Monday, 18 March 2013

T 1849/12 – Bad News For Early Birds


The present case is somewhat unusual. It raises the question whether an applicant has the right to have its application granted before the expiry of the 18-months-period. The treatment of the admissibility of the appeal is also quite interesting.

The application under consideration was filed on July 21, 2011.

On May 7, 2012, the applicant’s representative had a telephone interview with the Examiner. The Examiner appears to have told the representative that in principle there was no obstacle to grant the patent but that he could not do so before having carried out a “topping-up” search in order to detect A 54(3) prior art, in conformity with the Guidelines (C-IV 7.1).

On June 28, 2012, the applicant’s representative repeated the request for an early grant. He pointed out that there was no legal basis in the EPC for refusing a request for an early grant. It was up to the applicant to bear the risk of there being undetected A 54(3) prior art. The representative also invoked a recent article by M. Wilming in epi Information 1/2011, p. 31. He requested an appealable decision and explained that in the absence of such a decision the applicant might file an appeal anyway.

On July 17, the ED sent a communication wherein it explained that the Guidelines were in line with the EPC and that there was no legal basis for an appealable decision.

The applicant then filed an appeal.

How did the Board react?

*** Translation of the German original (available here) ***

Competence and composition of the Board of appeal

[1.1] First it has to be examined to which Board of appeal the EPC refers the present case.

[1.2] The impugned communication deals both with the main request of the applicant to allow the patent to be granted as soon as possible, by immediately issuing a R 71(3) communication, and with the auxiliary request to issue an appealable decision in case the ED was not willing to grant the patent without delay […]. Thus the communication directly concerns the moment at which the ED decides to grant the European patent, i.e. the decision to grant (cf. G 8/95 [4-5]). Therefore, the Board is of the opinion that the impugned communication of the ED concerns the grant of a European patent within the meaning of A 21(3)(a) and that the Technical Board of appeal in its composition pursuant to A 21(3)(a) is competent to decide on the present appeal.

[1.3] In view of the particular nature of the case the Board in the above composition has considered it to be necessary to decide on the appeal in a composition pursuant to A 21(3)(b) (Article 9 RPBA).

Admissibility of the appeal

On the qualification of the impugned decision as a decision

[2.1.1] Pursuant to A 106(1) decisions of the departments referred to in this provision are appealable. In the present case, however, the appeal is not directed against a formal decision but against what the ED has referred to as “communication”. As the term “decision” is not defined in the EPC, the question arises whether the impugned communication, notwithstanding its designation, qualifies as an appealable decision. It has been established in the case law of the Boards of appeal that the answer to this question does not primarily depend on the form or the title of the document, but on its content, which has to be assessed in its procedural context. In particular, a document such as the impugned communication in the present case does qualify as a decision when it finally settles the relevant factual situation with respect to a party.

[2.1.2] In view of its contents, the appellant considers the communication of the ED dated July 17, 2012, to be an appealable decision because it satisfies all the features of an appealable decision cited in decision T 1181/04 [2.4] […].

The Board cannot endorse this point of view. At least two of the four criteria are not satisfied in the present case. The first instance novelty assessment expressly had not been terminated yet, in view of A 54(3) prior art, and thus the factual examination had not yet been terminated, so that the subsequent proceedings did not depend on the decision of the applicant alone.

Moreover, the factual situation of the case underlying decision T 1181/04 significantly differs from the present situation in that the ED already had issued a communication pursuant to A 51(4) EPC 1973 (nowadays, R 71(3)), which, under the circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned above qualified as a decision. In the present case, however, the ED had refused to (immediately) issue a communication pursuant to R 71(3). Therefore the question whether (and if so, which of) the cited criteria can be used for the assessment of the admissibility of the appeal, in terms of double relevant facts in civil proceedings, can be left unanswered.

[2.1.3] However, the Board shares the opinion of the appellant that its request for a R 71(3) communication being issued immediately has been dealt with conclusively in the impugned communication and has been refused in a final manner by the ED. This is because, within the framework of the examining proceedings, the ED has made a final and legally binding statement on the request of the appellant, which, as to its content, has the nature of a decision within the meaning of A 106(1).

As this decision has resulted in the refusal of the request of the appellant to have the patent and the rights under A 64 related to it granted soon, [the appellant] is also adversely affected.

Admission of the separate appeal

[2.2.1] Pursuant to A 106(2), a decision which does not terminate proceedings as regards one of the parties can only be appealed together with the final decision, unless the decision allows a separate appeal.

The EPC does not contain an explicit provision [that allows to determine] in which cases a separate appeal against so-called interlocutory decisions has to be allowed.  Rather, the legislator has given the deciding department discretion to decide [on that matter], according to its duties (Travaux préparatoires to the EPC 1973, Report on the second session of the Coordination Committee, May 15-19, 1972, document BR/209/72, point 67).

It is undisputed that a first instance department which, in application of the EPC, has to take discretionary decisions has a margin of discretion which the Board of appeal has to respect. The Board may only should only overrule the way in which a first instance department has exercised its discretion if it comes to the conclusion either that the first instance department in its decision has not exercised its discretion in accordance with the right principles, or that it has exercised its discretion in an unreasonable way, and has thus exceeded the proper limits of its discretion cf. G 7/93 [2.5-6]).

[2.2.2] The impugned communication of the ED, which is to be qualified as a decision, does not terminate the examination proceedings with respect to the appellant. The ED has expressly refused the auxiliary request of the appellant for an appealable decision and has justified this by referring to the lack of an appropriate legal basis.

When doing so, it apparently has not sufficiently taken account of the fact that the request of the appellant, to allow the patent to be granted soon, by immediately issuing a R 71(3) communication, could not have been granted in a meaningful way in case a successful appeal had been filed after the final decision on the grant. Thereby it has adversely affected [the appellant] by issuing its communication, in a way that cannot be remedied by means of an appeal after the final decision.

[2.2.3] Nor could the appellant avail itself of another legal remedy provided by the EPC against the impugned communication. Under these circumstances, the ED should have allowed a separate appeal because only an appeal could offer the appellant an opportunity to remedy the adverse effect within the framework of a judicial examination of the refusal of its request. This is all the more so because the EPC does not provide for an appeal against inaction of the EPO (cf. J 26/87).

[2.2.4] Thus the Board comes to the conclusion that the ED, when refusing the request that an appealable decision be issued has insufficiently taken account of an essential aspect and has exercised its discretion in an erroneous way. Therefore, the communication of the ED is to be considered to be separately appealable.

[2.3] As the appeal satisfies all the other requirements of A 106 to A 108 and R 97 and R 99, it is admissible.

Allowability of the appeal

[3.1] A 97(1) regulates the grant of a European patent as follows:
“If the ED is of the opinion that the EP application and the invention to which it relates meet the requirements of this Convention, it shall decide to grant a EP […].”
Thus the grant of a patent presupposes that the ED has reached the opinion that the requirements of the EPC are met. In the present case, however, the ED has expressed in the impugned communication dated July 17, 2012 (point 1) that it was not yet of the opinion that the application under consideration satisfied all the requirements of the EPC, including the requirement of novelty with respect to A 54(3) prior art. Thus it did not have the possibility and the right to proffer the possibility of a grant by issuing a communication under R 71(3). In contrast to the opinion of the appellant, the ED has no margin of discretion in this respect.

Whether the appellant renounces the novelty assessment with respect to A 54(3) prior art and is ready to bear the risk that may result from it, i.e. that the resulting patent is not legally valid, is irrelevant in this context, because this would mean that the applicant had the right to choose whether its application should be examined before grant – and if so, in regard of which requirements. However, there is no support for [this approach] in the EPC. Rather, the EPC provides for a mandatory examination with respect to all the requirements of the EPC before a patent can be granted. It is only when the ED is of the opinion that all requirements that are to be examined are fulfilled that it may arrange for a grant. In this context, it has to be noted that the EPO has to guarantee the interests of both the applicant and the public and that the public must be able to rely on the fact that it actually does. The fact that it often happens that prior art that has not been taken account of during examination proceedings, for various reasons, is cited in opposition proceedings does not alter this duty. The very fact that the opportunity to file an opposition against a granted patent is offered to any person emphasises the interest of the public that only valid rights be maintained and shows that the applicant cannot decide on the requirements of the EPC that are to be used in the examination of its application.

Moreover the requirement of novelty with respect to A 54(3) prior art is not of secondary importance, as the applicant appears to believe. Rather, the requirement of lack of novelty with respect to A 54(3) prior art constitutes both a ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(a) and a ground for revocation pursuant to A 138(1)(a).

[3.2] The argument of the appellant based on A 93(2), which expressly stipulates that the EP application shall be published at the same time as the specification of the EP when the decision to grant the patent becomes effective before the expiry of the 18-month period of eighteen months from the date of filing, cannot succeed either.

As a matter of fact, A 93(2) only regulates the possibility of granting a patent before the expiration of the 18 months. Even if the relevant Travaux préparatoires, the decision T 276/99 cited by the appellant or the Guidelines A-VI 1.1 are taken into account, this provision does not state that the applicant is entitled to having the patent granted at a time and under conditions of its choice. Therefore, the grant of a patent before the expiration of said period is not excluded, provided the ED has reached the conviction that the application satisfies all the requirements of the EPC. However, as this was not the case here, the possibility of granting a patent before the expiration of the 18-month period, which is mentioned in A 93(2), is out of the question. In this context the Board does not see any contradiction between the provisions of A 93(2) and A 97(1).

[3.3] Finally, the appellant points out that to a large extent the EPO was already aware of the unpublished prior rights pursuant to A 54(3) before the 18-month period had expired. As far as PCT applications were concerned, 18 months after their filing or priority date, respectively, it was not established whether they would enter into the European phase within 31 month after their filing or priority date, respectively, and, therefore, become prior art at all. It was only at that later date that a translation was available, without which the contents of PCT applications of e.g. Japanese or Chinese origin – and, as a consequence, their relevance for the novelty assessment – could not be determined.

The Board cannot endorse this point of view.  According to A 153(5), in connection with R 165, international applications filed under the PCT constitute potential A 54(3) prior art. If the EPO is not in charge of their treatment during the international phase, then they are only available to the Office after their publication, because the EPO acting as Designated Office does not make use of the possibility of systematic early transmission under Article 13(1) PCT. Thus it is only 18 months after the filing or priority date, respectively, that the ED can have a complete picture of potential prior rights. If under these circumstances it reaches the conviction that the subject-matter of the claims to be examined is novel, then it may issue a R 71(3) communication, without there being any need to wait for a complete translation or an effective entry of the prior international applications into the European phase. To this extent the practice of the EPO not to proffer the possibility of a grant earlier than 18 months after the filing or priority date, respectively is quite understandable under said circumstances.

[4] Moreover, the Board wishes to point out that according to A 99(1) the nine-month time limit for filing an opposition is triggered by the publication of the mention of the grant of the EP in the EP Bulletin. If this moment was situated well before the end of the 18-month period pursuant to A 93(1), then the prior art pursuant to A 54(3) that is relevant for the granted patent would not be completely available to the public at the time of grant. Potentially novelty-destructive prior art would only emerge during the time limit for filing an opposition although it might be relevant in view of the ground for opposition pursuant to A 100(a). This would significantly complicate the assessment of the validity of the patent by third parties, and, consequently, their decision whether an opposition should be filed. In the worst case scenario the time limit for filing an appeal could expire before all A 54(3) prior rights were publicly available, which would constitute a considerable systematic disadvantage and would run counter to the intentions of the legislator regarding opposition proceedings, which have been mentioned under point [3.1]. […]

The appeal is dismissed.

NB: The Board has also prepared take-away headnotes:

When the ED refuses a request that is limited in time (zeitlich gebunden) then it has to allow for a separate appeal if this is the only way to remedy any adverse effect (see point [2.2]).

The decision whether the requirements of the EPC are fulfilled and whether the patent may be granted lies exclusively with the competent ED (see point [3.1]).

I find this decision quite stimulating. I personally agree with the legal conclusions of the Board, but I also find the applicant's criticism of the Guidelines to be justified: for some mysterious reason, A 93(2) appears to envisage the possibility of a grant before the 18-month time limit, whereas the Guidelines seem to prohibit it. This has a slight ultra vires flavour.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German) or have a look at the file wrapper, just click here.

Saturday, 16 March 2013

T 1413/08 – There Are Alternatives


Claims 1 and 2 on file in this examination appeal case read (in English translation):
1. A replaceable liquid filter, particularly for the lubricating oil of an internal combustion engine, comprising a substantially cup-shaped housing (12) with a concentrically disposed outlet opening (17) for the filtered liquid and at least one inlet opening (16) for liquid to be filtered, and
a filter element (18) disposed in a sealing manner between the inlet opening (16) and the outlet opening (17), wherein the housing (12) is connected to a top plate (14), and the top plate (14) is connected to an end plate (13), characterised in that the top plate (14)
encloses a displacement space (24) which is disposed in a feed chamber in a part which mates with the replaceable liquid filter, so that the inlet opening (16) in the top plate (14) is disposed in the area of the displacement space (24), wherein a backflow check valve (26) is disposed in the area of the displacement space (24), such that liquid cannot leak from the replaceable liquid filter (10) when the filter is detached.

2. A replaceable liquid filter, particularly for the lubricating oil of an internal combustion engine, comprising a substantially cup-shaped housing (12) with a concentrically disposed outlet opening (17) for the filtered liquid and at least one inlet opening (16) for liquid to be filtered, and a filter element (18) disposed in a sealing manner between the inlet opening (16) and the outlet opening (17), wherein the housing (12) is connected to a top plate (14), and the top plate (14) is connected to an end plate (13), characterised in that a volume contour (35), preferably made of metal, is connected to the end plate (13) and the top plate (14), which comprises the inlet opening (16) on the one hand and extends into the cylinder head (11) on the other hand, thereby forming a displacement space (24), wherein a backflow check valve (26) is disposed in the area of the displacement space (24), such that liquid cannot leak from the replaceable liquid filter (10) when the filter is detached from the cylinder head (11). (my emphasis)
The Board inter alia had to decide whether it was justified to have two independent product claims.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[4] The Board is of the opinion that the subject-matter of independent product claims 1 and 2 define alternative solutions for the problem defined under point [3.3] [i.e. to provide a replaceable liquid filter where the amount of liquid that is released when the filter is disassembled is reduced]. As in particular the characterising apparatus parts according to these alternative solutions are different and do not correspond to each other, apart from their suitability to solve the problem, the Board can accept that it is inappropriate to cover the alternatives by a single claim. Thus the situation corresponds to one of the exceptions provided in R 43(2)(c) according to which the European patent application may contain more than one independent claim of the same category.

Moreover, the inventions according to claim 1 or 2 have the technical relationship that is required by R 44. It is expressed in the corresponding particular technical features which characterise the subject-matter of claims 1 and 2, respectively and which define a contribution which the respective claimed invention makes over the prior art.

Thus the requirement of unity of invention is fulfilled (A 82).

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Friday, 15 March 2013

T 1785/10 – Worthy Of Trust


In this case the Board had to decide whether technical drawing D8 had been made available to the public before the effective date of the opposed patent.

Click to enlarge

*** Translation of the German original ***

Request for a hearing of witnesses

[2.1] In a letter dated November 5, 2012, the [opponent] requested that the witnesses Arne Hermsen and Olaf Brockmann be heard. These witnesses had already been proposed in the notice of opposition dated November 13, 2008, but the Opposition Division had not heard them. The Board is of the opinion that – because of the circumstances of the alleged disclosure, in particular of D8, without any obligation to maintain secrecy – it is appropriate to hear the witnesses under A 117(1)(d).

[2.2] During the oral proceedings (OPs) before the Board, the [patent proprietor] requested the Board not to hear the witnesses. However, all the arguments presented by the [patent proprietor] in this context did not concern the question of whether a hearing would make sense, but the assessment of the written evidence already before the Board.

[2.3] Thus the Board decided to hear the witnesses Arne Hermsen and Olaf Brockmann on the assertion of the [opponent] according to which documents D8 and D9 had been made available to representatives of the Seondo company in May 1996 without there having been any obligation to maintain secrecy.

The status of document D8 as prior art

[3.1] During the OPs held on December 8, 2012, the Board has heard the witnesses Hermsen and Brockmann, both of which are employees of the [opponent]. The witnesses have described the circumstances under which the documents which are referred to as D8 and D9 in these proceedings were made available to representatives of the Korean company Seondo in early 1996.

[3.2] It all began with a round trip to various countries of Southeast Asia of the chief marketing director of the [opponent], Dr Voss, towards the end of 1995. The purpose of this trip was to establish new commercial contacts in order to strengthen the then rather weak commercial relationships to companies in these regions. It is in this context that a contact to the Korean company Seondo was established. This company was then dealing with a project of the state-owned Korean energy supplier KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation). This project concerned the installation of 25.8 kV switchboards. In January 1996 there was a first meeting with representatives of the Seondo company, in the course of which the technical options that the [opponent] could offer were presented, i.e. purely cast resin insulated transformers, which were part of the standard production, as well as metal-encased transformers, none of which satisfied Seondo. The [opponent] was asked to prepare a proposal that was in line with the needs of Seondo and that would also be approved by KEPCO. This is what happened; finally drawing D9 was sent as a proposal solution to Korea. In March Seondo then asked [the opponent] to present this design with a primary circuit fuse (primärseitige Sicherung), which resulted in drawing EKM-Ps-96/08 being sent to Korea. However, Seondo sent the feed-back that KEPCO would not approve this solution because the device was too voluminous. There was a further meeting in May where a solution was sought in collaboration with Seondo, because the [opponent] was very much interested in concluding a deal. During this conversation the drawing referred to as D8 (drawing EKM-Ps-96/08 with handwritten remarks) was used as a basis for the discussions with Seondo. Finally a different technical solution was found and then also approved by KEPCO; however, only few of the corresponding devices were ordered and delivered. There was no concern of secrecy or confidentiality during the whole negotiations; the representatives of the [opponent] had not even considered this [issue].

[3.3] The Board is of the opinion that this factual situation is established on the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses Hermsen and Brockmann. Their statements corresponded to each other as to the core issues insofar as the factual situation was the same. The witnesses are consistent and plausibly describe the attempts of the [opponent] to gain a foothold on the Asian market, to adapt the existing offer and to tailor it to the needs of potential customers. In this context the approval of the product by the state-owned energy supplier KEPCO was always an underlying matter of concern. The statements are also consistent with the contents of the few documents on file regarding this context, i.e. D10, D11, D12, and D15.

[3.4] The arguments of the [patent proprietor] directed against the trustworthiness of the witness statements are not suitable for raising doubt on the trustworthiness of the witnesses or the credibility of their assertions.

[3.4.1] The [patent proprietor] first pointed out that the events mentioned by the witnesses had occurred more than 16 years earlier and expressed doubts that somebody could actually remember events belonging to the professional sphere so long after they had occurred. In this context the witness Hermsen has declared that this project had been his first big project in Southeast Asia, that he had put a great amount of time and energy into it and that it finally had ended in a disappointing manner because only few devices had been sold. The Board finds this declaration to be plausible. It is understandable that somebody would remember a big project at the beginning of his professional career which has had such an outcome, even after many years.

[3.4.2] The Board does not consider the alleged disagreement between the date 27.02.96 mentioned on D8 and the assertions of the witnesses to be a contradiction. Rather, this date confirms that the drawing EKM-Ps-96/08 was made by the technicians of the [opponent] on the company’s own initiative and not as a reaction to the invitation on behalf of Seondo (see also D12) received in March 1996. That this date is correct is also confirmed in D16.

[3.4.3] The Board does not attach much importance to the alleged disagreement regarding the handwritten remark on document D10. This is a minor issue that can hardly be clarified any more and that does not raise doubts regarding the declarations of the witnesses.

[3.4.4] Nor does the Board attach any importance to the fact that the [opponent] later filed an application (D7) which also contains the solution shown in D8. The witness Brockmann has declared in this context that he did not know the reasons [for this filing]; it was not part of his duties to decide on what would be the object of patent applications. In this context the Board notes that one can imagine many reasons why something that is not patentable from the start would be the object of a patent application, even if the applicant is well aware of the situation. However, such considerations are merely speculative and are not suitable for raising doubts regarding the statements of the witnesses.

[3.5] Thus the Board holds that the factual situation was such that the existence of a secrecy agreement was rather unlikely. This is because the present situation does not correspond to a collaboration between two companies in view of the development of a new product but to sales negotiations the first purpose of which was to tailor a product so that it would fit the expectations of the customer. The main issue was to create the basis for doing business at all. In this context the Board notes that a secrecy agreement, if such an agreement had been desired, would only have made sense if KEPCO had been included as well, because KEPCO had to examine and approve the design. However, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to include this [organism].

[3.6] If, according to the declarations of the witnesses, there was no explicit secrecy agreement, and if, considering the circumstances, such an agreement was not to be expected, then there is even less reason to assume a “tacit” secrecy agreement. The fact that D8 and D9 mention the DIN34 (cf. D17) cannot alter this conclusion. Thus the Board holds that documents D8 and D9 were part of the state of the art at the priority date.

The claimed subject-matter was then found to lack novelty and the patent was revoked.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 14 March 2013

T 366/11 – Wrong Order


The parties to opposition proceedings often file documents and requests just one month before oral proceedings (OPs), the common time limit set for such submissions. The Opposition Division (OD) has to take great care when deciding on the admissibility of these submissions, as the present decision shows.

The opposition had been filed against the patent as a whole based among others on A 100(a) in combination with A 54 and A 56 in view of inter alia document D1.

In an annex to summons to OPs issued on 2 June 2010, the OD communicated its preliminary opinion that the cited prior art appeared prejudicial to both novelty and inventive step.

Prior to the OPs the opponent, with two letters received on 5 and 9 October 2010 respectively, filed new documents D6 to D9 as further evidence of lack of novelty against the granted claims.

Almost at the same time, with letter received 7 October 2010, the patentee submitted new main and auxiliary requests directed at amendments to the granted claims.

OPs before the OD took place on 8 November 2010. The admissibility of the new documents D6 to D9 and the admissibility of the new requests were discussed. The OD decided not to admit the new documents but to admit the new requests. It subsequently held that the patent could be maintained in amended form according to the main request.

The opponent filed an appeal.

Substantial procedural violation

[3.1] In the case at hand, the appellant-opponent in the lead-up to OPs before the OD filed new documents D6 to D9 in two submissions on 5 and 8 October 2010. Both were filed on or before the deadline for filing submission set in the summons. In the accompanying letters the [opponent] cited these documents in new attacks against the granted claims then on file.

[3.1.1] Almost concurrently the respondent proprietor on 7 October 2010 filed new main and auxiliary requests. Whereas granted claim 1 was directed at a ventilation unit with a fan with cup-shaped central body and connected blades and at least one through window in the annular walls of the central body for channelling out condensate, the new requests added features of an external frame with an annular wall, a central sleeve and connecting ribs, with the annular wall of the fan central body extending from its base wall to the central frame of the sleeve, and of the condensate being channelled out due to centrifugal force when the fan rotates.

[3.1.2] At the OPs, the OD chose to first discuss admissibility of D6 to D9, deciding not to admit them. The division reasoned, see its written decision, reasons 2, first paragraph, that these documents were “prima facie not more relevant than documents D1-D5”. In the following paragraphs it then summarized each document’s contents in relation to the features of granted claim 1, in particular the central features of openings in the annular wall of the fan’s central body. D6 and D7 were not found to have this feature, while D8 and D9 were not seen to relate to a ventilation unit but were in a different technical field. No mention is made of any of the features added to claim 1 of the new main or auxiliary requests. Clearly, the division assessed prima facie relevance of D6 to D9 in relation to the granted claim 1 then still on file.

[3.1.3] Subsequently, it discussed admissibility of the new requests and decided to admit them, as recorded in sections 4 and 5 of the minutes. This would have been unobjectionable but for the fact that the appellant-opponent had expressly stated at the OPs that he was now citing D6 to D9 against the new requests: point 4.1 of the minutes records: “OPP argues that D6-D9 are admissible due to the newly filed main request and auxiliary requests from PRO, where new subject-matter has been introduced into the claims from the description.... “ and again at point 4.5: “OPP repeats that new features were introduced ....”.

[3.1.4] After the new requests had been admitted and the discussion had moved on to inventive step, the appellant opponent made a further attempt to introduce D6 to D9: the minutes duly record at section 9.6 :
“OPP ... also considers that novelty of claim 1 is not fulfilled in view of documents D6 and D9 and requests that this statement is minuted”. The OD denied this attempt stating, point 9.7 of the minutes: “CH reminds the OPP that documents D6-D9 are not part of the file and hence no novelty objections on the basis of D6-D9 had been validly brought in the opposition procedure”.
[3.2] D6 to D9 may thus have been originally cited against the granted claims, it is clear from the above that at the first instance OPs the appellant-opponent decided to cite these documents in response to the new requests, which he had received shortly before the proceedings. He did so in particular as he believed these documents to be more pertinent than those already on file for the features added to claim 1 in the new requests, as is clear from the minutes […].

[3.3] The Board notes that the amendments made to claim 1 in the new main and auxiliary requests are by no means trivial or insignificant. More importantly, the appellant-opponent could not reasonably have foreseen them.

[3.3.1] As stated, the new main and auxiliary requests added new features to claim 1 that pertain to an external frame with annular wall, central sleeve and connecting ribs, the relative position of the fan central body and the external frame, as well as condensate being channelled out due to centrifugal force when the fan rotates.

As indicated in the accompanying letter of 7 October 2010 […] the respondent-proprietor included these features to better distinguish the claimed ventilation unit from that of D1 cited in the opposition grounds. He was reacting to the provisional finding of the OD in […] the annex to the summons […], that the ventilation unit of D1 appeared to fall within the terms of granted claim 1, taking away novelty. The new features were thus intended to establish novelty. They were thus clearly substantial amendments to the claimed subject-matter.

[3.3.2] However, rather than being based on dependent claims, which together with the independent claims define the exclusive rights that are the object of an opposition, they derive from the description. […] As the description is not the main focus of an opposition, and it moreover contains a wealth of detail it is difficult if not impossible for an opponent to foresee amendments deriving from the description.

Nor was there any hint in the annex to the summons of the OD that exactly those parts of the description, or those specific features should play a role in the discussion on novelty vis-à-vis D1. Section 3 […] identifies as central to novelty the question of how to interpret the features in granted claim 1 of the base and annular wall of the fan central body. There is no suggestion, let alone mention, of the external frame or its role in the unit. In conclusion the amendments could not reasonably have been foreseen.

[3.4] Confronted with amendments filed shortly before OPs that were significant and could not reasonably have been foreseen by the opponent, the OD had the discretion to take two possible courses of action. The first was to not admit the amendments, exactly because the opponent could not have reasonably foreseen the amendments, and continue the proceedings on the basis of the claims then on file, namely the granted claims.

It chose not to follow this route but to rather admit the requests. In this case, however, the principles of equal treatment and the right to be heard required that the OD should then afford the appellant opponent a fair opportunity of responding in an appropriate manner to what were objectively speaking, unforeseeable amendments. Here, according to established jurisprudence and best practice as summarized above, an appropriate response could mean adducing new evidence. This indeed is how the opponent responded, when he stated at the OPs that he wished to cite D6 to D9 against the new requests.

[3.5] The appellant opponent cited D6 to D9 in particular because he considered these documents to disclose all or some of the added features. A cursory examination of these documents confirms this view. They are all indisputably concerned with electrically driven cooling fan units.

[3.5.1] Figures 1 and 2 of D6 show a fan 10 with a cup-shaped hub 12 having a base 13 and an annular wall 14 set within an external frame with annular wall 44, central sleeve 52 and connecting ribs 48. The central hub 12 moreover has what appear to be openings 26 where base and walls meet, similar to the placement of the windows 25 in figures 2 and 4 of the contested patent.

That the teaching of D6 might be so deficient as not to be realizable is not immediately apparent to the Board from the cursory inspection necessary to determine whether its citation is an appropriate response.

[3.5.2] D7, see figures 5 and 6, also shows a frame 10 surrounding bladed fan 16.

[3.5.3] The passages of D8 cited by the appellant opponent in the accompanying letter of 9 October 2010, page 1, lines 12 and 13, and figure 1, page 2, lines 69 to 92, 116 and 117 refer to the use of centrifugal force to expel water in a motor that can be used for a fan.

[3.5.4] D9, finally, shows a similar arrangement of an electric motor with surrounding fan unit 10 with airing holes at 10, see also cited passage in column 2, lines 41 and 42.

[3.5.5] Upon cursory inspection the Board thus finds D6 to D9 to be relevant to the added features. It considers their citation to thus constitute an appropriate response to the amendments.

[3.5.6] In this regard it is irrelevant that D6 and D9 had originally been cited against the granted claims and before the appellant opponent could have known of the amendments. Once the amendments had been admitted it was his prerogative under the principle of equal treatment and the right to be heard to adduce evidence of his choice in formulating an appropriate response. That he should choose to rely on the same documents he had belatedly submitted against the granted claims, as these by chance also happened to be relevant to the added features, cannot change this fact.

[3.6] As the appellant-opponent’s citation of D6 to D9 is seen to constitute an appropriate response to substantial amendments to claim 1 that were not reasonably foreseeable, the OD’s final refusal during the discussion of inventive step of the amended claim 1 […] to consider these documents deprived the appellant-opponent of the opportunity to respond in an appropriate manner to the amendments. This refusal severely limited his ability to react to these unforeseeable amendments. In a manner of speaking the appellant-opponent was made to fight with his hands tied behind his back. This violated both the principle of equal treatment of parties and the appellant-opponent’s right to be heard. This violation of fundamental procedural principles is a substantial procedural violation that has seriously flawed the procedure and prejudiced its outcome. It justifies a remittal to the first instance and the reimbursement of the appeal fee, Article 11 RPBA and R 103(1)(a).

[3.7] The Board adds that an OD, naturally, must have some discretion in the way it conducts OPs, this in particular if it wishes to hear the parties on all decisive issues in as efficient a manner as possible. It is therefore not wrong in principle to decide the admissibility of new documents prior to discussing the admissibility of new claims. This would be the case, for example, if new documents are cited exclusively against the claims then on file (say, the granted claims) or, alternatively, if the amendments do not result in significant changes in the claimed subject-matter. In that case admissibility could be decided on the basis of the documents’ prima facie relevance to the claimed subject-matter in accordance with well-established practice. Nor can this approach be faulted if the amendments in question are then subsequently not admitted.

[3.8] In the present case, however, in order to safeguard the appellant-opponent’s rights, once he had cited D6 to D9 also against the proposed substantial amendments the OD should have first discussed the admissibility of the amendments. Only once that issue had been decided, would it have been clear in which context – that of the granted or the amended claims – admissibility of the documents could be discussed. Here the Board notes that documents that have limited relevance to an initial set of claims may acquire new relevance as a result of subsequent amendments to those claims. A document’s relevance is thus not an absolute; (for the purpose of admissibility) it should normally be decided relative to the amended claims against which it is cited.

Further procedure

[4] To expedite the procedure and given the prima facie relevance of D6, D8 and D9 to the amended claims of the main request that the OD admitted into the proceedings and ultimately held allowable, the Board exercises the powers of the first instance under A111(1) and admits these documents into the proceedings. The appellant-opponent no longer requests admission of D7 and this document can be disregarded. Further prosecution of the case should consider all outstanding issues raised by the appellant-opponent in view of the prior art of D6, D8 and D9, in particular novelty and inventive step, as well as any issues that may arise in connection with amendments made.

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Wednesday, 13 March 2013

T 947/09 – Late Objections


In case you had doubts – Article 12(4) RPBA also applies to late filed objections, as the present decision illustrates

[1] In the “Notice of opposition”, the opponent/appellant raised an objection under A 100(b) concerning the plasmid shown in Figure 2B and described in Example 2 of the patent-in-suit. A further objection concerned the subject-matter of claim 6 ([…]. Both objections were addressed by the opposition division (OD) in its communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings (OPs) […]. In its reply to this communication, the opponent/appellant referred only to A 100(a) EPC/A 56 EPC and no comments were made on A 100(b). According to the “Minutes of the OPs before the OD” (hereinafter the “Minutes”), the parties had no comments under A 100(b) in addition to those filed in writing […]. As regards A 100(b), the OD in the decision under appeal gave only reasons for the opponent/appellant’s objections raised in the “Notice of opposition”. The decision of the OD on these objections was not contested in the appellant’s grounds of appeal and thus, it is not part of the present appeal proceedings.

[2] In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant raised a new objection under A 100(b) based on an alleged lack of guidance of the patent-in-suit for performing the invention over the whole range claimed […]. Although this objection is new under A 100(b), it is related to an objection originally raised under A 100(a)/A 56, namely that it was not plausible that the technical problem had been solved over the entire breadth of the claims […]. No reasons were given for justifying the introduction of this objection in appeal proceedings under A 100(b) and/or for explaining why it could not have been submitted in an earlier stage of the proceedings.

[3] In its communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA, the board – with reference to the function of an appeal proceedings as established in the case law (cf. “Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO”, 6th edition 2010, VII.E.1, page 821) – questioned whether the appellant’s objection was admissible under A 100(b) and referred to the discretion conferred on the board by Article 12(4) RPBA. In reply to this communication, the appellant maintained the new objection under A 100(b) and referred to the case law in support of its admissibility. At the OPs before the board, the appellant referred to its written submissions and made no further submissions on this issue.

[4] The subject-matter of claim 1 is directed to a product, i.e. a nucleic acid molecule, defined by several structural elements which are either present or absent […]. The claim does not mention a technical effect or functional feature of said nucleic acid molecule. The board fails to see any technical problem or difficulty for a skilled person to achieve the defined nucleic acid molecule and there is no evidence on file to the contrary. According to decision G 1/03 [2.5.2] “... if the effect is not expressed in a claim but is part of the problem to be solved, there is a problem of inventive step ...”. Thus, as regards the subject-matter of claim 1, appellant’s objection is relevant only under the requirements of A 100(a)/A 56.

[5] The subject-matter of claim 13 is directed to a method of obtaining non-infectious, non-replicating, immunogenic HIV-like particles. It is required that the constitutive expression of the nucleic acid molecule of any of claims 1 to 10 (comprised in an expression vector of claims 11 or 12) in mammalian cells results in a stable production of these non-infectious, non-replicating, immunogenic HIV-like particles […].

Thus, in line with decision G 1/03 [2.5.2] which states that “... (i)f an effect is expressed in a claim, there is lack of sufficiency of disclosure ...”, the appellant’s objection as regards the subject-matter of claim 13 could be relevant under the requirements of A 100(b). However, in view of the late filing of this objection […] and of the prosecution history of the present case and, more importantly, of this particular objection during the first instance proceedings, the board, exercising its discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA, refrains to deal with this objection here and finds it more appropriate to consider it under the requirements of A 100(a)/A 56 […].

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Tuesday, 12 March 2013

T 1018/10 – Partially Rounded


Claim 1 of the patent as maintained by the Opposition Division read (in English translation):
Implant (6) for the inter-vertebral space (25) with
A) an essentially cuboid shaped body (7) with different diameters (D1, D2) between the lateral surfaces (14, 15) as well as between an upper surface (16) and a lower surface (17); whereby
B) the lateral surfaces (14, 15) between which the smallest diameter (D1) extends are mostly parallel and flat; and with
C) a device (8) for grasping by a tool (9),
characterized in that
D) the implant (6) presents a chamfered lenticular profile in the longitudinal section of its largest diameter (D2); whereby
E) the upper surface (16) and the lower surface (17) between which the largest diameter (D2) extends are destined to contact an adjacent vertebral body each
F) the implant (6) has a partially rounded section perpendicular to its longitudinal axis (35); and
G) the implant (6) is provided with a through hole (18) having the shape of an oblong groove with parallel walls (19,20). (my emphasis)


The opponent objected that the claim was not clear because the longitudinal axis was not defined and could be, for instance, the longitudinal axis of the backbone. Moreover, the claim did not clearly state where the section was rounded. This difficulty could not be overcome by considering the description because in column 8, lines 35 to 37 it was disclosed that there was a “rounded side … on the upper edge of the front axial end” only , whereas Figures 10 and 11 disclosed that the rounded parts extended along one or two edges, respectively. 


In addition to that, it was not clear what was meant by “partially rounded section” because this wording encompassed both the embodiments according to figures 2 to 6, where all edges of the section were rounded, as well as the embodiments of figures 10 to 13, where only some of the edges were strongly rounded.

Finally, the combination of features F and G generated another lack of clarity with respect to the expressions “longitudinal axis” (Längsachse) and “oblong groove” (längliche Rille). An opening that extended parallel to the longitudinal axis contradicted the embodiments shown in the figures.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[3] Feature F of claim 1 requires the implant to have “a partially rounded section perpendicular to its longitudinal axis”.

According to feature A the implant is an essentially cuboid shaped body. In a cuboid having, according to feature A, different lateral lengths, the longitudinal axis is well defined as the axis that is parallel to the edge of greatest length. The interpretation according to which the longitudinal axis is the longitudinal axis of the backbone is absurd and has to be dismissed, be it only because this would not be technically meaningful in connection with feature A.

The passage regarding the position of the partially rounded section on column 8, lines 35 to 37, to which the [opponent] has referred, is clearly erroneous because both figure 10, to which this passage refers, and the rest of the description show that the rounded parts are not only on the upper edge of the front axial end but extend along the whole length of the edge of the cuboid. Thus, in the light of the description, feature F is to be understood in such a way that each section is to be partially rounded.

It is true indeed that the wording of claim 1 requires a section (ein Querschnitt; the German ‘ein’ is ambiguous and could be translated by both ‘a’ and ‘one’) to be partially rounded, so that, from a purely grammatical point of view, the feature could be understood in the way proposed by the [opponent], i.e. that there is only one section with rounded parts. However, a patent has to be interpreted with the willingness to understand, and not with the willingness to misunderstand, so that technically unreasonable interpretations are excluded. However, the interpretation proposed by the [opponent] does not make any technical sense, so that feature F can only be interpreted in such a way that the rounded part(s) extend along the whole length of the implant, as also disclosed in the earlier application.

Also, in the light of the description, the expression “partially rounded section” can only be interpreted to mean that it either encompasses a section all edges of which are slightly rounded and/or a section where some of the edges are more strongly rounded. Thus feature F encompasses both the embodiment according to figures 3 to 6, as well as the embodiments according to figures 10 to 12. The fact that a claim can be interpreted in a broad way does not make it unclear.

Finally, it is clear from the entire wording of the claim that the adjective “oblong” (länglich) referring to the through hole of the implant in feature G is unrelated to the longitudinal axis (Längsachse) of the implant F but only describes the shape of the hole.

Thus claim 1 fulfills the requirements of A 84 EPC (1973).

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Monday, 11 March 2013

T 1486/11 – You Should Have Noticed


This is an appeal against the decision of the Examining Division, dated February 28, 2011, to refuse the application under consideration.

A notice of appeal was received by letter dated March 23, 2011.

The statement of grounds of appeal was filed by a letter dated May 19, 2011. Under cover of the same letter was an authorisation to debit the appeal fee from the representative’s account.

A communication noting a loss of rights pursuant to R 112(1) was issued on July 21, 2011, stating that the appeal fee had been paid out of time and that the appeal was accordingly deemed not to have been filed (A 108, second sentence,).

The appellant then filed a request for re-establishment of rights under A 122 and paid the corresponding fee.

The appellant did not contest that the appeal fee was paid late but argued that this was attributable to a defective smart card which was used in the on-line filing process to authorise and to debit fees from the attorney’s deposit account at the EPO.

When the representative’s secretary later (March 24, 2011) filed the notice of appeal by facsimile, she had unfortunately omitted also to file an order to debit the appeal fee from the account at the EPO. Such an oversight, which constituted a single mistake in a well-functioning system, could only be attributed to the “human factor”.

The representative had become aware of the omitted payment only after his return from his summer holiday, on August 15, 2011, when a communication from the EPO dated July 25, 2011 in respect of the loss of rights, first came to his attention. Therefore, the request for re-establishment of rights was filed in good time.

[1] The late filing of the appeal fee was not disputed by the appellant.

As regards the failure to meet the time limit for filing a request for re-establishment of rights, the following is to be noted:

[1.1] The payment of the appeal fee had to be made on 7 April 2011, but was only made on 19 May 2011 along with the filing of the statement of grounds of appeal. It follows that the payment of the appeal fee was out of time and that the appellant must have been aware of the belated payment. This was not contested by the appellant.

[1.2] The communication noting the loss of rights was dated 21 July 2011. The appellant received this communication on 25 July 2011.

[1.3] R 136(1) defines inter alia a general period for requesting re-establishment, which is two months from the removal of the cause of non-compliance with the period.

The two-month period of R 136(1) is triggered by the removal of the cause of non-compliance, i.e. by the event which causes the party to become aware that a loss of rights had occurred.

[1.4] R 136(1) lays down that a request for re-establishment must include the filing of a written request and the payment of a fee. R 136(2) adds the requirement of completion of the omitted act. In the present case, the omitted act (i.e. non-payment of the appeal fee) was already completed on 19 May 2011 by payment of the appeal fee.

[1.5] It follows that in this case the two-month limit for the request for re- establishment expired on 19 July 2011 (19 May 2011 + 2 months).

[1.6] Apparently, the appellant considered the starting point of the two-month period pursuant to R 136(1), first sentence, to be either the day on which the representative personally took note of the content of the communication from the EPO concerning the loss of rights (15 August 2011) or, in any event, the date on which this communication arrived at his office (25 July 2011).

However, the start of the two-month period is the moment at which the appellant – exercising the due care stipulated by A 122(1) – was no longer prevented from performing the payment of the appeal fee (see M. Singer / D. Stauder (Editors), “Europäisches Patentübereinkommen: Kommentar”, 3rd edition, published by Carl Heymanns KG, Köln, Germany, A 122, note 107). In the present case, the payment of the appeal fee was made on 19 May 2011. Had all due care been exercised, this payment could not have been made without its belatedness being noticed.

[1.7] Accordingly, the two-month time limit for filing a request for re-establishment of rights expired on 19 July 2011 (19 May 2011 + 2 months). The period for paying the fee for re-establishment of rights expired on the same date.

[1.8] Since both the payment of the fee for re-establishment of rights and the request for re-establishment of rights were only made on 15 September 2011, both acts were performed after the expiry of the prescribed time period. The request for re -establishment of rights is therefore deemed not to have been filed (R 136(1), last sentence).

[2] It follows from point 1.8 above that the loss of rights pursuant to R 112(1), as communicated to the appellant by official letter dated 21 July 2011, cannot be remedied by way of restitutio in integrum. Consequently, pursuant to A 108, second sentence, the appeal is also deemed not to have been filed.

[3] As the appeal had not been validly filed, the appeal fee and the fee for re-establishment of rights have to be reimbursed.

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Saturday, 9 March 2013

T 2359/09 – Baring The Teeth



Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read (the amendments with respect to claim 1 as filed are marked):
Apparatus for displacing objects (10) which can be picked up, comprising:
- a fork-like member (2) provided with mutually adjacent teeth (3) and only one flexible carrier (4) arranged on each tooth (3), said flexible carriers (4) being drivable in longitudinal direction of the teeth (3) and being adapted for picking up the objects between the teeth (3),
- transporting means connected to this the fork-like member (2),
- moving means for moving the fork-like member (2) vertically, and
- control means for controlling the transporting and moving means,
characterized in that at least one pair of mutually adjacent teeth of the fork-like member is equipped with one flexible carrier arranged on each tooth and drivable in longitudinal direction of the tooth the fork-like member (2) comprises at least three teeth (3) each having the flexible carrier (4) arranged on a horizontal side thereof.


In what follows, the Board examines whether the requirements of A 123(2) are fulfilled:

[2.1] The patent is concerned with lifting objects, in particular pots, to then put them down with a different spacing […]. This is achieved basically using a fork-lift with a fork-like member that has a flexible carrier such as a belt or a chain on each tooth and driven along its length. The application as filed included claims to the apparatus and its method of operation.

Original claim 1 identified the fork-like member, means for moving it vertically and transporting means both under control of a control means. The characterizing part of the claim stated that “at least one pair of mutually adjacent teeth of the fork-like member is equipped with one flexible carrier arranged on each tooth and drivable in longitudinal direction of the tooth”.

In the proceedings leading up to grant claim 1 was amended to include the new requirement of the carriers “being adapted for picking up the objects between the teeth”. The characterizing part further includes new requirements that the fork-like member comprises “at least three teeth”, “each having the flexible carrier arranged on a horizontal side thereof”.

[2.2] These features have no literal basis in the application as filed as acknowledged by the Respondent-Proprietor. Rather, they are said to derive from figure 2 of the application as filed. This figure would show the “basic minimum unit” embodying the invention. Figure 2 is shown below.


According to as filed description page 2, lines 24 to 26, this figure is a “cross-section of three teeth”. Further page 5, lines 19 to 22, states: “objects for moving are for instance flower pots 10 with the edge 11 which can be picked up between teeth 3, wherein the edges 11 support on carriers 4 as shown in figure 2”. The Board notes there is no reference sign 11 in figure 2, but it easily infers that these “edges 11” refer to the edges of the rims of the pots 10, by which they are shown resting on the carrier 4.

Figure 2 considered in conjunction with the accompanying text is seen to show 3 adjacent teeth with two pots between each pair of adjacent teeth. The carrier 4, shown hatched, extends across the full width of the top and bottom of the cross-section of each of the three teeth 3. The rims of the pots rest on the edges of the carrier 4 on the top of the teeth and are supported thereby.

[2.3] When the Board compares the features said to be added to claim 1 from figure 2 with what is actually shown in figure 2 considered in conjunction with the corresponding passages it notes that not all features shown have been included in claim 1, and if they have been they are phrased in much broader terms. Thus, claim 1 does not require the teeth to be adjacent. Rather than stating that the carrier runs over top and bottom of the tooth it is “arranged on a horizontal side”, while the fact that the carrier on the top of the tooth extends over its entire width of the tooth so as to support the pot by its rim is replaced by the carrier “being adapted for picking up objects between the teeth”. Additionally, that there should be at least three teeth, where figure 2 shows exactly three can have no basis in the figure itself.

[2.4] The Board is unable to find a basis in the application as filed for these omissions and generalizations of features of figure 2, nor for the added requirement of at least three teeth.

[2.4.1] It is well-established in jurisprudence that the inclusion in a claim of some but not all features from a given context is only justified in the absence of any clearly recognizable functional or structural relationship among the features, see e.g. Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 6th edition, 2010, section III.A.2, and decisions T 1067/97, T 25/03, T 1408/04 cited therein. This applies not only to features isolated from a given context in the description but also when taken from figures, see T 191/93.

[2.4.2] Applying this approach to the present case the Board finds that in figure 2 the fact that the three teeth are adjacent is clearly functionally important in that it allows the pots to be picked up between them. Similarly, the carriers in figure 2 are only seen to fulfil their function of carrying the pots if they extend across the width of the individual teeth so that the pot rims can rest on them. Finally, if the Board reads figure 2 in conjunction with figure 1 as would the skilled person, it finds that the carrier’s longitudinal movement is due to the fact that it runs around the tooth over its top and bottom surfaces as shown by the hatched areas on the top and bottom of the cross-section of the tooth 3 in figure 2. The Board concludes that these various features are closely linked together in terms of function and structure. The features are thus taught together, in close combination. Introducing only selected ones but not others represents a new teaching which encompasses new embodiments that the skilled person would not have considered when reading the original disclosure. These include, for example, fork-like members with the three teeth separated by teeth without a carrier, or a with a carrier not on its horizontal side; members with teeth bearing carriers that do not extend across the width of the tooth; or members with teeth that have carriers arranged only on the top or the bottom on the tooth.

[2.4.3] It is not enough to state, as does granted claim 1, that the carrier is on a “horizontal side” of the tooth, or that it is “adapted for picking up objects between the teeth”. Leaving aside what is exactly meant by “horizontal” in this context, the former formulation allows for the carrier to be arranged on only one side, which can be either top or bottom of the tooth, while the latter does not limit in any way the particular features of the carrier that allow it to support the objects. Both formulations are much broader than is justified by figure 2 alone. Nor is there any basis for such a broad formulation in any other part of the original disclosure. Figures 1 and 3 show the carrier in belt form running around the length of the teeth, on top and bottom and matching its width. Figure 4 illustrates in cross-section a single tooth with chain-like carrier again extending both on top and bottom. How the objects are supported is unclear.

[2.4.4] Finally, the original application teaches “at least one pair” of teeth, see claim 1, and gives specific examples of eight, six and three teeth (figures 1, 5A and 2 respectively). There is no indication anywhere that three would represent a technically significant minimum for the number of teeth, either in relation to the application’s original idea or in any other context. The original idea was to have on each tooth one carrier drivable along it, which would allow variation of the distance between pots adjusting the speed of the carrier, see the bridging paragraph of as filed description pages 1 and 2. Apart from the requirement that there should be a minimum of two teeth to be able to pick up a pot, whether there are three, six or eight teeth plays no role. By specifying three as a minimum in granted claim 1 that number acquires a significance it did not have in the original teaching, thus also adding information.

[2.5] The Respondent-Proprietor relying on T 404/03 has argued that claim 1 incorporates only the essential features of the “basic minimum unit” which the skilled person will recognize in figure 2.

[2.5.1] T 404/03 [10-11] considers the broader application of the essentiality test, developed in T 331/87 for assessing the omission of a feature from an independent claim, to the generalization or isolation of a feature disclosed in a specific context in dependent claims or description. This three point test is concerned with what the skilled person perceives as essential and what not in a claimed constellation of features. This is the main criterion proposed there for deciding whether omission of a feature does not add subject-matter.

[2.5.2] The above argument based on the essentiality test presumes first and foremost that the skilled person perceives figure 2 in the totality of the original disclosure as embodying the essence of the invention. The Board is however unable to find any indication in the application as filed that figure 2 might be special in any way over and above the other figures. Its sole purpose is to illustrate one aspect among others of the application’s teaching, namely how pots, the particular objects of interest, can be supported on the carrier via their rims. Page 4, lines 24 to 26, identifies the figure as nothing more than a “cross-section .... of an embodiment” of the invention. That invention is stated in claim 1 as filed and is also outlined in the paragraph bridging pages 1 and 2 as the idea of having one carrier arranged on each tooth and drivable along the tooth, which would allow the distance between objects to be varied in response to variation of the carrier speed, see also as filed claim 12. It differs markedly from the one given in granted claim 1 which gives the number of teeth and the horizontal placement of the carrier centre stage.

[2.5.3] Even assuming that the skilled person had read figure 2 as special, the Board is unconvinced that he would have been able to distinguish between features that are and ones that are not essential. All the features shown therein appear to contribute equally to the way the pots are picked up, and no one feature is given greater significance over any other. Nor is this evident anywhere in the text of the description or when considering figure 2 together with the other figures.

[2.6] In the light of the above the Board concludes that claim 1 as granted extends beyond the content of the application as filed, contrary to A 100(c).

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