Friday, 8 March 2013

T 134/11 – Intermediate Is Alright


In this case the opponent argued that the appeal was inadmissible as the notice of appeal does not meet the requirements of R 99(1)(b) and (c). In particular it was not possible to appeal against any decision to refuse the claims as granted since the claims as granted were not the subject of the decision.

The opponent also argued that the main request should not be admitted into the proceedings pursuant to Article 12(4) RPBA and in line with decisions T 144/09 and T 936/09. This request could have been filed in the first instance opposition proceedings. More specifically, the restriction of this request was a reaction to an objection raised already before the Opposition Division (OD). By filing the main request only at the appeal case, the [patent proprietor] tried to re-open the case and this amounted to an abuse of procedure.

The Board did not agree:

Admissibility of the appeal

[1.1] The [opponent] challenged the admissibility of the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal did not meet the requirements of R 99(1)(b) and (c).

[1.2] R 99(1)(b) requires the notice of appeal to contain “an indication of the decision impugned”. In the present case, the notice of appeal identifies the impugned decision by giving its date (“we herewith lodge an appeal against the decision dated November 17, 2010”) and the number of the European patent in respect of which the decision was issued. The requirements of R 99(1)(b) are thus met.

R 99(1)(c) requires the notice of appeal to contain “a request defining the subject of the appeal”. In the present case, the notice of appeal contains the request for “Reversal of the decision and maintaining the patent as granted”. Therefore, the requirements of R 99(1)(c) are met as well.

[1.3] The [opponent] basically argued that the decision of the OD did not address the claims as granted because the claims were amended during the course of the opposition proceedings with the proprietor filing an amended main request on 30 August 2010. Therefore, it was not possible to appeal against any decision to refuse the claims as granted since the claims as granted were not the subject of the decision.

It is true that the request contained in the notice of appeal for maintenance of the patent as granted is broader than and hence different from the main request before the OD. It is also correct that under certain circumstances, this may render such a request inadmissible. However, R 99(1)(c) does not require the request defining the subject of the appeal to be admissible in order for the appeal itself to be admissible. Hence, even if the request contained in the present notice of appeal were to be indeed inadmissible, this would not entail the inadmissibility of the entire appeal.

[1.4] Inadmissibility does not ensue either because an adverse effect within the meaning of A 107 is lacking. A party is adversely affected within the meaning of this Article if the decision fails to meet that party’s wishes (T 244/85 [3]). The relevant issue in this respect is the difference between the formally submitted requests and the order of the appealed decision (T 434/00 [3]). In the present case, the [patent proprietor’s] main request was rejected by the OD and the patent was maintained on the basis of the first auxiliary request then pending before the OD. Hence, the OD did not accede to the proprietor’s main request and the proprietor is thus adversely affected.

[1.5] Consequently, the appeal is admissible.

The claimed subject-matter

The only independent claim of the main request is claim 1, which reads as follows:
1. Chewing gum comprising at least one biodegradable polymer and chewing gum ingredients, said chewing gum ingredients being chosen from the groups of softeners, sweeteners, flavoring agents, active ingredients, fillers, mixtures thereof and said chewing gum containing less than 1.0 wt% water of the chewing gum, wherein the at least one biodegradable polymer comprises at least 5% of the chewing gum polymers.

Admissibility of the main request

[3.1] The present main request is no longer broader than the main request before the OD. The question whether any request broader than the main request before the OD is admissible (see point [1.3] above) has thus become irrelevant.

[3.2] The [opponent], however, requested that the main request should not be admitted into the proceedings pursuant to Article 12(4) RPBA, because it could have already been filed in the first instance opposition proceedings. More specifically, the introduction of a lower limit with regard to the amount of biodegradable polymer in this request (“at least 5%”) was a reaction to the objection raised already in the first instance proceedings that the effects aimed at in the opposed patent were not achievable for low amounts of biodegradable polymer. By introducing the lower limit into the main request only now, the [patent proprietor] tried to re-open the case, which amounted to an abuse of procedure.

[3.3] According to Article 12(4) RPBA, it is in the discretionary power of the board to hold (or not to hold) inadmissible a request which could have been presented in the first instance proceedings. Consequently, the mere fact that a request could have been filed in the first instance proceedings as such does not lead automatically to the inadmissibility of this request (as in this case there would be no discretionary power of the board). On the contrary, normally such a request is inadmissible only in exceptional circumstances. For example, such circumstances may arise where, by the filing of a request only at the appeal stage, a decision by the OD on certain issues is avoided and the decision is shifted to the second instance (this is referred to as “forum shopping” in decision T 1067/08).

[3.3.1] In the present case, the OD rejected the proprietor’s main request, which covered any amount of biodegradable polymer, and allowed the first auxiliary request, which required the chewing gum polymers to consist essentially of biodegradable polymers (“substantially free of non-biodegradable polymers”). The present main request, in which the amount of biodegradable polymers has to be at least 5% of the chewing gum polymers, thus constitutes an “intermediate request” in the sense that the amount of biodegradable polymers is between those covered by the main and first auxiliary requests before the OD.

[3.3.2] There is no reason to consider the filing of this intermediate request to be an abuse of procedure as alleged by the [opponent].

First of all, as explained by the [patent proprietor], the objection that the effects aimed at in the opposed patent could not be achieved with low amounts of biodegradable polymer was raised for the first time during the oral proceedings (OPs) before the OD (this was not disputed by the [opponent]). As further explained by the [patent proprietor], in reaction to this objection, it had relied on the first auxiliary request submitted prior to the OPs rather than drafting a new request in the form of the present “intermediate” main request, as there was little time available during the OPs. It is thus credible that it was not the [patent proprietor’s] intention to avoid any decision of the OD on the present main request.

Furthermore, the effect of filing the present main request is not that the case is re-opened in the sense that new issues arise which were not previously dealt with by the OD. In fact, as is clear from the main request before the OD, the [patent proprietor] aimed throughout the entire opposition proceedings at claims that were less restricted in terms of the amount of biodegradable polymer than the first auxiliary request allowed by the OD. Therefore, the fact that the present main request is less restricted in terms of this amount does not raise any new issues but represents merely a continuation of the approach chosen by the [patent proprietor] all through the first instance opposition proceedings.

Therefore, it cannot be argued that by means of filing this request only in the appeal a decision of the OD on certain issues has been avoided such that forum shopping between instances has occurred.

[3.4] The main request thus is admissible.

[3.5] Contrary to the [opponent’s] view, this finding is not at variance with the decisions T 144/09 and T 936/09. The reason for not admitting certain requests in these decisions was essentially that the proprietor had not filed any request in the first instance opposition proceedings which could have overcome the OD’s objection and in fact had done so only in the appeal. This is clearly different from the present case, where the first auxiliary request was filed during first instance opposition proceedings and overcame the OD’s objection.

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Thursday, 7 March 2013

T 1157/09 – Before, During, After


Raphael’s Madonna of the Goldfinch before, during and after restoration

This is an appeal against the revocation of the opposed patent  by the Opposition Division (OD).

The decision contains an interesting reasoning on the admissibility of the main request:

[1] The main request was filed during oral proceedings (OPs). It was originally filed as auxiliary request VI with the grounds of appeal and later renumbered as auxiliary request II […]. After deletion of dependent claim 4 which comprised an embodiment no longer falling within the scope of amended claim 1, it became the main request.

[2] The [patent proprietor] and both [opponents] present at the OPs confirmed that the request […] had been submitted during OPs before the OD but was not admitted into the procedure. Although this is not mentioned in the minutes of the OPs, the board sees no reason to challenge this statement.

[3] Thus, the question arises whether the request should be admitted in appeal proceedings under the provisions of Article 12(4) RPBA which give the board the power to hold inadmissible requests which were not admitted in the first instance proceedings.

[4] The admission of late filed requests in opposition proceedings is at the discretion of the OD (A 114(2) , and the [patent proprietor] submitted that the OD had not exercised its discretion properly.

[5] It is established jurisprudence that “[a] board of appeal should only overrule the way in which a department of first instance has exercised its discretion if the board concludes it has done so according to the wrong principles, or without taking into account the right principles, or in an unreasonable way” (Case law, 6th edition, VII.E.6.6).

[6] In the present case however, neither the minutes of the OPs before the OD nor the decision under appeal make any mention of such a request, and the board finds itself in a situation where, due to the absence of any evidence why the OD did not admit the respective request, it is not in a position to assess the basis on which the OD had exercised its discretion.

Under these circumstances, the board, exercising its discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA, decided to admit the main request.

The Board also discussed compliance with A 123(2) of claim 1 of the main request, which read:
1. A process for making a vaccine for administration to humans or animals comprising:
(a) replication of influenza viruses in cell culture, in which MDCK 33016 cells (DSM ACC 2219) are cultured in cell culture in suspension in serum-free medium, the cells are infected with influenza viruses and after infection are cultured at a temperature in the range from 30ºC to 36ºC for virus replication, wherein a protease is added to the cultured cells before or during infection with influenza viruses;
(b) formulation of the replicated influenza viruses to give the vaccine.
[9] The [opponents] objected to the combination of features in part (a) of claim 1. They argued that the combination of only two of the three points in time specified in original claim 11 with the features of original claim 1 violated the provisions of A 123(2).

[10] Claim 11 as originally filed read:
“11. The process as claimed in one of claims 1 to 10, in which a protease is added to the cultured cells before, during or after infection with influenza viruses.”
In the [opponents’] view, claim 11 stated in essence that the point in time of adding the protease did not matter, and the combination of only two out of three possible points in time of adding the protease with the features of claim 1 represented a selection which was not derivable from the application as filed and which resulted in the addition of technical information.

[11] In point 1.2.1 of its decision, the OD stated that “The presence of an alleged technical effect resulting from such a selection has no relevance when assessing A 123(2)”.

The board does not agree with this statement.

Any amendment to the parts of a European patent application or of a European patent is subject to the mandatory prohibition on extension laid down in A 123(2) and can therefore, irrespective of the context of the amendment made, only be made within the limits of what a skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of filing, from the whole of the application documents as filed (cf. G 2/10 [4.3, 1st paragraph]). The test for an amendment to a claim, also for an amendment by limitation, is that after the amendment the skilled person may not be presented with new technical information (cf. G 2/10 [4.5.1]).

Whether an amendment of the type in question meets the requirements of A 123(2) depends therefore on the facts of the case and includes an assessment whether the amendment results in new technical effects.

[12] Regarding claim 1 of the main request, no argument has been put forward by any of the parties that the selection of two out of the three points in time for adding the protease provided any technical teaching going beyond the application as filed. Since claim 11 as filed directly referred to claim 1 and disclosed three individual points in time for adding the protease, no technical information is added by limiting present claim 1 to two out of the three points in time for adding the protease.

[13] Thus, the features of part (a) of claim 1, i.e. replicating the virus in cell culture at a temperature from 30 to 36 degrees C and adding a protease to the cultured cells before or during infection with influenza virus, are based on original claim 11 via its reference to original claim 1. Furthermore, according to the general part of the description as originally filed (page 6, lines 12 to 16), the use of cells growing in suspension, in particular in serum free medium is a preferred embodiment allowing particularly simple and efficient virus replication. The patent application as filed also discloses an MDCK derived cell line, MDCK 33016, adapted to growth in suspension in serum free medium, which is “particularly preferably used in the process according to the invention” (cf. page 5, lines 31 to 38).

[14] Dependent claims 2 to 7 are based on originally filed claims 2 and 3, and 12 to 15, and the general parts of the description, respectively (page 4, lines 33 to 36; page 7, lines 14 to 17; page 7, lines 27 to 28).

[15] The board is therefore satisfied that the requirements of A 123(2) are met.

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Wednesday, 6 March 2013

T 1985/11 – Acknowledgement


The present appeal was filed after the Examining Division had refused the application under consideration.

No statement of grounds of appeal was filed within the four-month time limit under A 108.

The Office informed the applicant on September 19, 2011, that the appeal would be rejected as inadmissible because there was no statement of grounds. The communication was received at the private practice on September 20, 2011, and signed by attorney-at-law Dr. A.

The applicant filed a request for re-establishment on November 29, 2011.

The EPO informed the applicant that this request was late-filed because the cause of non-compliance within the meaning of R 136(1) had been removed on September 20.

The applicant argued that the paralegals of the private practice had asked Dr. A to sign the acknowledgement of receipt and had entered the communication into the electronic file . Dr. A had read the file only on November 16. Therefore, it was this date that had to be taken into account when calculating the time limits under R 136(1).

The Board disagreed:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1] An applicant who, in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, was unable to observe the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal may have his rights re-established upon request. One of the conditions is that the request of re-establishment of rights is filed within two months of the removal of the cause of non-compliance (R 136(1)).

[2] According to the established case law the cause of non-compliance is removed on the day on which the competent person (i.e. the applicant or the professional representative) becomes aware or should have become aware that the time limit had been missed. The date of removal of the cause of non-compliance is a question of fact. When the applicant or the professional representative is informed by means of a communication of the EPO that a time limit has been missed, then the cause of non-compliance is removed by the receipt of the communication. The legal fiction of receipt under R 126(2) does not apply (see Case Law, 6th edition, p. 495 ff.).

[3] The Board is of the opinion that in the present case the professional representative was informed at the latest by the communication of the EPO dated September 19, 2011, that the time limit fof filing the statement of grounds of appeal had been missed.

[4] In the present case the professional representative argues that the communication was indeed received in his private practice on September 20, 2011, and that the person in charge did sign the acknowledgement of receipt, but that he had not read the communication because his assistants had entered the communication into the electronic file at once and had not submitted the communication to him. As the determination of the date of the removal of the cause of non-compliance was a question of fact, the removal of the cause of non-compliance could not have taken place on that day.

[5] The Board cannot endorse this argumentation. Even if the removal of the cause of non-compliance is a question of fact, this does not mean that only the actual appropriation (Kenntnisnahme) of the content of the communication is relevant. Rather, it has to be determined when the representative should have become aware of the content of the communication if he had exercised all due care. See e.g. J 24/97 [2.2] and T 1026/06 [4], and the references cited therein.

[6] The Board is of the opinion that this date is September 20, 2011, i.e. the day on which the professional representative signed the acknowledgement of receipt. The fact that the professional representative considered it not to be necessary to read or to request the document the receipt of which he acknowledged is not relevant. If the Board followed the representative’s argument, then the representative himself would be in control of determining the date of removal of the cause of non-compliance. However, this interpretation contradicts the very purpose of A 122 (cf. T 1561/05 [2.1.3-4]).

[7] As the request for re-establishment into the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal has not been filed within two months of the removal of the cause of non-compliance, it is inadmissible. Consequently, the statement of grounds of appeal has to be considered to be late filed. As a consequence, the appeal against the decision of the Examining Division posted on January 21? 2011, is also inadmissible.

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Tuesday, 5 March 2013

T 1009/12 – No Effect At All


This is an examination appeal.

Claim 1 of the auxiliary request read:
1. A process for plating silver onto a surface, wherein the silver is immersion plated from a composition comprises:
a) a soluble source of silver ions;
b) an acid;
c) an imidazole of the following formula:


wherein R1, R2, R3 and R4 are independently selected from the group consisting of substituted or unsubstituted alkyl groups, substituted or unsubstituted aryl groups, halogen, nitro groups and hydrogen; and
d) an oxidant selected from nitro aromatic compounds.
In what follows the Board discusses whether this claim involves an inventive step:

[2.1] The Board comes to the conclusion that process claim 1 of the […] auxiliary request lacks inventive step over the teaching of the uncontested closest prior art D1 for the reasons that follow.

[2.2] The English abstract of the Japanese application D1 discloses a process for forming a silver plating on the surface of copper or copper alloy by contacting the surface with an aqueous immersion plating solution. This solution according to D1 has a pH of 3.0 to 4.5 and contains 0.01 to 1.0 %, more preferably 0.05 to 0.5 % silver nitrate (this percentage “%” is interpreted as meaning “wt.%” so that these ranges correspond to 0.1-10 g/l and preferably 0.5-5.0 g/l silver nitrate; thus corresponding to 0.06-6.3 g/l or preferably 0.32-3.2 g/l Ag**(+)-ions), 2-alkylimidazole (see below) as an alkyl imidazole compound in combination with an organic acid, e.g. acetic acid (preferably in the form of the salt). The treating liquid is usually kept at 20-60°C and is brought into contact with the copper or copper alloy for 30 seconds to 5 minutes to form the silver film (see English abstract of D1).

[2.2.1] The aqueous immersion plating silver solution of D1 is thus a simple aqueous composition containing silver nitrate, an organic acid (or salt thereof) and e.g. a 2-alkylimidazole.

Taking account of the structural formula of the imidazole given in D1, which comprises the two substituents R**(2) and R**(4), and the imidazole description in the English abstract it is clear that the imidazole can be substituted by alkyl groups in the imidazole positions 2 and 4, i.e. R**(4) or R**(2) can be hydrogen:


[2.2.2] The composition described in the English abstract of D1 does not contain any surfactant or chelating agent.

[2.3] The process for plating silver onto a surface according to claim 1 of the first auxiliary request - wherein the silver is immersion plated from a composition which comprises a soluble source of silver ions, an acid, an imidazole of the given formula with either R1, R2 and R4 being selected from hydrogen and R3 being selected from substituted or unsubstituted alkyl groups, or R1, R3 and R4 being selected from hydrogen and R2 being selected from substituted or unsubstituted alkyl groups, or with R1 and R4 being selected from hydrogen and R2 and R3 being selected from substituted or unsubstituted alkyl groups (see points VII and 2.2.1 above) - is thus distinguished from the process according to D1 only by an oxidant being selected from nitro aromatic compounds.

[2.3.1] The divisional application as originally filed is silent with respect to any effect of this distinguishing feature […], and in the parent application it is presented only as an optional feature of the composition […], also without any effect.

[2.3.2] According to the examples I to III of the divisional application the silver plating solution consisted of the four components silver nitrate (1 g/l), methane sulfonic acid (20 ml (70%)/l), 3,5-dinitrohydroxy benzoic acid (1 g/l), l-histidine (1 g/l) and water and copper was plated with it at 100°F (= 37.8°C) for 5 minutes (see examples I-III).

This imidazole compound “L-histidine” (IUPAC name) used in the examples I-III can also be designated “2-Amino-3-(1H-imidazol-4-yl) propanoic acid”, and thus represents an imidazole of the claimed specific formula wherein R1, R2 and R4 are hydrogen and R3 is a substituted alkyl group, i.e. -CH2-CH(NH2)-COOH.

[2.3.3] On the other hand, process claim 1 defines a process for plating silver onto a surface which uses a composition which “comprises” the four specified components in unspecified amounts.

According to this open definition the presence of a very small amount of e.g. 5 ppm of said oxidant is sufficient to meet the condition of claim 1 of the first auxiliary request. However, the Board considers that such a low concentration will not cause any effect in view of the common general knowledge of a chemist and the intended purpose of an oxidant. Particularly in the light of the most general range of the oxidant of from 0.1-25 g/l (corresponding to 100-25000 ppm) disclosed in the present application […] it is not reasonable to expect any effect of the nitro aromatic compound in such a low concentration.

Therefore claim 1, which does not specify any concentration ranges of the four components at all, is considered to cover embodiments where the mere presence of the nitro aromatic oxidant compound will not produce any effect at all.

The appellant’s arguments to the contrary cannot hold for the following reasons.

[2.4] First of all, the appellant argued that the skilled person would comprehend the claims as encompassing only effective amounts of the specified components to achieve the technical effects including immersion silver plating as disclosed in the application; he would construe the claims by “building up” and not by “tearing down”, to arrive at an interpretation of the claims which is technically sensible and takes account of A 69 (T 190/99 [2.4]).

However, taking account of A 69 cannot be accepted since that decision relates to an opposition case where an interpretation of the claim which is technically sensible takes into account the whole disclosure of the patent (A 69) and therefore does not apply to the present examination case. In such a case, like the present one, the claims have to make sense as they stand. Since none of the independent claims of both requests defines “an effective amount of the oxidant” it is evident that the scope of these claims is not restricted to effective amounts but, to the contrary, encompasses ineffective amounts of said nitro aromatic oxidant.

In this context it is further considered that the immersion silver plating composition per se used according to process claim 1 – as described on page 6, second and third paragraphs of the parent application as originally filed (the oxidant was an optional component of the immersion silver plating composition of the parent application; see point [2.3.1] above) – even without the nitro aromatic oxidant provides brighter, smoother and more cohesive silver deposits than baths not containing imidazoles. The same conclusion would be valid for a bath according to process claim 1 which comprises an ineffective amount of e.g. 5 ppm of the nitro aromatic oxidant. Therefore also the appellant’s argument that an effective amount of the oxidant is necessary to obtain a bright silver deposit cannot hold.

[2.5] The appellant’s arguments that the experiments of D2 would represent acceptable comparative examples with respect to D1 and would prove an effect of the nitro aromatic oxidant – i.e. to decrease the plating rate and to brighten and improve the silver deposit – cannot hold either.

[2.5.1] Regarding the declaration D2 of Ms Toscano, the Board considers unusual that it is neither dated nor that it states that the described experiments have been made in agreement with the present application and/or in agreement with the closest state of the art D1. In substance, D2 discloses the examples A, B and C.

Example B repeats example A with the difference that no imidazole was present in the plating composition. Example C repeats example A with the difference that no dinitrosalicylic acid (i.e. the nitro aromatic oxidant) was present (see D2, paragraph 3).

The immersion silver plating bath of example A does not specify the silver ion concentration nor that it is aqueous. It comprises besides 10 g/l imidazole (since not further specified it has to be interpreted that all substituents R1, R2, R3 and R4 are hydrogen), 11.3 g/l of hydroxyethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (HEDTA), 5 g/l Chemeen T-15, 5 g/l Igepal Co-730, 0.75 g/l of 3,5-dinitrosalicylic acid (which is the trivial name for the compound “3,5-dinitrohydroxy benzoic acid” disclosed in the present application as the preferred oxidant) and said bath has a pH of 2 adjusted with nitric acid. The copper parts are plated in the bath for 6 minutes at 35°C (see D2, page 1, point 3A).

D2 does not contain any explanation of Ms Toscano why said chelating agent HEDTA and said two surfactants (Chemeen and Igepal) have been added to the immersion silver plating solution. They clearly do not figure in the plating solution of D1.

[2.5.2] Although the definition “comprising” of claim 1 does not exclude such additional components the present application is absolutely silent with respect to an optional addition of such a chelating agent like HEDTA, or of surfactants such as said Chemeen T-15 or Igepal Co-730 (compare point 2.3.1 above), let alone that such components should be added in such considerable amounts.

From a comparison with the components of the composition, temperature and treatment time of example A and the composition and corresponding parameters of examples I-III of the present application (see point [2.3.2] above) it is evident that more than 7 parameters (additional components HEDTA and surfactants, different imidazole in a 10-times higher concentration, lower concentration of nitro aromatic oxidant, longer treatment time and somewhat higher temperature) are modified.

[2.5.3] D1 is likewise silent with respect to the addition of the chelating agent HEDTA and surfactants (compare points [2.2.2] and [2.2.3] above) as admitted by the appellant at the oral proceedings. From a comparison between the components of the composition, temperature and treatment time of example A and the composition and corresponding parameters of the abstract of D1 it is evident that at least 3 parameters (additional components HEDTA and surfactants, different imidazole and longer treatment time) are modified.

[2.5.4] Taking account of these modifications, both in comparison with the parent application and the closest prior art D1, it is evident that the experiments A, B and C according to D2 do not represent comparative tests as required by the established jurisprudence to demonstrate an alleged effect.

According to this established jurisprudence, if comparative tests are chosen to demonstrate an inventive step on the basis of an improved (or surprising) effect, the nature of the comparison with the closest state of the art must be such that the alleged advantage or effect is convincingly shown to have its origin in the distinguishing feature of the invention compared with the closest state of the art (see Case Law, 6th edition 2010, section I.D.9.9; see T 197/86 [6]; T 234/03; T 378/03).

The appellant argued by reference to T 35/85, mentioned in the same section of the “Case Law of the Boards of Appeal”, that it should benefit from the qualification that decision applied to this “established jurisprudence”. Its variants lay close to the invention so that the advantageous effect attributable to the distinguishing feature was more clearly demonstrated. This cannot be accepted since the comparison remains executed with more than one parameter different from either the examples of the present application or the comparison of the abstract of D1. The decisions cited in that part all have in common that it is only the distinguishing feature which is different in the “closest variant” as allowed by the cited decisions. Having, 7 respectively, 3 parameters different can hardly qualify as a “closer variant”.

[2.5.5] Since D2 cannot be accepted as a comparative test the alleged effect of the nitro aromatic oxidant vis-à-vis the closest prior art D1 has not been proven and all the appellant’s arguments based thereon, including the problem to be solved, need not be considered.

[2.6] Furthermore, even if these experiments A, B and C according to the declaration D2 would be considered, they do not prove that a technical effect may be achieved “across the breadth of the claim” as alleged by the appellant.

[2.6.1] D2 discloses a single example, i.e. example A which composition comprises all four components specified in claim 1, made with a concentration of 0.75 g/l (corresponding to 750 ppm) of the preferred oxidant, i.e. 3,5-dinitrosalicylic acid (which is the trivial name for the compound “3,5-dinitrohydroxybenzoic acid” disclosed in the present application). This concentration is thus within the preferred range of from 0.5-2 g/l (corresponding to 500-2000 ppm) specified in the first paragraph at page 7 of present application as originally filed.

An example containing 750 ppm of the nitro aromatic oxidant represents, however, no proof at all that a non-de minimis concentration of 5 ppm thereof would be effective.

[2.6.2] The declaration D2 of Ms Toscano is totally silent with respect to a minimum threshold concentration of the nitro aromatic oxidant.

The appellant’s argument that Ms Toscano does not see a minimum threshold as necessary cannot hold since one of her conclusions based on the three experiments A, B and C as drawn in the fourth bullet point of paragraph 4, quoted by the appellant in support, merely and non-specifically states
“In optimizing an immersion silver plating bath, the presence and concentration of these additives can be manipulated in various ways to achieve good results”.
This non-statement with respect to a minimum threshold concentration, however, does not allow to conclusively derive that such a minimum threshold does not exist, particularly when considering her conclusions in the first and second bullet points of paragraph 4 that neither imidazole nor organic nitro compounds are necessary to achieve an acceptable silver plate.

[2.7] According to the established case law, features which do not contribute to the solution of the problem set in the description are not considered in assessing the inventive step of a combination of features (see Case Law, 6th edition 2010, section I.D.8.4, in particular T 206/91 [5.5]).

Since process claim 1 includes silver plating compositions including unspecified, therefore also ineffective concentrations of the nitro aromatic oxidant (see points [2.3.3] and [2.4] above) this feature can only be considered as an arbitrary feature, because it is not credible that it contributes to the solution of the underlying technical problem. The Board therefore does not further consider it. Moreover, in a case like the present one it considers that for the same reason the formulation of a less ambitious problem, i.e. to provide an alternative solution with the same effect, based on this alleged distinguishing feature cannot hold either.

Since there are no further distinguishing features it is not feasible to identify the technical problem to be solved.

Therefore, since no technical problem can be identified which is solved by the subject-matter of process claim 1, the Board considers that claim 1 of the first auxiliary request lacks inventive step (A 56). The first auxiliary request is therefore not allowable.

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NB: This decision has also been presented on Le blog du droit européen des brevets.

Monday, 4 March 2013

T 2050/07 – Just Ignore It


Claim 1 on file in this examination appeal read:
1. A method of analyzing a DNA sample that contains genetic material from at least two individuals to determine a probability distribution of genotype likelihood or weight in the sample, comprising the steps:
(a) amplifying the DNA sample to produce an amplification product comprising DNA fragments, wherein each allele at a locus is amplified to generate relative amounts of DNA fragments of the alleles that are proportional to the relative amounts of template DNA from the alleles in the DNA sample, and wherein the amplification product produces a signal comprising signal peaks from each allele the amounts of which are proportional to the relative amounts of the alleles;
(b) detecting signal peak amounts in the signal and quantifying the amounts using quantifying means that include a computing device with memory to produce DNA length and concentration estimates from the sample;
(c) resolving the estimates into one or more component genotypes using automated resolving means, said resolution into one or more genotypes including solving the coupled linear equations d = G.w+e for the relevant loci (i), individuals (j) and alleles (k), in which d is a column vector which describes the peak quantitation data of a DNA sample from the signal, G is a matrix that represents the genotypes in the DNA sample, with a column j giving the alleles for individual j, w is a weight column vector that represents relative proportions of template DNA in the sample and e is an error vector, wherein the solution includes calculation of data variance sigma² from the linear model d = G.w+e together with the global minimal solution Pd = Gw0, where Pd is the perpendicular projection point which is the closest point to d in mixture space C(G) and w0 is the minimum weight vector, using linear regression methods, and calculating a probability distribution of the data assuming a normal distribution and that the error is unbiased, so that E(e) = 0, but has a dispersion D[e] = sigma²V in which V is the covariance matrix of the data; and
(d) determining, using the probability distribution of the data, a probability distribution of genotype likelihood or weight in the DNA sample.
The discussion of novelty (over A 54(3) document D6) is interesting.

When considering a virtual objection that might be raised, the Board answers a question which, as I vividly remember, troubled some colleagues and myself when we prepared for the EQE: can non-technical features establish novelty?

[6] In the decision of the examining division, novelty of claim 1 of the set of claims filed with the letter of 15 February 2007 was denied in view of document D6 which describes a method of analysing a DNA mixture sample that contains genetic material from at least two individuals.

[7] Document D6 is a European patent application filed by the present appellant and published on 29 August 2001, i.e. after the priority date of the application at issue (2 February 2001). Furthermore, it has a priority date of 15 February 2000, the validity of which has not been challenged by the appellant. Therefore, its content is considered as comprised in the state of the art pursuant to A 54(3).

[8] Both the method according to claim 1 and the method of document D6 involve (i) an amplification step wherein as a result of the DNA amplification a signal is produced which comprises signal peaks, (ii) a step of detecting the peak amounts in the signal, (iii) a step of quantifying the amounts to produce DNA length and concentration estimates, and (iv) a resolution step which involves a mathematical method basically consisting in representing the estimates in a linear equation, deriving a solution from the linear equation, and resolving the DNA mixture into its components. The methods differ essentially in that in the method according to claim 1, (i) the linear matrix equation ‘p = G x w’ used in document D6 to represent the linear effect of the concentration estimates – where p is a column vector which describes the peak quantitation data of a DNA sample from the signal, G is a matrix that represents the genotypes in the DNA sample and w is a weight column vector that represents relative proportions of template DNA in the sample - has been amended to include an error vector which models measurement error (see paragraph [0186] of the published patent application) and reads ‘d = G.w + e’, and (ii) the solution includes calculation of data variance sigma² from the linear model ‘d = G.w + e’ together with the global minimal solution ‘Pd = Gw0’.

[9] The argument could be made that the distinguishing features described above are of non-technical nature as being a mathematical method or a method for performing mental activities, and that, in view of the established case law according to which features that do not contribute to the technical character of an invention and do not interact with the technical subject-matter of the claim for solving a technical problem, have to be ignored when assessing inventive step, such features should equally be ignored when assessing novelty. The Board therefore examines whether or not the distinguishing features in the present case make a technical contribution.

[10] Both the distinguishing features (i) and (ii) aim at ascertaining the reliability of the claimed method for analyzing DNA samples containing genetic material from two or more individuals and for determining the genotypes involved. By providing estimates of the error ‘e’, estimates of the variances and standard deviations can be computed from the data using the global minimal solution ‘Pd = Gw0’ and these values can be used to estimate probabilities. This results in a quantitative estimate of the quality of the solution […]. Thus, the distinguishing features constitute a means for improving the confidence of the genotype estimate of the quantitative method analysis of document D6 […]. The board therefore considers that the distinguishing features contribute to the technical character of the claimed invention.

[11] In decision T 784/06, the present Board in a different composition had to assess the inventive activity of a five-step method of determining the genotype of a locus within genetic material obtained from a biological sample. The method as claimed was regarded as a mix of technical features (step A) and non-technical features relying on the performance of mental activities based on the application of mathematical methods (steps B to E), the latter features being argued by the patentee to be core features of the invention. It was found that the disclosure of the invention was of such a general nature that it deprived the skilled person of the information he/she needed to understand how to proceed from the first reaction value collected in step A through steps B, C and D to the determination on a probabilistic basis of the genotype of step E. Thus, the Board came to the conclusion that the technical activity of step A did not interact with the mental activities of steps B to E to lead to a tangible technical result and therefore had to be ignored in the assessment of inventive step.

[12] The Board considers that the present case clearly differs from the case underlying decision T 784/06. In contrast to the vagueness of the disclosure of the invention in appeal case T 784/06, the description of the present patent application makes it sufficiently clear how the distinguishing features (i) and (ii) of the method of claim 1 should be implemented and how they interact with the remaining steps of the claimed method in order to provide a common technical result, namely a genotype estimate with an improved confidence compared to the quantitative method analysis known from the prior art.

[13] The above consideration leads the Board to consider that the distinguishing features have to be taken into account when assessing novelty of claim 1 and, therefore, it concludes that the method of claim 1 is new.

As claims 2 to 21 are dependent on claim 1, the request as a whole complies with the requirements of A 54.

The Board then remitted the case for examination of inventive step.

I have to admit that I do not find the analogy reasoning of point [9] particularly persuasive. What is true for inventive step does not have to apply to novelty.

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Saturday, 2 March 2013

T 316/10 – Simply Suppressing


Both parties appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 of the patent as granted read:
1. A process for the production of olefins comprising passing a synthetic naphtha to a steam cracker wherein at least a portion of the synthetic naphtha is converted to olefins characterised in that the synthetic naphtha is a combined synthetic naphtha produced from a process comprising
a) contacting a synthesis gas stream at an elevated temperature and pressure with a Fischer-Tropsch catalyst in a Fischer-Tropsch reactor to generate a hydrocarbon product stream
b) separating the hydrocarbon product stream to provide at least one lighter fraction and at least one heavier fraction
c) subjecting at least a portion of the heavier fraction to hydrocracking and/or hydroisomerisation in a hydroprocessing reactor to produce an upgraded hydrocarbon product stream
d) combining the lighter fraction with the upgraded hydrocarbon product stream to produce a combined hydrocarbon stream and
e) fractionating at least a portion of the combined hydrocarbon stream to produce the combined synthetic naphtha stream.
The Board found this claim to lack inventive step:

[2.1] The Board concurs with the finding of the OD, undisputed by the proprietor, that the assessment of inventive step may reasonably be made starting from the prior art disclosed in document D1 which mentions, inter alia, that the naphtha obtained from the Sasol process illustrated in Figure 4 of this citation is an excellent feed for the production of olefins via steam cracking (see document D1, page 6, point 3, the passage reading “In addition, the process also delivers a significant fraction of naphtha, an excellent feed for the production of olefins via steam cracking”; and at page 11, last paragraph, the passage reading: “The Sasol SPD naphtha is an excellent feed for the production of lower olefins, in particular ethylene, by steam cracking”).


[2.2] The Board notes that the processes of Figure 5 only differ from the prior art of departure in that the L-fraction is not hydrocracked, but combined as such with the UHP-stream (i.e. with the hydrocracked H-fraction).

[2.3] The opponent has argued that according to undisputedly previously existing common general knowledge (that a high content of olefins in the naphtha stream undergoing steam cracking resulted in large amounts of coking and, thus, was detrimental to the yield in olefins) even the most preferred processes of Figure 5 could produce substantially worse yields in olefins in comparison to the prior art, when the L-fractions generated in these processes have high olefin contents. Hence, the only problem credibly solved over the whole ambit of granted claim 1 would be that of providing in general further olefins production processes possibly simpler than the prior art, regardless as to whether these further processes achieve or not the excellent yields of the Sasol process.

The proprietor has rejected such argument by stating that the experimental data reported in the examples of patent-in-suit would instead prove false this common general knowledge, demonstrating that good yields in ethylene could even be obtained by steam cracking L-fractions as such (i.e. L-fractions rich in olefins). Hence, according to the proprietor’s line of argument, the technical problem solved over the whole ambit of the granted claim was rather that - also acknowledged by the OD (for the then pending Auxiliary Request 5) - of providing a simpler olefins production process whose yields in olefins were excellent, i.e. comparable to those of the process of document D1.

[2.4] The Board finds unconvincing the reasoning of the proprietor because the examples in the patent provide experimental data that (beside not being in accordance with granted claim 1) are based on a single L-fraction only containing about 10% by weight of olefins (see in the patent-in-suit the Table at page 6 entitled “Straight Synthetic Naphtha”).

Instead, as noted by the opponent […] and undisputed by the proprietor, granted claim 1 does not limit in any way the amount of olefins possibly present in the L-fraction. In particular, the granted claim sets no limitation for the kind of FT-process taking place in step “(a)” and, thus, embraces the possibility of using, for instance, the same FT-process used in document D1, that results in L-fractions possibly containing up to 35% by weight olefins.

Thus, the experimental data provided with the examples in the patent-in-suit are insufficient at rendering credible that e.g. also the claimed processes in which the L-fractions contain much more than 10% by weight of olefins are nevertheless steam cracked to olefins without substantial coking and, thus, with excellent yields.

Hence, the Board concludes that the technical problem credibly solved over the whole range of granted claim 1 (and thus also by the processes of Figure 5 in which the generated L-fractions substantially more than 10% by weight olefins) can only be that identified by the opponent, i.e. that of providing in general further olefins production processes simpler than the prior art, regardless as to whether these further processes produce yields in olefins comparable or worse than those produced in the prior art of departure.

[2.5] In the opinion of the Board, a person skilled in the art who is aiming at further olefins production processes that are simpler than that of document D1 but who does not attribute any particular relevance to the (normally implicit) aim of also retaining the convenience of the prior art of departure in terms of yields in the final product, would consider obvious to solve the posed problem by suppressing any of the steps of the prior art of departure that are not absolutely essential in order to obtain some olefins in the final product.

Such person would thus attempt to identify any such suppressible steps among all the process steps used in document D1 that are not essential for the production of olefins, including those that are explicitly or implicitly identified in this citation as essential for the achievement of low coking and high yields or of other advantages.

The Board notes that document D1 not only undisputedly teaches to such skilled person that the intermediate separate hydrocracking steps of both fractions are only needed for upgrading the naphtha - i.e. that the hydrocracking steps are only mandatory if one aims at the formation of an “essentially paraffinic” naphtha […] that allows to minimize the coking during steam cracking and, thus, to maximizing the yields in olefins – but even implicitly disclose at least the possibility to by-pass the intermediate hydrocracking of the L-fraction, as apparent from the dotted lines in Figure 4.

The Board concludes that no inventive ingenuity is required to the skilled person for arbitrarily selecting the solution to the posed technical problem consisting in suppressing the intermediate hydrocracking of the L-fraction, i.e. a simplification of the prior art of departure that is not only obvious per se but even suggested by the dotted lines in Figure 4.

In solving the posed technical problem in such an obvious manner the skilled person arrives at variants of the processes of Figure 5 that are also manifestly encompassed by granted claim 1.

The Board concludes, therefore, that this claim embraces processes for the production of olefins that are obvious in view of document D1. Accordingly, the Main Request is found to violate A 56 EPC (1973) and is refused.

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Friday, 1 March 2013

T 154/10 – Totus Pro Parte



This is an appeal by the opponent against the maintenance of the opposed patent in amended form.

Claim 1 as granted referred to a braking system but claim 1 of the patent as maintained by the Opposition Division was directed to a railway vehicle:
A braking control system with anti-slip and anti-lock functions for the wheels, for a railway or tramway vehicle provided with a pneumatic braking system including brake control apparatus (BCA) to which is connectable a plurality of electro-pneumatic valve units (G1-G4) for control of the brake cylinders (BC1-BC4) associated with the wheels/axles (1-4) of the vehicle, and a braking control system (A,B; BCA; G1-G4; S11-S42) with anti-slip and anti-lock functions for the wheels; the said valve units (G1-G4) being controllable by control means (A, B) in such a way as to allow, selectively, application of a braking pressure to the associated brake cylinders (BC1-BC4), holding of this pressure, and release of the pressure of the said brake cylinders (BC1-BC4);
the system being characterised in that
each axle (1-4) of the vehicle has associated therewith at least one first and respectively one second angular speed sensor (S1, S2; ...; S41, S42) are associatable with each axle (1-4) of the vehicle independent from one another;
the said electro-pneumatic valve units (G1-G4) include respective solenoid control valves (12-15) with first and second independent control inletsinput units (G11, G12); and
the control means (A, B) comprise
first and second independent electronic control units (A, B);
the first speed sensors (S11,...; S41) of each axle (1-4) and the first control input units (G11,...; G41) of the said valve units (G1-G4) being connected only to the respective first and control unit (A);
the second speed sensors (S11, S12; ... ; S41, S42) of each axle (1-4), as well as to the respective first and the second control inlet input units (G11, G12; ... ; G41, G42) of the said valve units (G1-G4), and being connected only to the second control unit (B); said control units (A,B) being predisposed to transmit from one to the other a respective state signal or vital signal (L1; L2) indicative of its operating condition;
the first unit (A) being arranged to perform a wheel anti-slip procedure;
the second unit (B) being arranged to perform a wheel anti-lock procedure when the state signal (L1) transmitted to it from the first unit (A) indicates that this latter is functioning normally and to perform both the wheel anti-lock procedure and an anti-slip procedure when the state signal (L1) transmitted to it from first unit (A) is indicative of a malfunction or breakdown condition of this latter. (deletions and additions with respect to claim 1 as granted are highlighted)
The opponent raised objections under A 123.

Admissibility of the amendments under A 123(2)

[2] The Board does not agree with the [opponent] when it contends that the application as originally filed did not provide any basis for the amendment of the claimed subject-matter to a “railway vehicle” and that this amendment represented an undisclosed selection from a list of various types of vehicles (including also tramway vehicle).

The application as originally filed EP-A-1 577 185 (hereinafter referred to as D0) clearly disclose that the braking control system of the invention may be incorporated in a railway vehicle or a tramway vehicle […]. Moreover, […] D0 specifically disclose[s] a railway or tramway vehicle into which the claimed braking system is incorporated. Since the application as originally filed discloses both the incorporation of the claimed braking system in a tramway vehicle or, alternatively, in a railway vehicle, there is a basis for limiting the claim to the combination of a railway vehicle and the braking control system of claim 1 as granted.

[3] Concerning the question of the connection between the control units A,B and the speed sensors, it is true that figure 1 as originally filed contains some inconsistencies (S11 associated with letter B in the bottom left-hand corner of the figure is shown associated with control unit A in the top left portion of the figure).


However, in the whole context of the original disclosure […], there is no ambiguity as to the fact that the first speed sensors of each axle 1-4 and the first control input units of each valve units G1-G4 are connected only to the first of the control units and the second speed sensors of each axle 1-4 and the second control input units of each said valve units G1-G4 are connected only to the second of the control units. For the person skilled in the art, it is obvious that a mere erroneous permutation has occurred when indexing the sensors of the first and of the third axles of figure 1.

[4] As a matter of English language and from a pure semantic point of view, it might be criticized that, in feature (i), the expression “connected only to the first (respectively second) control unit” could be interpreted as meaning “connected only to the first (respectively second) control unit and not connected to any further element”. However, the Board agrees with the general principle of interpretation as set out in T 190/99, according to which, when considering a claim, the skilled person should rule out interpretations which are illogical or which do not make technical sense. He should try, with synthetical propensity, i.e. building up rather than tearing down, to arrive at an interpretation of the claim which is technically sensible and takes into account the whole disclosure.

It is obvious to the skilled person that the respective sensors and control input units may have other connections, for example to the ground or to an electrical supply or even mechanical connections as mentioned by the [opponent]. However, in the present case, the “connections” are to be interpreted in the technical context of the claimed subject-matter with due consideration of the other technical features of the claim and of their technical significance.

Before introducing feature (i), the claim specifies that the electro-pneumatic valve units G1-G4 include respective solenoid valves with first and second control input units. The expression “control input units” indicates here that these two units input the control signals to the electro-pneumatic valve units […]. The person skilled in the art knows that the control of the braking is performed through control signals which are transmitted in accordance with the anti-slip and anti-lock control procedure performed by the control means […] whereby the control means have been specified in the claim as comprising first and second independent control units.

Therefore the features “the first speed sensors of each axle and the first control input units of the said valve units being connected only to the first control unit” and “the second speed sensors and the second control input units of the said valve units being connected only to the second control unit” have to be interpreted in the context of the possible connections that the respective two sensors and two control input units may have with the first and second control units A and B only […]. The person skilled in the art would not consider connections which are totally irrelevant from this context. Therefore the wording “connected only to” does not introduce subject-matter that extend beyond the content of the application as originally filed.

Admissibility of the amendments under A 123(3)

[5] For the [opponent], modifying claim 1 such that it is now directed to “a railway vehicle” while claim 1 as granted is directed to “a braking control system” amounted to an extension of the protection conferred which contravened A 123(3).

[5.1] The Board does not agree. When deciding whether a claim has been amended in such a way as to extend the protection conferred, the determination of the extent of protection has to be carried out in accordance with A 69(1) by interpretation of the terms of the claim. National laws of the Contracting States in relation to the infringement or, for example, the question whether the financial value of a railway vehicle is greater than that of a braking control system, need not to be taken into account in this respect (See G 2/88 [3.3]).

[5.2] Considering the question of the protection conferred by a claim directed to a physical entity, it is a general principle established by the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal that a patent which claims a physical entity per se confers absolute protection upon such entity, namely protection not only for such physical entity but also for all uses or all physical activities of such entity, for instance the integration into a larger entity (see G 2/88 [5]; T 514/06 [ 5.1.1-2]).

[5.3] In the present case, claim 1 as granted was directed to a braking control system for a railway. This conferred an absolute protection on any claimed braking control system, including those which may be installed and have not yet been installed and those which have been installed in a railway vehicle, this being the vehicle for which they undoubtedly have been specifically conceived […].

[5.4] Therefore the scope of claim 1 as granted already included the incorporation of the granted braking control system into a railway vehicle and the amended formulation “a railway vehicle… and a braking control system” is in effect a claim to a braking control system when incorporated in the railway vehicle. The change of the claimed subject-matter from “a braking control system” to “a railway vehicle… and a braking control system” confers less protection and is actually a limitation of the scope of protection initially conferred by the patent as granted since it is now required that the braking control system is incorporated in a railway vehicle (see also T 514/06 [5.1.1-2]).

The decision T 1898/07 which was cited by the [opponent] refers to a change of the claimed subject-matter from “a liquid composition” to “a package kit containing a syringe pre-filled with liquid composition”. This situation differs drastically from the present one, because, as explained in T 1898/07 [22], the liquid composition could not be seen as a feature of the package per se.

Claim 1 has therefore not been amended in such a way as to extend the protection conferred.

I very much prefer this approach to what we have seen, for instance, in T 867/05 (here).

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