Tuesday, 2 April 2013

T 2619/11 - The Logician And The Engineer


This is another examination appeal.

The claims were directed at a plasma torch for spectrochemical analysis.

On August 18, 2009, the Examining Division (ED) issued a communication pursuant to A 94(3) according to which most claims lacked novelty. In response, the applicant amended the claims (February 24, 2010).

A first telephone consultation took place on March 15, 2010, wherein the Examiner suggested certain further amendments of claim 1.

On May 27, 2010, the applicant filed amended claims; the amendments, however, did not correspond to what the Examiner had suggested.

There was a second telephone consultation on June 9, 2010. The Examiner pointed out that claim 1 on file was now novel but still not inventive. In response to this consultation the applicant filed amended claims on July 12, 2010.

It is not clear from the file whether there was yet another telephone consultation, but on September 8, 2010, filed further amendments. In its letter the applicant mentions a request to delete dependent claims 2, 3, and 4 and provides arguments why the examiner should reconsider this request.

Claims 1 to 4 on file read:
1. A plasma torch (40) for introducing a sample into a plasma (17) produced in the torch for spectrochemical analysis of the sample, wherein the plasma torch is for 5 aerosol samples having relatively high salt concentrations, the plasma torch including a tube (25) for conveying a flow of a gas carrying the aerosol sample to a plasma (17) produced in the torch by an electromagnetic field, the tube (25) having an inlet (31) and an outlet (39) of smaller size than the inlet, and being shaped to deliver a substantially laminar flow of the aerosol-laden gas at the outlet for penetrating the plasma, wherein the tube (25) is tapered (27) along substantially its whole length such that its cross-sectional area gradually and smoothly reduces towards its outlet along said substantially whole length, the arrangement being such that the tube (25) is resistant to obstruction by salts deposited by the aerosol sample containing relatively high salt concentrations. (my emphasis)

2. A torch (40) as claimed in claim 1 wherein the tube (25) is tapered (27) along its length for a distance that is at least five times the internal diameter of the inlet of the tube.

3. A torch (40) as claimed in claim 2 wherein the tube (25) is tapered (27) along its length for a distance that is from five to ten times the internal diameter of the inlet tube.

4. A torch (40) as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 3 wherein the tube (25) includes a parallel walled portion (29) extending to the outlet (39), wherein the tapered portion (27) of the tube smoothly blends into the parallel walled portion.
There was another (fourth?!) telephone consultation on October 13, 2010, wherein the Examiner insisted on the necessity to delete claims 2 to 4 in view of the amendment of claim 1.

On May 16, 2011, the Examiner called the applicant’s representative and informed him that the case was essentially suitable for issue of an intention to grant subject to deletion of claims 2 to 4. A communication pursuant to A 94(3) with a one-month time limit was sent shortly afterwards.

The applicant responded by refusing to delete claims 2 to 4. The request for oral proceedings was withdrawn and an appealable decision was requested.

The application was then refused on the ground of A 123(2); the applicant filed an appeal.

The Board did not agree with the ED:

Amendments

[2.1] In the view of the board, in the present case the focus of the decision is disproportionally directed to the structure of the claims as filed to the detriment of what is really disclosed to the skilled person by the documents as filed. This led to the ED identifying three separate alternatives pertaining to the tapering of the tube disclosed in the present application, which led to assumptions upon which the subsequent reasoning is based and which the board does not consider to stand up to close scrutiny.

[2.2] Firstly, as submitted by the appellant, a tube tapered along at least a substantial portion (designated (i) by the division) includes a tube tapered along substantially its whole length (designated (ii) by the division). Therefore no alternative is involved. Similarly, a tube tapered along at least a substantial portion (designated (i) by the division) includes a tube tapered over its entire length (designated (iii) by the division).

[2.3] Secondly, the stance of the division with respect to the tube being tapered over its entire length (designated (iii)) is somewhat contradictory because after stating it was an alternative, the division went on to consider a reference to entire length as not to be a particular embodiment, but to be a possibility. The consequence of this shift in position is to cast doubt on the division’s own argument about subject matter extending beyond the application as filed in a combination of pending claim 1 with claim 2, 3 or 4 because all the features concerned the described embodiment variation.

[2.4] In considering the reference in the passage on page 6 of the specification concerning the “entire length” feature to offer no basis for the “substantially the whole length” feature, the division can, nevertheless, be considered to reaffirm its view that “substantially its whole length” and “entire length” are alternatives.

[2.5] In the present context, “entire” and “whole” have virtually the same meaning, in fact the first definition given in the online “Oxford English Dictionary” (“OED”) of “entire” is “whole; with no parts excepted”. It therefore seems the division would have had the same “no basis” difficulty with “substantially its entire”, i.e. any difference seen by the division would rest on the originally disclosed word “substantially”, to which the online OED gives one meaning as “in all essential characters or features; in essentials, to all intents and purposes, in the main”. It is quite common practice in patent claim drafting to use the word “substantially” in the sense of the OED definition in order to soften strict mathematical boundaries.

[2.6] Turning to the disclosure in detail, the board is mindful that the application is directed to a technical audience rather than to a philologist or logician, for which audience an attempt to derive information from the structure of dependent claims leads to an artificial result.


A reading of the passage concerned in lines 2 to 6 on page 6 reveals that it follows a passage about a design according to Figure 3, worded as follows:
“This led to the design of a tube 25 as shown in Figure 3, which has a tapered portion 27 of greatly increased length compared to section 23 of tube 10 of Fig. 2. The tube 25 is substantially constantly tapered along at least a substantial portion of its length such that its cross-sectional area gradually and smoothly reduces between its inlet 37 and its outlet 39 along said at least a substantial portion of its length. Tube 25 includes a narrow parallel sided portion 29 similar to portion 22 of tube 10 of Fig. 2.”
the page 6 passage itself amounting to one sentence, which is worded as follows:
“It is probable, but not yet experimentally verified, that the tapered portion 27 could extend over the entire length of tube 25, the taper at the outlet end 39 approximating the narrow parallel-sided portion 29, such that the flow of sample aerosol laden gas within tube 25 at outlet 39 is substantially laminar.”
[2.7] What is striking about this sentence is that it uses the definite article in referring to “the tune (sic) 25” and “the tapered portion 27” and uses the verb form “could extend”. This tells the skilled person directly and unambiguously that starting from the length shown for the tube 27 in Figure 3, the tapered portion could extend over the entire length of the tube, i.e. fully consistent with “at least a substantial portion”. This can be contrasted with the embodiment of Figure 3 as opposed to that of prior art Figure 2, where different reference numerals are used for corresponding parts (25 instead of 10, 27 instead of 23 and 29 instead of 22), and where, moreover, the indefinite article is first used with items 25, 27 and 29. A variation of and not an alternative to the items of embodiment described in relation to Figure 3 is therefore directly and unambiguously described in relation to “entire length”. Moreover, the sentence also makes clear that the parallel sided portion is approximated at the outlet end for laminar flow, in other words in view of the approximately parallel sides, the “taper” tends away from being a taper at the end.

[2.8] What is directly and unambiguously disclosed to the skilled person is thus that the tapered portion of the tube with the features of Figure 3 could extend over the entire length of the tube, there being an approximated parallel wall portion thereof at the outlet end. In the view of the board, this tallies with the feature of originally filed claim 6 pertaining to tapering of the tube along substantially its whole length, just as the skilled person would understand it and in accordance with the OED definition mentioned in point [2.5] above.

[2.9] Similarly in relation to claims 2 and 3, since “substantially the whole length” is included in “at least a substantial portion” and not an alternative thereto, and because “over its entire length” is a variation of a described embodiment, the subject matter of these claims shows no inconsistency in relation either to the original claims or the statement of invention, nor did the ED object against the description of Figure 3 as such in this context.

[2.10] In view of the foregoing, the board does not consider the assumptions made by the ED correct and therefore concluded that present claims 2, 3 and 4 do not include subject matter extending beyond the disclosure of the application documents as filed. So far as the additional comments of the ED in relation to claims 5 and 6 are concerned, a corresponding argument applies.

[2.11] Since there is a disclosure of “tapered over its entire length” directly and unambiguously referring to a variation of but not alternative to the embodiment of Figure 3 as set out in section [2.7] above, contrary to the view of the ED, the board has not identified any reason in the content of decision T 1150/00 which could affect its view. A similar situation exists in relation to decisions T 296/96, T 147/99 and T 172/02.

Further Procedure

[3.1] The position of the ED was that the case was essentially suitable for issue of an intention to grant subject to deletion of claims 2 to 4. The board has, however, reached the conclusion that it is not necessary to delete claims 2 to 4, thus removing the sole objection of the ED. As editorial improvements to the description are not sufficient reason to depart from the position of the ED and the board sees no other reason thus to do, other than its disapproval of the necessity of the deletion, the appeal succeeds. Consequently, the oral proceedings requested on an auxiliary basis are not necessary. […]

The case is remitted to the department of first instance with the order to grant a patent […].

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

NB: This decision was also commented on Le blog du droit européen des brevets (here).

Monday, 1 April 2013

J 43/11 – When In Rome, Do As The Romans Did



The present case is an appeal against a decision of the Receiving Section (RS) that there was a loss of rights after the applicant had paid only 80% of the filing fee.

The decision is interesting because the Board adopts a somewhat liberal interpretation of R 6. There are also some noteworthy obiter dicta.

The applicant, a German monk living in Rome, had filed an application for a wake-up device on July 9, 2010. The filing was in Latin; a German translation was filed in due time. The applicant paid only 80% of the filing fee and referred to R 6(3).

On July 16, 2010, the RS informed the applicant that the filing fee had not been paid in full and that the requirements of R 6(3) were not fulfilled. The applicant was informed that the missing amount could still be paid until August 9; otherwise, the application would be deemed withdrawn.

In a letter dated July 20, 2010, the applicant explained that he was entitled to a fee reduction under R 6(3). He also declared that he “categorically excluded” the payment of the allegedly missing amount.

On December 21, 2010, the RS sent a communication of loss of rights under R 112(1).

The representative of the applicant then requested an appealable decision under R 112(2). This decision was taken on March 24, 2011.

The applicant filed an appeal.

He explained that Latin was indeed an official language in Italy. This could already be seen from the fact that he regularly celebrated offices (“Hochämter”) in Latin in the Contarelli Chapel in Rome. The narrow interpretation of the expression “official language” (Amtssprache) by the RS was inadmissible and had no legal basis in the EPC.

The applicant cited a document stating that Latin was the official language of the catholic Church and and pointed out that in a profoundly catholic (erzkatholisch) country such as Italy Latin should be considered to be one of the official languages.

In this context, the applicant also explained that his broad interpretation of the expression “official language” was possible in all three official languages of the EPC.

Finally, the applicant referred to reports on the imminent accession of the Vatican to the EPC and pointed out that it would not be equitable to deprive an applicant who had his place of business in the Vatican, of the advantages related to the use of its official language. He also cited a press release of the EPO wherein the Office expressed the wish to have members of the Sanctum Officium appointed as Examiners in the near future.

Here is the verdict of the Legal Board of appeal:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2] The interpretation of R 6(3) together with A 14(4) is decisive for the present appeal.

[3] A 14(4) provides that persons having their residence or principal place of business within a Contracting State having a language other than English, French or German as an official language may file documents which have to be filed within a time limit in an official language of that State. If such a person files a European patent application, then, in application of R 6(3), the filing fee shall be reduced in accordance with the Rules relating to Fees (RRF). Article 14(1) RRF provides that the reduction laid down in R 6(3) shall be 20% of the filing fee.

[4] If amount due as filing fee is not paid in full within one month of filing the European patent application (R 38(1)) then the application is deemed to be withdrawn in application of A 78(2).

Pursuant to Article 8 RRF the Office may, where this is considered justified, overlook any small amounts lacking without prejudice to the rights of the person making the payment. However, as stated in T 905/90 [10], this Article was designed to prevent a loss of rights 
“where an inadvertent error of some kind had led to a slight, small insignificant or trifling underpayment of an amount due in respect of the relevant proceedings. It was never really intended to provide a remedy where a party had deliberately paid a reduced fee, and what is more, in an amount specifically provided for by the law …” (emphasis by the Board). 
Thus Article 8 RRF cannot find application in the present case.

[5] Therefore, what is decisive in the present case is whether the appellant was entitled to a fee reduction, i.e. whether Latin is to be considered as an official language within the meaning of Article 14(4). If it is not, then the RS was right in declaring that the application was deemed to be withdrawn.

[6] The arguments invoked by the appellant […] are not persuasive, for the following reasons.

[6.1] The interpretation of the expression “official language” proposed by the appellant does not resist close scrutiny.

[6.1.1] The fact that the applicant celebrates offices in Latin in Italy does not result in this language being an official language within the meaning of the EPC. “Official language” designates a language of an office, whether the patent office (A 14(1)) or the offices of a Contracting State (A 14(4)). Duden’s lexicon defines “official language” (Amtssprache) as “an official language of a state, a language of legislation” as well as “a language which is accepted in international organisations and which is relevant for drafting agreements, publications etc.”.

[6.1.2] The Board does not contest that Latin is the official language of the Catholic Church. However, as the Catholic Church is not a Contracting State to the EPC until further notice, this fact is completely irrelevant to the legal situation under consideration.

[6.1.3] That the expression “official language” used in A 14(4) is not to be understood in a religious sense also follows from the overall context (Gesamtzusammenhang) of the EPC.

As a matter of fact, the EPC constitutes, according to the first paragraph of its Preamble, a means for strengthening the “co-operation between the States of Europe in respect of the protection of inventions” (emphasis by the Board) and aims at obtaining “such protection … in those States by a single procedure for the grant of patents and by the establishment of certain standard rules governing patents so granted” (Preamble, second paragraph).

These efforts concern the field of intellectual property, which is completely alien to the religious sphere.

In its decision G 1/83 the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA) has found that the principles of interpretation set out in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969 (reprinted, in part, in OJ EPO 1984, 192) should be applied to the EPC.

In particular, the EBA has explained that the Convention must be interpreted in good faith and that,( unless it is established that the Contracting States intended that a special meaning should be given to a term, the terms of the treaty shall be given their ordinary meaning in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the EPC (point [5] of the Reasons).

Therefore, it is clear that it is not admissible to refer to special meanings that may be used in the context of religious activities when interpreting certain expressions of the provisions of a Convention in respect of the protection of inventions.

Thus the Board feels compelled to dismiss the interpretation of the expression “official language” in A 14(4) as “language of a religious office” because it is alien (wesensfremd) to the EPC.

As a consequence, this argument of the appellant cannot succeed.

[6.2] As to the accession of the Vatican to the EPC, the Board has not been officially informed although it has heard corresponding rumours. However, this question is not relevant for the decision to be taken because it has not been disputed that on the day of filing the Vatican had not been a Contracting State to the EPC. And even if it had been, this would not have altered the legal situation because the applicant has his residence in Italy and, as he admitted, did not have the nationality of the Vatican. The Board is of the opinion that A 14(4) has to be interpreted in such a way that “residence” refers to “natural persons” and “principal place of business” to “legal persons”. But even if this interpretation is incorrect, it appears to be impossible to refer to the priestly activities of the applicant on the territory of the Vatican in order to justify the existence of a place of business in the Vatican.

[6.3] Thus the applicant is only entitled to a fee reduction if the application was filed in one of the official languages of the Federal Republic of Germany (in view of his German nationality) or the Italian Republic (in view of his residence) that is not an official language of the EPO. However, Latin is not an official language of Germany or Italy (see the booklet “National Law relating to the EPC” (15th edition, pages 69 and 71).

[6.4] The Board of appeal wishes to add, as an obiter dictum, that the use of former inquisitors of the Sanctum Officium could indeed be beneficial to the EPO. As interrogation specialists the members of this office have a worldwide reputation and are surpassed only by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) and its subsidiaries in the Middle East. Thus it would be advantageous to use these competences in oral proceedings. The Legal Board of appeal would most certainly be interested in making use of those talents within the framework of the application of A 117 and in particular in hearing the parties (A 117(1)(a)), requesting information (A 117(1)(b)) and hearing witnesses (A 117(1)(d)). Moreover, the fact that these examiners have professed vows of obedience, celibacy and poverty has to be welcomed in view of the plans of the EPO to increase its productivity while reducing costs. However, this does not alter the fact that the question of the accession of the Vatican to the EPC and the advantages this might bring to the EPO is irrelevant to the present appeal.

[7] Although the arguments of the appellant have to be dismissed, the Board has come to the conclusion that it is equitable to grant a fee reduction in the present case, for the following reasons.

[7.1] Latin may well be a “dead” language, but it has lived on in the so-called Romance languages, and in particular in the Italian language. Thus it is not absurd to consider Latin as “Ancient Italian” (“Altitalienisch”) very much like the language of the small city states of ancient Greece is referred to as “Ancient Greek” (“Altgriechisch”) or the language of the Torah as “Ancient Hebrew” (“Althebräisch”).

[7.2] The EPC does not distinguish between different forms of a language as they may arise in the course of time, nor would this be appropriate. The reader of examination reports issued by the EPO will see that some Examiners use classical French which Bossuet or Chateaubriand would have approved of, whereas others have a vocabulary and knowledge of grammar corresponding to the Paris suburbs of the 21st century. The same observation can be made in regard of the case law of the Boards of appeal: some decisions, in particular of the Legal Board of appeal, are drafted in medieval German without anybody seeing the need for a translation.

[7.3] An applicant having its residence or principal place of business in Greece and who filed an application in Ancient Greek would not encounter any difficulty when requesting a reduction of the filing fee. In case the present efforts to make Israel accede to the EPC were successful, a person having its residence or principal place of business in the Holy Land would have the same opportunity, all the more as the Office would not be able to distinguish an application filed in Ivrit (Modern Hebrew) from an application filed in Ancient Hebrew.

[7.4] Thus the Board finds it equitable for an applicant having its residence or principal place of business in Italy and who files an application in “Ancient Italian”, i.e. in Latin, to be offered the possibility of a fee reduction.

[7.5] The question of whether an applicant having its residence or principal place of business in a country the official language of which is another Romance language would also be entitled to a fee reduction when filing in Latin does not have to be answered here.

[7.6] Finally, the Board would like to point out – even though this is not decisive here – that Latin has a special status within the language system of the EPO. This can be seen in particular in the case law of the Boards of appeal, which frequently cite Latin maxims without feeling compelled to offer translations. The person familiar with the jurisprudence of the Boards of appeal may have the impression, and rightfully so, that Latin, although not cited among the official languages in A 14(1) is something like an “unofficial official language” and that there are unwritten rules governing its use.

[8] In view of the above arguments the Board comes to the conclusion that the applicant was entitled to a fee reduction within the meaning of R 6(3). Thus the decision of the RS is to be set aside and the case is to be remitted to the RS for further prosecution.

NB: The Board dismissed the request for reimbursement of the appeal fee.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

Unfortunately, as the decision has been anonymised, I cannot provide a link to the file wrapper.

Addendum of April 2: This post is not to be taken seriously (see the date)

Saturday, 30 March 2013

T 712/10 – Diapers, Dots, And Dreadful Draps


The decision on this appeal against the revocation of the opposed patent by the Opposition Division contains two interesting passages.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read:
A disposable absorbent article in the form of a diaper having an absorbent structure comprising an absorbent core (3) which is coated with absorbent sheets (3A, 3B) to thereby form the absorbent structure and disposed between a liquid pervious sheet (1) and a liquid impervious sheet (2),
wherein the absorbent sheets (3A, 3B), laterally extend beyond the side edges of the absorbent core (3) to thereby form extended peripheral side portions in the opposite leg portions of the diaper wherein the liquid impervious sheet (2) has the shape of a rectangle with a width being larger than that of the absorbent structure and a back sheet (30), which has the shape of an hourglass, is provided so as to cover externally the liquid impervious sheet (2),
wherein the liquid pervious sheet (1) has the shape of rectangle with a width being larger than that of the absorbent structure so as to laterally extend beyond the side edges of the absorbent structure with a short distance, and is fixed to the liquid impervious sheet (2),
and at least one standing cuff (B) comprising a double standing sheet which has a free portion thereof standing toward the wearer’s leg by means of a stretching force of stretching members (5) in a used condition,
wherein an internal side of the double standing sheet initiates at the proximal edge fixed to the side edge of the liquid pervious sheet (1) and is fixed to the liquid impervious sheet (2) along its extended peripheral side portion in the laterally outboard portion with respect to the proximal edge and the proximal edge where the internal side of the double standing sheet is fixed to the liquid pervious sheet 1, defines a base line from which each standing cuff B stands such that said free portion has a base line for standing in a side flap being outboard with respect to the side edge of said absorbent core,
wherein the free portion includes a standing portion (10) which stands from the base line toward the longitudinal centerline of said article and a contacting portion (20) which folds back halfway outwardly;
wherein said stretching members (5) extend in said contacting portion (20), in the vicinity of the fold and in said standing portion (10), respectively;
and said standing cuff (B) stands toward said wearer’s leg by means of a stretching force of said stretching members (5) in a used condition, while the extended peripheral side portion of the absorbent sheets (3A, 3B) and the absorbent core (3) are deformed and lifted such that said side flap between said side edge of said absorbent core (3) and said base line for standing is deformed and a deep pocket space is formed in the diaper.
The Board found this claim not to comply with A 123(2):

[2.1] The feature of claim 1
“wherein said stretching members (5) extend in said contacting portion (20), in the vicinity of the fold and in said standing portion (10), respectively;” (specified as “feature (iii)” in the following text)
results, in particular with regard to the wording “in the vicinity of the fold”, in subject-matter which does not meet the requirement of A 123(2).

[2.2] Objection had been made already to this feature in the decision under appeal (point 2.1.4.3) as contravening the requirement of A 123(2).

[2.3] The appellant was of the view that although there was no literal disclosure of such wording, the drawings shown in Figures 1 to 3, which refer to the first and second embodiments, clearly disclosed such feature and claim 1 defined the essential features of these embodiments. In particular, it considered the black dot in the double standing sheet (in Figure 2) close to the position separating the standing portion (10) from the surface contacting portion (20) as representing the stretching member which extended in the vicinity of the fold. Additionally, paragraphs [0068] and [0076] (A-publication) should be interpreted in such a way that they confirmed this disclosure.

[2.4] When scrutinizing the disclosure in the above cited Figures and paragraphs, there is no clear and unambiguous disclosure with regard to a stretching member “in the vicinity of the fold” as claimed, for the reasons given infra.

[2.4.1] The wording of paragraph [0068] (A-publication) does not refer to a stretching member in the vicinity of the fold but to a plurality of stretching members as extending in the vicinity of the side edge of the surface-contacting portion 20 and is worded as follows:
“In the more preferable aspect, the stretching members 5, 5 ... extend in the vicinity of the base line for the standing portion 10, in the vicinity of the distal edge of the double standing sheet, and in the vicinity of the side edge of the surface-contacting portion 20. In addition, a plurality of stretching members 5, 5 ... preferably extend in the vicinity of the side edge of the surface-contacting portion 20 as shown. Additionally, in order to improve the standing ability of the standing portion 10, a plurality of stretching members 5, 5... may further extend on the standing portion 10. In the Figure are shown six stretching members in total.”
[2.4.2] When considering Figure 2 for the presence of such stretching members, the surface-contacting portion 20 is shown as being provided with two stretching members, one of which is positioned in the (outer or distal) side edge of the surface-contacting portion, which edge represents the upper end of the free portion when standing; and the other stretching member is positioned slightly inboard of this edge. Both stretching members are identified via the reference numeral 5. No further stretching member is shown as being located on (or within) the surface-contacting portion. 


[2.4.3] In Figure 2 there are two further stretching members identified via the reference numeral 5. However, these stretching members are within the standing portion 10 of the free portion and are located at the base end and in the middle between the base end and the distal end of the standing portion, respectively. Hence, these stretching members cannot represent stretching members extending in the vicinity of the side edge of the surface-contacting portion such as set out in paragraph [0068].

[2.4.4] Additionally, there are two further numerically unreferenced black dots within the standing portion 10, one of which is close to the edge which joins the surface contacting portion 20 to the standing portion 10. However, on the one hand this black dot cannot be clearly and unambiguously identified as a stretching member because it is not indicated with the corresponding reference number, and on the other hand, it is not clear whether it is this fold which is to be considered. There are two folds possible in the double-layered standing sheet: one fold concerns the folding in relation to the surface-contacting portion, the other fold concerns the folding of the fixed portion in relation to the free portion when fitting the article. Since there is one stretching member 5 exactly at this latter position for folding/upstanding of the cuff – at the base end –, no clear and unambiguous disclosure is present with regard to which fold is concerned.

[2.4.5] The further reference to the disclosure in paragraph [0076] is also not unambiguous. This paragraph refers to the second embodiment, shown in Figure 4, which is said to differ from the first embodiment in that the stretching member is present in the vicinity of the edge where the surface-contacting portion (20) folds back halfway. Hence, this reference cannot clarify the description provided in paragraph [0068] either - on the contrary, it highlights that in the first embodiment no such stretching member should be present at that location. It may be noted also that the claim defines “stretching members” in the vicinity of the fold, whereas, even when considering Figure 2, a single stretching member (if this is the “black dot” mentioned earlier) is present on the end part of the standing portion 10 close to the joining fold.

[2.5] Accordingly, the main request is not allowable under A 123(2) at least because there is no clear and unambiguous disclosure in the application as filed for the feature “wherein said stretching members (5) extend in said contacting portion (20), in the vicinity of the fold and in said standing portion (10), respectively;” in combination with the further features in claim 1 concerning the claimed embodiment.

[2.6] Moreover, the features of paragraphs [0062] and [0066] of the application as filed (A-publication) which are also disclosed in combination with the embodiment which the appellant claims are omitted. These features concern in part the standing cuff which is made double by folding the inside of the standing sheet inwardly so as to be shorter than the outside and the fixation of the standing cuff in the front and back ends of the diaper body. These features are also related in particular to the functions of “volume” and “sealing” which were emphasized by the appellant as being essential for the invention. Accordingly, these features are disclosed in a functional and structural relation to the claimed embodiment whereby, via their omission, the requirement of A 123(2) is not met since an unallowable intermediate generalisation of the content of the application as filed has occurred. Hence, the main request is not allowable at least for the foregoing reasons.

The appellant also requested the Board to refer the following questions to the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA):
1. Is the drastic consequence of G 1/93 (the so-called A 123(2)/123(3) trap) still valid, although no contracting state of the EPC and no other country in the world followed that approach?

2. If a European patent as granted contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed and also limits the scope of protection conferred by the claims, is it possible during the opposition proceedings to maintain the patent in view of paragraphs 2 and 3 of A 123 while no rights can be derived from features that relate to said subject matter in the sense that said features must not be considered to delimit the subject matter over prior art but restrict the scope?

3. Is there a difference in answering questions 1 and 2, if an amendment which leads to the drastic consequence that a feature cannot be deleted because of A 123(3) but extends beyond application as filed has been carried out during the international phase of a PCT application which then entered the regional phase in Europe or if that amendment has been carried out during the granting proceedings before the EPO?

4. If questions 1 and 2 are answered in the negative, does there exist another possibility of escaping the so-called A 123(2)/123(3) EPC trap?
The Board refused to refer the questions to the EBA:

[8.1] The conditions in A 112(1) for referring a question to the EBA are either that a reference is necessary to ensure a uniform application of the law or that a point of law of fundamental importance arises. Neither of these questions is met in regard to the questions […] which the appellant requested to have referred.

[8.2] Concerning the alleged non-uniform application of law, this requirement in general refers to non-uniform application of the law by the Boards of Appeal: the EBA does not have the power to ensure uniform application of the law between the Boards of Appeal and national courts. A lack of uniformity between the law as applied by the Boards of Appeal and national courts could in theory bring to the fore a point of law of fundamental importance, something which is considered in the next paragraph. As to non-uniform application of the law by the Boards of Appeal, the appellant did not in fact suggest that the principles laid down in G 1/93 have not been consistently applied by the Boards of Appeal.

[8.3] As to whether a point of law of fundamental importance arises, no such issue is apparent. The relevant issues have already been decided by the EBA in G 1/93 and it has not been shown that any legal or technical developments have occurred in the interim making it desirable in the public interest to have the issues reviewed again by the EBA: T 82/93. The appellant did not provide evidence that the contracting states of the EPO had not followed the principles of G 1/93 concerning the relation between A 123(2) and (3). The separate footnote solution applied in Germany does not support a trend in Europe but rather represents an isolated approach which in fact was held not allowable in G 1/93.

[8.4] By question 2 it appears to the Board that the appellant asks a question which is in fact not related to the facts of the present case. The point is that the omitted features do make a technical contribution to the claimed subject matter since they concern the structures which give rise to the specific configuration of the article […]. The question is therefore not relevant because its premise (“while no rights can be derived from features that relate to said subject matter in the sense that said features must not be considered to delimit the subject matter over prior art but restrict the scope”) does not apply.

[8.5] As to question 3, irrespective of when the amendments leading to such a situation were made, the requirements of A 123(2)/123(3) have to be met as set out in G 1/93. The issue of the amendments being made during the international phase of the application does therefore not alter the applicable case law. It is also noted that when entering the European regional phase, the applicant was not required to proceed with any amendments it had made in the international phase.

[8.6] Thus, when addressing the four questions posed by the appellant, there is no evidence for the allegation in question 1 that no contracting state of the EPC and no other country follows the approach of the EPC. The subject-matter of question 2 does not arise in the current case. Question 3 can be answered by the present Board to the effect that an application is not restricted to an amendment made at the international phase. Finally, question 4 has already been answered in item 2 of decision G 1/93.

[8.7] The request for referral of a question to the EBA is thus refused.

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Friday, 29 March 2013

T 196/10 – From Paris With Love


This is an appeal by the patent proprietor against the revocation of its patent by the Opposition Division.

In its opposition, opponent 1 had inter alia questioned the validity of the patent because it had been filed as a divisional application at the French patent office (INPI), although A 76 required divisional applications to be filed at the EPO.

The OD had endorsed this approach and had considered that the divisional did not benefit of the filing date of the parent application and, as a consequence, was lacking novelty over the parent application.

The Board disagreed:

*** Translation of the French original ***


Status of the application on which the patent-in-suit is based

Divisional application and place of filing

[1.1] A 75 EPC 1973, which applies in the present case, reads:
A European patent application may be filed:

(a) at the EPO at Munich, or its branch at The Hague, or

(b) if the law of the Contracting State so permits, at the central industrial property office or other competent authority of that State. An application filed in this way shall have the same effect as if it had been filed on the same date at the EPO.

(2) …

(3) No Contracting State may provide for or allow the filing of European divisional applications with an authority referred to in paragraph (1)(b).
Pursuant to A 75(3) EPC 1973 divisional applications must be filed at the EPO. The Contracting States are not entitled to allow or require divisional applications to be filed with their national authorities. If a divisional application is sent to a national authority, the latter does not have to transmit it to the EPO. However, if it does, in application of the principles of good cooperation between administrative authorities, then this application shall have as date of receipt the date on which it reaches the EPO. In other words, it is only when the EPO recieves the documents that are to constitute a divisional application that they are treated as a filing of a divisional application. Incidentally, this finding is laid down in the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, part A, chapter IV, point 1.3.1.

The travaux préparatoires for the EPC 1973 show that it was only in the course of the intergovernmental conference for establishing a European patent system in November 1971 that the decision was taken to expressly provide in the text of the EPC that divisional applications were to be filed at the EPO only and to exclude, as a consequence, filings with the national authorities (“The group, after deliberation, has chosen a solution consisting in providing that divisional applications may only be filed at the EPO and that no state may provide for or allow such filings with the central industrial property office.”) Considerations related to the examination of the parent application with respect to national provisions regarding the maintenance of secrecy (mise au secret), the transmission of the parent application and the divisional application to the EPO, and the possible legal effect of a divisional being filed with a national authority (the application and its parent application would have been deemed to be withdrawn in case they were not transmitted, A 77(5) EPC 1973) led the legislator to prohibit the filing of divisional applications with the national authorities, for the sake of clarity. See document BR/144/71 dated December 16, 1971, point 18.

[1.2] In the present case, the patent application on which the patent was based has been filed, as shown by form 1001, at the INPI on March 21, 2000 (stamp on form 1001.6), and has been transmitted by the INPI to the EPO, where it was received on March 30, 2000 (stamp on box 3 of form 1000.1). The fact that the box is ticked in section 35 of form 1001 clearly indicates that the the European patent application is a divisional application; the number indicated in this section (n° 96 401 179.5) is the number of the parent application. The priority claimed in section 25 of form 1001 is the priority of the parent application. The Contracting States designated in section 32 of form 1001 are the same as those designated by the parent application. Moreover, the applicant is the same (see sections 7 to 9 of form 1001).


[1.3] Considering all these pieces of information the only objective conclusion possible is that the patent application on which the patent-in-suit is based is a divisional application which has been erroneously filed with a national authority – first mistake – and to which that authority, here the INPI, has allocated a number [as if it was] a patent application filed under A 75(1)(b) EPC 1973 […] – second mistake –, which allocation has not been expressly corrected or nullified by means of a communication of the Receiving Section (RS) – third mistake.

[1.4] However, it is clear from the file that the RS, which has exclusive competence to allocate a filing date (cf. J 18/86), has, upon receipt of the European patent application, on March 30, 2000, allocated the filing date of the earlier application, i.e. June 3, 1996, to it and has indicated on the first sheet of the application as published (A1 document) that the application was a divisional application.

[1.5] The Board of appeal agrees with the assertion of […] opponent 1 that the date (“21-03-2000”) indicated as filing date under the heading “Remarks” of the publication EP 1 026 438 A1 is incorrect – fourth mistake. The correct date was March 30, 2000, i.e. the date on which the divisional application was received at the EPO. However, the Board is of the opinion that this is nothing more than an erroneous date. Howally [NB: the French has “toutefin”, which appears to be a contraction of “toutefois” and “enfin”, which might be best rendered by a contraction of “however” and “finally”], it is clear from the cover sheet of the application as published that the RS has treated this application as a divisional application.

Divisional application and pending earlier application – R 25 EPC 1973

[1.6] For a divisional application to be treated as such it is necessary for it to have been filed at a moment when the earlier application was still pending. The present situation is governed by R 25 EPC 1973, which reads:
“R 25 EPC 1973   Provisions for European divisional applications

(1) The applicant may file a divisional application relating to any pending earlier European patent application.”
The communication pursuant to R 51(4) EPC 1973 for the earlier application n° 96 401 179.5 is dated March 30, 2001; the mention of the grant has been published on October 17, 2001. The transmission of the documents by the INPI has shifted the date of receipt at the EPO from March 21, 2000 (date of receipt at the INPI, stamp on form 1001.6) to March 30, 2000. Thus the earlier application was still pending on March 30, 2000, when the divisional application was received at the EPO.

The Board notes that this point is not contested by […] opponent 1 […].

[1.7] Consequently, the Board can only conclude, as did the RS, that the present application satisfies the requirements of A 76(1), first sentence, EPC 1973, together with R 25(1) EPC 1973. Thus the patent application on which the patent-in-suit is based is a divisional application.

It is deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the earlier application and has the benefit of the right to priority in respect of the subject-matter that does not extend beyond the content of the earlier application as filed (A 76(1), second sentence, EPC 1973).

As the patent is deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the earlier application, that application (document D14, EP-A-0 747 796) does not form part of the state of the art for the patent-in-suit.

In view of the above the decision of the OD has to be set aside.

[1.8] Incidentally, the Board wishes to emphasise that an application that has been filed as a divisional application can be treated as such or not. If it is not treated as such, there cannot be grant proceedings. The legislator has not provided the possibility of a posteriori allocating the date of receipt of the divisional application as date of filing of a new application, cf. G 1/05 [11.1] and T 600/08 [2.3]. Even if the RS, when examining the application in view of formal requirements, or even the Examining Division, when carrying out the substantial examination, had erroneously treated the application under consideration as a divisional application and a patent had been granted, the OD is only competent for examining the validity (bien-fondé) of the grant of the European patent within the very strict framework of the grounds for opposition a restrictive list of which is provided by A 100 EPC 1973.  

Reimbursement of the appeal fee – R 67 EPC 1973 (applicable here)

The Board of appeal is of the opinion that the decision issued by the OD is insufficiently reasoned and, therefore, does not satisfy the requirements of R 68(2) EPC 1973, which applies in the present case. The OD only cited some applicable legal provisions without taking account of all the objective facts of the present case. For instance, it has not considered the possible error on behalf of the applicant when it filed the patent application with the national authority, the context of the transmission by the INPI of the patent application under consideration as divisional application, the clear and unambiguous indications of all of the elements of form 1001 and in particular of section 35 concerning the explicit reference to the earlier application. A sufficiently reasoned decision taking account of all the facts of the case would have allowed the appellant and the Board to understand why the OD had decided not to treat the application under consideration as a divisional application. The absence of sufficient reasons as required by R 68(2) EPC 1973 constitutes a substantial procedural violation justifying – the other requirements of R 67 EPC 1973, which is applicable here, being fulfilled – that the appeal fee be reimbursed, the impugned decision set aside and the case remitted to the first instance (A 111(1) EPC 1973).

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Thursday, 28 March 2013

T 395/12 – Simply Wrong


This is an examination appeal.

The statement of grounds of appeal was rather minimalist with regard to the impugned decision of the Examining Division (ED):


The following pages of the statement of grounds of appeal essentially reproduced a letter dated June 15, 2007, which had been filed during the examination proceedings.

The Board found this appeal to be inadmissible:

[1.1] In the present case, the applicant’s only statement that directly addresses the decision under appeal was that the ED was “wrong” […]. There is no explanation why it should have been wrong, though.

[1.2] This as such is not contested by the appellant. Yet the appellant invites the board to look at the grounds of appeal as a document in its own right, without a comparison with statements previously made in examination. Both the nature of the appeal proceedings and previous case law speak against such an approach. Decisions T 213/85 and T 95/10 clarify that the appeal procedure is not a mere continuation of the examination procedure (in accordance with decisions G 10/91, G 9/92 and G 4/93, but separate therefrom. Where the applicant in the grounds of appeal repeats its arguments set out during the examination phase without taking into account the decision under appeal, it mistakes the function of the boards of appeal, as the boards of appeal are not a second go of the examination procedure, but are meant to review decisions made by the EDs. Such a review is carried out based on the objections raised against the decision in the grounds of appeal. The grounds of appeal must therefore by definition relate to the reasons on which the decision under appeal is based and cannot be looked at in isolation from the appealed decision and the procedure leading to such decision. According to the decision T 1045/02 [1], “grounds sufficient to make an appeal admissible must therefore at least implicitly deal with the fundamental reasons in the decision under appeal and must explain in an objective manner why the decision under appeal is considered wrong.” (translation by the board).

[1.3] As a fallback position, the appellant has argued that the case at issue cannot be likened to cases where the grounds of appeal merely made reference to statements presented in earlier phases of the procedure. It is true that the inadmissibility of an appeal in decisions such as T 220/83 and T 1045/02 was also based on the fact that a mere reference was made to previous statements. The grounds of appeal in this case do not merely make reference to the letter of 15 June 2007, but cite this letter almost in its entirety. Rather than “grounds by reference”, one could call this “grounds by cut-and-paste”, and the board fails to see how this mechanical exercise adds more to the case than a phrase such as “reference is made to the letter of 15 June 2007 in its entirety” would have done. It has not been argued that the cited passages represent a creative selection that would give these statements a new meaning and could thereby be regarded as a response to the decision under appeal. As far as the arguments on A 56 are concerned, there is an almost literal identity between the grounds of appeal and the letter of 15 June 2007. Decision T 65/96 does not help the appellant’s position, because in addition to the reference to previous statements, three specific points made in the decision under appeal were contested.

[1.4] A further argument advanced by the appellant rests upon a passage in the decision T 644/97 [1] according to which an appellant cannot be compelled to come up with new arguments (“Indeed, a requirement that new arguments must be submitted to render an appeal admissible would imply that the appealed decision, as issued, had necessarily been correct”). In this decision, the board based the admissibility of the appeal on a number of reasons. Apart from the one mentioned above, the admissibility was for the first time contested in oral proceedings, and “a relevant objection [had] already [been] substantiated in the Statement of Grounds of Appeal” […]. Apart from that, the fact that the appellant is not required to come up with new arguments does not mean that the decision under appeal should not be addressed at all.

[1.5] Decision T 934/02 [2] found an appeal to be sufficiently substantiated even in the absence of arguments dealing with the contested decision if two criteria were met:
“(i) The subject of the proceedings has changed e.g. due to the filing of a new set of amended claims together with the statement of grounds, and

(ii) The reasons for the decision are no longer relevant in view of the change in the subject of the proceedings, (cf. in particular J xx/87 [1.4] and T 105/87).”

This rather broad statement is qualified in two further decisions. According to decision T 1045/02, merely filing new claims makes the appeal admissible only in exceptional cases, and according to decision T 1276/05, new claims filed in lieu of any other grounds must be accompanied by an explanation why these requests overcome the objections raised in the decision under appeal, unless this is obvious.

In the present case, six auxiliary requests with new claims have been filed with the grounds of appeal. According to the appellant, this was sufficient to change the case and make the appeal admissible.

[1.6] All six auxiliary requests are combinations of independent and dependent claims, and all these combinations were addressed in the appealed decision and held to lack inventive step. Thus, the decision under appeal still remains relevant for these auxiliary requests. In addition, while the appellant has indicated the basis for the new auxiliary requests, there is no explanation why the ED was wrong in considering these combinations not inventive. The appeal thus does not become admissible by the filing of the auxiliary requests.

[1.7] Finally, the appeal must also be considered inadmissible because the grounds fail to deal with all the reasons the ED has advanced for refusing the application. According to the decisions T 213/85 [4] and T 1045/02, the grounds of appeal must deal with all those reasons on which the decision under appeal is based:
“According to the Board, the minimum requirements for an admissible appeal have not been met if only one of several reasons for refusal are addressed ...” (T 1045/02 [4]; translation by the board).
This position is consistent with the requirement of Article 12(2) RPBA according to which
“The statement of grounds of appeal and the reply shall contain a party’s complete case”.
In the case at issue, the summons of 1 June 2011 which served as the reasoning for the decision according to the state of the file, raised new objections with respect to A 84 for the newly added passages in claim 1 […]. Since these objections were not pertinent and therefore not raised for the previous versions of the claim, the letter of 15 June 2007 and the grounds of appeal that are an almost verbatim copy of this letter do not deal with this objection. As the decision under appeal held that claims 1 and 10 were not clear, A 84 must be considered as one of the reasons the refusal of the application is based upon. Already the failure to address this ground of refusal makes the appeal insufficiently reasoned and inadmissible.

[1.8] Summarising, the grounds of appeal consist of an almost verbatim copy of the appellant’s letter of 15 June 2007 that predates the summons and cannot take into account the division’s subsequent arguments and objections to the amended claims, be it for grounds that have already been raised (lack of inventive step), be it for grounds that became relevant only for the amended claims (lack of clarity). Nor can the above letter furnish arguments to the ED’s comments regarding the amended claims filed with that letter. The auxiliary requests filed with the grounds of appeal are combinations of dependent and independent claims, all of which were addressed in the decision under appeal and can therefore not be considered to be a change of case vis-à-vis the decision under appeal. The appeal is therefore insufficiently reasoned and does not comply with the requirements of A 108. It must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible.

So make sure your statement of grounds of appeal contains at least a reasoned statement or two why the impugned decision was wrong.

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