Friday, 19 April 2013

T 454/08 – A Fake Swiss


Swiss-type claims are a dying species, but from time to time we still have decisions dealing with them.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read (in English translation):
Use of an active substance in the form of microcrystals or microgranules comprising a coating that masks their taste and a mixture of excipients, wherein the mixture of excipients comprises one or more disintegrating agents and one or more swelling agents or soluble agents, for the manufacture of a rapidly disintegratable multiparticulate tablet, wherein said tablet is intended for oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue, and wherein its disintegration speed is such that it disintegrates in less than 60 seconds, in order to provide with the saliva present a suspension easy to be swallowed.
In what follows, the Board examines the novelty of this claim and shows us that travelling with a fake Swiss passport is a dangerous activity.

*** Translation of the French original ***

[4] Claim 1 of the main request is essentially directed at:
  • the use of an active substance in the form of microcrystals or microgranules comprising a coating that masks their taste and a mixture of excipients …
  • for the manufacture of a rapidly disintegratable multiparticulate tablet …
  • said tablet is intended for oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue …
  • its disintegration speed is such that it disintegrates in less than 60 seconds, in order to provide with the saliva present a suspension easy to be swallowed.

Interpretation of claim 1

[4.1.1] According to decision G 6/83, a European patent may be granted with claims directed to the use of a substance or composition for the manufacture of a medicament for a specified new and inventive therapeutic application.

Decision G 6/83 allowed the reformulation of claims for therapeutic methods referred to in A 52(4) EPC 1973 as so-called Swiss-type claims.

Thus the use of a composition for manufacturing a medicament to be used within the framework of a therapeutic or surgical activity is patentable for the implementation of any specific use in a given therapeutic method, within the framework of a further medical indication, provided that the other requirements of the EPC, and in particular novelty and inventive step, are satisfied.

However, if a claim drafted in the form of a Swiss-type claim does not refer to an implementation of any therapeutic method or de facto refers to a non-therapeutic use, then the feature defining the implementation is of purely illustrative character and cannot serve to establish novelty over the state of the art. As a matter of fact, this particular approach to novelty only applies to claims directed at the use of a substance or composition for a method within the meaning of A 52(4) EPC 1973 (now A 53(c)).

Claim 1 of the main request is drafted according to the model proposed by decision G 6/83, i.e. the use of a substance for the manufacture of a composition intended for a specific use.

However, none of the terms of claim 1, i.e. “active substance”, “multiparticulate tablet” and “intended for oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue” implies the implementation in any therapeutic method within the meaning of A 53(c).

As a matter of fact, the expressions “active substance”, “multiparticulate tablet” and “intended for oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue” cannot be considered to be limited to the therapeutic domain. In particular, one cannot assert that a “oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue” refers to a therapeutic use. Moreover, claim 1 does not contain any additional feature related to any implementation in a therapeutic method.

The particular approach to novelty created by decision G 6/83, therefore, does not apply to claim 1 of the main request, the subject-matter of which is equivalent to a process claim, i.e.  “process for manufacturing a rapidly disintegratable multiparticulate tablet by using an active substance in the form of microcrystals or microgranules comprising a coating that masks their taste and a mixture of excipients …”. The step where the tablet is administered, wherein “said tablet is intended for oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue” has to be understood as a feature that is illustrative of the tablet and not as a limiting feature concerning a specific way of administration.

[4.1.2] Moreover, the subject-matter of the claim comprises a functional feature defining the multiparticulate tablet, i.e. “its disintegration speed is such that it disintegrates in less than 60 seconds, in order to provide with the saliva present a suspension easy to be swallowed”.

This functional feature does not allow to define the subject-matter of claim 1 in a clear and unambiguous way. As a matter of fact, claim 1 does not contain any indication concerning the measuring method used for the measurement of the disintegration speed. In particular, claim 1 only defines the degree of disintegration via its capacity to form a suspension that can be swallowed easily. This capacity is a subjective concept. The level of disintegration can vary between a mere reduction of the size of the multiparticulate tablet and the achievement of a suspension of small particles. This variability has an impact on the claimed disintegration time, which makes it ambiguous.

The relevance of the state of the art has to be evaluated taking into account this ambiguity.

Document 4(3)

[4.2] Document 4(3) refers to pharmaceutical compositions for oral administration, comprising a medicament that is coated by a polymer which is soluble at pH values above 5 and an acid component intended to reduce or avoid the dissolution of the coating in the buccal cavity […]. It is the polymer coating, which is protected from dissolution by the acid component, that masks the taste […].

The compound can be a tablet that quickly disintegrates in the mouth […]. The tablets of example 1 comprise cellulose and reticulated polyvinylpyrrolidone. They disintegrate in the mouth in less than 30 seconds (see example 1).

Thus document 4(3) anticipates all the features of the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request.

Document 2(3)

[4.3] Document 2(3) concerns tablets that are to be dispersed in water in order to be then swallowed in the form of a suspension […]. These tablets are made up of coated microparticles that are dispersed in at least one swelling agent and a disintegrating agent […]. Examples 1 and 3 comprise coated microparticles that are associated with guar gum, cellulose and reticulated polyvinylpyrrolidone.

The amounts of excipients and the final hardness of the tablets obtained in document 2(3) are identical or very similar to the amounts and the hardness obtained with the tablets of the preferred embodiment of the impugned patent […]. The speed of disintegration obtained with the tablets of document 2(3) is 1 minute in water. The skilled person can only conclude that these tablets have physical properties that are equivalent to those of the impugned patent and necessarily would have the same disintegration properties if they were administered in the mouth.

Incidentally, although these tablets are intended for a different use, they are appropriate and suitable “for oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue”.

Thus the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request is not novel over the disclosure of document 2(3).
 
Document 2(2)

[4.4] Document 2(2) concerns a tablet that quickly disintegrates into several granules in the stomach […]. The granules are made up of an active substance that is coated with a mixture of acrylic polymers and ethyl cellulose (Eudragit® E30D and Aquacoat® ECD), which polymers are well known for masking the taste […] and which are also used in the impugned patent. These coated granules are blended with cellulose and reticulated polyvinylpyrrolidone, which are also cited among the preferred excipients of the embodiments of the impugned patent. These tablets are appropriate and suitable “for oral administration in the buccal cavity on the tongue”.

These tablets disintegrate in 37°C water in less than one minute […]. Although the disintegration time is measured in vitro, one may expect that the disintegration time is of the same order when it is measured in vivo, in presence of saliva. The skilled person can only conclude that these tablets have physical properties that are equivalent to those of the impugned patent and necessarily would have the same disintegration properties if they were administered in the mouth.

Thus document 2(2) destroys the novelty of claim 1 of the main request.

Document 4(6)

[4.5] Document 4(6) discloses tablets comprising pellets that are coated with a protective polymer. These tablets may be brought in contact with a small quantity of water […] and may be absorbed as they are or in drinkable form that is obtained using the liquid used for disintegrating the tablet […]. The tablet of example 1 discloses pellets coated with Eudragit® E30D and contains starch and reticulated polyvinylpyrrolidone as excipients. The quantities of excipients and the final hardness of the tablet are equivalent to the tablets of the impugned patent. One can only conclude that the tablet of document 4(6) is suitable for buccal administration on the tongue and that implicitly the disintegration speed would be identical to the embodiments of the present invention.

Thus claim 1 of the main request is not novel over document 4(6).

Additional arguments of the [patent proprietor]

[4.6] (a) The [patent proprietor] was of the opinion that claim 1 of the main request was drafted as a second therapeutic use related to a specific way of administration. Claim 1 of the main request has to be read in the light of the description, which makes it clear that the active substance can only be a therapeutic substance. As a matter of fact, the description uses expressions related to therapy such as “practitioner” […], “therapeutic substance” […], “medicament” […], therapeutic protection […] all along. Also, the examples contain therapeutic substances. Thus the skilled person cannot interpret the expression “active substance” in claim 1 to mean anything but a “therapeutic substance”. Consequently, the oral administration is to be considered as a feature to be taken into account for assessing novelty. However, this reasoning cannot be endorsed. Not only should it not be necessary to consult the description in order to interpret the subject-matter of a claim, but these expressions, in particular “active substance”, “therapeutic substance” or “medicament” are not sufficient for de facto implying a therapeutic method. A therapeutic use is not related to the nature of a substance that in itself possesses therapeutic properties, but it is related to the effective involvement of said substance in any therapeutic method within the meaning of A 53(c). As a matter of fact, one cannot exclude that a substance having therapeutic properties may be used in methods that are not methods within the meaning of A 53(c).

(b) According to the [patent proprietor], the claimed tablet has to have particular properties, i.e. it has to have satisfy conditions related to the disintegration time and masking of taste. In particular, the criterion according to which it has to disintegrate in less than 60 seconds has to be taken into account when novelty is assessed. The Board does not contest that the criterion of disintegration is a fundamental feature of the multiparticulate tablet according to the invention and agrees that it should be taken into account for the assessment of the novelty of claim 1. However, the ambiguity and the subjective nature of this functional feature does not allow for a restrictive interpretation. In particular, the interpretation of the disintegration level allows for many different ways of measuring the corresponding disintegration time. This variability has to be taken into account when comparing [the claimed subject-matter] with the state of the art (cf. point [4.1.2] above). The [patent proprietor] has provided Annexes 2 and 4 containing measurements of the disintegration time of the tablet according to example 3 of document 2(3) and a comparison between example 1 of document 4(6) and example 1 of the impugned patent. As far as Annex 2 is concerned, there is no explanation whatsoever in regard of the way in which the time of disintegration in the mouth is measured. Annex 4 advocates complete disintegration of the tablet, which is a particular method that is not mentioned in claim 1 or in the text of the description of the impugned patent. Thus these Annexes cannot be considered to be relevant for establishing an objective comparison with the state of the art.

Conclusions

[4.7] It follows [from the above] that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request is not novel (A 54).

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 18 April 2013

R 9/11 – Don’t Wait Too Long


Here is a recent decision on a petition for review. This petition had successfully passed the first stage examination (R 109(2)(a)), which does not happen very often; most petitions are rejected as clearly inadmissible or unallowable.

The petition concerned decision T 642/08, in which Board of Appeal 3.3.09 (referred to as “the Board”) maintained the opposed patent in amended form.

The Opposition Division had maintained the patent in amended form, which triggered an appeal by the opponent. Oral proceedings before the Board were held on March 15, 2011.

In an annex to the summons to OPs issued on December 1, 2010, the Board indicated that the only issue to be discussed at those proceedings appeared to be inventive step. In this context, D4 appeared to be the closest prior art.

On February 15, 2011, the opponent submitted additional arguments concerning lack of inventive step, and filed new document D24; it argued that claim 1 lacked inventive step in view of the combination of D4 with D24.

At the OPs the Board admitted document D24 and found the main request to lack inventive step in view of D4 in combination with D24.

The proprietor then withdrew the auxiliary request on file and submitted auxiliary requests A, B and C, the admissibility of which was then discussed. After deliberation, the Board informed the parties that only auxiliary request C would be admitted into the proceedings. The proprietor then requested the following written statement to be included in the minutes of the OPs:
“Respondent is of the opinion that the fact that D24 is admitted so late (1 month prior to OPs) in the proceedings followed by the subsequent denial of the admissibility of late filed claims is in violation of the right to be heard (R 113) [sic] and R 112 [sic]. The board also failed to ask why we believed that the Auxiliary Request A and B would overcome any of the objections. It is considered and submitted as a procedural violation of the right to be heard.”
Before the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA), the patent proprietor argued as follows:

After the Board had decided to admit document D24 into the proceedings, the patent proprietor had not been given the opportunity to address the arguments raised by the opponent and the Board against admitting newly filed auxiliary requests A and B. The Board, before closing the debate on the admissibility of the new requests, had failed to allow the petitioner to address at least once the arguments put forward by the Board and the opponent which had not been raised during the written proceedings. These new auxiliary requests had been meant and submitted as a proper reaction to the new situation on the file. Also, the discussion had not addressed the issue of inventive step. From the chronology of this discussion it followed that the petitioner had only explained the amendments in the requests and where the basis for the amendments was to be found. The Board had indicated that it would be rather unwilling to accept product-by-process claims and that these did not overcome the objections raised against the main request. The opponent had argued on the merits of these requests. No further discussion had taken place. After the Board’s decision not to admit auxiliary requests A and B, the petitioner had immediately filed an objection. The Board had failed to ask it why it thought that the auxiliary requests overcame the objections. Thus, a severe violation of A 113 had occurred. This violation was also linked to the fact that the Board had not invited the petitioner to comment on the auxiliary requests as regards the prima facie issue of inventive step …

The Board found the petition to be admissible and then examined its substance:

The grounds of the petition - scope of the petition

[2.1] The petition alleges fundamental procedural defects on two grounds, namely A 112a(2)(c) and (d).

[2.2] The petitioner complains that, at the OPs on 15 March 2011, its right to be heard was denied in three ways:

(a) firstly, the Board decided on the admissibility of newly filed auxiliary requests A and B without giving the petitioner an opportunity to comment on objections raised by the Board and the [opponent] […];

(b) secondly, the Board decided to admit document D24 and rejected claims filed in response to that late document, thereby effectively depriving the petitioner of a reasonable opportunity to respond adequately to the introduction of the new document […];

(c) thirdly, the Board violated the right to fair proceedings by first allowing D24 to be filed late filing and then refusing new claims filed by the petitioner, thereby demonstrating bias which was contrary to the principle of fair proceedings […].

[2.3] As regards complaint (c), an alleged violation of the principle of procedural fairness is not as such a ground for a petition for review.

Consequently, complaint (c) can only be seen in terms of a violation of A 113 and hence A 112a(2)(c) EPC.

The petitioner agreed with this at the OPs on 7 December 2012.

Thus, the only remaining ground for the petition is that, at the OPs before the Board on 15 March 2011, a fundamental violation of A 113 occurred.

Allowability of the petition for review

[3.1] Complaint (a): At the OPs on 15 March 2011, the Board decided on the admissibility of newly filed auxiliary requests A and B without giving the petitioner an opportunity to comment on the objections raised by the Board and the [opponent].

[3.1.1] The petition invokes the ground of A 112a(2)(c). In the petitioner’s submissions and according to its handwritten statement, the Board decided on the appeal in violation of A 113 in a manner that gave the petitioner no opportunity to present its comments.

[3.1.2] The facts of the case show that, after admitting document D24 into the proceedings, the Board discussed extensively with the parties the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request on its merits with regard to inventive step in view of D4 in combination with D24 […]. The Board concluded that the main request was not allowable.

After the Board’s conclusion on the non-patentability of claim 1 of the main request, the petitioner filed new auxiliary requests A, B and C and withdrew the previous auxiliary request.

Claim 1 of auxiliary request A corresponds to claim 1 of the main request, to which the feature of dependent claim 14 has been added. Claim 15 (process claim) is identical to claim 15 of the main request; claim 16 (product-by-process claim) of auxiliary request A corresponds to claim 1 of the main request, to which the following wording has been added: “… wherein the multilayer film is obtainable by a method as defined in claim 15”.

Claim 1 of auxiliary request B corresponds to claim 16 of auxiliary request A, i.e. claim 1 of the main request, to which the following wording has been added: “… wherein the multilayer film is obtainable by a method as defined in claim 15”. Claims 2 to 15 correspond to claims 2 to 15 of the main request.

[3.1.3] The issue of the admissibility of the newly filed auxiliary requests was then examined.

It is not contested by the petitioner that first of all the Board chairman invited the petitioner to explain the differences in, and the support for, the auxiliary requests. In the petition […] it is further indicated that the “[p]atentee also briefly referred to the experimental section and [0060] of the patent to emphasise that the subject matter of claim 1 of this request is associated with beneficial properties, namely that the material suffers from little if any shrinking after printing.”

Then, after the explanations of the petitioner, the [opponent] and the Board gave their comments as to why the new auxiliary requests did not overcome the objections raised with respect to the main request.

The statement of Mr de Lang, who was the authorised patent attorney for the petitioner, indicates that “the Opponent … inter alia criticised the new requests for lack of inventive step.” This is also confirmed by the petition, which states that the [opponent] “… not only addressed the differences and support issues, but he also argued on the merits of these requests” (see page 4, fourth paragraph).

At this stage the Board also emphasised the feature formulated as a product-by-process and newly added to claim 16 of auxiliary request A and claim 1 of auxiliary request B. The petition stresses that the Board indicated that it “… would be rather unwilling to accept product-by-process claims, as one could not verify whether or not these claims truly make a contribution to inventive step” (see page 4, fifth paragraph).

[3.1.4] The EBA concludes from the petitioner’s own submissions and statements that before the closure of the debate a discussion was held on the admissibility of the new auxiliary requests and various objections were raised […] by the Board chairman and also by the [opponent]. The petitioner, however, did not comment on these objections.

It would seem that from these two objections alone, made by the [opponent] and the Board before the closure of the debate, it was apparent that the two new auxiliary requests A and B could not be admitted into the proceedings, which would also explain […] why no argument was put forward by the petitioner to counter them.

Along the same lines, reference is made to the explanations of the [opponent] […] (“… it was not prima facie apparent how the introduction of the process feature into the product claim could overcome the inventive step raised against the main request, the proprietor’s representative chose not to respond to that question, and tried to shift the discussion to a consideration of Claim 1 of Auxiliary Request A and an advantage regarding printability as demonstrated by the examples of the patent in suit”).

[3.1.5] In any event, there is no doubt that the petitioner had the opportunity to state its case in respect of the admissibility of the auxiliary requests and, in particular, to address the merits of process claim 15 and product-by-process claim 16 of auxiliary request A as well as product-by-process claim 1 of auxiliary request B. Nor has it been alleged that it was prevented from doing so.

[3.1.6] It is part of the responsibility of any party (here: the petitioner) to state its case and to choose which line of argumentation and which particular arguments it wishes to put to the Board. This procedural responsibility cannot be placed on the Board; a party cannot just wait to be explicitly asked whether it wishes to expand on its previous submissions.

Hence, at the latest when the chairman is closing the debate on a specific issue, a party must not just passively follow the other party’s submissions and the Board’s remarks but must actively take the initiative to ensure that the Board continues the debate on the admissibility of a request, or it must amend the request in response to the Board’s remarks. Since the closure of the debate normally marks the point in the proceedings when the Board intends to start its deliberation on a specific issue, and thereafter potentially take a decision on it, a party wishing to present further submissions on that issue must intervene at that moment, without waiting to be asked.

Because the petitioner did not do so in this case, the chairman was justified in closing the debate on the admissibility of the new auxiliary requests. The petitioner could not expect the Board, which has to stay neutral in inter partes proceedings, to prompt the petitioner to make further submissions or ask for further explanations.

No violation of A 113(1) was therefore committed by the Board in this connection.

[3.1.7] Moreover, if there are doubts or expectations as to what is going to be deliberated, it is up to the party to verify this before the OPs are interrupted for deliberation.

Any party is expected actively to participate in the OPs and safeguard its interests. In this respect the EBA refers to its decision R 17/11 [19], in which it stressed that in appeal proceedings it is incumbent upon a party to make sure that the points it wishes to raise are actually raised in the proceedings. If it considers that an issue is going to be overlooked, it should raise it.

In that sense, the petitioner had the opportunity to raise the points it considered necessary before the Board interrupted the proceedings for deliberation. The Board was therefore not at fault in deciding to deliberate on the admissibility of the auxiliary requests and in pronouncing its conclusion after deliberation.

The petitioner’s right to be heard has thus not been violated (A 113(1)).

[3.2] Complaints (b) and (c): the admission of D24, the non-admission of auxiliary requests A and B, and the application of the principle of fair proceedings

[3.2.1] The admissibility of requests filed at a late stage in the appeal proceedings is subject to Article 13(1) RPBA, which provides that any amendment to a party’s case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply - and a new set of claims with a new feature is clearly such an amendment - is admissible not as of right but at the Board’s discretion. That discretion is to be exercised in view inter alia of three criteria, namely the complexity of the new subject-matter, the current state of the proceedings, and the need for procedural economy. The concept of “complexity” in Article 13(1) RPBA is not merely confined to the technical content of a proposed amendment to a party’s case. It also extends to any procedural complexity the amendment would entail.

This provision also applies when a new document has been admitted into the proceedings, even if this occurs during OPs. This discretionary power is exercised under the conditions set out above. It is for the Board to exercise this power, taking account of the particular circumstances of each case.

Since both the decision to admit or not to admit a late-filed document and the decision to admit or not to admit a late-filed request are primarily discretionary decisions of the competent Board, they can only be reviewed to the extent that the way in which a Board exercised its discretion constituted a fundamental violation of A 113. Whether the decision was right or wrong and whether the members of the EBA would have reached the same decision is – as with all discretionary decisions – not the relevant criterion.

[3.2.2] In this respect, the petitioner argues that the Board did not take into consideration the fact that document D24 was late filed when deciding not to admit auxiliary requests A and B. The petitioner is of the opinion that the auxiliary requests were not late filed within the meaning of A 114(2).

The petitioner further maintains that Article 13(2) RPBA, providing that other parties are entitled to submit their observations on any amendment not held inadmissible by the Board ex officio, was to be read as giving the petitioner a right to file new requests in reaction to the late-filed but admitted document D24.

However, apart from the fact that not only the document’s admissibility had been discussed with the parties but also its disclosure in view of the patent in suit had been extensively disputed by both parties, the petitioner’s right according to Article 13(2) RPBA does not inevitably extend to having all auxiliary requests – without any further examination of their prima facie allowability – automatically admitted into the proceedings.

[3.2.3] Hence, the petitioner can succeed only if it can be demonstrated that the Board declined to admit auxiliary requests A and B into the proceedings arbitrarily or on grounds that were not relevant to the exercise of its discretion, thereby unlawfully depriving the petitioner of its right to have these requests admitted and discussed in full. However, the EBA sees no evidence of that on file. The arguments used for admitting D24 and not admitting requests A and B, as mentioned in points [3], [3.1] and [5.1-3] of the reasons, are within the scope of Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA. Furthermore they were mentioned during the OPs and the petitioner was not denied the opportunity to comment on them, as the EBA has shown under point 3.1 above.

In consequence, the EBA is not convinced that there was a “biased distribution contrary to the principle of fair proceedings” or that the petitioner’s right to be heard has been fundamentally violated.

[4] For the above reasons, the petition is unallowable.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Wednesday, 17 April 2013

T 808/09 – Sweet Death


When sloppy drafting meets thoughtless amendments, the outcome may be deadly.

The appeal was against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to revoke the patent for lack of novelty.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read:
A cartridge (1) for use in a beverage preparation machine, the cartridge containing one or more beverage ingredients (200) and being formed from substantially air- and water-impermeable materials, wherein the one or more beverage ingredients is a liquid chocolate ingredient, characterised in that the liquid chocolate ingredient has a viscosity between 70 and 3900 mPas at ambient temperature. (my emphasis)
The viscosity feature was introduced at the suggestion of the Examining Divison (ED). The patent proprietor explained that it had accepted this amendment in good faith with a view to expediting allowance of the application.

The Board found this claim to lack sufficiency of disclosure.

[2.1] Concerning the issue of sufficiency of disclosure the Board has to criticise the rather short reasoning given in point 2 of the reasons of the impugned decision:
“The OD is of the opinion that the skilled person trying to reproduce a cartridge of claim 1 would use a standard method for measuring the viscosity, which would e.g. be disclosed by the hand book of the device to be used, and thus obtain a cartridge according to claim 1”.
This reasoning is considered to be insufficient with respect to the plurality of different arguments as well as the evidence D1, D24 and D25 submitted by the two opponents 01 and 02 in support of their objection of insufficiency. None of these find any treatment in the impugned decision. It is also not apparent, neither from the decision nor from the minutes of the oral proceedings (OPs), why the OD changed its provisional negative opinion with respect to the viscosity feature as communicated to the parties, into the positive opinion expressed in the decision.

Indeed, the impugned decision is silent with respect to document D25, which has been timely submitted during the opposition procedure by opponent 02 and which both the appellant and respondent 01 confirmed as having been discussed at the OPs before the OD.

By the same token four other documents submitted during the opposition proceedings […] have not been mentioned in the impugned decision either.

[2.2] Taking proper account of the user’s manual D1 and the declaration D25 the Board reaches the opposite conclusion, for the following reasons.

Main request

[2.3] Product claim 1 of the main request comprises the feature of a “liquid chocolate ingredient having a viscosity of between 70 and 3900 mPas at ambient temperature”.

It is, however, evident that the patent in suit provides insufficient information to enable the person skilled in the art to carry out the invention with respect to this feature of the viscosity.

[2.4] In the first place, the patent in suit does not contain a single working example executed with a liquid chocolate concentrate within the scope of the claims as granted; they concerned exclusively ground coffee extract.

[2.4.1] Further, the patent description and particularly the passages quoted by the appellant […] are silent on how the viscosity of between 70 and 3900 mPas is to be determined and which device and which parameters necessary for measuring the viscosity of the liquid chocolate concentrate have to be used:

Paragraphs [0011] to [0014] only specify certain total solids content values of the liquid chocolate concentrates, which may contain a high solids content of cocoa solids and which may be a gel (i.e. thixotropic).

The dilution ratio of between 2 to 1 and 10 to 1 of said liquid chocolate concentrate […] is not helpful either. The presence of the concentrate to be diluted is a prerequisite for said dilution.

The viscosity difference between 1700 and 3900 mPas at ambient temperature and between 5000 and 10000 mPas at 0°C of an embodiment with a solids content of 67 Brix ± 3 mentioned in paragraph [0069] only leads to a huge difference in viscosity of 3300-6100 mPas at different temperatures but likewise does not enable the person skilled in the art to formulate such a liquid chocolate concentrate.

[2.4.2] The patent also does not contain any description how such liquid chocolate ingredients or concentrates should be prepared – there exists no formulation which cocoa solids and which other components need to be blended to achieve a composition having the high total solids content as e.g. specified in paragraphs [0011] to [0014] or [0069] – which at the same time also has a viscosity in the range of 70-3900 mPas at ambient temperature. It could be any combination of ingredients known from the prior art […] but the specification does not help in this respect and therefore places an undue burden on the person skilled in the art.

[2.4.3] It belongs to the common general knowledge of the person skilled in the art that liquid chocolate concentrates are typically both shear-thinning and thixotropic so that their viscosity is dependent on the temperature, applied shear rate as well as the shear time. This means that there is a time-dependent change in viscosity: the longer the fluid undergoes shear stress the lower is its viscosity […].

As a consequence of these properties a single viscosity value for such a concentrate, without any indication of the shear rate and of the measurement time, is meaningless and not enabling a determination of its viscosity.

[2.4.4] D1 does not disclose such a standard method for liquid chocolate concentrates. This fact was also admitted by the appellant at the OPs. D1 only discloses information necessary to make meaningful viscosity measurements, with the emphasis on Brookfield viscometers (see page 7, chapter “3.1 Why You Should Read This Chapter”). It states that it is necessary to record the viscometer model, spindle (or accessory), rotational speed, container size or dimensions, sample temperature, sample preparation procedure (if any), and whether or not the spindle guard was used to ensure reproducibility of the test results (see page 8, chapter “3.3.1 Recordkeeping”; and page 16, chapter “4.7.3 Measuring Conditions”). The patent in suit does not mention any of these parameters.

Thus D1 teaches the person skilled in the art the essential parameters which have to be considered when performing a viscosity measurement but it is silent which device components and which specific parameters have to be selected when in particular the viscosity of a liquid chocolate concentrate is to be measured.

[2.4.5] The reasoning of the OD in its decision to the contrary cannot hold since there is firstly no indication in the patent in suit concerning the device to be used - there exist several manufacturers of viscometers and the Brookfield viscometer mentioned in D1 is only one of them, […] so that the person skilled in the art cannot consult the corresponding viscometer manual for the viscosity measurement […]. Secondly there exists no standard method for measuring the viscosity of such thixotropic suspensions as stated in the decision. The declaration D25 states that there exists no standard method with a standard shear rate or standard measuring time for such concentrated dispersions […].

However, the appellant did not discharge its burden of proof for the existence of such a standard method for shear-thinning and/or thixotropic liquid chocolate concentrates (see Case Law, 6th edition 2010, sections VI.H.5.1.1 and VI.H.5.2). This deficiency has been mentioned in the Board’s communication annexed to the summons to OPs; when asked at the OPs by the Board the appellant admitted that it had no evidence for the existence of a standard method for measuring the viscosity of such liquid chocolate concentrates.

[2.4.6] The appellant’s further arguments cannot hold for the following reasons.

The arguments concerning the case history of the incorporation of the viscosity feature during the examination proceedings are not relevant for the issue of sufficiency of disclosure.

Furthermore, as correctly argued by respondent 01 the responsibility for this amendment remains with the appellant.

The further argument that the Examining Division considered that the disclosure was reproducible without undue burden is not particularly relevant for the appeal proceedings since this issue was actually raised in the opposition proceedings by opponents 01 and 02 who submitted in this context amongst others the documents D1 and D25.

The fact that the OD reached the conclusion that A 83 is complied with, is likewise not considered to be particularly relevant, in view of the extremely short reasoning given (see point [2.1] above) which does not take account of any of the opponents’ arguments and evidence.

The argument that the combined knowledge of D1 and the specification of the patent in suit would enable the person skilled in the art to carry out the invention cannot hold either since the patent does not give the information to use one of the Brookfield viscometers mentioned in D1.

The argument that the declaration D25 would not be relevant as it focuses only on the claims while A 83 requires to take account of the entire specification cannot hold since there is no difference between the subject-matter of claims 1, 2 and 4-12 as discussed in D25 and the disclosure of paragraphs [0011] to [0015] of the patent in suit. The additional viscosity range at 0°C for an embodiment with a specific total solids content according to paragraph [0069] of the patent does not resolve the sufficiency problem either […].

Likewise the argument concerning the missing “hard data” that the invention does not work or that the claimed viscosities cannot be determined cannot hold since the patent in suit already fails at the prior requirement of not disclosing the method, apparatus and the parameters for determination of the viscosity, in particular for the claimed liquid chocolate suspension.

In any case, the appellant did not produce any counter-evidence against the experiments carried out by opponent 02 demonstrating the effect of the shear rate on the viscosity of 13 different liquid chocolate concentrates belonging to the prior art which viscosities were measured at shear rates of 100 s-1 and 1000 s-1. This comparison clearly shows the effect of different shear rates on the measured viscosity.

The absence of any reference to viscosity measurements in D8 or D9, which do not explain in explicit detail how these viscosities were measured, cannot alter this conclusion. While not wishing to enter into a detailed discussion of these documents the Board notes that D8, though a granted patent, is not granted according to the EPC and D9 is a mere application, not a granted European patent.

[2.5] Taking account of the above the Board considers that the patent in suit fails to enable the measurement of the essential parameter of the invention, i.e. the viscosity of the liquid chocolate ingredient.

Considering this fact and in line with the longstanding jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal (see Case Law, 6th edition 2010, section II.A.1 to II.A.7; compare e.g. T 805/93 (dealing with viscosity measurement at “room temperature”) and T 83/01 and T 1250/01 (both concerning the measurement of an essential parameter, i.e. a specific mean diameter or the Sears number, respectively)), the Board concludes that claim 1 of the main request does not comply with A 83.

The main request is therefore not allowable.

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Tuesday, 16 April 2013

T 902/07 – The Narrow Path


The present decision - which is from 2010 but has been published only now - has something to say on what “the same invention” means in the realm of biotech.

[2] Documents D1 and D8 are scientific publications dated 19 January 1996 and 12 March 1996, respectively. Document D9 is a European patent application published on 23 July 1997 claiming inter alia priority from US 08/639,501 (document D10), filed on 29 April 1996.

Thus, the publication dates of documents D1 and D8 and the priority date of document D9 lie between the filing dates of the second priority document P2 and the third priority document P3 of the patent in suit.

It is undisputed that the disclosure in documents D1, D8 and D9, if it belonged to the state of the art under A 54(2) or A 54(3), would be detrimental to the novelty of the subject-matter of claim 2 of the main request (and all identically formulated claims in [the patent proprietors’] auxiliary requests).

Documents D1, D8 and D9 would not belong to the state of the art under A 54(2) and A 54(3), if the claims were entitled to claim priority from P1 or P2, the first and second priority documents.

[3] The complete BRCA2 coding sequence is not depicted in any of the three priority documents, but only in the application as filed (figure 7). It encodes 3418 amino acids.

P1 and P2, respectively, contain partial BRCA2 sequences while P3 does not contain any coding sequence at all. The partial sequence of P1 as depicted in figures 1 to 3 (corresponding to figures 1 to 3 of the patent) encodes 544 amino acids (about 16% of the complete sequence). The partial sequence of P2 shown in figures 4 and 5 (corresponding to figures 4 and 5 of the patent) encodes 2329 amino acids (about 68% of the complete sequence).

[4] The Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) in the opinion G 2/98 came to the conclusion that the requirement for claiming priority in respect of “the same invention”, referred to in A 87(1), means that priority of a previous application in respect of a claim in a European patent application in accordance with A 88 is to be acknowledged only if the skilled person can derive the subject-matter of the claim directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the previous application as a whole.

When examining whether a narrow or strict interpretation of the concept of “the same invention” referred to in A 87(1) should be applied, the EBA considered that a narrow and strict interpretation of the concept of “the same invention”, equating it with the concept of “the same subject-matter” referred to in A 87(4), was entirely consistent with Articles 4F and 4H of the Paris Convention (points [2] to [5] of the reasons). This followed from the very aim and object of the right of priority: the protection from novelty destroying disclosures during a period of twelve months from the date of filing of the first application is satisfied only in case of the filing of a subsequent application relating to the same invention.

In point [8.3] of the reasons the EBA considered an issue that had been raised in decision T 73/88 which, in order to assess whether a claim in a later European patent application was in respect of the same invention as the priority application pursuant to A 87(1), made a distinction between technical features which are related to the function and effect of the invention and technical features which are not. This approach was said to be problematic because there are no suitable and clear, objective criteria for making such a distinction; it could thus give rise to arbitrariness. Different deciding bodies might thus arrive at different results when assessing these facts and circumstances. Furthermore, as pointed out in the referral of the President of the EPO giving rise to the opinion, it had to be borne in mind that the assessment by these different deciding bodies of whether or not certain technical features were related to the function and effect of the claimed invention might completely change in the course of proceedings. This was the case, in particular, if new prior art was to be considered, with the possible consequence that the validity of a hitherto acknowledged right of priority could be put in jeopardy. Such dependence would, however, be at variance with the requirement of legal certainty.

Finally in point [9] of the reasons the EBA stated:
“... an extensive or broad interpretation of the concept of “the same invention” referred to in A 87(1), making a distinction between technical features which are related to the function and effect of the invention and technical features which are not, with the possible consequence that a claimed invention is considered to remain the same even though a feature is modified or deleted, or a further feature is added (cf. point [8.3] supra), is inappropriate and prejudicial to a proper exercise of priority rights. Rather, according to that analysis, a narrow or strict interpretation of the concept of “the same invention”, equating it to the concept of “the same subject-matter” referred to in A 87(4) (cf. point [2] supra), is necessary to ensure a proper exercise of priority rights ...”.
[5] In application of G 2/98, the Boards of Appeal, in a number of decisions, have defined the concept of “the same invention” in the field of biotechnology and especially in connection with inventions referring to nucleotide sequences.

A summary of this case law of the Boards of Appeal is given in decision T 1213/05 [22-25] of this Board in a different composition.

[6] [The patent proprietors] have argued that this case law of the Boards of Appeal did not apply in the present case since, contrary to the technical situation underlying those decisions, the claimed nucleotide sequence was not defined by sequence information but by a process for obtaining it. The essence of the present invention was to be seen in the identification of the BRCA2 gene, whose identity had been confirmed by partial sequencing as disclosed in priority documents P1 and P2. Starting from this disclosure sequencing the rest of the gene (about 32% of the entire gene sequence not disclosed in document P2) was a matter of routine work that could have been done by a person skilled in the art without undue burden.

[7] In fact the [the patent proprietors] seek to distinguish between technical features which are related to the function and effect of the invention (and which according to [the patent proprietors] are disclosed in P1 and P2) and technical features which are not. This is exactly the approach which the EBA found to be inappropriate and prejudicial to a proper exercise of priority rights (G 2/98 [9]).

Documents P1 and P2 disclose partial sequences of the BRCA2 gene only. They do not refer to “the same invention”, in the sense of “the same subject-matter” referred to in A 87(4), as the patent, which discloses in figure 7 the complete BRCA2 coding sequence (see G 2/98 [2-5]).

[8] Yet further, the Board notes that claim 2 of [the patent proprietors’] main request is not directed to a method for identifying a gene, which according to [the patent proprietors] is the essence of the invention, but to “an isolated nucleic acid molecule consisting of the full length coding sequence or complete BRCA2 gene”.

[9] [The patent proprietors] referred to decision T 932/92 (NB: this should read T 923/92) wherein, as they argued, it was decided that a claim to a DNA isolate defined by a process for its production was entitled to claim priority from a priority document containing sequencing errors.

[10] In that earlier decision the Board decided that a claim referring to a process comprising the preparation of a protein which was defined by its function and by an amino acid sequence 1 to 527 as depicted in Figure 5, did not enjoy priority from the first and second priority documents which contained a Figure 5 that differed from Figure 5 of the patent in suit in respect of three amino acid positions 175, 178 and 191. It enjoyed priority only from the third priority document which disclosed the correct sequence (see T 923/92 [3-17]).

However, in point [46], the Board decided that claim 1 of subsidiary request 3 was entitled to claim priority from the first priority document. This claim was formulated such that it referred to a DNA isolate obtainable by probing a cDNA library with one or more of three defined hybridisation probes, isolating strongly hybridising clones and using them to produce a DNA sequence having a restriction pattern shown in figure 4 “for the putative mature tissue plasminogen activator sequence” encoding a polypeptide of 527 amino acids. The claim defined the N-terminal and C-terminal amino acid of the protein and specified the human t-Pa activator function.

[11] The first priority document disclosed the used starting material and hybridisation probes and it contained figure 4 in identical form as the patent. The nucleotides corresponding to amino acid residues 30 to 67, which were responsible for binding of the hybridisation probes, were identical in figure 5 of P1 and of the patent. Figure 5 of the first priority document and of the patent disclosed a polypeptide of 527 amino acids whose N-terminal and C-terminal amino acid were identical.

[12] The claim which was found to be entitled to claim priority from the first priority document in decision T 923/92 was formulated differently than claim 2 of the main request in the present case, which is directed to “an isolated nucleic acid molecule consisting of the full length coding sequence or complete BRCA2 gene”. Also the disclosure in the priority documents in that case was different than in the present case. Therefore, the passages of decision T 923/92 relied on by [the patent proprietors] do not apply in the present case.

[13] The issue of entitlement to priority has been dealt with in G 2/98, five years after the publication of decision T 923/92. The case law of the Boards of Appeal with regard to the entitlement to priority of a claim referring to a nucleic acid sequence is uniform and definite. The arguments presented by [the patent proprietors], therefore, have not persuaded the Board that there is anything in the present case which could justify a deviation from this case law. Accordingly, the Board arrives at the decision that the subject-matter of claim 2 of [the patent proprietors’] main request is not entitled to claim priority from P1 or P2.

Consequently, the claimed subject-matter lacked novelty and the patent was revoked.

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Monday, 15 April 2013

T 1032/10 – With And Without Paper


This decision is a good and handy reminder of the rules governing the transfer of the opponent status by mergers and universal succession, as established and confirmed by the case law.

The appeal was filed against the rejection of an opposition filed by “Claudius Peters Technologies GmbH” (CPT).

The patent proprietor objected to the admissibility of the appeal.

It pointed out that a demerger agreement (Abspaltungsvertrag) between the companies “Claudius Peters Group GmbH” (CPG) and “Claudius Peters Project GmbH” (CPP) the relevant assets had been transferred from CPT to CPP before the date of filing of the appeal (May 14, 2010). Moreover, there was a settlement agreement that hindered the appellant from pursuing the opposition.

The opponent argued that the CPT had existed until March 29, 2012, the day of its merger with “Claudius Peters Aerospace GmbH” (CPA), which had become its legal successor. After the filing of the appeal, the opponent status was transferred from CPT to CPA and then to “Piller Holding GmbH” (PH).

The Board found the appeal to be admissible.

*** Translation of the German original* ***

[1.2.1] According to A 107 any party to proceedings adversely affected by a decision may appeal.

[1.2.1] All persons who have been explicitly referred to as parties to the proceedings for the relevant part of the proceedings, as well as all persons the legal interests of which are affected by the decision qualify as parties to the first instance proceedings (Ausgangsverfahren) in the framework of which the impugned decision has been taken (T 811/90; J 28/94; J 33/95 [4]). In practice, the parties to the proceedings are at first the parties in regard of which the deciding organ intended to take the decision, i.e. the parties that are mentioned in the caption of the decision (see Günzel/Beckedorf in: Benkard, EPÜ, 2nd edition, A 107, marginal number 4 et seq.).

What is decisive for the procedural position as party within the meaning of A 107, first sentence, is the legal situation at the moment at which the impugned decision was taken (T 631/94).

[1.2.3] CPT, which had filed an opposition against the patent-in-suit on January 18, 2008, and which was mentioned as party to the proceedings in the caption of the impugned decision of the Opposition Division (OD) dated March 5, 2010, was a party to the opposition proceedings preceding the present appeal proceedings.

[1.2.4] Insofar as the [patent proprietor] points out that the appellant had lost its entitlement to appeal as a consequence of the demerger agreement (document Z1) after the impugned decision had been issued, but shortly before the appeal was filed, the admissibility objection of the [patent proprietor] based on this argument cannot succeed.

Just as a change of party on behalf of the applicant or patent proprietor pursuant to R 22 and R 85 is a direct consequence of a transfer (Umschreibung) of the patent in the Patent Register, an (original) opponent who was adversely affected by the decision of the administrative department of the EPO (here: the OD) can file an appeal and act in the appeal proceedings, irrespective of the substantive situation, as long as the transfer of the opponent status has not been brought to bear and established in the proceedings (see Günzel/Beckedorf, op.cit., A 107, marginal number 29).

[1.2.5] The decisions G 4/88 and G 2/04 have made decisive statements on the conditions for a change of opponent or appellant in analogy to R 22 and R 85.

Accordingly, from a legal point of view, the status as an opponent in pending opposition or appeal proceedings cannot be freely transferred. The transfer is only admissible if it occurs at the same time as the transfer of the business or the part of the company in the interests of which the opposition was filed (cf. T 724/05 [1 et seq.]; T 1206/06 [2]; T 1877/08 [1.2 et seq.]). A change of party is only effective when the legal succession has been requested and established before the EPO via the submission of official documents. As long as the transfer has not been established, the former party remains entitled and bound, because the change of the party status only occurs when it is asserted and established (T 870/92 [3.1]; T 1137/97 [4]; T 413/02 [3]; T 593/04 [1.1]; T 229/03 [3]; T 163/05 [1.5]; T 85/03 [1]; T 6/05 [1.6.1-4]; T 1421/05 [3.3]). A mere statement regarding the transfer of the opponent status is not sufficient (T 670/95 [2]; T 229/03 [5]).

Irrespective of the fact that the parties do not agree on what belongs to the “operative business” (“operativer Geschäftsbetrieb”) which, according to document Z1, has been demerged from CPT and transferred to CPP and in particular whether this was the business in the interests of which the opposition was filed, and that the documents on file in the appeal proceedings do not allow to draw an unambiguous conclusion in this respect, what is decisive in the present situation is that there was no request for a change of party in favour of CPP on behalf of the appellant. There is no need for an approval of the adverse party (here the [patent proprietor]) to the change of party, and a missing (mandatory) request of the appellant cannot be replaced by a corresponding submission on behalf of the respondent.

[1.2.6] Thus CPT was entitled to file an appeal in its quality as opponent and party to the opposition proceedings within the meaning of A 107.

Legal succession

[2] In contrast to the legal transfer of an opposition together with a business, or part of it, respectively, an opposition can be transferred by universal succession, e.g. as a consequence of a merger of the opponent with another company. In such a case the opposition is transferred automatically, irrespective of the date on which the required evidence is filed (T 6/05 [1.7]; T 425/05; in detail: T 1421/05 [1 et seq. and headnotes 1 to 4]).

When a transfer of the opposition due to an (at first merely) alleged legal transfer together with the business in the framework of which the opposition had been filed, there is the possibility that the opposition remains with the original opponent or is transferred to the transferee, of which both the Board before which the appeal is pending and the other parties to the proceedings can only be certain after the corresponding evidence has been filed. In the case of a legal universal succession, however, there can only be one single entitled person (Berechtigter) because the transferee automatically and exclusively takes the legal position of the former opponent. Thus there cannot be any legal uncertainty regarding the identity of the person that holds the legal position of the opponent. This is what justifies an exception from the otherwise strict requirements for the legal transfer of an opposition and the application, mutatis mutandis, of the principles that govern the transfer of a patent to the transfer of an opposition by legal universal succession (see : Günzel/Beckedorf, op.cit., A 107, marginal number 32).

[2.2] In the present case the appellant has established by documents Z2 and Z3 that the original opponent and appellant CPT has merged with CPA as a consequence of the merger agreement dated February 29, 2012, as well as the consent of the shareholders’ meeting held on the same day and the shareholders’ meeting of the transferee on March 1, 2012, and that [CPT] has ceased to exist as soon as the merger had become effective, i.e. on March 29, 2012.

Thus CPA has taken over all legal positions of CPT in its quality as the universal legal successor of the latter.

Document Z4 further proves that CPA, as a consequence of the decision on its shareholders’ meeting of May 21, 2012, has become PH.

[2.3] In view of this unambiguous legal succession from the original opponent CPT to CPA and the change of the latter to PH, the Board cannot see any indication for an abuse of proceedings within the meaning of decision G 3/97 on behalf of the appellant, as alleged by the [patent proprietor].

The same holds true for the […] settlement agreement into which the [patent proprietor] and CPP have entered (document Z5). Even if CPG was controlling CPT between November 13, 2008 and January 3, 2011 […] (document Z5), the settlement agreement does not bind CPT and its legal successors – at least as far as the present appeal proceedings are concerned.

[3] As a consequence, CPT was entitled to file the appeal under A 107, which is admissible.

The transfer of the opponent/appellant status to CPA, which has later become PH, is established ; the appeal proceedings are pursued with PH.

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