Friday, 12 April 2013

T 1676/08 – Too Big Not To Fail


This very long – 123 pages – decision contains lots of interesting procedural aspects (it’s one of those decisions where the appellants are desperate enough to invoke Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention, which is never a good sign) and is well worth skimming through. The patent proprietor had filed an appeal after the Opposition Division (OD) had maintained its patent in amended form. The patent-in-suit was based on a divisional application; the patent proprietor apparently had chosen to have a patent delivered for a preferred embodiment and to cover the more general teaching by means of a divisional application. However, the OD had found claim 1 as granted to violate A 76.

In the following extract the Board answers the question of whether the main request (i.e. the patent as granted) did indeed extend beyond the content of the corresponding parent application. Claim 1 of this request read:
A controlled release oxycodone formulation for oral administration to human patients, comprising:
(a) oxycodone salt in an amount equivalent to 10 mg to 160 mg of the oxycodone hydrochloride salt, and
(b) a controlled release dosage matrix, other than an acrylic resin matrix selected so that the formulation provides pH-independent dissolution characteristics,
(c) wherein said formulation provides, at steady state after repeated administration at 12-hour intervals, a mean maximum plasma concentration of oxycodone of 6 to 240 ng/ml at 2 to 4.5 hours after administration and a mean minimum plasma concentration of oxycodone of 3 to 120 ng/ml at 10 to 14 hours after administration.
In the discussion of the compliance of this claim with A 76 we once more meet our good old friend G 2/10.

[8.1] In its interlocutory decision the OD reached a conclusion on the issue of A 100(c) EPC 1973 for the set of claims as granted. Consequently, the assessment of the grounds pursuant to A 100(c) EPC 1973 is part of the legal framework of the present appeal proceedings.

[8.2] According to A 100(c) EPC 1973, opposition may be filed on the grounds that:
“the subject-matter of the European patent extends beyond the content of the application as filed, or, if the patent was granted as a divisional application or on a new application filed under Article 61, beyond the content of the earlier application as filed” (emphasis added).
The application underlying the patent in suit was filed as a divisional application of an earlier European application which was based on the international application published as WO 93/10765 (parent application P4).

Decision G 1/05 [3.6] states:
“Thus in opposition proceedings under A 100(c) it is a ground of revocation that the subject-matter of the European patent granted on a divisional application extends beyond the content of the earlier application as filed. A 100 does not state that it is a ground of revocation that the patent was granted on a divisional application whose subject-matter as filed extended beyond the content of the earlier application as filed. A 100 exhaustively sets out all the grounds of revocation that can be relied on, so the lack of any such ground of revocation suggests that the significant factor is the subject-matter at the time of grant and not whether the subject-matter of the divisional application as filed met the requirement of not extending beyond the content of the earlier application as filed.”
[8.3] The principles set out in decision G 2/10 with regard to the requirements to be met in order for amendments by the introduction of disclaimers for disclosed subject-matter to be allowable under A 123(2) also apply with regard to the requirements for divisional applications under A 76(1) (see decision G 2/10 [4.6]). They therefore also apply to the examination under A 100(c) EPC 1973 in the present case.

In decision G 2/10 the question referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal is answered as follows:
“1a. An amendment to a claim by the introduction of a disclaimer disclaiming from it subject-matter disclosed in the application as filed infringes Article 123(2) EPC if the subject-matter remaining in the claim after the introduction of the disclaimer is not, be it explicitly or implicitly, directly and unambiguously disclosed to the skilled person using common general knowledge, in the application as filed.

1b. Determining whether or not that is the case requires a technical assessment of the overall technical circumstances of the individual case under consideration, taking into account the nature and extent of the disclosure in the application as filed, the nature and extent of the disclaimed subject-matter and its relationship with the subject-matter remaining in the claim after the amendment.”
In accordance with decision G 2/10, the disclosure of the parent application as filed has to be evaluated in comparison with the subject-matter remaining in the claim after the amendment.

[8.4] Claim 1 of the main request is identical to claim 1 as granted. The [patent proprietors] submitted that the disclaimer in claim 1 of the main request excluded subject-matter disclosed and claimed in the granted patent deriving from the parent application and referred to paragraph [0007] of the patent in suit (P1). Irrespective of whether or not this is the case, the following has to be considered. Such a procedural situation (which concerns the prosecution in a divisional application of the general teaching, whereas in the parent application the protection of a preferred embodiment is pursued) is reflected in decision G 2/10 [4.5.5, third paragraph]:
“The applicant may, for example, be interested in obtaining a first quicker protection for a preferred embodiment and pursue the general teaching in a divisional application. Whether or not and, if so, under what circumstances, in such a case a disclaimer would be necessary in order to avoid the so-called prohibition on double protection is a different matter. It is sufficient to say that such procedural behaviour is not abusive and even legitimate.”
[8.5] In order to assess what is the subject-matter claimed in claim 1 of the main request, the claim’s construction has first to be investigated.

[8.5.1] In accordance with Article 7(1), second sentence, of the Revision Act of 29 November 2000 and the decision of the Administrative Council of 28 June 2001 (Special edition No. 1, OJ EPO 2007, 197), revised A 54(4) is applicable, since the mention of the grant of the patent in suit was published in European Patent Bulletin before the entry into force of the revised EPC.

Oxycodone (as well as some oxycodone formulations) was known as a pharmaceutical drug before the effective date of filing of the patent in suit. Therefore, in accordance with A 54(4), claim 1 of the main request, which relates to “a controlled release oxycodone formulation for oral administration to human patients”, is a product claim in which the condition “for oral administration to human patients” merely expresses the suitability of the formulation for oral administration.

[8.5.2] Claim 1 of the main request relates to a controlled release formulation comprising oxycodone salt and a controlled release dosage matrix. The oxycodone salt is present in an amount equivalent to 10 mg to 160 mg of the oxycodone hydrochloride salt. The objective reading of the claim is that the oxycodone salt is included in the controlled release dosage matrix.

Moreover, the condition appearing in the definition of the controlled release dosage matrix “selected so that the formulation provides pH-independent dissolution characteristics” serves to define the controlled release dosage matrix as one that allows the formulation to release amounts of oxycodone (active compound) in a pH-independent manner. According to the wording in claim 1 of the main request, said condition must also apply to the matrix excluded from the claim by means of the disclaimer. Additionally, the expression “other than an acrylic resin matrix” excludes from the controlled resin matrices those which incorporate acrylic resins as suitable materials.

Therefore, the controlled release dosage matrix in the formulation according to claim 1 is any controlled release matrix which is not an acrylic resin matrix, and which allows the formulation to release oxycodone amounts without pH-dependent dose dumping.

[8.5.3] Additionally, claim 1 defines the formulation as providing, at steady state after repeated administration at 12-hour intervals, a mean maximum plasma concentration of oxycodone of 6 to 240 ng/ml at 2 to 4.5 hours after administration and a mean minimum plasma concentration of oxycodone of 3 to 120 ng/ml at 10 to 14 hours after administration.

These functional definitions require that the controlled release formulation comprising oxycodone salt in the lowest amount (i.e. an amount equivalent to 10 mg of oxycodone hydrochloride salt) be able to achieve (when administered at 12-hour intervals) at least the lowest values for the mean maximum plasma concentration and the mean minimum plasma concentration of the stated pharmacokinetic plasma profile at steady state conditions. By analogy, the controlled release formulation comprising oxycodone salt in the highest amount (i.e. an amount equivalent to 160 mg of oxycodone hydrochloride salt) must be able to achieve (when administered at 12-hour intervals) the highest values for the mean maximum plasma concentration and the mean minimum plasma concentration of the stated pharmacokinetic plasma profile at steady state conditions. Moreover, formulations comprising oxycodone salt within the range defined (i.e. amounts equivalent to 10 mg to 160 mg of oxycodone hydrochloride salt) and a controlled release dosage matrix, other than an acrylic resin matrix, must provide a pharmacokinetic plasma profile within the ranges defined in the claim (when administered at 12-hour intervals).

[8.5.4] From the foregoing it follows that claim 1 of the main request conveys that the particular pharmacokinetic plasma profiles at steady state, characterised by identifiable Cmax and Cmin at particular times, are attainable by means of any controlled release dosage matrix (as far as it does not cause pH-dependent dose dumping), without occurrence of acrylic resins.

[8.6] It has to be investigated whether or not the parent application (P4) discloses the product claimed in claim 1 of the main request and whether the subject-matter in said claim included technical information which is directly and unambiguously derivable from the parent application.

[8.6.1] The parent application (P4) discloses the general principle that “administering an oral solid controlled release dosage formulation comprising up to about 160 mg of oxycodone or a salt thereof … providing a mean maximum plasma concentration of oxycodone up to about 240 ng/ml from a mean of up to about 2 to about 4.5 hours after administration, and a mean minimum plasma concentration up to about 120 ng/ml from a mean of about 10 to about 14 hours after repeated “q12h” (i.e. every 12 hours) administration through steady-state conditions” reduces the range in daily dosages required to control pain in substantially all patients […]. However, the disclosure of this general principle does not suffice as a basis for the product claimed in claim 1 of the main request.

[8.6.2] The generic disclosure […] of the parent application P4 relates in general terms to “controlled release oxycodone formulations comprising up to about 160 mg oxycodone or a salt thereof, said formulations providing a mean maximum plasma concentration of oxycodone up to about 240 ng/ml from a mean of about 2 to about 4.5 hours after administration, and a mean minimum plasma concentration up to about 120 ng/ml from about 10 to about 14 hours after repeated q12h administration through steady-state conditions”. This disclosure does not suffice either as an allowable basis for the product claimed in claim 1 as granted. In particular, the basis for the lowest value of oxycodone salt “in an amount equivalent to 10 mg of the oxycodone hydrochloride salt”, the lowest mean maximum plasma concentration of oxycodone of 6 ng/ml, and the lowest mean minimum plasma concentration of oxycodone of 3 ng/ml are lacking.

[8.6.3] The parent application P4 discloses controlled release formulations comprising a matrix. The matrix is defined in the parent application as “any matrix that affords in vitro dissolution rates of oxycodone within the narrow ranges required and that releases the oxycodone in a pH independent manner” […]. However, claim 1 of the main request does not require the controlled release dosage matrix to afford a particular in vitro dissolution rate. As a consequence, the definition of the matrix defined in claim 1 of the main request is broader in this respect than the definition given [… in] the parent application.

[8.6.4] The parent application P4 discloses generically the “materials” which are “suitable for inclusion” in a controlled release matrix by giving different broadly defined generic options […]. However, the particular options given for materials to be included in the matrix do not amount to a generic disclosure encompassing any thinkable controlled release matrix capable of achieving the plasma profile given in claim 1 of the main request. The list of suitable materials which may be included in a controlled release matrix appearing [… in] the parent application does not represent a complete and fully elaborated list of constituents covering each and every kind of controlled release matrices. Furthermore, the parent application does not disclose that the plasma profile defined in claim 1 of the main request is the immediate and direct result of any controlled release matrix just because it contains any of the materials listed on pages 9 and 10. Moreover, […] some particular suitable matrices are disclosed which, however, do not cover any possible suitable controlled release matrix of claim 1. Thus, it cannot be derived from the content of the parent application that any controlled release matrix is able to provide the pharmacokinetic plasma profile required by claim 1 of the main request, or that any controlled release matrix can achieve the plasma profile without the occurrence of an acrylic resin.

[8.6.5] The parent application P4 discloses controlled release matrices comprising hydrophilic polymers other than acrylic resins, namely it discloses suitable matrices comprising at least one water-soluble hydroxyalkyl cellulose and at least one C12-C36 aliphatic alcohol […]. However, this particular subgroup is not a sufficient basis for the generic definition in claim 1 of the main request. Moreover, the constitution of the “suitable matrix” in this particular embodiment only confirms that the “suitable materials” listed […] do not represent singularised subgroups of a “suitable matrix” but generic options for materials to be selected and included in order that a “suitable matrix” is built.

[8.6.6] Additionally, claim 5 of the parent application P4 explicitly requires a suitable pharmaceutical diluent to be present in the solid oral dosage form. Apart from the fact that this feature is lacking in claim 1 of the main request, claim 5 of the parent application does not give in its paragraph (b) any exhaustive list of all possible constituents forming a controlled release matrix. Moreover, claim 5 of the parent application does not teach that each and every constitution of the controlled release matrix is able to attain the pharmacokinetic plasma profile defined in claim 1 of the main request, or that said profile can be achieved by any combination of materials without the occurrence of acrylic resins.

The fact that claim 6 of the parent application P4 explicitly refers to a controlled release composition of claim 5, “wherein said controlled release matrix comprises an acrylic resin” (emphasis added) merely emphasises that controlled release matrices comprising an acrylic resin are preferred, but says nothing about the nature and effect of controlled release matrices without the occurrence of acrylic resins.

[8.6.7] For the above reasons, the board concludes that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request remaining after the introduction of the disclaimer extends beyond the content of the parent application P4.

[8.7] Turning now to the [patent proprietors’] arguments:

[8.7.1] The person skilled in the art is the notional skilled person working in the technical field at the effective date of filing. The notional skilled person is not represented by a particular scientific expert or specialist with almost twenty years of accumulated expertise and knowledge after the date of filing of the parent application.

Additionally, if an application requires additional technical information to interpret terms differently from an objective reading of them in the technical field, then the application as filed has to include explanations and/or citations of prior-art references to clarify those aspects. In the absence of such explanations and references in the parent application as filed, the terms and definitions employed are to be given their objective and generally accepted meaning. Nothing other than this has been done in the present case.

Moreover, as regards the [patent proprietors’] allegation that the pharmacokinetic plasma profile makes it possible for the person skilled in the art to identify a controlled release formulation as one according to the parent application P4, it has to be said that this is not the question to be answered for the assessment of added subject-matter. The question to be answered in the present case is whether the product claimed in claim 1 of the main request presents the skilled person with technical information which is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the parent application. As shown by the analysis above, the product claimed in claim 1 of the main request presents the skilled person with new technical information relating to the constitution of the controlled release matrix suitable for attaining the particular pharmacokinetic plasma profile defined in the claim.

[8.7.2] The [patent proprietors] also submitted that according to decision G 2/10 [4.5.4, fourth paragraph] the remaining subject-matter and the remaining general teaching will normally not be modified by excluding from protection, by means of a disclaimer, a group initially disclosed in the application as filed. However, decision G 2/10 also states in the same paragraph that a situation may arise in which the disclaimer has the effect of confining the subject-matter remaining in the claim to a subgroup of the originally claimed subject-matter which could not be regarded as disclosed in the application as filed even taking into account what the skilled person would have considered as implicitly disclosed.

In the present case there is an essential difference between what the [patent proprietors] subjectively consider has been disclosed in their parent application P4 and the objective assessment of what has actually been, be it explicitly or implicitly, directly and unambiguously disclosed. The board considers that the concept of implicit disclosure has to be applied with great care. Therefore, subject-matter is implicitly disclosed to the skilled person in an application as filed if this subject-matter is necessarily derivable from said application.

[8.7.3] The [patent proprietors] made use in their submissions of the expressions “technical contribution”, “technical information” and “technical teaching” as if they referred to the same concepts. However, when examining the subject-matter remaining after introduction of the disclaimer in the present case in the light of the principles set out in decision G 2/10, it has to be assessed whether the subject-matter claimed presents the skilled person with new technical information not directly and unambiguously derivable from the parent application as filed. On the other hand, the test relating to the technical contribution provided by a claim vis-à-vis the prior art does not apply to the present case, since the disclaimer was not introduced in view of any particular prior-art document. Moreover, the technical teaching in the patent in suit, which derives from the divisional application, is per se different from that in the parent application P4. This is due to the fact that the content of the divisional application as filed was restricted in comparison to the parent application P4. The fact that the content of a patent deriving from a divisional application is limited in relation to the parent application does not necessarily mean that there is a problem under A 100(c) EPC 1973. However, if the limitations cause the “singling out” of intermediate generalisations (such as particular subgroups of elements) involving new technical information, then there is added subject-matter within the meaning of A 100(c) EPC 1973.

Furthermore, the [patent proprietors] argued that the disclosure of a certain pharmacokinetic profile in the parent application P4 means that the parent application inevitably singles out each and every constituent and combination of constituents for the formulation. However, for the application of A 123(2) EPC, A 76(1) EPC 1973, or A 100(c) EPC 1973, the disclosure test does not relate to alternatives which are not directly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed.

[8.7.4] Additionally, the [patent proprietors] cited the High Court’s decision D40 and the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal D40a in support of their argument that the subject-matter claimed in claim 1 of the main request does not contain added subject-matter.

All the national decisions cited by the [patent proprietors] predate the referral decision T 1068/07 and decision G 2/10. Decision G 2/10 leaves no doubt that it has to be investigated in each individual case whether the subject-matter remaining in the claim after the introduction of a disclaimer includes technical information which is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the parent application as filed.

As regards the passages cited by the [patent proprietors] in said national decisions, it has to be stressed that the High Court in its decision D40 and the Court of Appeal in its decision D40a did not assess whether the subject-matter remaining in the claim after the introduction of the disclaimer was disclosed in the parent application as filed.

The same applies in relation to the decision of the District Court of The Hague (D78a).

[8.7.5] The [patent proprietors] also cited decisions T 142/94 and T 1024/96.

Decision T 142/94 deals with the assessment of the requirements of inventive step in relation to a claim relating to a solid controlled release dosage form characterised inter alia by means of in vitro release profile and in vivo release profile. Therefore, decision T 142/94 is not relevant for the examination under A 100(c) EPC 1973. Decision T 1024/96 deals with the assessment of clarity of functional features under A 84 EPC 1973. However, claim 1 of the present main request is identical to claim 1 as granted. Therefore, A 84 EPC 1973 is not at issue (T 23/86). Decision T 1024/96 is thus not relevant for the present case either. Finally, it has to be pointed out that, in contrast to the circumstances of the decisions cited by the [patent proprietors], the product of claim 1 of the main request is not characterised by the in vitro dissolution rate.

[8.7.6] The [patent proprietors] also referred to their written submissions made in document D70. In document D70 the [patent proprietors] referred to decision T 1139/00, and submitted that by analogy to said decision claim 1 as granted had to be considered as allowable since the disclaimer excluded subject-matter disclosed in the parent application as filed. However, even if it is established that the disclaimer excludes subject-matter disclosed in the parent application as filed, the analysis to be made according to decision G 2/10 is whether the subject-matter remaining after introduction of the disclaimer is directly and unambiguously disclosed in the parent application as filed. Decision T 1139/00 was issued long before decision G 2/10, and thus only cites decisions G 1/03 and G 1/93. However, decision G 2/10 [4.3, last paragraph] makes it clear that neither decision G 1/93 nor decision G 1/03 intended to modify the general definition of the requirements of A 123(2). This finding is undoubtedly also applicable in the context of A 100(c) EPC 1973 (see point [8.3] above).

[8.7.7] The [patent proprietors] also cited decision T 1107/06 to support their arguments in favour of the allowability of a claim with a disclaimer for excluding subject-matter disclosed in the application as filed. However, decision T 1107/06 predates decision G 2/10, which stipulates that the investigation as to whether the subject-matter remaining in a claim after the introduction of a disclaimer is disclosed in the parent application as filed has to be decided in each case individually, after an objective investigation of the disclosure in the parent application as filed.

[8.8] For the above reasons, the main request fails under A 100(c) EPC 1973 since the subject-matter of claim 1 extends beyond the content of the parent application as filed.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 11 April 2013

T 1222/11 – Getting Your Priorities Right


Can a loss of priority lead to a violation of A 123(2)? Yes, it can, as illustrated in this examination appeal.

The Examining Division (ED) had found that the main request did not comply with the requirements of A 123(2) and that the auxiliary request lacked inventive step. Claim 1 of this request read:
1. A leave-on hair cosmetic composition, comprising the following components (A), (B) and (C):

(A) malic acid or a salt thereof;

(B) at least one organic solvent selected from benzylacohol or 2-benzyloxyethanol; and

(C) a set polymer, selected from polyvinylpyrrolidone polymer compounds, acidic vinyl ether polymer compounds, acidic polyvinyl acetate polymer compounds, acidic acrylic polymer compounds, amphoteric acrylic polymer compounds, basic acrylic polymer compounds and chitin/chitosan derivatives

wherein the cosmetic composition has a pH of from 2 to 5 at 25°C when diluted to 20 times the weight with water and has a buffering capacity of 0.001 gram equivalent/L or greater but less than 0.05 gram equivalent/L,

wherein the following compositions are excluded:
This was also the main request before the Board. The decision presents us with a noteworthy domino effect leading from a loss of priority to an unallowable disclaimer and thus to a violation of A 123(2). The Board also offers us some interesting – and possibly controversial – findings on how to understand certain statements of G 2/98. 

Not an easy read, though.

Amendments

[2] Compared to claim 1 as originally filed, claim 1 of the main request has been amended by (i) restricting the definition of component (A) from “an organic C2-8 dicarboxylic acid or salt thereof” to malic acid or a salt thereof, (ii) restricting the definition of component (B) from “at least one or more of an organic solvent selected from the group consisting of aromatic alcohols, N-alkylpyrrolidones, alkylene carbonates, polypropylene glycols, lactones and cyclic ketones, wherein the organic solvent has a Clog P of from -2 to 3” to at least one organic solvent selected from benzylalcohol or 2-benzyloxyethanol, (iii) making mandatory the use of a set polymer selected from polyvinylpyrrolidone polymer compounds, acidic vinyl ether polymer compounds, acidic polyvinyl acetate polymer compounds, acidic acrylic polymer compounds, amphoteric acrylic polymer compounds, basic acrylic polymer compounds and chitin/chitosan derivatives, (iv) restricting the upper value of the buffering capacity of the composition to 0.05 gram equivalent/L and (v) disclaiming six particular compositions.

[3] It is not disputed that the six disclaimers contained in Claim 1 are “undisclosed disclaimers” within the meaning of G 1/03, i.e. concern subject-matters which are not disclosed as such in the application as originally filed (see G 2/10 [3]). They have the purpose of restoring novelty over D4b, which is an earlier application by the present applicants, published in the Japanese language between the priority date claimed and the filing date of the present application. A translation in English of D4b, which entered the European phase, was published in accordance with A 158(3) as D4 (EP-A-1 570 832). The passages of D4b indicated in the present decision refer to the corresponding passages in the latter publication D4.

Disclosure of D4b and comparison with the present application

[4] Claim 1 of D4b is directed to leave-on hair cosmetic compositions comprising malic acid or a salt thereof, lactic acid or a salt thereof and an organic solvent selected from the group consisting of aromatic alcohols, N-alkylpyrrolidones, alkylene carbonates, polypropylene glycol, lactones and cyclic ketones, wherein the organic solvent has a Clog P of from -2 to 3. The compositions are described to provide set retention, sleekness and smoothness to the hair […].

[4.1] D4b discloses in particular six specific leave-on hair cosmetic compositions […] on the basis of which the present disclaimers have been formulated. They comprise malic acid, lactic acid, 2-Benzyloxyethanol, a set polymer, namely either a polyvinylpyrrolidone polymer […] or an amphoteric acrylic polymer […]. Their pH is 3.7 and has been adjusted with an aqueous solution of sodium hydroxide.

[4.2] In line with the disclosure of these exemplified compositions, D4b teaches, like the present application as filed […], that the preferred ingredients for the organic solvent include benzyl alcohol, benzyloxyethanol, propylene carbonate, and polypropylene glycol (number average molecular weight: 300 to 500, especially 400) […]. The use of a set polymer is considered to be optional both in D4b […] and in the application as filed […], the lists of set polymers exemplified in D4b and in the application as filed being identical, including the classes of set polymers defined in claim 1 of the present requests. D4b also discloses that it is preferred, in order to achieve the objective of D4b with respect to sleekness of hair and styling ease, that the pH measured at 25°C of the cosmetic solution diluted 20-fold in water is in a range of from 2.5 to 4.5, more preferably in a range of from 3 to 4.2 […], i.e. within the pH range defined in claim 1 of the present request. Hence, the technical information in the application as filed regarding the use of the preferred organic solvent, of the set polymer and of a pH range does not differ from that provided in D4b, with the consequence that any pointer to be found in the application as filed to the combination of features defined in the first part of present claim 1 in terms of positive features with the exception of buffering capacity is also to be found in D4b.

[4.3] As to the buffering capacity defined in present claim 1, this parameter results from the presence of a buffering agent such as compound (A), i.e. the organic C2-8 dicarboxylic acid or salt thereof […], in particular malic acid, in an amount preferably from 0.5 wt.% to 10 wt.% […], i.e. the same amount as taught in D4b […]. Moreover, lactic acid is known as a conventional buffering agent and is used according to […] D4b in an amount preferably lying within the range from 0.5 to 10 wt.-%. The present application confirms with Example 5 that the mere presence of malic acid in an amount of 4 wt.% and lactic acid in an amount of 1 wt.%, i.e. the respective amounts of those acids used in Example Product 10 and Example Product 6 of D4b, now disclaimed, brings about a buffering capacity of 0.006 gram equivalent/L, i.e. within the range broadly defined in present claim 1. Thus, in view of the above, it is concluded that Example Product 10 and Example Product 6 of D4 exhibit the buffering capacity required by present claim 1. Also, a strong presumption has been established that Example Products 11 to 14 which contain equal amounts of malic and lactic acids, i.e. 5 wt.% in total, like Example 5 of the present application, also meet the parametric definition of buffering capacity as defined in claim 1 of the main request. The applicants, although they argued that D4b remained completely silent in regard to buffering capacity, did not argue that said parameter constituted a distinguishing feature. In view of the strong presumption established above that these specific embodiments also fulfil this parametric condition, and the absence of evidence to the contrary, let alone any denial by the appellants that it is so, the Board concludes that the above six examples of D4b fall within the definition of the composition defined in positive terms in the first part of claim 1.

[5] It follows also from the above that the disclosure of D4b overlaps with the definition of the compositions defined in positive terms in present claim 1 (i.e. in the absence of the disclaimers), D4b giving direct and unambiguous pointers, at least through the disclosure of six exemplified compositions, corresponding to the compositions presently disclaimed, to apply the technical teaching of D4b in that area of overlap. The use of six disclaimers for the main request, which correspond to six compositions falling within the area of overlap between the present application and D4b raises the issue of whether these disclaimers could in any event succeed in restoring novelty. It is however more appropriate in the present case, as the same question also arises for the First and Second Auxiliary Requests, which contain a more broadly defined disclaimer also solely based on the disclosure of D4b, to first examine whether a disclaimer based on the sole disclosure of D4b and not on the application as filed might be allowable having regard to the requirements set out in decisions G 1/03 and G 2/10. As the present disclaimers have the purpose of restoring novelty over D4b, it is necessary in view of the criteria developed in decision G 1/03 for allowability of disclaimers introduced to restore novelty to determine whether D4b published between the priority date claimed and the filing date represents state of the art pursuant to A 54(3) or a disclosure pursuant to A 54(2).

[6] In the context of assessing whether D4b is state of the art pursuant to A 54(3) or A 54(2), the question arises whether the combination of features defined in positive terms in amended claim 1, i.e. before the introduction of the disclaimers, or in other words in the absence thereof, enjoys the priority claimed. In this respect reference is also made to decision G 1/03 [4], according to which the introduction during the prosecution of a European patent application of an allowable disclaimer does not change the identity of the invention within the meaning of A 87(1).

Priority

[7] The text of the present application as filed corresponds to the translation in English of the Japanese patent application 2004053708, on the basis of which priority is presently claimed. According to A 87(1), a requirement for enjoying a right of priority for filing a European patent application is that the application for a patent, a utility model or a utility certificate on the basis of which the priority is claimed must be the first application in respect of the same invention. According to A 87(4), the definition of a first application extends also to a subsequent application in respect of the same subject-matter as the previous first application and filed in or for the same State, provided that at the date of filing of the subsequent application, the previous first application has been withdrawn, abandoned or refused without having become open to public inspection and without leaving any rights outstanding, and has not served as a basis for claiming a right of priority.

[8] The purpose of the provisions of A 87(4) is to allow applicants to replace a previous application by a subsequent application and still benefit from a right of priority. The reasons may be that the previous application which has been filed did not describe the invention properly or might need to be supplemented by additional embodiments resulting from further research developments. Patent applicants may in particular wish to combine the originally disclosed subject-matter of the first filing with further additional related embodiments developed during the priority period within one and the same application, while claiming and enjoying priority from the embodiments disclosed in the first filing (see T 15/01 [38]).

[9] If Japanese patent application 2004053708, on the basis of which priority is presently claimed and the earlier PCT application PCT/JP2003/014791 filed on 20 November 2003 related to the same invention, the later Japanese patent application could not represent such a subsequent application being considered as the first application within the meaning of A 87(4) replacing the earlier PCT application for the benefit of a right of priority for said invention, as the above earlier application was published as D4b and entered the European phase (see point [3] above). The question therefore arises whether or not the subject-matter of claim 1 of the Main request in the absence of any disclaimer, which subject-matter is also disclosed in Japanese patent application 2004053708 on the basis of which priority is presently claimed, is in respect of the same invention as already disclosed in D4b.

[9.1] In view of opinion G 2/98 [2-6.8], a narrow or strict interpretation of the concept of “the same invention” referred to in A 87(1), equating it with the concept of “the same subject-matter” referred to in A 87(4), is perfectly consistent with the relevant provisions of both the Paris Convention and the EPC.

[9.2] It follows from the above that the combination of features defined in positive terms in the first part of present claim 1 of the main request cannot be distinguished from the disclosure of the earlier application D4b. Example Products 10 to 14 and Example Product 6 of D4b constitute prior disclosures of the combination of features defined in positive terms in the first part of present claim 1 of the main request and therefore cannot be held to relate to a different subject-matter, i.e. a different invention. In view of the above, the subject-matter defined in amended claim 1 in positive terms (i.e. without any disclaimer) is not entitled to priority as far as far it concerns the subject-matter already disclosed in D4b.

[9.3] The appellants’ argument that the presently claimed invention differs from that of D4b, as it does not require the presence of lactic acid, fails to convince in view of the meaning of “invention” equating with “subject-matter”, which subject-matter, in the absence of the present disclaimers, cannot be distinguished from that disclosed in D4b.

[9.4] The appellants’ further argument that the claimed invention or claimed subject-matter in D4b does not provide any basis for claiming, as in present claim 1, the use of malic acid without any restriction to its combined use with lactic acid does not mean that D4b and the present application do not contain a common subject-matter or invention, but only means that the disclosure of D4b does not extend to the use of malic acid without any lactic acid. In other words, the present subject-matter can be seen as the invention of D4b supplemented with additional subject-matter relating to the use of malic acid without lactic acid, whereas the appellants did not make use of the provisions of A 87(4) in order to claim on the basis of the present priority document a first filing in respect of the subject-matter defined in the present claims, or take advantage of the possibility to file a separate application disclosing these additional embodiments, possibly to benefit from a priority right for the additional embodiments in a later application.

[10] Consequently, in view of the ruling in opinion G 2/98, that the concept of “the same invention” referred to in A 87(1) may be equated with the concept of “the same subject-matter”, it must be concluded for this reason alone that the appellants cannot benefit from the priority claimed for the combination of features defined in positive terms in amended claim 1, in so far as it covers subject-matter disclosed in D4b, in particular in so far as it covers the six compositions disclosed in D4b which the appellants are seeking to disclaim.

Additional remarks in relation to priority

[11] According to opinions G 3/93 [4] and G 2/98 [3] A 87 to A 89 provide a complete, self-contained code of rules of law on the subject of claiming priority for the purpose of filing a European patent application and are clearly intended not to contravene the basic principles concerning priority laid down in the Paris Convention. Therefore, although the following considerations are not part of the reasons for denying priority for present claim 1 in so far as it covers compositions already disclosed in D4b (see points [7] to [10] above), the Board nevertheless considers it useful to explain why the reasons given above for denying priority for present claim 1, in so far as it covers compositions disclosed by D4b, although present claim 1 is not specific as to the presence or absence of lactic acid, are coherent with the principles of claiming multiple priorities and claiming partial priority, which are enshrined in Article 4F of the Paris Convention and reflected in the corresponding provisions of the EPC, namely A 88(2) and (3) (see G 2/98 [6.1] and T 15/01 [31-33]).

[11.1] It follows from opinion G 2/98 [6.3-4] that the legislative intent underlying A 88(2), second sentence, concerning the possibility of claiming multiple priorities for any one claim is expressed in Memorandum C drawn up by FICPI (M/48/I, Section C) (hereafter “Memorandum”) for the Munich Diplomatic Conference in 1973. According to the Memorandum, when evaluating whether there is any justification for claiming multiple priorities for one and the same claim of an application, a distinction has to be made between (i) “AND”-claims and (ii) “OR”-claims (see point [6.5]).

[11.2] As regards the “AND”-claim situation, the Memorandum stated (see G 2/98 [6.6]) that where a first priority document discloses a feature A, and a second priority document discloses a feature B for use together with feature A, “then a claim directed to A+B cannot enjoy a partial priority from the first priority date, because the invention A+B was disclosed only at the date of the second priority document”.

[11.3] Concerning the “OR”-claim situation it is stated in the Memorandum, according to G 2/98 [6.7], that where a first priority document discloses a feature A, and a second priority document discloses a feature B for use as an alternative to feature A, then a claim directed to A or B can enjoy the first priority for part A of the claim and the second priority for part B of the claim (for the definition of the “OR”-claim situation given in the Memorandum, see point [11.5.4] below). It is also added in the penultimate sentence of opinion G 2/98 [6.7] that the Memorandum suggests that these two priorities may also be claimed for a claim directed to C, if the feature C, either in the form of a generic term or formula, or otherwise, encompasses feature A as well as feature B, the last sentence of point [6.7] of the Reasons reading “The use of a generic term or formula in a claim for which multiple priorities are claimed in accordance with A 88(2), second sentence, EPC is perfectly acceptable under A 87(1) and A 88(3) EPC, provided that it gives rise to the claiming of a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters.”

[11.4] The Board is aware of decisions T 1877/08 [2.4], T 476/09 [5.6], T 1443/05 [4.2.6] and T 1127/00 [6] according to which the condition “provided that it gives rise to the claiming of a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters” set out in G 2/98 [6.7] was seen as characterising the manner in which the subject-matter of the “OR”-claim must be defined.

In decisions T 1877/08 and T 476/09, the claim of the application defined larger numerical ranges than those defined in the priority document. A partial priority was denied for the compositions disclosed in the priority document, which were encompassed by the composition of the application, on the ground that the claimed ranges represented a continuum of numerical values, from which no separable alternative embodiments, i.e. elements in the sense of A 88(3), could be identified. In T 1127/00, partial priority for a claim directed to a generic formula which was broader that the generic formula defined in the priority document was not upheld. The claim covered a great number of alternative compounds which were not, as such, spelled out in the claim and which did not represent a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters in the form of an “OR”-claim, which could be split up into groups of different priorities. The fact that these compounds might be intellectually envisaged to fall within the scope of the claim was not considered to make up for a clear and unambiguous presence of these alternatives, individualized as such. Claim 1 could not enjoy the partial priority from a priority document, but could only be entitled to the priority date of the document where the said generic formula was for the first time disclosed.

[11.5] The present Board is however of the opinion as explained below that the condition “provided that it gives rise to the claiming of a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters” should be given, when read in its proper context, a different meaning than that attributed to it by the respective Boards in the above mentioned decisions T 1877/08, T 476/09, T 1443/05 and T 1127/00.

As a preliminary remark, this condition cannot be meant to set out the manner in which the subject-matter of the “OR”-claim must be defined, i.e. to give “rise to the claiming of a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters” as this would, at least in relation to generic terms, be at variance with the disclosure test based on the principle of an unambiguous and direct disclosure set out in opinion G 3/89. Furthermore, and more importantly:

[11.5.1] A 88(3), which is referred to in the last sentence of point [6.7], reads
“If one or more priorities are claimed in respect of a European patent application, the right of priority shall cover only those elements of the European patent application which are included in the application or applications whose priority is claimed”.
In the context of opinion G 2/98 [6.7] concerning exclusively the question of the claiming of multiple priorities for one and the same “OR”-claim, the reference to A 88(3) in the last sentence of point [6.7] of the Reasons means therefore that the Enlarged Board (EBA) indicates under which conditions the assessment required by A 88(3), as to which elements of the “OR”-claim are covered by any of the multiple priority claims, can be made when the “OR”-claim is drafted using a generic term or formula.

[11.5.2] Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that the assessment required by A 88(3), as to which elements (alternatives) of the “OR”-claim are covered by any of the multiple priority claims can be achieved only by a comparison of the claimed subject-matter of that “OR”-claim with the disclosure of the multiple priority documents. Therefore, in the context of assessing which elements of the “OR”-claim are covered by any of the multiple priority documents, the words “gives rise to the claiming of a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters” refer to the ability to conceptually identify by said comparison a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters to which the multiple rights of priority claimed can be attributed or not.

[11.5.3] That this comparison should give rise to a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters is obviously necessary in order to identify which parts of the claims benefit from the effect of the priority right defined in A 89. For the avoidance of doubt, the Board wishes to add that it is not the task of the EPO to determine ex officio to which parts of an “OR”-claim can be attributed the right(s) of priority claimed. In view of an intermediate prior art which appears relevant for assessing the patentability of a particular “OR”-claim, the burden of proof that said particular claim benefits from a partial priority or partial priorities, if the latter is prima facie not immediately obvious, is on the person alleging the existence of said partial priority.

[11.5.4] Furthermore, the above analysis of the last sentence of G 2/98 [6.7] holds good in the light of the Memorandum, which according to the EBA proved the intent of the legislator concerning the question of multiple priorities. As to “OR”-claims, which are spelled out in this manner in the Memorandum, those are defined as claims which are “too broad to be supported by the disclosure of the first priority document” (the passages relating to the Memorandum […] are quotations from the latter). According to page 2 of the Memorandum,
“It is of course immaterial whether the word “or” actually occurs in the claim, or is implied through the use of a generic term, or otherwise”. The Memorandum goes on to provide three typical examples of “situations of the “OR”-type”.
[11.5.5] According to the first example entitled “Broadening of chemical formulae”,
“A first priority document discloses a relatively narrow chemical formula supported by representative examples. A second priority document discloses a broader chemical formula which within its scope includes the narrower chemical formula, and which is supported by additional examples justifying the broader formula. If multiple priorities for one and the same claim are allowed, it will suffice to draw up a single claim directed to the broad formula. This claim will then enjoy priority from the first priority date to the extent that the compound in question comes within the scope of the narrow formula, and the second priority for the rest of its scope. If multiple priorities for one and the same claim are not allowed, the applicant would have to draw up two parallel claims, one directed to the narrow formula and enjoying the first priority, and another directed to compounds coming within the broad formula, but not within the narrow formula. The latter claim would then enjoy the second priority.”
This example which is not specified to relate to a claim directed to a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters confirms, through the use of the terms “within the scope” and “for the rest of its scope” and the identification of the parts of the claim enjoying the respective rights of priority, that the attribution of the partial priorities to the different parts of the claim has to be made by a comparison of the subject-matter of the claim with the disclosure of the priority documents. The clearly defined alternative subject-matters are in this example the narrow formula and the rest of the scope of the claim.

[11.5.6] According to the second example of the Memorandum entitled “Broadening of range (temperature, pressure, concentration, etc.)”
“a first priority document discloses a temperature range of 15-20°C and a second priority document discloses a temperature range of 10-25°C. If multiple priorities for one and the same claim are allowed, it will suffice in the European patent application to draw up a claim directed to the temperature range 10-25°C. If multiple priorities for one and the same claim are not allowed, the applicant will have to draw up two parallel claims, one directed to the temperature range 15-20°C and enjoying the first priority, and another claim directed to the temperature ranges l0-15° or 20-25°C, which claim will then enjoy the priority of the second priority document which was the first one to disclose these temperature ranges”.
It follows from this second example, that the claim defining a temperature range of 10-25°C enjoys the first priority for the temperature range 15-20°C, although the latter is neither explicitly nor implicitly disclosed in the claim. The clearly defined alternative subject-matters are in this example the three above mentioned temperature ranges.

[11.5.7] That the different dates of priority should be attributed through a comparison between the claimed subject-matter and the subject-matter of the priority documents and that partial priority is not reserved only to claims which define on their own “a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters” is also illustrated by the third example of the Memorandum. In this third Example, the first priority document discloses a method of coating the inner wall of a pipe and the second priority document discloses the use of the same method for coating the inner wall of bottles or any other hollow bodies. According to the Memorandum,
“If multiple priorities for one and the same claim are allowed, it will suffice in the European patent application to draw up a claim to a method for coating the inner wall of hollow bodies. If multiple priorities for one and the same claim are not allowed, the applicant will have to draw up two parallel claims, one directed to a method of coating the inner wall of pipes, which claim will enjoy the first priority, and a second claim directed to a method of coating the inner wall of hollow bodies not being pipes, which claim would enjoy the second priority.”
The identifiable alternatives resulting from the comparison between the claimed subject-matter and the priority documents are in this case the method of coating the inner wall of pipes and the method of coating the inner wall of hollow bodies not being pipes.

[11.5.8] Thus the Memorandum, which was considered by the EBA to express the legislative intent underlying the possibility of claiming multiple priorities for any one claim as defined in A 88(2), second sentence, confirms through the situations exemplified therein the significance to be attributed to the condition referred to in opinion G 2/98 [6.7], as indicated in point [11.5.2] above, namely the ability to conceptually identify a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters by a comparison of the subject-matter of that “OR”-claim with the disclosure of the multiple priority documents, so as to determine which parts of the “OR”-claim or alternative subject-matters are covered by the rights of priority claimed.

[11.6] Bearing in mind the above conclusion concerning assessment of partial priority for an “OR”-claim (claim too broad to be supported by the disclosure of the first priority document, as defined in the Memorandum) when multiple priorities are claimed, there is no reason why the assessment of partial priority for an “OR”-claim should be different depending on whether a single priority or multiple priorities are claimed, nor is there any provision in the EPC which would support a different view. A 88(3) does not make any difference in this respect. Referring to any of the examples given in the Memorandum, for the part of the subject-matter claimed corresponding to the subject-matter disclosed in the first priority document, there is no reason why the validity of the priority disclosing a first subject-matter should be made dependent on the existence of a later second priority document disclosing a subject-matter broader in scope and encompassing the earlier disclosure. Hence, the condition referred to in opinion G2/98 [6.7] must be considered to be applicable also when assessing partial priority in relation to a single priority document, i.e. the comparison of the claimed subject-matter of that “OR”-claim with the disclosure of the priority document must give rise to a limited number of clearly defined alternative subject-matters, so that it is possible to determine which subject-matters are covered by the priority claimed and which are not.

[11.7] According to the conclusion of opinion G 2/98, “The requirement for claiming priority of “the same invention”, referred to in A 87(1), means that priority of a previous application in respect of a claim in a European patent application in accordance with A 88 is to be acknowledged only if the skilled person can derive the subject-matter of the claim directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the previous application as a whole”. For the sake of avoiding any misunderstanding, it is pointed out that applying the principle of partial priority in the context of “OR”-claims as defined in the Memorandum, i.e. claims too broad to be supported by the disclosure of the first priority document, does not contradict the conclusion reached in opinion G 2/98, because that conclusion is not given in respect of “OR”-claims, as implicitly follows from the Reasons for opinion G 2/98, in particular point [6.7] (see point [11.3] above), and the wording of the conclusion itself.

[11.8] It is therefore concluded that in so far as a subject-matter disclosed in a priority document and encompassed by an “OR”-claim of a European application (i.e. a claim of a European application which compared to the disclosure of the subject-matter in the priority document has been broadened) is concerned, the decision on whether priority can be acknowledged for this subject-matter, i.e. for this embodiment covered by the “OR”-claim, is independent of whether said subject-matter or embodiment disclosed in the priority document is identified in the “OR”-claim of the European application as a separate alternative embodiment.

The above conclusion, however, also implies in view of the necessary coherence of rules of law on the subject of claiming priority defined in the EPC, that when an application on the basis of which a priority date is claimed encompasses a narrower subject-matter already disclosed by the same applicant in an earlier application, the decision on whether the claim to priority on the basis of the later application is valid does not depend on whether the narrower subject-matter disclosed in the earlier application is identified in said later application.

The latter situation is precisely the one underlying the case under appeal.

Allowability of the disclaimers

[12] As the claimed priority for the combination of features defined in positive terms in amended claim 1, i.e. before the introduction of the disclaimers, does not hold at least with respect to the six compositions already disclosed in application D4b, as follows from above points [7] to [10], the publication of those embodiments of D4b before the filing date of the present application constitutes prior art pursuant to A 54(2). As the anticipatory disclosure of D4b also concerns according to its claim 1 leave-on hair compositions, it does not constitute an accidental anticipation within the meaning of G 1/03 with the consequence that the six disclaimers introduced, which are based solely on the disclosure of document D4b, are not allowable under A 123(2).

[13] The main request is therefore rejected.

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Wednesday, 10 April 2013

T 2086/11 – More Mean Misery


This is an appeal against the refusal of the application under consideration by the Examining Division, which had found the claims on file to lack clarity.

Claim 1 before the Board read:
1. An aluminum flake pigment characterized in that the mean particle size of aluminum flake particles contained in said aluminum flake pigment is in the range of 3 to 20 µm and among the aluminum flake particles contained in said aluminum flake pigment, the aluminum flake particles having major axes (D) of not more than 10 µm have a mean aspect ratio in the range of 8 to 20, calculated from individual aspect ratios (D/thickness of each particle) of at least 50 aluminum flake particles having major axes (D) of not more than 10 µm. (my emphasis)
The Board confirmed that this claim was not clear:

[1.1.1] It is established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO that, in order to ensure legal certainty, a claim must clearly define the matter for which protection is sought in terms of the technical features of the invention; the clarity of the technical features contained in the claim thus serves the purpose of ensuring that the public is not left in any doubt as to which subject-matter is covered by a particular claim and which is not (see Case Law, 6th edition, 2010, II.B.1.1.1, first two full paragraphs on page 253 as well as T 728/98 [3.1]).

[1.1.2] The parameter “mean aspect ratio”, contained in the wording of claim 1, represents, in the present case, the mean of the individual aspect ratios, defined as the ratio of the major axis to thickness, of 50 aluminium flake particles having major axes of not more than 10 µm The method for measuring said mean aspect ratio is described in paragraphs 61 to 63 of the application.

According to this method of measurement a paint plate containing aluminium flake pigments, obtained as described in paragraphs 54 to 56, is cut into 1.5 cm square in order to prepare an observation sample. The aluminium flake particles are then observed in a section of the paint film of the sample by means of a digital HD microscope, the individual aspect ratios of 50 flake particles observed on the screen are measured and the mean of these 50 individual aspect ratios is calculated.

It is undisputed that the observed sample, which contains flake particles with a mean diameter of 3 to 20 µm, can contain thousands of aluminium flake particles having a major axis of not more than 10 µm.

It is also undisputed that the measurement contains necessarily an error (as remarked in paragraph 63 of the application itself) since the flake particles are observed on a screen and the observation of the major axis and thickness of the two-dimensional image of the individual particles depends on their orientation in the observed plate; therefore, it is not possible for an operator to assess with certainty if the observed particle is really showing its major axis and thickness or not. As explained by the Appellant and in the application (paragraph 63), the measurement has been repeated 50 times by taking 50 different particles in order to reduce the experimental error.

However, since the investigated sample contains thousands of particles having a major axis of not more than 10 µm and the method described in the application does not give any precise indication upon how to select such 50 particles, one operator, by selecting at random one group of 50 particles, would measure perhaps a mean aspect ratio according to claim 1 whilst another operator, by selecting for the same sample a different group of 50 particles, could find a value of mean aspect ratio outside the claim.

The Board remarks also that claim 1 requires a mean diameter for all aluminium flake particles of from 3 to 20 µm, i.e. that 50% of the particles are above the mean diameter and 50% below, but it does not contain any further requirement with regard to the homogeneity of the overall particle size distribution or of the particle thickness. Hence, an observed sample could contain, for example, 1000 particles with a size below 10 µm but with very different thickness.

Therefore, the average aspect ratio measured on a random selected group of only 50 particles, which would represent 2% of 1000 particles, cannot represent anyway a statistically significant indication of the real mean aspect ratio of the total group of particles contained in the tested flake pigment.

Therefore, the parameter chosen in claim 1 is by itself insufficient to characterize the claimed product in a reliable way so that a skilled person would know if the product tested falls or not within the extent of the claim.

The Board thus concludes that the parameter “mean aspect ratio” is unclear and that claim 1 does not comply with the requirements of A 84 EPC 1973.

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