something that is more than the sum of the parts. Absent synergy the whole is not more than the sum of its parts, i.e. an aggregation of features, as correctly objected by the examining division. 

[3.10] The board judges, for the above reasons, that the method of claim 1 of the main request does not involve an inventive step.

This decision is interesting because it involves a concept that is not so often present in EPO decisions: the concept of juxtaposition, i.e. the aggregation of features the effect of which does not go beyond the sum of the effects of the individual features (in other words, there is no synergy between the features). This notion was very common in French case law prior to the alignment of French law with the Munich convention. Maybe this is the reason why it has some “vintage” flavour to me.

The notion of juxtaposition is not without danger, because it is of course possible to have a patentable juxtaposition of known elements, in particular if at least one of the known elements was disclosed in an A 54(3) document only (which is not the case here).

Therefore, I would say that the reasoning of the Examining Division and the Board using the short cut “juxtaposition” (thereby following the Guidelines C-IV 11.7) is incomplete. Methinks that it would have been preferable to use the traditional problem-solution approach, starting from either D5 or D8 and showing that the combination of features was obvious. The fact that the claimed device appears to be a juxtaposition of features disclosed in D5 and D8 is indeed a strong indication that the combination was obvious, but it is not as such formal proof for lack of inventive step.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Saturday, 27 March 2010

R 9/09 - For Pros Only


The present petition for review was filed by the patent proprietor after its appeal against the revocation of the patent by the Opposition Division had been dismissed by the Board of appeal. During the appeal proceedings, the patent proprietor was represented by a professional representative, accompanied by Dr Illescas, its Spanish legal practitioner, who later on represented the patent proprietor before the Enlarged Board (EBA).

[1.4] Pursuant to R 106, a petition under A 112a(2)(a) to (d) is only admissible where an objection in respect of the alleged procedural defect was raised during the appeal proceedings and dismissed by the Board of Appeal, except where such an objection could not be raised during the appeal proceedings.

The present petition refers to three procedural violations :
  • refusal of the request for postponement of the oral proceedings (OPs),
  • admission of Dl0 as a late filed document into the proceedings,
  • refusal of the request to postpone the OPs for carrying out comparative experiments with respect to D10.
It may appear that the first and third alleged violation are based on the same facts as for both violations the refusal of the postponement of the OPs is at issue. Nevertheless the EBA considers both as independent with respect to the fact that the petitioner repeated during the OPs its request for postponement in order to conduct the said tests. Accordingly, all three allegations have to be examined by the EBA in its composition according to R 109(2) (a) with respect to whether the petition is clearly inadmissible or not in view of R 106.

[1.5] The first alleged violation under A 112a refers to the petitioner’s request for postponement of the scheduled OPs with respect to its new representative appointed on 15 September 2008. It argued that this new representative needed a longer period than only one month to get familiar with the complex technical impact of the case and to discuss the case with its client in a meeting in Madrid. Refusing this request with a communication dated 24 September 2009, the Board would have violated the respondent’s right to be heard under A 113.

However, the Technical Board refused this request because serious substantive reasons for postponement of OPS pursuant to items 2.2 and 2.3 of the Notice of the Vice-President DG3 dated 16 July 2007 concerning OPs before the boards of appeal of the EPO were not given. This lack of substantive reasons results from the fact that all the arguments provided by the appellant are the consequence of the appellant’s own decision to change its representative. And indeed the representative of the petitioner did not raise objections pursuant to R 106 against the Board’s decision not to postpone the OPs. Accordingly, as far as the petition is based on this first objection, it is clearly inadmissible (R 109(2) (a) in combination with R 106 and R 108(1))

[1.6] The second alleged violation concerns the admission of D10 although it was late filed. Also in respect of this second objection the EBA has no indication that the requirements of R 106 are fulfilled. The petitioner submitted only the request to refuse Dl0 as late filed before and during the OPs. But there is no hint neither in its petition nor in the minutes nor in the contested decision that it raised during the OPs an objection under R 106 with respect to a procedural defect in the sense of A 112a(2) (c) and (d) after the Board had taken its decision to admit Dl0 into the proceedings.

The EBA has no doubts that during the OPs the petitioner made clear that it does not share the Technical Board’s view on the admission of this document. However this is not an objection in the sense of R 106. This rule requires a separate objection directed to the procedural defect. This is mandatory in order to give the Technical Board an opportunity to revise the alleged procedural defect and to reserve the petitioner’s right according to A 112a. Consequently, also as far as the petition is based on this second objection the petition is clearly inadmissible.

[1.7] The third objection relates to the refusal of the appellant’s request to postpone the scheduled OPs for carrying out comparative tests with respect to D10. The petitioner submitted that the Board hindered it from showing that the requested comparative tests would have been necessary for proving an inventive step in the light of the prior art. But also in respect of the third objection the petition is clearly inadmissible as the petitioner failed to fulfil the requirements of R 106 for the following reasons :

[1.7.1] According to the clear wording of R 106 a petition is only admissible if the objection concerning an alleged procedural defect was raised during the appeal proceedings and dismissed by the Board, except where such an objection could not be raised during the appeal proceedings. However, in the present case the petitioner did not submit in the grounds of its petition that it could not raise an objection pursuant to R 106 before the Board closed the debate in order to deliberate the issue of inventive step. Just at that point in time it should have pointed to an alleged procedural defect when the Board intended to discuss inventive step without having regard to the aspect of the requested comparative tests. An example that such an intervention was not impossible was given by the respondent who requested to take account in the protocol of the OPs that it has not been heard with regard to the question of admissibility of auxiliary requests 1 - 3 concerning amendments made therein.

[1.7.2] The petitioner claims that its representative accomplished the procedural requirement of R 106 by stating the following: The Board asked the appellant’s representative what the purpose of the comparative experiments should be. Dr Illescas then took the floor and began to explain what the purpose would be, but was interrupted by the Chairman of the Board, who stated that the discussion relating to inventive step of the proposed auxiliary request had already been decided by the Board and that, therefore, the appellant was not allowed to argue back on this particular item […] However, apart from the fact that this can hardly be qualified as an objection pursuant to R 106, according to the minutes of the OPs Dr Illescas was not the representative of the petitioner but an accompanying person. In this capacity, he could not validly make procedural declarations, such as one pursuant to R 106. […]

[2] It follows from the foregoing that in the present case the requirements of R 106 have not been met. Therefore, the petition for review has to be rejected as clearly inadmissible.

This decision makes it very clear how important it is to make an explicit objection referring to R 106 during OPs if a petition for review is to be envisaged. This requires some quick-wittedness on behalf of the representative. One may also note that the objection has to be made by the representative (or the party itself) – an objection made by an accompanying person, even if the latter is legally qualified and could represent the party, will not be accepted by the EBA.

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