Tuesday, 9 April 2013

T 71/09 – Colours Of The Vine


The present decision reminds us that whenever an opponent invokes its own prior public use, the applicable standard of proof is very strict.

*** Translation of the French original ***

[5] The [opponent] has invoked a prior public use that is said to destroy both the novelty of and the inventive step involved in the claimed subject-matter. This prior use belongs to its own activities because the underlying facts concern the sale of the “Weinlaub 6-89” product by the [opponent].

[5.1] According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal, a finding that a use forms part of the state of the art for the purpose of A 54(2) should only be made if the available evidence, when subjected to a strict and careful evaluation, allows to establish that it has occurred (T 750/94 [4]). Consequently, before it can be asserted that a use is part of the state of the art, the Board has to ascertain that the evidence on file allows to establish with a degree of certainty that is close to absolute conviction – or, in other words, beyond all reasonable doubt – that this prior use has indeed occurred before the priority date of the impugned patent (T 97/94 [5.1]).

[5.2] The alleged prior use consists in the marketing of the “Weinlaub 6-89” product before the priority date of the patent-in-suit. This product is found in a catalogue dated May 1996 (page 8 of document V1). The product bears the reference 46364 and is not associated to a production batch (lot de fabrication).


[5.3] The [opponent] asserts that the product proposed in the catalogue corresponds to the production batch of October 26, 1995, which is mentioned in document V3 dated November 2, 1995.



This document provides details on a series of compounds of the “Igora Soft line extension” product line, which includes the product “Weinlaub” of nuance 6-89 the composition of which is referred to by number 99185 and its cream formulation by number 75855. According to this document, the product contains a blend of powders of colour AB as well as a blend of powder of colour C, both of which are simply identified by the same number 11008. Consequently, even considering that the production batch disclosed in document V3 has indeed been proposed for sale by means of catalogue V1, document V3 alone does not establish which are the oxidation colorants present in the product “Weinlaub” of nuance 6-89 because the colorants used for the preparation of the product are codified, i.e. via a colour blend 99185 or by a blend of powders of colour AB and C.

The [opponent] refers to a production batch of coloured powder bearing the number 199185 and dated November 10, 1995 (document V5). 


This blend of coloured powder has been produced after the “Weinlaub 6-89” product according to document V3 had been manufactured (2 November 1995). Thus the colour blend of document V5 could not have been used for the preparation of the production batch of the “Weinlaub 6-89” product according to document V3. Document V4 concerns a production batch of the product “Igora Soft 6-89” dated February 5, 1998, which is later than the catalogue V1 dated May 1996. As a consequence, it cannot establish the composition of the product “Weinlaub” of nuance 6-89 as proposed in the catalogue of May 1996.

The [opponent] has tried to support the public prior use by asserting that all the compositions of the blends of colours referred to by the same number are identical and that, therefore, a composition identical to the one disclosed in document V5 had been used for the manufacture of the “Weinlaub 6-89” product.

According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal of the EPO, each party to the proceedings bears the burden of proof for the facts it asserts; if a fact that is relevant to the decision is not proven, the decision is taken to the detriment of the party that was not able to administer the proof incumbent on it. In the present case the [opponent], who alone is in possession of the evidence, asserts, without providing any evidence whatsoever, that the “Weinlaub” product of nuance 6-89 referred to in catalogue V1 is the same than the one obtained in the production batch of document V3 dated November 2, 1995, and that all the recipes for the coloured power numbered 99185 have the same composition, irrespective of their manufacturing date.

Moreover, document P9 – which consists of copies of packages of products of the “Igora Royal” product line – shows that the products marketed as the same nuance may have differing colorant compositions. For instance, products 1 and 2 have not the same colorant composition although they are both referred to as “Igora Royal of nuance 4-68”. As a matter of fact, the composition of product 1 comprises o-aminophenol, HC red 3, and 4-amino 3-nitrophenol, whereas product 2 does not. Conversely, 4-amino-2-hydroxytoluene is only found in product 2.

Consequently, the Board considers that the documents filed by the [opponent] are not sufficient for establishing beyond all reasonable doubt that the composition of the product “Weinlaub” of nuance 6-89 referred to in the catalogue dated May 1996 is the same as the one disclosed in documents V4 and V5.

Thus the composition of the product “Weinlaub” of nuance 6-89 has not been established. Consequently, the alleged prior use has not been sufficiently proven and cannot be part of the state of the art (A 54(2)).

Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to answer the question on which the parties did not agree, i.e. whether the mere fact that this product was referred to in a catalogue, without there being any proof for a sale, is equivalent to making the composition of the product available to the public.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Monday, 8 April 2013

T 1843/11 – Whatever Order You Like


In this appeal against the revocation of the opposed patent the [patent proprietor] invoked several substantial procedural violations:

Wet tensile strength

[5.1] The opposed patent is directed to fibrous nonwoven web materials to be used as premoistened wipes. These web materials are characterised by inter alia a basis weight in the range of about 30 to about 90 gsm and “a wet tensile strength (for 55 gsm basis weight) in the machine direction of at least about 160 gms/25 mm” (claim 1). Due to this wet tensile strength, the web material’s serviceability and resistance to sheet material breakage during manufacturing operations, as well as its handling on automated equipment, is improved and the finished material is able to resist tearing or puncturing during dispensing and use […].

[5.2] The Opposition Division (OD) revoked the patent for lack of sufficiency of disclosure as the skilled person was considered not to know how to determine the parameter “wet tensile strength (for 55 gsm basis weight)” in claim 1 and thus was not able to tell whether he was working within the forbidden area of the claims or not.

[5.3] In the statement of grounds of appeal […], the proprietor […] complained that a substantial procedural violation had been committed by the OD as its decision neither acknowledged nor gave any reasons as to the following argument (in the following: “wet tensile strength argument”):
“...the skilled person did know whether he or she was working within the forbidden area of the claims because the skilled person simply had to prepare a sheet of basis weight 55 gsm for a given composition and measure the wet tensile strength. If the wet tensile strength of this particular sheet composition satisfied the criteria in claim 1, then a sheet having any basis weight within the claimed range for this specific sheet composition must fall within the scope of claim 1.”
[5.4] In the following, it will be examined whether the [patent proprietor’s] complaint is justified. In this respect, it has first to be decided whether it is credible that the wet tensile strength argument was indeed made by the [patent proprietor] during the first instance opposition proceedings.

[5.4.1] The [patent proprietor] had complained in its letter of 15 August 2011, i.e. after issuance of the OD’s decision and prior to the present appeal, that despite the above wet tensile strength argument having been made during the oral proceedings (OPs), it had been omitted from the OD’s decision and the minutes. The [patent proprietor] requested accordingly that the minutes be corrected.

[5.4.2] The OD refused this request as follows:
“The Proprietor’s request for correction of the minutes of the OPs which took place on the 24th May 2011 is rejected. The OD considers that the requirements of R 124(1) of those containing the essentials of the OPs and the relevant statements made by the parties are fulfilled.”
This statement is not responsive to the [patent proprietor’s] complaint and in particular does not dispute in any way that the wet tensile strength argument was made during the OPs.

[5.4.3] For its part, the [opponent] has not, at any time during the opposition or appeal proceedings, disputed that the wet tensile strength argument was made during the OPs before the OD.

[5.4.4] Finally, apart from having been made during the OPs, the wet tensile strength argument in fact was also made during the written opposition proceedings, namely in the [patent proprietor’s] letter of 21 April 2011 […]. More particularly, in this letter, the [patent proprietor] argued as follows:
“In any case, to establish whether or not a nonwoven web material falls within the scope of claim 1 the skilled person only has to take the fibrous composition of its web and prepare a similar web material with a basis weight of 55 gsm and then measure its wet tensile strength. This process involves no inventive skill and does not represent an undue burden on the skilled person.”
[5.4.5] In view of the above, it is credible to the board that the [patent proprietor’s] wet tensile strength argument was advanced twice during the opposition proceedings, namely in the written proceedings (letter of 21 April 2011) and then again during the OPs.

[5.5] In view of the above, it has to be examined whether the OD’s decision is indeed silent about the [patent proprietor’s] wet tensile strength argument.

The only argument of the [patent proprietor] addressed in the OD’s decision is the argument that a linear relationship between the basis weight and the wet tensile strength exists such that with the value for e.g. a 30 gsm basis weight, the value for a 55 gsm basis weight can be obtained by linear extrapolation […].

This argument is not related to the [patent proprietor’s] wet tensile strength argument. More particularly, while the argument dealt with by the OD implies that the wet tensile strength at a basis weight of 55 gsm can be obtained mathematically by a linear extrapolation, the [patent proprietor’s] wet tensile strength argument in fact meant that a sample with a basis weight of 55 gsm must actually be prepared in order to obtain this wet tensile strength.

Hence, despite the wet tensile strength argument having been raised in the written and oral opposition proceedings, the OD did not address it at all in its decision.

[5.6] It remains to be decided whether this constituted a substantial procedural violation.

[5.6.1] According to R 111(2), decisions of the EPO which are open to appeal shall be reasoned.

Although the OD is not required to address each and every argument of a party (R 19/10 [6.2] and R 17/11 [4]), the important question is whether the party concerned can objectively understand whether the decision was justified or not.

In this respect, the decision should contain at least some motivation on crucial points of dispute, in order to give the party concerned a fair idea of why its submissions were not considered convincing and to enable it to base its grounds of appeal on relevant issues (T 70/02 [7]). The points to be addressed are in particular arguments which may militate against or cast doubt on the decision in question (T 246/08 [2.2]).

[5.6.2] As will be seen, the present decision of the board acknowledges sufficiency of disclosure on the basis of the [patent proprietor’s] wet tensile strength argument […]. This argument is thus clearly crucial to the point decided upon by the OD.

[5.6.3] The fact that no reasons were given in the decision of the OD why the [patent proprietor’s] wet tensile strength argument was not an answer to the objection under A 83 therefore amounts to a substantial procedural violation.

[5.6.4] The [opponent] argued in this respect that the [patent proprietor] was given ample opportunity to make submissions as regards sufficiency of disclosure in writing before the OPs and that the [patent proprietor] made additional submissions on this point during the OPs itself. The decision was therefore not based on a ground or evidence on which the [patent proprietor] had not had an opportunity to present its comments, and there was therefore no violation of A 113(1).

However, as stated in T 763/04 [4.4],
“A 113(1) is not a formal provision, but rather one of substance. Hence it is not sufficient to observe A 113(1) merely formally by granting the applicant the procedural possibility for presenting comments, as this was the case here. This procedural step falls short of its legislative purpose and remains a pure formality, if there is no trace in the file that such comments were indeed read and discussed on the merits, beyond a mere acknowledgement of their existence. In summary, A 113(1) requires not merely that a party be given an opportunity to voice comments, but more importantly it requires that the deciding instance demonstrably hears and considers these comments.”
Consequently, the fact that the [patent proprietor] in the present case was given the opportunity to (and in fact did) put forward the wet tensile strength argument is not sufficient for the requirements of A 113(1) to be met. What is additionally important is that the OD demonstrably heard and considered this argument and, as has been set out above […], this condition has not been met in the present case.

[5.7] Thus a substantial procedural violation has occurred as regards the omission of the wet tensile strength argument from the OD’s decision. Therefore, there is no need to elaborate on the [patent proprietor’s] further objection that this argument had also been omitted from the minutes of the OPs before the OD.

Added matter

[6.1] The [patent proprietor] argued that a further substantial procedural violation had occurred since the parties had not been given the opportunity to present arguments in respect of added subject-matter (A 100(c) and A 123(2)) during the OPs.

However, A 113(1) in this respect merely requires that a decision has to be based on grounds or evidence on which the parties concerned have had an opportunity to present their comments. Since in the present case, the OD did not base its decision on added subject-matter, there was no need to offer the parties an opportunity to address this issue. The requirements of A 113(1) were thus not violated in this respect.

[6.2] The [patent proprietor] additionally argued that it was highly inefficient and illogical to make a decision on sufficiency of disclosure without first making a decision on whether the requests were allowable under A 123(2) […].

The board is however not aware of any provision in the EPC (and none has been cited by the [patent proprietor]) that stipulates that the various patentability requirements or grounds of opposition have to be dealt with in a particular order in opposition proceedings. Therefore the order chosen by the OD, even if it were to be considered as inefficient or illogical, cannot amount to a substantial procedural violation.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Saturday, 6 April 2013

Publish Or Perish (ctd.)


At the end of each quarter, I have a look at the number of decisions that have been published on the DG3 website. Of course, it is way too early to assert anything, but there might be a slight upward trend in the number of decisions:

Number of decisions published on the DG3 website 
during the first quarter, for the years 2008 to 2013

The rhythm of publication was more smooth in 2013:

Number of decisions published per day 
between January 1 and March 31, 2013

than it was in 2012:

Number of decisions published per day 
between January 1 and March 31, 2012

Apropos rhythm of publication, you might be aware that there was a poll on whether this blog should have weekend (i.e. Saturday evening) posts. The number of participants was small, which probably means that most of my readers do not really care. About two thirds of those who participated thought that five posts per week were more than enough, about one third liked the weekend posts.

As you might have realized, the weekend posts were somewhat different from the rest, because I never published ‘important’ decisions on weekends; I rather presented decisions dealing with interpretative issues (“Interpretative Spotlight”), reviews of old decisions (“Oldies But Goldies”) and decisions that I found to be unspectacular but still interesting.

I sort of liked these posts but I understand that some readers, especially those having an e-mail subscription, were annoyed by them. In view of the outcome of the poll, I will, as a rule, not publish weekend posts any more. A reduction of the overall number of posts also allows me to take account of the (admittedly subjective) finding that, for whatever reason, there appear to be less “interesting” decisions as the overall number of decisions increases. (As a physicist, I would believe this has something to do with the law of conservation of energy.)

Posts of more statistical character (such as the present one) will still be published on weekends.

A last point perhaps. This week was special because there was the famous April fool’s post on fee reductions for applications filed in Latin. Very unexpectedly (to me), this post was an enormous success and immediately became the second most popular post ever. The fact that two fellow bloggers referred to it on their blogs certainly contributed to this hype. I have to admit that I am somewhat embarrassed by the craze because what was intended to be a joke for case law freaks (if I may say so) has reached people well beyond that sphere, who may or may not be able to appreciate it, which leaves me with mixed feelings. I hope that nobody was offended and, to end on a Latin note, that I have not become a persona non grata in the Isar Building. In which case I might as well pursue my career ... in Latin America.

Valete! 

Friday, 5 April 2013

T 1698/08 – On Self-Depreciation


This appeal was filed by the opponent after its opposition had been rejected.

The patent proprietor questioned the authorisation of the opponent’s previous and current representatives and the admissibility of the appeal. It requested the Board not to admit certain documents filed by the opponent, among which there was an extract from the Zurich Commercial Register. In what follows, the Board deals with the admission of this document:

[1.5] Although the [patent proprietor] – until the announcement of the admissibility of the appeal – had not objected to the admission of the documents filed with the [opponent’s] letter of 27 November 2012, the day before the oral proceedings, after this announcement it objected to the admission of this extract as it states at the end “Die obenstehenden Informationen erfolgen ohne Gewähr und haben keinerlei Rechtswirkung”, which in its opinion had the consequence that the extract could not be considered as a means of evidence in the sense of A 117(1).

A 117(1)(c) lists “production of documents” as a valid means of giving evidence, whereby it is to be noted that the list in A 117(1) is not exhaustive, as can be deduced from the words “shall include”. A refusal to admit such a piece of evidence can therefore not be based on A 117(1).

While it has been accepted in the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal that EPO departments have some discretion in admitting evidence, e.g. where the evidence is unnecessary or of no relevance (cf. T 142/97 [2.2]), the main legal basis for refusing the admission of evidence are the provisions dealing with the late filing of evidence (A 114(2) EPC, A 12(4) and 13 RPBA). The present piece of evidence cannot be considered as having been filed late, as it was filed in direct response to arguments the [patent proprietor] had raised for the first time in its letter of 15 November 2012.

There is also no other reason for the board to exercise its discretion to refuse to admit the evidence, as it can neither be said that it is irrelevant nor that it is unnecessary. A refusal to admit can in any case not be based on statements in the document with respect to the accuracy of the facts it contains. Such statements relate to the probative value of a document. Based on the principle of free evaluation of evidence (G 3/97 [5]), the board is free in assessing to what extent the information in a document is credible, whereby such statement may play a role.

The board has been in a position to establish that the appeal is admissible without relying on the data in the document in question (extract from the Zurich Commercial Register), but has at the same time found no indication in the document that would cast any doubts on the finding of admissibility. It has also found no indication that would lead to doubts as to Mr Peter Geistlich’s authority to sign the authorisation for Mr Barry. This document rather confirms all the findings by the board as far as based on the evidence filed by the [patent proprietor] himself, and the board is convinced that its content is credible at least to that extent.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 4 April 2013

T 790/10 – Dead End


Some time ago, we have seen T 51/08 (here) where the Board made clear that claims that have been found not to comply with the EPC in a final decision cannot be revived by means of a divisional application. The present decision confirms this approach:

The principle of res judicata

[1] The present board agrees with the findings regarding the principle of res judicata set out in T 51/08 [3] in the context of a parent and its divisional application. Thus subject-matter on which a final decision has been taken by a board of appeal in the parent application cannot be pursued in a divisional application.

The decision in the parent application

[2] The application in suit’s parent application 01 947 493.1 was refused by its respective examining division which held that that application contained subject-matter which extends beyond the content of 01 947 493.1 as filed (A 123(2)). This decision was maintained on appeal in particular with respect to the feature of the return pipe line which returns lubricant from the part to be lubricated for which there was no direct and unambiguous disclosure in the parent application 01 947 493.1 as filed (published as WO-A-01/98703) (T 1005/07 [1]).

The divisional application in suit

[3.1] One issue of added subject-matter concerns the feature “a return pipe line (5) configured to return lubricant from at least one part to be lubricated” of claim 1 (main and auxiliary request) with respect to European patent application 01 947 493.1, the parent of the divisional application in suit. This issue was raised by the board in the annex to the summons to oral proceedings.

Main request

[3.2.1] The subject-matter of claim 1 according to the main request differs from the subject-matter of claim 1 according main request in the parent application in the addition of the feature “the intermediate tank (1) being configured to condition the lubricant before recirculation” after the first mention of “an intermediate tank (1)” and in that the reference signs have been renumbered.

The changes in the reference signs are not of substantive significance.

The addition of the feature “the intermediate tank (1) being configured to condition the lubricant before recirculation” independent of, and does not affect, the feature of “a return pipe line (5) configured to return lubricant from at least one part to be lubricated”.

Thus, insofar as the feature of a return pipe line configured to return lubricant from the part to be lubricated of claim 1 according to the main request of the present appeal is concerned, the facts are the same as to those for claim 1 according to the main request of the parent application in appeal case T 1005/07.

[3.2.2] As already noted above, in appeal case T 1005/07 it was finally decided that the feature of “a return pipe line configured to return lubricant from at least one part to be lubricated” constitutes added subject-matter which extends beyond the content of European patent application 01 947 493.1 as filed. Therefore, the present board is prevented from deciding on it a second time.

Furthermore, additional evidence provided by the appellant in the context of this appeal and concerning the use of return pipe lines in prior art cannot overcome a deficiency in the direct and unambiguous disclosure of such a feature as part of the invention in the parent application 01 947 493.1 as filed.

[3.2.3] Thus, the issue of added subject-matter concerning the feature of a return pipe line configured to return lubricant from the part to be lubricated, as set out in T 1005/07 [1], renders the present main request unallowable under A 76(1) EPC 1973.

Auxiliary request

[3.3] Claim 1 according to the auxiliary request differs from claim 1 of the main request in that the text “the intermediate tank (1) being configured to condition the lubricant before recirculation” has been deleted.

This means that claim 1 according to the auxiliary request is, apart from changes in the reference sign numbering scheme, identical to claim 1 according to the main request decided in decision T 1005/07. Therefore, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the auxiliary request is the same as that of claim 1 according to the main request decided in decision T 1005/07.

Since a final judgement was already handed down on this subject-matter in that decision, the present board is prevented from deciding on it a second time.

Again, additional evidence provided by the appellant in the context of this appeal and concerning the use of return pipe lines in prior art cannot overcome a deficiency in the direct and unambiguous disclosure of such a feature as part of the invention in the parent application as filed.

Thus, the issue of added subject-matter concerning the feature of a return pipe line configured to return lubricant from the part to be lubricated, as set out in point 1 of T 1005/07, renders the present auxiliary request unallowable under A 76(1) EPC 1973. […]

The appeal is dismissed.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Also interesting in this context: T 2112/09.

Wednesday, 3 April 2013

T 228/09 – Abroad


This is another opposition appeal case where the Board of appeal refused to postpone oral proceedings (OPs).

*** Translation of the French original ***

[IV] By fax received on September 26, 2012, the professional representative of the appellant has requested the Board to postpone the OPs to be held on September 28, 2012, because he, the only European patent attorney of the law firm, had to travel abroad at the end of the day because of an unforeseen infringement case.

[V] The Board has not granted this request, for the following reasons:

Article 2 of the “Notice of the Vice-President of DG 3 of the EPO dated 16 July 2007 concerning OPs before the boards of appeal of the EPO” (OJ EPO, special edition 3/2007, 115) indicated that OPs appointed by the EPO will be cancelled and another date fixed only if the party concerned can advance serious reasons which justify the fixing of a new date. Such a request shall be accompanied by a sufficiently substantiated written statement indicating these reasons.

Article 2.2 gives examples of grounds which, as a rule, are not acceptable:
  • a summons to OPs before the EPO or a national court notified after the summons in the relevant proceedings,
  • excessive work pressure.
In the present case, the professional representative of the appellant […] has simply declared in his fax that an unforeseen infringement case required him to travel abroad at the end of the day and that he could not be in Munich on Friday morning. Moreover, being the sole European patent attorney of his law firm, he was unable to send somebody to replace him.

The fax dated September 26 does not give any detailed information on the circumstances of the case that obliged the professional representative to travel abroad, or on the travel itself. Thus the Board is not able to examine the seriousness of the reasons invoked. Moreover, in view of Article 2.2 of the Notice mentioned above, the Board is of the opinion that an unforeseen infringement case could not, as a rule, constitute a valid reason justifying a postponement. Finally, in the absence of explanations, the Boarder is surprised by the assertion that the professional representative is the sole European patent attorney of his law firm because the letterhead of the stationery of the law firm which has been used for the fax dated September 26 refers to “Professional representatives before the EPO”.


Thus the Board has informed the parties by means of a fax sent on September 27, 2012, that the request to postpone the OPs was dismissed and that the OPs were maintained on September 28, 2012.

[VI] Thus the OPs before the Board were held on September 28, 2012, in the absence of the appellant.

… and the appeal was dismissed.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 2 April 2013

T 2619/11 - The Logician And The Engineer


This is another examination appeal.

The claims were directed at a plasma torch for spectrochemical analysis.

On August 18, 2009, the Examining Division (ED) issued a communication pursuant to A 94(3) according to which most claims lacked novelty. In response, the applicant amended the claims (February 24, 2010).

A first telephone consultation took place on March 15, 2010, wherein the Examiner suggested certain further amendments of claim 1.

On May 27, 2010, the applicant filed amended claims; the amendments, however, did not correspond to what the Examiner had suggested.

There was a second telephone consultation on June 9, 2010. The Examiner pointed out that claim 1 on file was now novel but still not inventive. In response to this consultation the applicant filed amended claims on July 12, 2010.

It is not clear from the file whether there was yet another telephone consultation, but on September 8, 2010, filed further amendments. In its letter the applicant mentions a request to delete dependent claims 2, 3, and 4 and provides arguments why the examiner should reconsider this request.

Claims 1 to 4 on file read:
1. A plasma torch (40) for introducing a sample into a plasma (17) produced in the torch for spectrochemical analysis of the sample, wherein the plasma torch is for 5 aerosol samples having relatively high salt concentrations, the plasma torch including a tube (25) for conveying a flow of a gas carrying the aerosol sample to a plasma (17) produced in the torch by an electromagnetic field, the tube (25) having an inlet (31) and an outlet (39) of smaller size than the inlet, and being shaped to deliver a substantially laminar flow of the aerosol-laden gas at the outlet for penetrating the plasma, wherein the tube (25) is tapered (27) along substantially its whole length such that its cross-sectional area gradually and smoothly reduces towards its outlet along said substantially whole length, the arrangement being such that the tube (25) is resistant to obstruction by salts deposited by the aerosol sample containing relatively high salt concentrations. (my emphasis)

2. A torch (40) as claimed in claim 1 wherein the tube (25) is tapered (27) along its length for a distance that is at least five times the internal diameter of the inlet of the tube.

3. A torch (40) as claimed in claim 2 wherein the tube (25) is tapered (27) along its length for a distance that is from five to ten times the internal diameter of the inlet tube.

4. A torch (40) as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 3 wherein the tube (25) includes a parallel walled portion (29) extending to the outlet (39), wherein the tapered portion (27) of the tube smoothly blends into the parallel walled portion.
There was another (fourth?!) telephone consultation on October 13, 2010, wherein the Examiner insisted on the necessity to delete claims 2 to 4 in view of the amendment of claim 1.

On May 16, 2011, the Examiner called the applicant’s representative and informed him that the case was essentially suitable for issue of an intention to grant subject to deletion of claims 2 to 4. A communication pursuant to A 94(3) with a one-month time limit was sent shortly afterwards.

The applicant responded by refusing to delete claims 2 to 4. The request for oral proceedings was withdrawn and an appealable decision was requested.

The application was then refused on the ground of A 123(2); the applicant filed an appeal.

The Board did not agree with the ED:

Amendments

[2.1] In the view of the board, in the present case the focus of the decision is disproportionally directed to the structure of the claims as filed to the detriment of what is really disclosed to the skilled person by the documents as filed. This led to the ED identifying three separate alternatives pertaining to the tapering of the tube disclosed in the present application, which led to assumptions upon which the subsequent reasoning is based and which the board does not consider to stand up to close scrutiny.

[2.2] Firstly, as submitted by the appellant, a tube tapered along at least a substantial portion (designated (i) by the division) includes a tube tapered along substantially its whole length (designated (ii) by the division). Therefore no alternative is involved. Similarly, a tube tapered along at least a substantial portion (designated (i) by the division) includes a tube tapered over its entire length (designated (iii) by the division).

[2.3] Secondly, the stance of the division with respect to the tube being tapered over its entire length (designated (iii)) is somewhat contradictory because after stating it was an alternative, the division went on to consider a reference to entire length as not to be a particular embodiment, but to be a possibility. The consequence of this shift in position is to cast doubt on the division’s own argument about subject matter extending beyond the application as filed in a combination of pending claim 1 with claim 2, 3 or 4 because all the features concerned the described embodiment variation.

[2.4] In considering the reference in the passage on page 6 of the specification concerning the “entire length” feature to offer no basis for the “substantially the whole length” feature, the division can, nevertheless, be considered to reaffirm its view that “substantially its whole length” and “entire length” are alternatives.

[2.5] In the present context, “entire” and “whole” have virtually the same meaning, in fact the first definition given in the online “Oxford English Dictionary” (“OED”) of “entire” is “whole; with no parts excepted”. It therefore seems the division would have had the same “no basis” difficulty with “substantially its entire”, i.e. any difference seen by the division would rest on the originally disclosed word “substantially”, to which the online OED gives one meaning as “in all essential characters or features; in essentials, to all intents and purposes, in the main”. It is quite common practice in patent claim drafting to use the word “substantially” in the sense of the OED definition in order to soften strict mathematical boundaries.

[2.6] Turning to the disclosure in detail, the board is mindful that the application is directed to a technical audience rather than to a philologist or logician, for which audience an attempt to derive information from the structure of dependent claims leads to an artificial result.


A reading of the passage concerned in lines 2 to 6 on page 6 reveals that it follows a passage about a design according to Figure 3, worded as follows:
“This led to the design of a tube 25 as shown in Figure 3, which has a tapered portion 27 of greatly increased length compared to section 23 of tube 10 of Fig. 2. The tube 25 is substantially constantly tapered along at least a substantial portion of its length such that its cross-sectional area gradually and smoothly reduces between its inlet 37 and its outlet 39 along said at least a substantial portion of its length. Tube 25 includes a narrow parallel sided portion 29 similar to portion 22 of tube 10 of Fig. 2.”
the page 6 passage itself amounting to one sentence, which is worded as follows:
“It is probable, but not yet experimentally verified, that the tapered portion 27 could extend over the entire length of tube 25, the taper at the outlet end 39 approximating the narrow parallel-sided portion 29, such that the flow of sample aerosol laden gas within tube 25 at outlet 39 is substantially laminar.”
[2.7] What is striking about this sentence is that it uses the definite article in referring to “the tune (sic) 25” and “the tapered portion 27” and uses the verb form “could extend”. This tells the skilled person directly and unambiguously that starting from the length shown for the tube 27 in Figure 3, the tapered portion could extend over the entire length of the tube, i.e. fully consistent with “at least a substantial portion”. This can be contrasted with the embodiment of Figure 3 as opposed to that of prior art Figure 2, where different reference numerals are used for corresponding parts (25 instead of 10, 27 instead of 23 and 29 instead of 22), and where, moreover, the indefinite article is first used with items 25, 27 and 29. A variation of and not an alternative to the items of embodiment described in relation to Figure 3 is therefore directly and unambiguously described in relation to “entire length”. Moreover, the sentence also makes clear that the parallel sided portion is approximated at the outlet end for laminar flow, in other words in view of the approximately parallel sides, the “taper” tends away from being a taper at the end.

[2.8] What is directly and unambiguously disclosed to the skilled person is thus that the tapered portion of the tube with the features of Figure 3 could extend over the entire length of the tube, there being an approximated parallel wall portion thereof at the outlet end. In the view of the board, this tallies with the feature of originally filed claim 6 pertaining to tapering of the tube along substantially its whole length, just as the skilled person would understand it and in accordance with the OED definition mentioned in point [2.5] above.

[2.9] Similarly in relation to claims 2 and 3, since “substantially the whole length” is included in “at least a substantial portion” and not an alternative thereto, and because “over its entire length” is a variation of a described embodiment, the subject matter of these claims shows no inconsistency in relation either to the original claims or the statement of invention, nor did the ED object against the description of Figure 3 as such in this context.

[2.10] In view of the foregoing, the board does not consider the assumptions made by the ED correct and therefore concluded that present claims 2, 3 and 4 do not include subject matter extending beyond the disclosure of the application documents as filed. So far as the additional comments of the ED in relation to claims 5 and 6 are concerned, a corresponding argument applies.

[2.11] Since there is a disclosure of “tapered over its entire length” directly and unambiguously referring to a variation of but not alternative to the embodiment of Figure 3 as set out in section [2.7] above, contrary to the view of the ED, the board has not identified any reason in the content of decision T 1150/00 which could affect its view. A similar situation exists in relation to decisions T 296/96, T 147/99 and T 172/02.

Further Procedure

[3.1] The position of the ED was that the case was essentially suitable for issue of an intention to grant subject to deletion of claims 2 to 4. The board has, however, reached the conclusion that it is not necessary to delete claims 2 to 4, thus removing the sole objection of the ED. As editorial improvements to the description are not sufficient reason to depart from the position of the ED and the board sees no other reason thus to do, other than its disapproval of the necessity of the deletion, the appeal succeeds. Consequently, the oral proceedings requested on an auxiliary basis are not necessary. […]

The case is remitted to the department of first instance with the order to grant a patent […].

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

NB: This decision was also commented on Le blog du droit européen des brevets (here).

Monday, 1 April 2013

J 43/11 – When In Rome, Do As The Romans Did



The present case is an appeal against a decision of the Receiving Section (RS) that there was a loss of rights after the applicant had paid only 80% of the filing fee.

The decision is interesting because the Board adopts a somewhat liberal interpretation of R 6. There are also some noteworthy obiter dicta.

The applicant, a German monk living in Rome, had filed an application for a wake-up device on July 9, 2010. The filing was in Latin; a German translation was filed in due time. The applicant paid only 80% of the filing fee and referred to R 6(3).

On July 16, 2010, the RS informed the applicant that the filing fee had not been paid in full and that the requirements of R 6(3) were not fulfilled. The applicant was informed that the missing amount could still be paid until August 9; otherwise, the application would be deemed withdrawn.

In a letter dated July 20, 2010, the applicant explained that he was entitled to a fee reduction under R 6(3). He also declared that he “categorically excluded” the payment of the allegedly missing amount.

On December 21, 2010, the RS sent a communication of loss of rights under R 112(1).

The representative of the applicant then requested an appealable decision under R 112(2). This decision was taken on March 24, 2011.

The applicant filed an appeal.

He explained that Latin was indeed an official language in Italy. This could already be seen from the fact that he regularly celebrated offices (“Hochämter”) in Latin in the Contarelli Chapel in Rome. The narrow interpretation of the expression “official language” (Amtssprache) by the RS was inadmissible and had no legal basis in the EPC.

The applicant cited a document stating that Latin was the official language of the catholic Church and and pointed out that in a profoundly catholic (erzkatholisch) country such as Italy Latin should be considered to be one of the official languages.

In this context, the applicant also explained that his broad interpretation of the expression “official language” was possible in all three official languages of the EPC.

Finally, the applicant referred to reports on the imminent accession of the Vatican to the EPC and pointed out that it would not be equitable to deprive an applicant who had his place of business in the Vatican, of the advantages related to the use of its official language. He also cited a press release of the EPO wherein the Office expressed the wish to have members of the Sanctum Officium appointed as Examiners in the near future.

Here is the verdict of the Legal Board of appeal:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2] The interpretation of R 6(3) together with A 14(4) is decisive for the present appeal.

[3] A 14(4) provides that persons having their residence or principal place of business within a Contracting State having a language other than English, French or German as an official language may file documents which have to be filed within a time limit in an official language of that State. If such a person files a European patent application, then, in application of R 6(3), the filing fee shall be reduced in accordance with the Rules relating to Fees (RRF). Article 14(1) RRF provides that the reduction laid down in R 6(3) shall be 20% of the filing fee.

[4] If amount due as filing fee is not paid in full within one month of filing the European patent application (R 38(1)) then the application is deemed to be withdrawn in application of A 78(2).

Pursuant to Article 8 RRF the Office may, where this is considered justified, overlook any small amounts lacking without prejudice to the rights of the person making the payment. However, as stated in T 905/90 [10], this Article was designed to prevent a loss of rights 
“where an inadvertent error of some kind had led to a slight, small insignificant or trifling underpayment of an amount due in respect of the relevant proceedings. It was never really intended to provide a remedy where a party had deliberately paid a reduced fee, and what is more, in an amount specifically provided for by the law …” (emphasis by the Board). 
Thus Article 8 RRF cannot find application in the present case.

[5] Therefore, what is decisive in the present case is whether the appellant was entitled to a fee reduction, i.e. whether Latin is to be considered as an official language within the meaning of Article 14(4). If it is not, then the RS was right in declaring that the application was deemed to be withdrawn.

[6] The arguments invoked by the appellant […] are not persuasive, for the following reasons.

[6.1] The interpretation of the expression “official language” proposed by the appellant does not resist close scrutiny.

[6.1.1] The fact that the applicant celebrates offices in Latin in Italy does not result in this language being an official language within the meaning of the EPC. “Official language” designates a language of an office, whether the patent office (A 14(1)) or the offices of a Contracting State (A 14(4)). Duden’s lexicon defines “official language” (Amtssprache) as “an official language of a state, a language of legislation” as well as “a language which is accepted in international organisations and which is relevant for drafting agreements, publications etc.”.

[6.1.2] The Board does not contest that Latin is the official language of the Catholic Church. However, as the Catholic Church is not a Contracting State to the EPC until further notice, this fact is completely irrelevant to the legal situation under consideration.

[6.1.3] That the expression “official language” used in A 14(4) is not to be understood in a religious sense also follows from the overall context (Gesamtzusammenhang) of the EPC.

As a matter of fact, the EPC constitutes, according to the first paragraph of its Preamble, a means for strengthening the “co-operation between the States of Europe in respect of the protection of inventions” (emphasis by the Board) and aims at obtaining “such protection … in those States by a single procedure for the grant of patents and by the establishment of certain standard rules governing patents so granted” (Preamble, second paragraph).

These efforts concern the field of intellectual property, which is completely alien to the religious sphere.

In its decision G 1/83 the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA) has found that the principles of interpretation set out in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969 (reprinted, in part, in OJ EPO 1984, 192) should be applied to the EPC.

In particular, the EBA has explained that the Convention must be interpreted in good faith and that,( unless it is established that the Contracting States intended that a special meaning should be given to a term, the terms of the treaty shall be given their ordinary meaning in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the EPC (point [5] of the Reasons).

Therefore, it is clear that it is not admissible to refer to special meanings that may be used in the context of religious activities when interpreting certain expressions of the provisions of a Convention in respect of the protection of inventions.

Thus the Board feels compelled to dismiss the interpretation of the expression “official language” in A 14(4) as “language of a religious office” because it is alien (wesensfremd) to the EPC.

As a consequence, this argument of the appellant cannot succeed.

[6.2] As to the accession of the Vatican to the EPC, the Board has not been officially informed although it has heard corresponding rumours. However, this question is not relevant for the decision to be taken because it has not been disputed that on the day of filing the Vatican had not been a Contracting State to the EPC. And even if it had been, this would not have altered the legal situation because the applicant has his residence in Italy and, as he admitted, did not have the nationality of the Vatican. The Board is of the opinion that A 14(4) has to be interpreted in such a way that “residence” refers to “natural persons” and “principal place of business” to “legal persons”. But even if this interpretation is incorrect, it appears to be impossible to refer to the priestly activities of the applicant on the territory of the Vatican in order to justify the existence of a place of business in the Vatican.

[6.3] Thus the applicant is only entitled to a fee reduction if the application was filed in one of the official languages of the Federal Republic of Germany (in view of his German nationality) or the Italian Republic (in view of his residence) that is not an official language of the EPO. However, Latin is not an official language of Germany or Italy (see the booklet “National Law relating to the EPC” (15th edition, pages 69 and 71).

[6.4] The Board of appeal wishes to add, as an obiter dictum, that the use of former inquisitors of the Sanctum Officium could indeed be beneficial to the EPO. As interrogation specialists the members of this office have a worldwide reputation and are surpassed only by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) and its subsidiaries in the Middle East. Thus it would be advantageous to use these competences in oral proceedings. The Legal Board of appeal would most certainly be interested in making use of those talents within the framework of the application of A 117 and in particular in hearing the parties (A 117(1)(a)), requesting information (A 117(1)(b)) and hearing witnesses (A 117(1)(d)). Moreover, the fact that these examiners have professed vows of obedience, celibacy and poverty has to be welcomed in view of the plans of the EPO to increase its productivity while reducing costs. However, this does not alter the fact that the question of the accession of the Vatican to the EPC and the advantages this might bring to the EPO is irrelevant to the present appeal.

[7] Although the arguments of the appellant have to be dismissed, the Board has come to the conclusion that it is equitable to grant a fee reduction in the present case, for the following reasons.

[7.1] Latin may well be a “dead” language, but it has lived on in the so-called Romance languages, and in particular in the Italian language. Thus it is not absurd to consider Latin as “Ancient Italian” (“Altitalienisch”) very much like the language of the small city states of ancient Greece is referred to as “Ancient Greek” (“Altgriechisch”) or the language of the Torah as “Ancient Hebrew” (“Althebräisch”).

[7.2] The EPC does not distinguish between different forms of a language as they may arise in the course of time, nor would this be appropriate. The reader of examination reports issued by the EPO will see that some Examiners use classical French which Bossuet or Chateaubriand would have approved of, whereas others have a vocabulary and knowledge of grammar corresponding to the Paris suburbs of the 21st century. The same observation can be made in regard of the case law of the Boards of appeal: some decisions, in particular of the Legal Board of appeal, are drafted in medieval German without anybody seeing the need for a translation.

[7.3] An applicant having its residence or principal place of business in Greece and who filed an application in Ancient Greek would not encounter any difficulty when requesting a reduction of the filing fee. In case the present efforts to make Israel accede to the EPC were successful, a person having its residence or principal place of business in the Holy Land would have the same opportunity, all the more as the Office would not be able to distinguish an application filed in Ivrit (Modern Hebrew) from an application filed in Ancient Hebrew.

[7.4] Thus the Board finds it equitable for an applicant having its residence or principal place of business in Italy and who files an application in “Ancient Italian”, i.e. in Latin, to be offered the possibility of a fee reduction.

[7.5] The question of whether an applicant having its residence or principal place of business in a country the official language of which is another Romance language would also be entitled to a fee reduction when filing in Latin does not have to be answered here.

[7.6] Finally, the Board would like to point out – even though this is not decisive here – that Latin has a special status within the language system of the EPO. This can be seen in particular in the case law of the Boards of appeal, which frequently cite Latin maxims without feeling compelled to offer translations. The person familiar with the jurisprudence of the Boards of appeal may have the impression, and rightfully so, that Latin, although not cited among the official languages in A 14(1) is something like an “unofficial official language” and that there are unwritten rules governing its use.

[8] In view of the above arguments the Board comes to the conclusion that the applicant was entitled to a fee reduction within the meaning of R 6(3). Thus the decision of the RS is to be set aside and the case is to be remitted to the RS for further prosecution.

NB: The Board dismissed the request for reimbursement of the appeal fee.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

Unfortunately, as the decision has been anonymised, I cannot provide a link to the file wrapper.

Addendum of April 2: This post is not to be taken seriously (see the date)