Wednesday, 27 March 2013

T 2254/11 – Insufficient Funds


Can a wannabe-opponent who did not pay the opposition fee in due time, because of its failure to pay the administrative fee under Article 6 ADA in due time, be re-established in the time limit for paying the fee? That is the question the Board had to answer in the present case.

The problem arose because the opposition fee was to be paid from the deposit account of the ‘opponent’, but the account was not sufficiently funded (similarities to a recent D2 paper are merely fortuitous).

The debit order (705 €) arrived on November 9, 2010, one day before the end of the 9-month time limit for filing an opposition. On November 16 the EPO invited the opponent to replenish its account and to file a debit order for the corresponding administrative fee (211.5 €). The opponent omitted to pay this fee, which triggered a notification of loss or rights under R 112(1). The opponent objected to this finding (invoking Article 7 RRF) and filed auxiliary requests for further processing and for re-establishment (why choose when there are so many wonderful remedies, let the EPO pick whatever they like!).

The Opposition Division (OD) confirmed the loss of rights, explained that further processing was not available and dismissed the request for re-establishment.

The opponent then filed an appeal.

When the Board expressed its provisional opinion that the request could not be granted, the appellant pointed out that all three requirements established by the EBA in G 1/86 were fulfilled: (1) when A 122 was drafted, there were no deposit accounts and the corresponding provisions did not exist yet; (2) the patent proprietor had been informed that an opposition had been filed; (3) the strict standards that apply to a missing statement of grounds of appeal should not be applied to the payment of a penalty (Säumnisgebühr).

Here is what the Board had to say:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[3] Even the appellant admits that the possibility for an opponent to request re-establishment in view of an opposition fee that has been paid after the expiration of the time limit cannot be derived from A 122. However, it refers to decision G 1/86 where the Enlarged Board (EBA) has provided a broad interpretation of the wording of A 122 [allowing] an opponent who has missed the time for filing the statement of grounds of appeal [to request re-establishment] (cf. the communication of the EPO in OJ EPO 2003, 419). Having considered the history and the purpose of the provision, the EBA has come to the conclusion that re-establishment could be envisaged when the time limit was not a time limit for making proceedings pending (Frist zur Anhängigmachung) but for pursuing them (time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal).

[4] The case G 1/86 to which the appellant has referred concerns the possibility of re-establishment into the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal in inter partes proceedings before the Board of appeal, which are similar to court proceedings. Based on the principle of equal treatment that applies in this case, G 1/86 had decided that an interpretation of A 122 contra legem was necessary. Decision T 702/89 has declined to extend these principles to the time limit for filing an opposition, for the following reasons:
“[3] Concerning the request for re-establishment of rights

[3.1] The requirements relating to admissibility of a request under A 122 filed by the opponent were set out in part in above-mentioned decision G 1/86 of the EBA. The Board shares the Appellant’s opinion that this decision represented a step forward as far as the opponent’s rights were concerned in that it enabled him to benefit from the provisions of A 122 in the event of late filing of the statement of grounds of appeal, whereas previously this would appear to have been limited to the applicant and patent proprietor.

However, the EBA’s reasons for this decision were based on an analysis of the differences between the rights which can legitimately be invoked by the opponent and the applicant or patent proprietor, depending on whether the legal process has begun or not (cf. point [9] of the decision). This process begins in appeal proceedings when the appeal has been filed and the appropriate fee paid (cf. point [8], second sub-paragraph).

For the same reasons as those given by the EBA, the present Board maintains that, in accordance with A 99(1), the legal process begins in opposition proceedings when the notice of opposition is filed and the appropriate fee is paid.

Continuing with its analysis, the EBA decided that, since the legal process had given rise to the appeal, the opponent should be granted the same rights under A 122 as the applicant or patent proprietor in respect of the filing of the statement of grounds of appeal and the other time limits provided for in the appeal procedure, because failure to observe the procedural time limits may involve the opponent too in a loss of rights (cf. point [10] of the Reasons).

On the other hand, on the question of time limits connected with the initiation of the legal process, the EBA pointed out that, in the course of the preparatory work on the EPC, a majority of the Working Party which had looked into the scope of re-establishment of rights had considered that re-establishment should not apply to the opponent because he had other means of availing himself of his rights, in particular by bringing an action for revocation before the national courts. Clearly, under similar circumstances where it was not possible to observe the time limits connected with the initiation of the legal process, an applicant or patent proprietor wishing to appeal against a decision to refuse him a patent or to revoke it would irrevocably have lost his rights were re-establishment not possible.

It is true that in the above-mentioned decision the matter was only referred to the EBA once the statement of grounds of appeal had been filed. This naturally prompted it to base its reply on an analysis of the circumstances specific to the appeal proceedings (cf. inter alia points [5] to [11] of the Reasons). However, when the ad hoc Working Party held that the opponent should not be entitled to have his rights re-established because he had other means of availing himself of those rights, it did not intend such exclusion to apply only to the specific case of non-observance of the time limits for appeal but to all cases of failure to observe time limits before the EPO. The same generalisation is accordingly found in A 122, which does not apply only to appeal proceedings.

[3.2] Consequently, the request for re-establishment of rights by the opponent, who has failed to observe the nine-month time limit under A 99(1) for filing the notice of opposition and paying the appropriate fee, must be rejected as inadmissible, notwithstanding any arguments put forward to explain the reasons for not complying with the time limit, which are a matter for consideration in connection with an assessment of the merits and not the admissibility of the request.”
[5] The appellant  now submits that the considerations that have led the EBA to a broader reading of A 122(1) were fulfilled in the present case […]. However, decision G 1/86 [6] expressly states that “the wording of A 122(1), the historical documentation relating to the Convention and a comparison of the national laws of Members States suggest that opponents may not have their rights re-established in respect of time limits of appeals”. The further considerations of the EBA exclusively concern the particularities of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal, which the EBA distinguishes from the time limit for filing the appeal (and the corresponding payment of the appeal fee). Thus the decision is based on a situation “where the appeal has already been filed, i.e. […] the opponent has validly made known his intention of having the OD’s decision set aside” (point [9] of the reasons). Therefore, [the EBA] considered a case where “the legal process has already begun” as stated in decision T 702/89.

[6] This is not the case here, because there is one single (nine-month) time limit in opposition proceedings, within which the opposition fee has to be paid and the notice of opposition has to be filed. Therefore, in contrast to the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal, and in a way that is analogous to the time limit for filing an appeal, the relevant question is whether a legally valid opposition has been filed at all. In this context, decision T 702/89 unambiguously states “that, in accordance with A 99(1), the legal process begins in opposition proceedings when the notice of opposition is filed and the appropriate fee is paid” […].

Thus the situation underlying G 1/86 is different from the present situation in several respects. First, there already was a validly filed opposition [in G 1/86], and secondly, the considerations [of the EBA] refer to the particularities of appeal proceedings rather than to opposition proceedings, where there is no distinction between the time limit for filing the opposition and the time limit for filing the statement of grounds. Both A 122(1) and the decisions G 1/86 and T 702/89 clearly indicate that re-establishment into the time limit for filing an opposition is out of the question.

[7] This outcome is appropriate (sachgerecht) not only because in opposition proceedings there is one single time limit for filing the opposition and the corresponding statement of grounds but also because the considerations underlying A 122(1), i.e. that a competitor who has not filed an opposition still can avail himself of national revocation proceedings, applies even more to opposition proceedings than to appeal proceedings.

[8] Based on the factual situations underlying G 1/86 and T 702/89, the Board draws the general conclusion that re-establishment, which is a special legal remedy that, in principle, is only available to the applicant and patent proprietor, is, in application of the principle of equal treatment, exceptionally available to all parties to inter partes proceedings when the proceedings have been validly commenced (eingeleitet) and are pending.

In the present case, however, the opposition proceedings have not been validly commenced yet. The failure to pay the administrative fee pursuant to Article 6.6 ADA in due time has triggered the legal consequence provided in Article 6.7 ADA in connection with Article 7(2) RRF, i.e. the payment is considered to have been made on the date on which the deposit account was duly replenished. It is undisputed that this happened after the expiration of the 9-month time limit for filing an opposition. In application of A 99(1) the opposition shall be deemed not to have been filed. Thus there are no pending opposition proceedings. As a consequence, a party that has failed to pay the opposition fee in due time, even if this is the consequence of the failure to meet the time limit for paying the administrative fee for replenishing the deposit account, cannot avail itself of the possibility of requesting re-establishment.

[9] The arguments of the appellant […] cannot alter this fact. Although the ADA did not exist at the time when A 122 was drafted (which is the first argument invoked by the appellant), these provisions provide particular rules in favour of the person ordering the payment (Zahlungsgeber) in case the deposit account is insufficiently funded. Thus these provisions contain their proper rules dealing with belatedness (Verspätungsregelungen). Now turning to the third argument of the appellant, these rules are to be considered as a whole and cannot be divided into more or less important acts. The law does not state whether the lack of a statement of grounds of appeal is more or less important than the failure to pay a penalty (Säumnisgebühr). Finally, the provisional communication by the Office regarding the filing of an opposition cannot alter the fact that the latter is inadmissible, even if the patent proprietor relied on this information. Otherwise the patent proprietor could not invoke the inadmissibility of the opposition, just because the Office had informed it on the filing of an opposition. If this was the case, the provisional communication on the filing of an opposition would be legally relevant to an extent that by far exceeds its mere informative character. This cannot be accepted.

[9] The appellant’s request that the decision be set aside and that re-establishment into the time limit for paying the administrative fee of 211.5 € be granted is to be dismissed. […]

The appeal is dismissed.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 26 March 2013

T 1483/10 – Back To China


[2.1] A 14(2) allows for a European patent application to be filed in any language and then to be translated into one of the official languages. Throughout the proceedings before the EPO, such translation may be brought into conformity with the application as filed.

[2.2] According to A 153(2), an international application for which the EPO is a designated or elected Office, shall be equivalent to a regular European application (Euro-PCT application). Under A 153(5) Euro-PCT applications shall be treated as European applications. It is also a general principle that such applications must be treated as favourably as those made in a contracting state (see T 700/05 [4.1.1], also T 353/03). Hence, by analogy, A 14(2) must also allow the translation into English of a PCT application originally filed in Chinese to be brought into conformity with the original Chinese text of the application throughout the proceedings before EPO.

[2.3] The certified translation provided by the appellant with its letter of 17 January 2013 shows that the use of the term “astigmatism plate” was the result of a translation error and the correct term should have been “light-scattering plate”. Accordingly, the replacement of the term “astigmatism plate” by “light scattering plate” in claim 1 is an allowable correction made under Article 14(2) EPC and does not infringe A 123(2).

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The file wrapper can be found here.

Monday, 25 March 2013

T 1677/11 – Bad Timing


Objections under A 24 other than self-recusations are hardly ever successful. Most of the time the Boards find the allegations of partiality to be unpersuasive. In the present case, where the whole Board (!) was being objected to, the objection was rejected on another ground.

[3] Partiality objections were raised by [opponents] 1, 3, 4 and 6 against all board members under A 24(3) EPC. It was argued that, since the substantively identical parallel appeal case T 1760/11 had been decided by a board in identical composition one week previously, the present board would not bring an open mind to the present appeal.

As a first step, it is to be decided by the present board whether the said objections are admissible (cf. decision T 1028/96 [1]).

According to A 24(3), second sentence, “an objection shall not be admissible if, while being aware of a reason for objection, the party has taken a procedural step”. The principle underlying this provision is that an objection should be “raised immediately after the party concerned has become aware of the reason for the objection”, since “otherwise, the system could be open to abuse” (see decision G 5/91 [4]).

In the present case, the statement of grounds of appeal dated 22 November 2011 already contained a reference to the parallel appeal concerning to the closely related patent EP 1 020 461 […]. In addition, present [opponents] 3, 4 and 6 were also [opponents] in the corresponding appeal case T 1760/11 (as [opponents] 2, 7 and 13, respectively), and although [opponent] 1 was not a party in appeal T 1760/11, its representative was the same as that acting for [opponent] 6. Therefore, [opponents] 1, 3, 4 and 6 would have been aware of the closely related parallel appeal T 1760/11 right from the beginning of the present appeal proceedings.

A communication of the board was sent on 19 December 2011 granting the request for accelerated processing of the appeal, and informing the parties that the board then envisaged issuing an invitation to oral proceedings (OPs) by August 2012 to attend OPs from 27 to 29 November 2012 [...]. On the same day, an identically worded communication was sent out in appeal case T 1760/11, except that the date foreseen for OPs was stated to be 13 to 15 November 2012. Both communications were signed by the same rapporteur.

At this stage in the proceeding, present [opponents] 1, 3, 4 and 6 would therefore have been aware that the boards had been constituted in both cases, that the rapporteur was the same, and that appeal T 1760/11 was likely to be decided prior to the present appeal. Moreover, the information would have been readily available by online file inspection (entry from 20 October 2011) that the boards were identical in both cases, as foreseen in Article 7 of the business distribution scheme, which stipulates that, where appeals pending before the board are closely linked, in particular by involving similar legal or factual questions, the chairman may order that the board decides in the same composition (see Supplement to OJ EPO 1/2012, 12 to 25).

Replies to the statement of grounds of appeal were inter alia received from [opponents] 1, 3 and 6, but not from [opponent] 4 […]. However, it is to be noted that [opponent] 4 did file a response in case T 1760/11 (as [opponent] 7), as did [opponents] 3 and 6 (as [opponents] 2, and 13, respectively). No concerns were voiced by said parties in either case with respect to the identical compositions of the boards.

Thereafter, summons were sent out on 6 July 2012 to attend OPs on 27 to 29 November 2012, as previously announced. Corresponding summons were sent out on the same day in appeal case T 1760/11 to attend OPs on 13 to 16 November 2012. The board’s composition appearing on the these summons was identical in both cases and had not changed with respect to that previously available by online file inspection.

These summons therefore provided confirmation to the parties that the boards were to be identically constituted in both cases and that OPs for T 1760/11 would take place two weeks prior to those for T 1677/11. Again no concerns were voiced by any of the parties in this respect, and the representatives of present [opponents] 1, 3, 4 and 6 all attended the OPs in case T 1760/11 from 13 to 16 November 2012.

It was only after an adverse decision in that case had been announced that said [opponents] raised their objections of suspected partiality in the present case. However, as outlined above, the reasons for said objections, namely, the close link between the cases and the identical compositions of the boards, had been known to the parties long before the date of the first OPs. Therefore, regardless of whether the [opponents], notably [opponent] 4, took a specific procedural step in the present appeal proceedings, it is undoubtedly the case that they did not submit their objection immediately after becoming aware of the reasons therefore. Moreover, in view of the fact that the objections raised are linked to both appeals, attendance of OPs for T 1760/11 must be regarded as a procedural step within the factual context of the present case, in the sense of A 24(3).

Consequently, in view of their timing, the objections under A 24(3) are rejected as inadmissible.

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Saturday, 23 March 2013

T 487/12 – Likely? So what?


This is an appeal of a patent proprietor whose patent had been revoked.

The decision contains an interesting passage on compliance of the main request with the requirements of A 123(2).

The application as filed had 15 claims, whereby claims 1, 2 and 3 read as follows:
1. A copolymer of ethylene and an alpha olefin having 3 to 10 carbon atoms, said polymer having
(a) a density in the range 0.900 to 0.940
(b) an apparent Mw/Mn of 2 - 3.4
(c) I21/I2 from 16 to 24
(d) activation energy of flow (Ea) from 28 to 45 kJ/mol
(e) a ratio Ea(HMW)/Ea(LMW)>1.1, and
(f) a ratio g’(HMW)/g’(LMW) from 0.85 to 0.95.

2. A copolymer according to claim 1 having an apparent Mw/Mn in the range 2 to 3 and I21/I2 from 18 to 24.

3. A copolymer according to claim 2 having an apparent Mw/Mn in the range 2.5 to 3, an activation energy of flow from 30 to 35 KJ/mol, and a ratio Ea(HMW)/Ea(LMW) >1.2.
The patent was granted with a set of 10 claims, whereby claim 1 read as follows, amendments compared to claim 1 as originally filed being underlined:
A copolymer of ethylene and an alpha olefin having 3 to 10 carbon atoms, said polymer having
(a) a density in the range 0.900 to 0.940
(b) an apparent Mw/Mn of 2.5 - 3.0
(c) I21/I2 from 16 to 24
(d) activation energy of flow (Ea) from 30 to 35 kJ/mol
(e) a ratio Ea(HMW)/Ea(LMW)>1.2, and
(f) a ratio g’(HMW)/g’(LMW) from 0.85 to 0.95
wherein g’ represents the ratio of the measured intrinsic viscosity divided by the intrinsic viscosity of a linear polymer having the same molecular weight, HMW = high molecular weight species, and LMW = low molecular weight species.
According to the patent proprietor, the values of five of the six parameters of claim 1, i.e. parameters (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) were disclosed at page 3, lines 11-17, of the application as filed. Parameters (a) and (f) were the same throughout the application. The value ranges for the parameter (b), (d) and (e) were within the broadest ranges disclosed for said parameters, i.e. represented preferred ranges. The claimed range of 16-24 for parameter (c) corresponded to the broadest disclosure of this parameter in the application as filed. The combination of the broadest range of parameter (c) with the - in some cases preferred - values of the remaining five parameters was inherently disclosed in the application as filed. Furthermore from examples 1, 4, and 5 it was seen that the values for parameter (e) were 1.55, 1.29 and 1.34, all of which were within the claimed range. Similarly from examples 1-3 it would be seen that parameter (f) had the values 0.912, 0.915 and 0.912. Examples 4 and 5 disclosed all the parameters of claim 1 apart from parameter (f). As the value of parameter (f) reported in examples 1-3 was consistently in the middle of the claimed range it was highly likely that the value of parameter (f) in examples 4 and 5 was also within the claimed range. Consequently the skilled reader could derive the subject-matter of claim 1 from a full reading of the application as filed.

The Board won’t allow such reasonings:

A 123(2)

[2.1] The preamble and features (a), (c) and (f) of claim 1 are disclosed in originally filed claim 1 and at page 2, line 28 - page 3, line 3 of the description of the application as filed. The definitions of g’, HMW and LMW are disclosed at page 4, lines 5-20.

[2.2] The specified values of features (b), (d) and (e) of present claim 1 are disclosed in originally filed claim 3. However in the application as originally filed claim 3 is dependent not on claim 1 but on claim 2 which specifies a value of feature (b) of 2 to 3 and a value of feature (c) of 18 to 24 […].

[2.3] Consequently the ranges for features (b), (d) and (e) specified in operative claim 1 are originally disclosed only in combination with a range of feature (c) of from 18-24, not however with the broader range of 16-24 as now specified in claim 1.

[2.4] The description of the application as filed does not provide any basis for the presently claimed subject matter since in the passage starting at page 2, line 27, and concluding at page 3, line 17, the subject matter of each of claims 1, 2 and 3 is explicitly set out as closed sets of six features.

Thus the description and the claims of the application as filed are consistent with each other in that only certain combinations of values for features (a)-(f) are permitted. There is no statement, express or implied, that the various ranges of values for features (a)-(f) can be freely combined independently of each other. In other words, according to the disclosure of the application as originally filed there is no indication that the ranges of values of the six features (a)-(f) are not interdependent.

Operative claim 1 therefore discloses a combination of values which is not disclosed as such in the description or claims of the application as filed.

[2.5] Recourse to the examples does not lead to any other conclusion.

The examples each represent a single point disclosure, i.e. a specific combination of values for each of the six parameters mentioned in present claim 1.

Since, in view of the considerations set out in section [2.4] above, only certain combinations of the features (a)-(f) are permitted, it has to be concluded that individual parameters from the examples may not be isolated and generalised.

Further, none of the examples discloses all of the six features specified in the claims, meaning that it is not even established that any of the examples actually fall within the scope of the claims.

Considerations, as advanced by the [patent proprietor], of the likelihood or probability of certain parameters being within the scope of the claims are not appropriate when considering the question of compliance with the requirements of A 123(2), as held for example in decision T 383/88 [2.2.2].

The main request therefore does not meet the requirements of A 123(2) and has to be refused.

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Friday, 22 March 2013

J 7/12 – Last Minute Risks


This is an appeal against the refusal of the Examining Division (ED) to grant re-establishment.

The applicant’s PCT application (earliest priority: November 2005) had entered the European phase in May 2008.

In a letter dated January 7, 2010, the EPO informed the applicant’s representative that the renewal fee for the fourth year, which had fallen due on November 30, 2009, had not been paid and that it still could be paid within six months of the due date, provided that an additional fee was also paid within that period (i.e. on or before May 31, 2010, “de ultimo ad ultimo”).

A communication of loss of rights was sent to the representative on July 8, 2010.

On July 28, 2010, the applicant filed a request for re-establishment.

The representative explained that the applicant had requested him to pay the fee by fax, on May 31, 2010. The order was received at 5 o’clock p.m. but there was a fax problem causing the fax not to be printed out. The problem was discovered on June 1 only because the office staff was surprised to see that apparently no faxes had been received during the night.

The ED considered that the requirement of all due care had not been complied with and refused re-establishment.

The applicant then filed an appeal.

Readers familiar with re-establishment case law will not be surprised that the appeal was not successful.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[3] As explained in great detail in the communication [NB: annexed to the summons to oral proceedings before the Board] a request for re-establishment can be granted when an applicant, in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, was unable to observe a time limit vis-à-vis the EPO (A 122(1)).

According to the established case law the duty of due care enshrined in A 122 concerns both the applicant and the representative (J 3/93 [2.1]; T 381/93 [6]; J 17/03 [5]; J 1/07 [4.1,7]; cf. Case Law, 6th edition, 2010, VI.E.7.3.1), the due care required on behalf of the representative depending on the relationship between him and his client (J 19/04 [9]; J 1/07 [4.1]).

[4] As correctly stated in the impugned decision, the representative has clearly and in due time informed the applicant of the fee being due. The reminder sent by the representative on April 9, 2010, contained all the information that was needed; it also bore the indication “final time limit”. It clearly follows from the letter that the representative could only pay the renewal fees if he was instructed to do so by the applicant. The representative received the required funds together with the corresponding instructions.

It follows that the applicant alone had the duty to take all due care required by the circumstances for the time limit for paying the fees to be met. However, the fact that the representative did not make any mistake does not protect his client from the consequences of its own errors or negligence (J 3/93; T 381/93; J 16/93; J 17/03).

[5] The argument that the applicant could not have known which time limits [, if not met,] would result in the irrevocable loss of the application is not sufficient for establishing that all due care had been taken. This ignorance rather proves the need to be more careful and, therefore, to act much earlier than on the last day of the additional period (Nachfrist). According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal, ignorance or wrong interpretation of a provision of the EPC cannot justify re-establishment. Incidentally, this principle also applies to individual applicants that are not represented (J 2/02).

[6] Moreover, as mentioned during the oral proceedings, anybody who puts himself in a situation where he cannot be sure that the required action can be taken in due time takes the risk that his legal request (Rechtsbegehr) will be unsuccessful (cf. J 16/92).

In the present case the order to pay (Zahlungsanweisung) has only been transmitted in the late afternoon of the last day for paying the renewal fee and the additional fee. By acting in this way, the [applicant] (almost) completely exhausted the additional period. Such action is per se acceptable, but it creates a risk that is to be borne (also) by the [applicant], namely that errors may occur during the receipt and execution of its instructions. Under these circumstances the [applicant] would have had to enquire of the professional representative or his clerk whether the instructions had been received and had been (or would be) carried out in due time (T 1289/10; J 16/92). This requirement does not amount to an unduly high standard for due care on behalf of the applicant, as extensively argued by the [applicant] - both orally and in writing. Rather, it only corresponds to the due care that is required in the applicant’s own interest and reflects the concrete circumstances. The requirement to enquire (Erkundigungsobliegenheit) thus results from both the fact that the applicant, by exhausting (Ausreizen) the time limit has created the particular risk that delays in transmission may lead to a failure to miss the time limit, and from the fact that – in contrast to last-minute transmissions directly to the Office – the instructions of the applicant to its representative still lie in the sphere of the applicant and that the interposition (Zwischenschaltung) of the representative naturally generates further transmission risks.

[7] For the above reasons the requirements of A 122(1) and R 136 have not been met and, consequently, the appeal has to be dismissed.

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Thursday, 21 March 2013

T 584/09 – Merry Swapping


Some time ago, I dedicated a post to the successful petition for review R 21/11 and mentioned that Board of appeal (BoA) 3.3.01 had changed its composition of its own motion because the former chairman would retire in early 2013. This retirement had a domino effect, as the present decision shows: the two remaining members of the Board recused themselves.

The original decision had been taken by P. Ranguis (chairman), G. Seufert and D. Rogers.

The petitioner had asked the Enlarged Board (EBA) to order a change of composition, but this request was refused.

P. Ranguis retired on March 1, 2013.

G. Seufert and D. Rogers then recused themselves in order to avoid the appearance of partiality.

The following decision on their exclusion was taken by the Board in the following decision: C.M. Radke (chairman), J.-B. Ousset (rapporteur) and C.-P. Brandt.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1] Pursuant to A 24(1) members of the Boards of appeal may not take part in a case in which they have any personal interest, or if they have previously been involved as representatives of one of the parties, or if they participated in the decision under appeal. If, for one of the reasons mentioned in paragraph 1, or for any other reason, a member of a BoA considers that he should not take part in any appeal, he shall inform the Board accordingly (A 24(2)).

[2] Apparently the self-recusations that are to be examined here are not based on a reason for exclusion pursuant to A 24(1). In particular the decision of the BoA of February 3, 2011, is not a decision of the previous instance within the meaning of this provision [NB: contrary to the English version of A 24(1), the German version refers to a previous instance (Vorinstanz)]. However, the reason given [by the self-recusing members], i.e. [the wish] to avoid the appearance of partiality based on the necessity to answer the same questions once more, may qualify as “any other reason” within the meaning of A 24(2).

[3] Pursuant to A 24(4), first sentence, the BoA shall decide as to the action to be taken in such cases. As the opponent has correctly stated […], a self-recusation, therefore, does not automatically result in the Board member concerned being excluded from the proceedings. Such an exclusion can only result from a decision of the Board in its composition pursuant to A 24(4), second sentence, on whether the replacement of the Board member is justified. In its present composition the Board is entitled to decide whether the technically competent member (G. Seufert) and the legally competent member (D. Rogers), who originally were in charge of the appeal proceedings, are excluded from participating in the appeal proceedings that are to be resumed.

[4] In principle the requirement of fair and impartial proceedings does not prohibit members of the BoA from deciding again on the submissions of parties. This can happen, for instance, when a case is remitted to the first instance and the same Board composed of the very same members who had taken the first decision is competent for deciding on the appeal against the subsequent first instance decision (cf. J 15/04 [8]).

[5] However, there is a general legal principle that nobody may decide on a case in which one of the parties may have good reasons to suspect him/her to be biased. A 24(2) serves this principle as it requires a Board member who believes that (s)he cannot take part in the proceedings for such a reason to inform the Board. This avoids situations where the circumstances underlying the self-recusation become public at a later stage of the proceedings and shed doubt on the process leading to the decision or even the decision itself. As a consequence, it is of paramount importance that after a decision of a BoA pursuant to A 24(4) on the self-recusation of a Board member neither the public nor any party may consider that there is a serious possibility or even a mere appearance of partiality (cf. J 15/04 [13]).

[6] It is true that neither during the petition for review proceedings under A 112a nor subsequent to the communication by the Board dated December 14, 2012, the petitioner has provided any concrete indications (Anhaltspunkte) clearly suggesting or actually justifying that there may be reasons to fear partiality of the original Board members, nor does the Board see any such indications. This notwithstanding, having pondered the particular circumstances of the present case, for the following reasons (see point [7]) and in view of the general principle explained above (see point [5]) the Board considers the self-recusations under consideration to be justified.

[7] As a matter of fact, when, as in the present case, members of the BoA justify a self-recusation by invoking a reason which as such could possibly justify an exclusion based on a partiality concern (Besorgnis der Befangenheit), then this reason should, as a rule, be respected by the decision on the replacement of these members because one has to assume that these members know best whether a partiality concern might arise (cf. J 15/04 [13]). In the present case this conclusion is further suggested by the fact that the petitioner in the petition for review proceedings did indeed request to replace the members involved in the decision of February 3, 2011, because otherwise they would have to decide on the same questions once more.

[8] Thus the Board comes to the conclusion that, considering the requirement of impartiality in proceedings before the BoA that underlies A 24, and in view of the fact that their members, who have a judicial function, have to avoid even the appearance of possible partiality, it is justified to replace the original technically and legally competent members of Board 3.3.01 in the proceedings that are to be resumed in the present case because of their declaration of self-recusation.

[9] This outcome does not contradict decision R 21/11 of the EBA in which the EBA refused the request to replace the members of the BoA who had participated in the decision that has been set aside, because in this respect the factual situation has changed in a decisive manner subsequent to the decision of the EBA. The EBA based its decision on the assumption that in principle the members of the BoA who had participated in the decision of February 3, 2011, which has been set aside, were also available for the proceedings that were to be resumed, and this was the only reasonable assumption at the time of the decision. Moreover, the EBA has also established that within the framework of the request to maintain the impugned patent the only question to be decided was whether in case of an admission of the second Mehlhorn expert opinion into the appeal proceedings this additional evidence would make a difference (R 21/11 [30]). As this request had not been dealt with before, there was no need to decide a second time on the same questions.

[10] The opponent could only have invoked legitimate expectations created by the decision of the EBA concerning the composition of the BoA if the facts underlying the decision of the EBA had remained unchanged, which is not the case, be it only because a change of chairman had become necessary afterwards.

[11] As a matter of fact the EBA has expressly pointed out that a replacement of the former members would mean that a Board in a new composition would have to repeat the appeal proceedings in order to reach a final decision (R 21/11 [30]). However, this is precisely the situation created by the retirement of the chairman P. Ranguis on March 1, 2013. The change of chairman as such already requires the appeal proceedings to be repeated, even if the originally appointed legally and technically competent members remained in the proceedings. These members then would have to decide once again on the same questions in the present appeal proceedings, which was to be avoided by means of the self-recusations.

[12] Insofar, and contrary to the opinion of the opponent […], it is irrelevant which reasons (retirement, partiality concerns) require the BoA member to be replaced. What matters is that before taking a final decision on the appeal the member must be able to form an opinion based on his/her proper perception, study (Kenntniserlangung) of the factual situation and assessment of all relevant questions. This presupposes that it may be necessary to discuss and assess afresh all questions that are relevant for the decision on the appeal, even though they have been dealt with and decided by a Board in different composition in the course of the preceding appeal proceedings. This also encompasses the participation in oral proceedings at the end of which the final decision of the newly composed BoA on the appeal as a whole is taken and announced.

[13] The Board is unable to endorse the opinion of the opponent according to which the principle of res judicata (i.e. of legal effect and legal binding) would hinder the BoA, when resuming the proceedings, in a partially or completely new composition, to decide once more on the questions that have already been dealt with and decided during the preceding appeal proceedings. The reasons are of a legal nature.

[14] It is true that a petition for review pursuant to A 112a is an extraordinary legal remedy and has no suspensive effect (A 112a(3)), i.e. the filing of the petition as such does not have any effect on the legal force of the impugned decision. This being said, it follows from A 112a(5) in connection with R 108(3) that if the petition succeeds, the EBA sets aside the decision and re-opens proceedings before the BoA. It may then order that the composition of the members be modified.

[15] The wording of these provisions does not express the idea that in a situation where the decision of the BoA is set aside the BoA […] is bound by the factual or legal statements that have been made in the preceding decision, which has been set aside. This is fully in line with the unambiguous and explicit will of the legislator as expressed when the provisions governing petitions for review under A 112a. Accordingly, if the petition is allowed, the decision of the EBA setting aside the decision of the BoA and re-opening the proceedings overturns the “res judicata effect”, i.e. the formal legal force of the decision of the BoA (OJ EPO, Special edition 4/2007, on A 112a, p. 126-131, and in particular points 10, 17, and 19, and expressly referring to A 112a(5) in connection with R 108(3)). Moreover it is expressly stated in this context that consequently the result of the second appeal proceedings may be the same as in the first appeal proceedings, or different (ibid., point 19). The legal fact (Rechtstatsache) that in a case where the petition is allowed, the decision of the BoA is set aside and the appeal proceedings are re-opened pursuant to A 112a(5) in connection with R 108(3), the res judicata effect of the first decision of the BoA is broken or overturned by means of a “cassatory” decision and that, as a consequence, the reversal of the decision in the second appeal proceedings is possible, has also been expressly confirmed in the legal literature (see Günzel, GRUR 2009, 269, 270; Messerli, GRUR 2001, 979, 981; Joos/Schmitz in Singer/Stauder, EPÜ, 6th edition, A 112a, marginal numbers 5 and 20). The EBA in its decision R 21/11 manifestly and without further ado based its reasoning on this fact when it declared that “replacing the previous members would mean that a BoA in new composition would have to carry out afresh the whole appeal proceedings … in order to come to a final decision” (R 21/11 [30]). This statement would not make any sense if one had to assume as a res judicata effect for the second appeal proceedings.

[16] For the above reasons the Board cannot endorse the opinion of the opponent acoording to which the principle of legal security would require a limitation of the BoA’s entitlement to take decisions, within the framework of the re-opened proceedings, to the so far unanswered question whether the second Mehlhorn expert opinion was to be admitted and, if so, whether it was relevant, and, therefore, excluded the possibility for the BoA to decide the questions that had already been dealt with once more, and possibly differently.

[17] Thus in the end there are no decisive reasons not to replace the original technically competent member G. Seufert and the original legally competent member D. Rogers by a deputy.

[18] The BoA, therefore, comes to the conclusion that Ms. G. Seufert and Mr. D. Rogers are to be replaced by Mr. J.-B. Ousset and Mr. C.-P. Brandt, respectively.

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Wednesday, 20 March 2013

J 15/12 – To Miss, Or Not To Miss, …


… that is the question.

This is an appeal against the decision of the Receiving Section (RS) to refuse the applicant’s request for a replacement of drawings under R 56(3).

The application under consideration was filed on June 25, 2010, claiming the priority of a GB patent application. The request for grant of a European patent was accompanied by 15 claims, 13 description pages and one sheet of drawings labelled “Fig 1A.” and “Fig 1B.”. In the description reference is made to Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.

On June 29, 2010, the applicant filed two sheets of drawings consisting of Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 and stated that the drawings filed with the application were incorrect and did not correspond to the specification. On August 5, 2010, the applicant filed a letter stating the following:


The RS was of the opinion that R 56 allows the filing of missing drawings, but not their replacement, without losing the earlier filing date. Figs. 2, 3 and 4 were obviously missing drawings, whereas Fig. 1 was not an obviously missing drawing, since it was present in the application documents as filed on the date of filing. As a consequence, the RS refused to accept Fig. 1 as a missing drawing within the meaning of R 56. It also decided that for the publication of the European patent application according to Article 93 EPC, the documents as originally filed would be used together with Figures 2, 3 and 4 filed on June 29 and August 5,2010.

The applicant filed an appeal against this decision.

[2] R 56 reads in relevant parts:

“(1) If the examination under A 90(1) reveals that parts of the description, or drawings referred to in the description or in the claims, appear to be missing, the EPO shall invite the applicant to file the missing parts within two months. …

(2) If missing parts of the description or missing drawings are filed later than the date of filing, but within two months of the date of filing or, if a communication is issued under paragraph 1, within two months of that communication, the application shall be re-dated to the date on which the missing parts of the description or missing drawings were filed. The EPO shall inform the applicant accordingly.

(3) If the missing parts of the description or missing drawings are filed within the period under paragraph 2, and the application claims priority of an earlier application, the date of filing shall, provided that the missing parts of the description or the missing drawings are completely contained in the earlier application, remain the date on which the requirements laid down in R 40(1) were fulfilled, where the applicant so requests and files, within the period under paragraph 2:

(a) a copy of the earlier application, unless such copy is available to the EPO under R 53(2); ...”

[3] In the present case in the description as filed reference is made to Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 […]. However, no drawing labelled “Fig.1” was part of the application received on 25 June 2010. Drawing Fig. 1 together with drawings Figs. 2, 3 and 4 were filed by the applicant under R 56(2) of its own volition and were received on 29 June 2010, and a copy of the earlier application, which contained Figs. 1, 2 3 and 4, was received on 5 August 2010; both dates are within the time limit of two months from the filing date (25 June 2010). Consequently, pursuant to R 56(3) the date of filing remains 25 June 2010, i.e. the date on which the requirements of R 40(1) were fulfilled. The incomplete application documents filed originally are to be completed by the missing parts, which must be added to the text of the application filed originally.

[4] The RS correctly states that R 56 does not allow any replacement of drawings. An interpretation of R 56 that some, or all, of the application documents that were originally filed in order to obtain a filing date could be amended, replaced or deleted would indeed be incorrect (see decision J 27/10 [8-18]).

However, the filing of drawing Fig. 1 does not replace any Fig. 1 filed earlier in a legal sense.

R 56(1), first sentence, refers to drawings referred to in the description or in the claims, which appear to be missing. Hence, where a drawing referred to in the description is missing in the application documents as filed. R 56 is applicable and the said drawing can be filed later in accordance with the procedure laid down in R 56.

As set out above, no drawing labelled “Fig.1” was part of the application received on 25 June 2010. The drawings “Fig.1A” and “Fig.1B” are not a “Fig. 1” as stated in the decision under appeal and therefore the later filing of “Fig. 1” is not a replacement of the aforementioned figures but constitutes the filing of a figure referred to in the description but missing from the application documents as filed.

[5] The Board therefore concludes that Fig. 1 has to be treated as a missing drawing in accordance with R 56(3) and (2). Fig. 1 must be added to the application documents already filed, with no ensuing change of the original filing date of 25 June 2010. Consequently, the EPO will also have to provide for a publication of drawing Fig. 1.

I understand this to mean that if the originally filed figures had been labelled “Fig. 1”, then they could not have been replaced by the ‘new’ “Fig.1”.

Also, although the decision is silent on this matter, I would think that the Figures 1A and 1B still are part of the application as filed and can only be deleted via an amendment.

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Tuesday, 19 March 2013

T 1906/11 – What Really Counts


Both the patent proprietor and the opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 of the patent as maintained read (amendments with respect to claim 1 as granted are highlighted):
Scale (1) having a supporting plate (4) for receiving a mass to be weighed and having an electrical
switching device (16, 24) for choosing or selecting a function of the scale (1), characterized in that the
switching device (16, 24) has a capacitive proximity switch having an electrode (18, 28, 38, 44) which is arranged on the supporting plate (4) for monitoring the ambient capacitance of the electrode (18, 28, 38, 44), wherein the electrode (18, 38, 44) is located under the supporting plate and wherein the choice or selection of a function performed with the electrical switching device consists in switching on the scale.
The Board dismissed the main request of the patent proprietor for lack of inventive step and then examined the claims of the patent as maintained by the OD. The part on compliance with A 123(2) is not without interest.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[4.2.1] The opponents have criticised that the feature that has been added to claim 1, according to which “the electrode is located under the supporting plate”, represented an inadmissible intermediate generalization, because this feature meant that any unspecified electrode could be located under the supporting plate. There was no corresponding disclosure in the original patent application, where the only electrode said to be located under the supporting plate was an electrically conductive printed layer.

[4.2.2] The discussion between the parties concerning the opponent’s attack under A 123(2) mainly concentrated on the question whether the amendment of claim was an intermediate generalization within the meaning of e.g. T 1067/97, which had been cited by the opponent.

However, the Board is of the opinion that this question is irrelevant in the present context. Whether an amendment qualifies as “intermediate generalization” or rather as “omission of an originally disclosed feature” or “multiple selection from two groups of alternative features” does not allow to draw a conclusion on whether this amendment is admissible under A 123(2). The only relevant question is whether the skilled person who is confronted with the amended version of the application or the patent, as compared to the skilled person who was only aware of the originally disclosed version, would find additional, technically relevant pieces of information in the amended version. Only when it is possible to find such additional, technically relevant pieces of information can there be a violation of the requirements of A 123(2).

[4.2.3] The Board agrees with the opponents insofar as present claim 1 as amended, which now defines an electrode that is not specified any further to be located under the supporting plate, clearly teaches the skilled person to locate an electrode of any kind (Beschaffenheit) under the supporting plate.

[4.2.4] As to the nature and location of the electrode, the following hints are found in the original application (paragraphs refer to the application as published):
“In principle there are no limitations with respect to the design (Ausbildung) of the electrode. However, it is particularly advantageous for the electrode to have an electrically conductive printed layer on or under the supporting plate” (cf. paragraph [0007])

“According to another advantageous development (Weiterbildung) of the invention the electrode comprises a sputtered layer that is electrically conductive in at least part of its area, on or under the supporting plate” (cf. paragraph [0008]).

“… it is suitable if the electrode comprises an electrically conductive metal element mounted on the support plate.” (cf. paragraph [0010]).
Moreover, the figures show two embodiments:

The first embodiment, shown in Figures 1 and 2, comprises an electrode 18 that consists in an electrically conductive printed layer 32 provided under the support plate (cf. paragraph [0015]), as well as a second electrode 28 consisting in a sputtered layer (cf. paragraph [0016]), which according o the figure is provided on the upper surface of the support plate.


The second embodiment, represented in Figure 3, has an electrode that consists in a metal element glued to the bottom of the support plate (cf. paragraph [0017]). 


Thus the original documents as filed disclose, in various places of the description and the drawings, electrodes that are arranged under the support plate and which consist in an electrically conductive printed layer, an electrically conductive sputtered layer, or a metal element that is glued [onto the support plate]. Considering this plurality of variants that are said to be advantageous embodiments, the skilled person would understand that in principle there is no limitation regarding the design of the electrode on the bottom surface of the support plate, and that the electrode can be of any kind, respectively. This fact is also expressly stated in paragraph [0007] of the description.

The fact that claim 2 as originally filed referred to a design of the electrode that was apparently considered to be particularly advantageous – i.e. a printed layer – cannot be understood to delimit the whole disclosure, as the opponents believe.

[4.2.5] From the above comparison between the technical teaching which the skilled person receives from claim 1 as amended on the one hand and from the documents as originally filed on the other hand, and their agreement, [the Board] has to conclude that the technical teaching introduced by the amendment and which allegedly was an addition [to the original disclosure], was already present in the application [as filed], which means that there is no violation of the requirements of A 123(2).

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