Monday, 2 January 2012

T 1644/10 – You’re Late


In this case the EPO had published the mention of the grant of the patent under consideration on November 22, 2006. The B1 specification was published on the same day. Claim 1 contained an error: the EPO had published an earlier version of the claim instead of the claim as granted! In response to a request by the patent proprietor, the Examining Division ordered the publication of a corrected (B9) specification on March 19, 2008.

The error concerned claim 1 in its German version, German being the language of the application as filed. Claim 1 of the B9 document was different from claim 1 of the B1 document in the following way (underlined parts correspond to additions, struck-through parts to deletions)
Filter device (1) for the separation of undissolved solid substances from liquids, in particular in the fields of waste water purification and water treatment, with several filter elements (6), for the introduction into a container (2) containing the unpurified liquid, wherein through the individual filter elements (6) a filtrate is capable of being drained away, the fitter elements are arranged so as to be capable of rotating around a horizontal axis, and the filter elements (6) are designed and arranged in such a manner, that they form a hollow space (4) in the centre, characterised in that the filter device (1 ) comprises a gassing installation (8), which is stationarily arranged in the hollow space (4) and which for the formation of a mixture of gas and liquid is capable of being impinged with compressed gas and which is arranged in such a manner, that in the liquid a flow of a mixture of gas and liquid is capable of being produced at the filter elements (6), such that this flow renders an adhesion of solid substances to the filter elements (6) more difficult, and in that the filter elements (6) are arranged to be rotatable around the gassing installation (8), wherein the gassing installation (8) comprises either a hollow shaft (9) with gas outlet openings, or at least one elongated hollow body (10) that is arranged parallel to a hollow shaft (9) and closed on both ends, or at least one elongated hollow body (10) arranged horizontally as well as orthogonally to a hollow shaft (9), and the at least one hollow body (10) is connected with a chamber (12) of the hollow shaft (9) through connecting pieces (11), wherein the chamber (12) is connected with a compressed gas generator (14).
NB: The English version was the same for the B1 and the B9 documents.

The “opponent” filed an opposition against the patent on December 18, 2008, i.e. almost nine months after the publication of the corrected specification.

The Opposition Division (OD) concluded that the opposition was deemed not to have been filed.

The opponent filed an appeal.

The Board confirmed the verdict of the OD and made some interesting statements on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations (PPL, sometimes also referred to as “principle of good faith”).

I have finally found the time to translate this interesting decision. Admittedly, it is quite lengthy but I find it very pedagogical and well worth reading. For those who are in a hurry, here is a translation of the

Headnotes

1. Pursuant to A 99(1) EPC 1973 the moment at which the time limit for filing an opposition begins to run only depends on [the fact] that a European patent has been granted and that the mention of the grant has been published in the European Patent Bulletin. It does not depend on [the fact] that the patent specification has been published (see point [6] of the reasons).

2. The mention of the publication of a corrigendum to the patent specification in the European Patent Bulletin does not trigger a first or a further time limit for filing an opposition, even if the corrected patent specification has a scope of protection that is broader than the scope of protection of the patent specification as originally published. (see point [11] of the reasons)

3. The application of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations to a failure to meet the time limit to file an opposition in inter partes proceedings is subject to a balance of interests. The patent proprietor’s legitimate expectations regarding the validity and legal force of the decision to grant are not, as a rule, subordinate to the opponent’s legitimate expectations regarding the correctness of the content of the patent specification as published. This would contradict the principle of equal procedural treatment of the parties. (see point [27] of the reasons).

NB: Unless otherwise specified, all legal provisions refer to the EPC 1973.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1] The appeal fulfils the requirements of A 106 to A 108 and R 99 EPC (2000) and is, therefore, admissible.

The name of the company of the opponent and appellant was to be corrected to “Huber SE” ex officio. It follows from the extract of the commercial register (Handelsregisterauszug) that “Hans Huber AG Maschinen- und Anlagenbau” has changed its legal form to become “Huber SE”. According to German law, such a change of legal form only concerns the legal form as such but not the legal personality. In application of the legal fiction provided in § 202 (1) of the German Transformation Act (Umwandlungsgesetz) the legal identity of the company undergoing the change is conserved. Therefore, the change of company to be taken into account ex officio at any time.

[2] The appeal cannot be allowed. The reasons set out in the impugned decision, according to which the opposition was filed belatedly are not objectionable, as will be explained in what follows.

Provisions to be applied (EPC 1973 vs. EPC 2000)

[3] As the application under consideration was filed on December 2, 2003, the question arises as to which provisions have to be applied after the entry into force of the EPC 2000. Here the following applies: procedural acts that were legally effective for the proceedings (verfahrensgestaltend schon rechtswirksam) and completed (e.g. the time limit for filing an opposition (TFO)) before the entry into force of the EPC 2000 on December 13, 2007, are to be decided on the basis of the old law (J 10/07 [1]; T 1172/04 [1], tempus regit actum). The new provisions are to be applied to factual situations that were not yet completed at that time, provided that they are mentioned in Article 1, n° 1, first and second sentences of the Decision of the Administrative Council of 28 June 2001 on the transitional provisions under Article 7 of the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000 (OJ EPO, Special edition 1/2007, 197). The Board is of the opinion that the provisions cited hereinafter do not differ depending on whether the old or the new law are considered, even though there may have been numerical or linguistic adaptations in particular cases. Therefore, the Board does not consider it to be necessary to explain in detail the legal situation for each individual provision. As a result, only the provisions of the EPC 1973 are applied.

Computation of the beginning and the end of the TFO

[4] In agreement with the parties the Board of appeal bases its considerations on the following factual situation: The wording of claim 1 according to the decision to grant a patent of October 26, 2006, comprised three parallel alternatives A, B, and C, whereas the wording of claim 1 of the patent specification in the relevant German version only contained the alternatives A and B but not alternative C.

The opponent invokes the fact that its opposition was “only” directed against alternative C and that the 9-month TFO related to this subject-matter was only triggered by the publication of the B9 document. According to A 99(1), an opposition to a patent has to be filed within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent. In the present case, however, no mention of the grant of the European patent on which the decision to grant was based had been published because the patent specification B1 was incorrect.

Therefore, the Board of appeal has dealt with the legal question whether and how the publication of the patent specification can determine the moment in time when the TFO starts and whether the publication of the B9 document having a broader scope of protection than the B1 document can trigger a new TFO, which might be limited to the subject-matter of alternative C.

[5] Whether an opposition has been filed in due time depends on when the TFO begins, because this moment also determines the end of the nine-month TFO, as well as on the payment of the opposition fee.

According to A 99(1), which was in force when the opposition was filed, an opposition against a European patent has to be filed within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant in the European Patent Bulletin (EPB) (A 99(1), first sentence); it shall not be deemed to have been filed until the opposition fee has been paid (A 99(1), second sentence).

[6] In the present case the mention of the grant of the European patent had been published in the EPB 06/47 on November 22, 2006. Therefore, the nine-month TFO ended on August 22, 2007. As a consequence, the opposition filed on December 18, 2008, was not filed in due time and is deemed not to have been filed, also because the opposition fee was paid by debit order only on this date. (As far as the requirement for the payment of the opposition fee within the TFO is concerned, see T 152/85 [1])

According to the wording of A 99(1), the TFO is triggered exclusively by the fact that a European patent has been granted and a mention of the grant has been published in the EPB, and not by the fact that a patent specification has been published.

No legal effect of the publication of the specification

[7] The appellant has not contested that in the present case the decision to grant a patent concerned embodiment C in claim 1 and that the mention of the grant of the patent was published in the EPB on November 22, 2006.

Regarding its content, the mention complied with the requirements pursuant to A 97(4). The opinion of the appellant according to which the mention was deficient to the extent that the patent specification B1 was deficient contradicts the wording of the provision which only refers to the procedural fact of the grant of the patent but not to the patent specification. The publication of the mention of the grant of the patent in the EPB on November 22, 2006, was complete and correct with respect to its content, as also admitted by the appellant and, therefore, was not affected by any of the deficiencies of the publication that were considered in decision J 14/87 [11].

[8] Considering that the publication of the European patent specification is not relevant for the computation of the time limit pursuant to A 99(1), this also holds true for the publication of a subsequent correction of the patent specification (cf. T 438/87 [4.1])

It also follows from the legal systematics of A 98 and A 99 that the wording of the patent specification as published has no legal effect even when its contents differ from the decision to grant a patent.

A 98 only provides:
“At the same time as it publishes the mention of the grant of the European patent, the EPO shall publish a specification of the European patent containing the description, the claims and any drawings”.
The fact that the lawmaker in the next article, i.e. A 99(1), nevertheless makes the beginning of the time limit depend on the day of the publication of the mention of the grant of the patent in the EPB only and does not refer to the actual publication of the patent specification makes it obvious that the TFO shall not depend on the public availability of the patent specification. Therefore, from a legal point of view, it is irrelevant for the beginning of the TFO whether the scope of protection defined in the patent specification is smaller than the scope of protection as defined in the decision to grant a patent or whether it exceeds it.

Systematics of A 64(1), A 97(4), and A 99(1)

[9] The arrangement of A 99(1) also serves legal security. As the EPB is published routinely at a date that is known in advance, the date of the publication of the mention of the grant of the patent is determined unambiguously and in a way that can be reproduced at any later moment, whereas the actual publication of the patent specification can be uncertain because the law does not establish any duty of documentation. However, the moment when a European patent becomes effective has to be understandable (nachvollziehbar) in a simple and safe way in view of the national patent rights which arise from it. Thus A 64(1) provides that a European patent shall, (subject to the provisions of paragraph 2) confer on its proprietor from the date of publication of the mention of its grant, in each Contracting State in respect of which it is granted, the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that State. Clearly the law has not added an additional requirement according to which the patent specification has to be published and must be correct as to its content for the patent to be effective.

It is not accidental that the moment at which the European patent becomes effective in the Contracting States pursuant to A 64 coincides with the moment at which the mention is published in the EPB pursuant to A 97(4) and the moment at which the TFO begins to run pursuant to A 99(1) but it serves the legal security the lawmaker intended. In this context it has to be noted that the grant proceedings are ex parte proceedings and would be factually terminated when the decision to grant a patent is sent (notified) to the applicant. However, notwithstanding these procedural principles the legal effectiveness of the decision to grant a patent is shifted pursuant to A 97(4) to the moment at which the mention of the grant of the patent is published in the EPB for the sake of legal security so that the European patent right arises at the same time as the national rights granted pursuant to A 64. These provisions do not establish that it is necessary to send the patent specification to the applicant or [make it available to] the public in order for the decision to grant a patent to become legally effective, and this would indeed be completely alien to the proceedings.

For these reasons also it has to be noted that the moment at which the patent specification is made available has no influence on the beginning of the TFO. This corresponds to the wording of A 99(1) according to which the opposition has to be filed “within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent”. Thus the lawmaker has expressly associated the beginning of the TFO with the moment at which the European patent becomes effective and at which national rights arise.

Confirmation of Legal Advice n° 17/90

[10] The Board of appeal considers Legal Advice n° 17/90, which has been published by the EPO (OJ EPO 1990, 260) but which is not binding on the Board to be correct in view of the legal situation under consideration.

The Board does not share the opinion of the appellant according to which the meaning of the term “misprints” used in point 1 of the Legal Advice is limited to mistakes created in the printing process. The Legal Advice defines this term as a divergence from the text on which the decision to grant was based, owing to error during production. This definition includes not only typesetting errors (“Druck-setz-Fehler”) but all possible mistakes that can occur during the production of the patent specification, including the use of a version of the claims that has not been granted.

Therefore, based on the legal situation presented above, the Board of appeal does not share the opinion of the appellant according to which the legal effect of the publication of the mention of the grant of the patent is limited to the extent to which the wording of the specification is identical to the content of the decision to grant a patent.

No legal effect of the publication of a corrigendum to the specification

[11] If even the publication of the B1 specification has no legal effect, then the mention of the publication of a corrigendum to the patent specification in the EPB 2008/12 on March 19, 2008, cannot have any legal effect in view of the beginning of the TFO. Therefore, because of the unambiguous legal situation the publication of the B9 specification has not triggered a “first” TFO, nor has it triggered a “further” TFO, limited to the embodiment C in claim 1.

Principle of unity of the opposition proceedings

[12] Moreover, it has to be noted that a “legal construction” such as the one aimed at by the appellant would contradict the principle of a unitary patent enshrined in the EPC.

It would be unlawful to consider that the first publication dated November 22, 2006, gave rise to a patent limited to the subject-matter of alternatives A and B in claim 1 and that it was only the publication of the corrected version on March 19, 2008, that gave rise to a patent encompassing the alternative C, because in grant or opposition proceedings [the EPO] can only grant a unitary patent based on the set of claims that has been expressly agreed upon by the applicant pursuant to A 113(2).

Moreover, the EPO does not have the power to grant a patent limited to individual claims of a set of claims presented [to it] and to reject the remaining claims of this set as not allowable. The set of claims is either allowable as a whole or to be dismissed, even if only one claim does not comply with the requirements of the EPC.

As can be seen from A 99(2), an opposition that is limited to certain claims encompasses (erfasst) the whole European patent and does not create a partial patent corresponding to the extent to which the patent has not been attacked. Therefore, in order to always ensure the maintenance of a unitary patent, A 99(4) provides that opponents shall be parties to the opposition proceedings as well as the proprietor of the patent. This provision guarantees the unity of the opposition proceedings and excludes, for instance, that there are several parallel or subsequent opposition proceedings.

As a consequence, the systematics of the unity of the opposition proceedings laid down in the EPC hinders mistakes that have occurred in the production and publication of the patent specification from having any influence on the beginning and the course of the TFO if the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent as such was regular. As in the present proceedings the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent was done in a legally correct way on November 22, 2006, the nine-month TFO began to run on that day. As a consequence of provisions of law, the mention of the correction of the patent specification, which was published at a later moment, did not cause the beginning of a completely new TFO nor did it trigger a TFO limited to the embodiment C of claim 1 of the patent specification, as explained by the appellant.

Legal delimitation with respect to a correction of a decision to grant a patent

[13] From a legal point of view, the present case of a retroactive correction of the patent specification is to be distinguished from the correction of the decision to grant. In the first case the patent specification is brought in conformity with the content of the decision to grant, i.e. the version of the patent as granted. The scope of protection of the patent as granted is not changed by [such action]. If the decision to grant a patent was extended, in the second case, by addition of embodiment C to claim 1, then this would result in a substantive amendment and, therefore, in an extension of the scope of protection conferred by the patent. The corresponding question of whether this correction could retroactively amend or extend the scope of protection in a legally effective (rechtswirksam) way does not arise in the present case. Therefore, the questions that have been referred to the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA) in decision T 1145/09 are not relevant for the decision to be taken in the present case.

The “mere” correction of the patent specification, intended to bring the latter in conformity with the content of the decision to grant, does not change the substantive patent right that has arisen as a consequence of the decision to grant at all; it “only” corrects a misleading piece of information of the EPO concerning the content of the European patent, which has not changed.

Expiry of the TFO as an intermediate result

[14] The explanations given above, therefore, disprove the opinion of the appellant according to which the publication of the B9 specification on March 19, 2008, triggered a (fresh) nine-month TFO at least against the subject-matter of embodiment C of claim 1 of the patent. Because, therefore, as already shown under point [6] above, the TFO began to run when the mention of the grant was published in the EPB, on November 22, 2006, and, as a consequence, expired on August 22, 2007, the opposition filed on December 18, 2008, by the appellant has not been filed in due time.

Therefore, the Board of appeal had to examine whether there was a remedy for the failure to file the opposition in time. In this context, it was to be examined whether the requirements stipulated in A 122 constituted an exclusive set of rules or whether the PPL could be applied.

Domain of application of the rules for re-establishment pursuant to A 122

[15] The misleading information provided by the EPO in the form of the patent specification has caused the appellant to fail to file an opposition within the TFO because he only took notice of the scope of protection encompassing embodiment C by means of the publication of the B9 specification, after the TFO had expired. Therefore, the legal question arises whether re-establishment into the TFO can be granted.

The factual submissions of the appellant can be understood to mean, from a legal point of view, that the appellant had missed this time limit through no fault of his own, because he trusted that the wording of claim 1 of the German version of the originally published patent specification corresponded to the patent as granted. Therefore, the loss of rights caused by the expiration of the time limit was unjustified and had to be remedied. The further submissions of the appellant concerning the public’s need for legal remedies (Rechtsschutzbedürfnis) concern the procedural situation provided for in A 122, allowing someone who, in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, was unable to observe a time limit, to request re-establishment into the time limit.

[16] However, the appellant does not invoke this provision, and rightly so. He has not requested re-establishment and has not paid the corresponding fee because the law does not allow an opponent who has missed the TFO to benefit from re-establishment pursuant to A 122.

Although in the present case even the formal requirements pursuant to A 122 (request, time limit, fee, one-year deadline) have not been complied with and the appellant does not invoke this provision, the Board feels the need to explain why re-establishment of an opponent into the missed time-limit for filing an opposition is prohibited […] pursuant to A 122.

As a matter of fact, in order to decide on whether the failure to comply with the time limit can be legally “remedied” by application of the PPL, it is necessary to find that the factual situation is not governed by A 122. Otherwise the application of the PPL would constitute an inadmissible circumvention of the requirements laid down in A 122, which have not been fulfilled in the present case. In this context the one-year deadline of A 122(2), second sentence, has a great legal significance because the lawmaker has expressly laid down a positive foreclosure effect (Ausschlusswirkung) to the detriment of the person seeking a legal remedy.

Moreover, it is necessary to examine whether the lawmaker has intended a negative foreclosure effect. Insofar as the wording of A 122 would exclude an opponent from re-establishment, this would clearly constitute a negative foreclosure effect for the opponent. Then, if the factual situation is the same, the failure to meet the TFO could not ne remedied along other rules of law without violating A 122.

[17] The EBA has decided, as soon as in G 1/86 [8], that A 122 does not find application when the opponent has failed to comply with the TFO, not only because of its wording – which defines the applicant and patent proprietor to be entitled, but not the opponent – but also because for reasons of procedural certainty (Verfahrenssicherheit), because it is the filing of the opposition itself that creates a new legal instance (Rechtszug).

According to the ratio of this decision of the EBA an application of A 122 in favour of an opponent who has missed the TFO is excluded, be it only because at the expiry of the TFO the members of the public who could have become opponents did not have any concrete procedural relationship with the EPO.

The further reasons invoked by the EBA, relating to legal certainty, also exclude the direct or analogous application of this provision in favour of an opponent who has missed the TFO.

The fact that the opponent has missed the TFO through no fault of his own, does not alter the interests involved (Interessenlage) with respect to those of an opponent missing the TFO. Unlike ex parte proceedings, inter partes proceedings require [the EPO] to balance the interests of both parties. The “improvement” of the situation of the opponent could only be obtained at the expense of the patent proprietor’s legitimate expectations regarding the effectiveness and legal force (Rechtskraft) of the decision to grant. The EPC has expressly solved this conflict of interests in favour of the patent proprietor and has given the principle of legal effectiveness (Rechtskraftwirkung) priority by excluding a potential opponent from requesting re-establishment after having missed the TFO. An opponent who misses the TFO in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, therefore, is referred to the possibility of national nullity proceedings and cannot request re-establishment into his rights by means of a direct or analogous application of A 122.

This legal opinion has already been expressly validated in the case law, in decision T 702/89 [3]. The Board of appeal is of the opinion that this assessment still holds true because whenever the interests of the opponent in being re-established and legal certainty regarding the validity and legal force (Bestands- bzw. Rechtskraft) of a European patent are to be balanced, legal certainty is to be given priority in view of the effect of a finally granted (bestandskräftig) patent in the Contracting States (A 64).

Moreover, it is to be noted that the legal possibility of re-establishment would contradict the principle of unity of the opposition proceedings explained above under point [12] when there is more than one opponent because a re-establishment into the missed time limit would de facto extend the TFO. Additional opposition proceedings initiated retroactively by “re-establishment” could take a different turn, from the point of view of procedural law, than opposition proceedings that have been partly or completely terminated before, and could, therefore, lead to different versions of the patent.

Application of the PPL when time limits are missed

[19] The fact that the TFO has been missed cannot be “remedied” in the present case by invoking the PPL, as will be explained in more detail below, even if the appellant has not filed an opposition because it trusted that the patent specification issued by the EPO was correct.

PPL in connection with A 125

[20] The appellant invokes a violation of A 125 because the PPL has not been taken into account.

According to this provision, in the absence of procedural provisions in the EPC, the EPO shall take into account the principles of procedural law generally recognised in the Contracting States.

It follows that in order for this provision to be applied there has to be a legal loophole in the procedural provisions of the EPC. Also, there have to be principles of procedural law that are recognised in the Contracting States.

The statement of the EBA (see G 1/86 [4,7]) that according to the documents relating to the EPC, even in a case of force majeure an opponent should not be granted the right to re-establishment (and, therefore, [re-establishment] into a missed TFO) makes clear that in this context A 122 does not constitute a legal loophole but a negative foreclosure provision. Falling back on principles of procedural law generally recognised in the Contracting States pursuant to A 125, based on a factual situation governed by A 122, would be excluded because there is no legal loophole.

[21] The only way to consider that the factual situation of the present case is not objectively governed by A 122 is [to base one’s reasoning on the fact] that the appellant has trusted the patent specification B1 issued by the EPO to be correct and, as a consequence, has omitted to file an opposition in due time.

By issuing an incorrect patent specification B1 the EPO has not fulfilled its duty of publishing the (correct) patent specification laid down in A 98. This misleading information of the EPO extends beyond the factual situation governed by A 122(1). The factual element (Tatsbestandsmerkmal) “in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken” only concerns the duties of the applicant/patent proprietor and is intended to encompass the malfunctions (Störungen) resulting therefrom. That the public has been misled by the incorrect patent specification B1, however, has its origin in a fact that is related to the duties of the EPO and which is not governed or excluded by A 122(1).

The factual point of contact for the application of the PPL as a remedy for having missed the time limit, therefore, is constituted by the false information of the public by the EPO, by means of the publication of the patent specification B1.

Legislative content of the PPL

[22] The case law of the Boards of appeal acknowledges that in general a user of the European patent system has to be able to trust the legal validity (Rechtsgültigkeit) of documents and procedures of the EPO and that he shall not be prejudiced if they are incorrect. The EBA has repeatedly found that the protection of legitimate expectations is acknowledged in the Contracting States to the EPC and anchored in European Community law (see G 5/88 [3.2] and G 2/97 [1]).

[23] However, the PPL as a “procedural principle” is not a rule of law that is uniformly defined, neither in the case law of the Boards of appeal nor in the case law of the Contracting States, and it cannot be directly applied as a concrete procedural rule by referring to A 125. Therefore, the application of this principle is not unrestricted and always has to be examined within the framework of the concrete procedural situation under consideration. When doing so, one has to take into account the procedural system of the EPC on the one hand and the concrete procedural embodiments (verfahrensrechtliche Ausgestaltung) of the PPL in the Rules of procedure of the Contracting states on the other hand.

[24] For instance, there is no generally accepted principle in the Contracting States according to which, when a time limit for using legal means in inter partes proceedings has been missed, it is sufficient to invoke some “official” false information in order to obtain a new time limit for using the legal means after the “official” correction, or for the time limit to be deemed not to have been missed.

Considering the present procedural question as to when the TFO begins to run after the grant of a patent, the German Federal Patent Court has decided, quite to the contrary, that in a legal situation corresponding to § 59(1), first sentence, of the German Federal Patent Law, a clear-cut entry into force of the legal effects of the patent is necessary for the sake of legal security [and that] the publication of the patent specification and its correctness as regards the content is not an additional requirement without which the TFO cannot effectively begin to run (BPatGE 28, page 18) [. The Court has] referred the opponent to the possibility of file inspection whereby it was possible to know the exact version of the patent. [NB: I had to interpret and complete the German sentence because it is unclear and appears to contain at least two syntax errors]

[25] In the decisions of the Boards of appeal also, the protection of legitimate expectations is considered to be a mere assessment criterion and not an absolute (fest normiert) rule. There have been differences regarding the legal consequences (Rechtsfolge): either re-establishment into the missed time limit has been granted (T 781/04 [10]) or the applicant was treated as if he had carried out the missing act (in due time) (cf. J 14/94 [9]; T 1973/09 [2.4])

Content of the decision G 5/88 of the EBA

[26] Decision G 5/88 of the EBA, applying the PPL, treats the opponent – whose opposition had been filed at the German Patent Office in Berlin within the nine-month TFO but had reached the EPO in Munich after expiration of this time limit – as if he had filed the opposition in due time at the EPO. Therefore, the legal consequence of the PPL to be applied was not a re-establishment into the missed time limit but the legal fiction of timeliness. Therefore, this decisions opens the legal possibility of remedying the fact that a time limit had been missed through no fault [of the opponent] without requiring the legal requirements for re-establishment laid down in A 122 to be fulfilled. By proceeding in this way the EBA has made the patent proprietor’s legitimate expectations and right to the legal effectiveness of the decision to grant subordinate to the interest of the opponent in an effective assertion of his legal rights (Rechtsverfolgung).

[27] However, the patent proprietor’s legitimate expectations regarding the validity and legal force of the decision to grant are not, as a rule, subordinate to the opponent’s legitimate expectations regarding the correctness of the contents of the patent specification. This would indeed contradict the principle of equal procedural treatment of the parties.

Such a subordination can only be justified on the basis of the individual circumstances. In the factual situation underlying the decision G 5/88 there were such particular circumstances because the patent proprietor had received the notice of opposition within a time frame in which he would also have received a notice of opposition filed in due time. Moreover, he had not received a notification stating that there had not been any opposition filed within the nine-month TFO. Therefore, the patent proprietor had no reason to have legitimate expectations regarding the legal effectiveness of the decision to grant after all. As he had received a notice of opposition immediately after the expiration of the TFO, he had to consider the possibility of a revocation or amendment of the decision to grant a patent. Therefore, the question of whether the opposition had been filed in time and was, as a consequence, admissible, depended on the decision of the EPO that still had to be taken. This factual situation does not justify any legitimate expectations of the patent proprietor regarding the legal effectiveness of the decision to grant that are worthy of protection.

[28] In the present case there are no circumstances that could justify giving the legitimate expectations of the appellant (opponent) regarding the correctness of the content of the patent specification priority over the legitimate expectations of the patent proprietor regarding the validity of the decision to grant, because no notice of opposition was filed within the TFO.

Quite to the contrary, after the expiration of the nine-month TFO the respondent received the communication of the EPO stating that no opposition had been filed. Moreover, it was not part of the duties of the respondent to ensure the correctness of the content of the patent specification because this is the exclusive duty of the EPO pursuant to A 98.

Nor can the appellant’s error concerning the consequences of the publication of an incorrect patent specification establish a situation justifying legitimate expectations (Vertrauenstatbestand) in his favour. It belongs to the appellant’s duties to keep himself informed on the legal consequences of a patent specification having an incorrect content, all the more as the EPO in Legal Advice n° 17/90 has expressly pointed out that the patent specification has no legal effects. It is true that the text of the patent specification is intended to facilitate the access of the public to the content of the patent as granted, and in particular to the category and extent of the exclusive rights (Schutzrecht), but it does not establish any legal effects concerning the course of the TFO, as can be seen from the explanations given above on the legal systematics [and in particular the connection] between A 64(1), A 97(4) and A 99(1)(4). Therefore, the Board of appeal agrees with the appellant that the publication of an incorrect B1 specification is a serious mistake of the EPO, but it does not agree [with the appellant’s opinion] that the publication of the incorrect specification establishes a situation justifying legitimate expectations in favour of an opponent, which could hinder the decision to grant from being – even partially – legally effective until the publication of a corrected specification, or justify that a fresh TFO run from the publication of the correction. Therefore, the patent specification can only serve for allowing a first review of the patent but cannot replace the examination of the scope of protection conferred by the granted patent by means of file inspection.

As a consequence, the appellant cannot rely on the application of the PPL [in order to remedy] the fact that the TFO has been missed. Therefore, the opposition was not filed in due time. As the opposition fee has been paid only after the expiration of the nine-month TFO, the opposition is deemed not to have been filed pursuant to A 99(1), third sentence.

Referral of an important point of law to the EBA

[29] Insofar as the appellant has requested that an important point of law be referred to the EBA, the requirements pursuant to A 112(1) are not fulfilled. The request is to be dismissed because the deciding Board of appeal can decide on all the points of law that are relevant for the decision without doubt. The answer to the question on the beginning and, therefore, the end of the TFO directly results from the legal systematics and the wording of A 64(1), A 97(4), A 98 and A 99(1)(4). The same holds true for the lack of legal effect of the publication of a European patent specification on the course of the TFO, on which the Board has decided in agreement with the previous case law (cf. T 438/87). The answer given by the Board to the legal question, i.e. that the failure to meet the TFO cannot be remedied by invoking the PPL if this necessarily entails a violation of the legitimate expectations of the patent proprietor regarding the validity or legal force of the decision to grant, is based on the principle of equal procedural treatment of the parties and is in agreement with the decisions of the EBA G 1/86 and G 5/88 cited above.

Confirmation of the refund of the opposition fee

[30] As the opposition fee has not been paid within the TFO, the opposition is deemed not to have been filed pursuant to A 99(1), third sentence. In view of this legal fiction, there was no cause in law for the late payment of the opposition fee (cf. T 323/87 [5]). An opposition fee paid without cause misses its purpose (Günzel in Benkard, EPÜ, Munich, 2002, §99, marginal number 35). Therefore, the OD was right in ordering the refund of the opposition fee.

Dismissal of the appeal

[31] The appeal is to be dismissed for the relevant reasons given in the impugned decisions. It is only for the sake of clarity in the final treatment of the proceedings that the Board has expressly confirmed the refund of the opposition fee in the order.

ORDER

For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The refund of the opposition fee ordered by the first instance is maintained.

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A French summary has been published here.

Saturday, 31 December 2011

T 1007/09 – Talking With Asterisks


In its decison revoking the opposed patent, the Opposition Division (OD) found the main request (patent as granted) as well as the three auxiliary requests on file to lack inventive step.

The Board did not agree and maintained the patent as granted. It also considered the question of whether the appeal fee should be reimbursed:

*** Translation of the French original ***

[9] Pursuant to R 111(2) the decisions of the EPO which are open to appeal shall be reasoned.

According to the established case law a lack of reasoning of a decision constitutes a substantial procedural violation within the meaning of A 113(1) (cf. inter alia T 763/04; T 1182/05; T 246/08).

In the present case the impugned decision comprises a blank paragraph (paragraph 6.2.3).

The opposition division is of the opinion that ***********************

It is obvious that the OD intended to give the reasons justifying its dismissal of the second auxiliary request, but it did not do so, whereby it kept the appellant in the dark as to the reasons for the dismissal.

Therefore, the impugned decision is affected by a substantial prodedural violation. As the appeal is granted, it is necessary to order the refund of the appeal fee pursuant to R 103(1)(a).

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Friday, 30 December 2011

T 193/07 – Purely Hypothetical


Both the patent proprietor and opponent 2 (!) filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) revoking the patent under consideration.

In what follows the Board discussed the admissibility of the opponent’s appeal:

[2.1] According to A 107 “any party to the proceedings adversely affected by a decision may appeal”.

[2.1.1] The first instance opposition proceedings led to the revocation of the patent in its entirety as requested by opponent 2 […]. The order of the decision of the OD thus fully complies with the request of opponent 2.

[2.1.2] A party is only adversely affected if the order of the appealed decision does not comply with its request. Hence, in the present case, [opponent 2] is not adversely affected by the decision of the OD.

[2.2] [Opponent 2] argued that A 107 did not expressly further specify the meaning of “adversely affected”. In a case like the present one, with no possibility of continuing appeal proceedings initiated by an appeal of the patent proprietor if the latter withdraws its appeal, procedural situations could occur which could adversely affect the respondent-opponent in parallel or related national infringement or nullity proceedings.

[2.2.1] However, the board observes that [opponent 2] has not identified any specific reasons for which it considered itself to be adversely affected on the day it filed its notice of appeal. [Opponent 2] merely presented purely hypothetical considerations concerning potentially disadvantageous situations that may occur (in the future) in related national litigation proceedings. These considerations have no legal relevance under A 107, first sentence.

[2.2.2] In this connection, the board also observes that the possibility of an anticipatory cross-appeal is not foreseen by the EPC (see e.g. decision T 854/02 [2.2]). A respondent-opponent which is not adversely affected by a decision revoking the patent is thus not entitled to file an appeal for the sake of acquiring an independent appellant status instead of the status of a respondent (party as of right).

[2.3] Moreover, the board’s conclusion in the present case is in accordance with the established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal, according to which in cases where the order of the decision of the OD is the revocation of the patent, an opponent who requested revocation of the patent in its entirety is not “adversely affected by” said decision within the meaning of A 107, first sentence, irrespective of the reasons given in the decision. Reference can e.g. be made to decisions T 854/02 [3.1-2], T 981/01 [5-6], T 1147/01 [2], T 1341/04 [1.2(i),1.3] and T 473/98 [2.2-8]. Whether or not the OD, in its decision to revoke the patent on the ground of lack of inventive step, dealt with all the novelty objections raised by opponent 2 is thus not relevant in the assessment of the admissibility of the appeal of [opponent 2]. The board sees no reason for deviating from the established case law in the present case.


[2.4] Summarising, in the board’s judgement, [opponent 2] was not entitled to appeal against the decision of the OD, since it was not “adversely affected by” said decision within the meaning of Article 107 EPC.

[2.5] Therefore, the appeal of [opponent 2] is not admissible.

[2.6] Consequently, the board considered the submissions of [opponent 2] from the point of view of its status as a respondent to the appeal of the patent proprietor.

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Thursday, 29 December 2011

T 305/07 – Time Does Not Heal All Wounds



Evidence that has been considered inadmissible by the Opposition Division (OD) because it had been filed belatedly will not necessarily be admitted in appeal proceedings only because it is re-filed together with the statement of grounds of appeal. This is what the patent proprietor in the present case had to find out when filing an appeal against the decision of the OD revoking his patent.

[5] The [patent proprietor] filed the experimental evidence which had not been admitted by the OD, i.e. experimental evidence originally included in the letters dated 26 June 2006 and 21 July 2006, with its statement of the grounds of appeal and requests its admission.

[6] The board is not convinced by the [patent proprietor’s] argument that “the EPO and the Opponent have now had ample time to evaluate the experimental data and the Opponent has had time, should it wish to, to repeat any experiments”. The board does not see why the [opponent] should react to experimental evidence which is not “in” the proceedings (even if it could be expected that it would be re-filed in appeal proceedings). The [patent proprietor’s] argument overlooks the difference between filing and admissibility.

[7] The admissibility of late-filed evidence during appeal proceedings is specifically regulated in Article 12(4) RPBA stipulating that, without prejudice to the power of the board to hold inadmissible evidence which was not admitted in the first instance proceedings, everything presented by the parties with the statement of the grounds of appeal shall be taken into account by the board if and to the extent it relates to the case under appeal.

[8] The present claims differ from those dealt with by the OD and in relation to which it considered the experimental evidence as irrelevant. Thus, in the board’s view, Article 12(4) RPBA, first half sentence does not apply here, but Article 12(4) RPBA, second half sentence is to be considered. In particular, the question arises whether, and if so to what extent, the experimental evidence relates to the case under appeal.

[9] According to the [patent proprietor] the data originally presented in the letter of 26 June 2006 demonstrate not only that alkali metal salts are indeed suited to reduce trisulfide variants in a recombinant product, but also that this effect can be applied to other peptides. However, the board considers that what the [patent proprietor] aims to demonstrate is sufficiently demonstrated by the data in the patent, in particular those of Figure 2. The evidential weight of the data originally submitted with the letter of 26 June 2006 is moreover questionable, inter alia, since there is no information as to when, during the recombinant production process, the salt was applied, i.e. during or after fermentation.

[10] According to the [patent proprietor] the experimental data as originally submitted with the letter dated 21 July 2006 was filed in order to exclude the mechanism of trisulfide reduction disclosed in document D1 as the mechanism by which the alkali metal or earth alkali metal salts of the present invention operate. However, feature or features relating to a mechanism are absent from claim 1 and therefore it is not necessary to prove that mechanism.

[11] The board thus comes to the conclusion that none of the experimental evidence submitted with the statement of the grounds of appeal is relevant to the present case. Therefore, it cannot be considered to “relate” to it. Hence, in accordance with Article 12(4) RPBA, second half sentence the board decides not to admit the experimental evidence filed with the statement of the grounds of appeal.

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Wednesday, 28 December 2011

T 468/09 – Don’t Focus On The Negative


The patent proprietor filed an appeal after the Opposition Division (OD) had revoked the patent under consideration because it found the disclosure not to be sufficient within the meaning of A 100(b).

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read:
A urinary catheter assembly comprising at least one urinary catheter (1) having on at least a part of its surface a hydrophilic surface layer (6) intended to produce a low-friction surface character of the catheter by treatment with a liquid swelling medium prior to use of the catheter and a catheter package (7, 16, 29, 34, 42, 46, 51, 51’) made of a gas impermeable material and having a cavity (11, 18, 39, 48, 53) for accommodation of the catheter (1, 58, 69), characterized in that the cavity accommodates said liquid swelling medium for provision of a ready-to-use catheter assembly.
The appellant argued that the gist of the claimed invention was to provide an assembly for intermittent catheterisation, wherein the catheter could be withdrawn from the package in a condition which was suitable for insertion into the urethra. In order to put the invention into practice, the skilled person had to provide the urinary catheter with a hydrophilic surface layer, a package made of a gas impermeable material, to place the catheter and a liquid swelling medium in the package and to close the package. Urinary catheters with hydrophilic surface layers were known at the priority date of the patent in suit, and so were gas-impermeable packages. On the basis of the disclosure of the opposed patent and his common general knowledge, the skilled person would have no difficulty in carrying out the catheter assembly in the claimed manner, no matter if the liquid swelling medium were to be placed in direct contact with the catheter surface or in a storage body from which it was released. The subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request covered both embodiments and did not require storage of the catheter for years. The stability of the catheter coating was not an essential feature in the present patent.

Opponent 1 pointed out that the invention as claimed was restricted to the embodiments in which the coating was in contact with the liquid swelling medium (water) from the time of manufacture until use of the catheter, which could be up to 5 years later. It was essential that the coating be capable of being stored for the duration of this period without deterioration. Although not specified in claim 1, the recommended time period was, however, implicit. The subject-matter of claim 1 did not include the embodiment in which coating and liquid were kept apart until immediately before use, by confining the liquid in a spongy body. At the time the patent was filed, a skilled person was not able to produce without undue burden a hydrophilic catheter coating that could withstand wet storage for the required shelf life, i.e. avoiding deterioration of the coating. The patent was silent on how to solve this problem with the coating, namely how to provide a pre-wetted catheter assembly which could be stored for up to 5 years, typically 36 months, thus resulting in a long term preservation of the low friction surface characteristic of the catheter until its use. The evidence provided by the appellant clearly showed that the prior art coatings were not suitable. None of the catheters disclosed in the prior art cited in the patent was intended for wet storage. There was no indication in the patent of how the hydrophilic coating catheter could be made.

Opponent 2 argued along similar lines.

[4.1] A 100(b) states that an opposition may be filed on the ground that the European patent does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. The requirement is the same as for A 83, which addresses the European patent application before grant.

It is established case law that sufficiency of disclosure must be assessed on the basis of the patent specification as a whole, including the description and the claims. Moreover, the disclosure is only regarded as sufficient if it allows the invention to be performed in the whole range claimed, i.e. for all embodiments falling within the ambit of the claimed subject-matter.

[4.2] Essentially, claim 1 of the main request defines a urinary catheter assembly comprising a urinary catheter and a catheter package;
  • the urinary catheter has on its surface a hydrophilic surface layer (coating);
  • prior to use, the hydrophilic surface layer is brought into contact with a liquid swelling medium to produce a low-friction surface;
  • the catheter package is made of a gas impermeable material and has a cavity;
  • the cavity accommodates the catheter (preamble of claim 1) and the liquid swelling medium (characterising portion of claim 1) for provision of a ready-to-use catheter assembly.
Claim 1 of the main request covers the two embodiments which are disclosed in the patent specification.

[4.3] In a first embodiment, shown in Figures 1 and 2, the catheter package 7 is formed by two sheets 8 and 9 of gas impermeable material welded together along a seam 10 (joint) so as to define a cavity 11 for accommodating a catheter tube 2 and a compartment 12, spaced apart from the cavity by an transitional section 13 […] for accommodation of a liquid swelling medium confined in a storage body 14 made of a spongy or gel-like material […].


The catheter and the spongy body are arranged in the package prior to welding the sheets of gas impermeable material together, in order to form the urinary catheter assembly. This clearly means that the package 7 encloses both the cavity and the compartment […].

Prior to use of the catheter, the hydrophilic surface layer 6 (coating) is prepared for activation of its low friction character by squeezing the liquid out of the body in order to allow it to flow into the cavity and to bring the catheter into a ready-to-use condition […].

This first embodiment, therefore, corresponds point by point to the wording of claim 1 in suit and, contrary to [opponent 1’s] assertion, falls within the scope of said claim. In particular, the hydrophilic coating of the catheter which is accommodated in the cavity is activated “prior to use” by treatment with the liquid swelling medium (preferably water - see paragraph [69]) within the cavity for provision of a “ready-to-use” catheter assembly.

This embodiment can readily be carried out on the basis of the information given in […] the description. This was not contested by the respondents either.

[4.4] In a second embodiment, not shown in the figures, the spongy body 14 is not used. The liquid is introduced into the package during the assembly operation, prior to the welding of the joint. In this case, the compartment for the liquid swelling medium is integrated with the cavity for accommodation of the catheter, the coating being prepared and activated immediately after completion of the production process when the liquid has been introduced into the package […].

This embodiment is made possible due to the gas impermeable characteristic of the material of the package. As explained in […] the patent, this should be understood as a material sufficiently tight to avoid diffusion by evaporation of the liquid, so as to prevent the coating from drying out and to preserve its low friction character for a long time […]. A period exceeding the shelf life of the catheter is recommended, which could be up to 5 years but is typically 36 months.

It should be noted here that the disclosed range is not limited at the lower end and therefore does not exclude much shorter periods of e.g. a few months, though such interpretations should be ruled out which do not make any technical or commercial sense, such as a zero length period or a period of a few days. Moreover, the time period of 36 months is given as an example (“typically”; “recommended”). The important matter is to keep the coating activated and the catheter in a ready-to-use condition “at all times” […], i.e. within the time period corresponding to the above defined range.

Claim 1 does not mention any duration for the preservation of the coating, i.e. the period between the time of activation of the coating and the time at which a catheter is used. Therefore the subject-matter of claim 1 also covers the second embodiment since “prior to use” corresponds in that case to the activation of the coating at the time the catheter assembly is produced. From that time onwards, the catheter assembly is “ready-to-use”, in accordance with the wording of a claim 1.

[4.5] As can be derived from the patent specification, the problem underlying the claimed solution is principally to avoid diffusion by evaporation of the liquid swelling medium in order to protect the activated coating from drying out […]. This result is achieved by the gas impermeable characteristic of the material constituting the package, not by a characteristic of the coating. Therefore, the respondent’s arguments based on maintenance of the coating stability and of its coherence over time by avoiding its dissolution in the liquid are irrelevant and not convincing.

The same is true for the problem formulated by the OD of avoiding the coating reacting with the material inside the bag or dissolving into water.

[4.6] It results therefrom that all the discussions about the characteristics of the coating appear to be irrelevant for the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure and of the reproducibility of the catheter assembly as claimed. The same applies to the document cited by both parties in support of their arguments regarding the properties of the coating.

Having regard to the broad definition of claim 1 and given that the gas impermeable material of the package provides sufficient tightness against evaporation of the liquid for a period of time which could vary considerably (“up to five years”), the known catheters referred to in […] the patent specification could be suitable in any case and on the basis of this disclosure the invention can be carried out, even if such catheters may suffer from some other deficiencies. A 100(b) does not require that the best mode be performed.

Where a disadvantage of an invention could (possibly) prevent its use, this is not an obstacle to reproducibility provided that the otherwise desired result was achieved by the technical teaching disclosed in the patent (see also T 881/95). This is obviously the case here since the only problem addressed by the contested patent is confined to preventing evaporation of the liquid from the package and subsequent drying of the catheter coating, and this is solved by the provision of an appropriate material for the package. The coating stability of a catheter immersed for a long period of time is not an issue. Under the circumstances, it matters little whether, at the priority date of the contested patent, catheter coatings capable of withstanding water storage over a long period of at least 36 months were available or not.

[4.7] For the foregoing reasons, the requirements of A 100(b) are satisfied.

The case was then remitted to the OD for further prosecution.

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Tuesday, 27 December 2011

T 2166/10 – Missing Pages


Missing pages are one of the recurring problems to be solved in paper D of the EQE, but the problem also occurs in real life and may have dramatic consequences if it is not dealt with properly.

The patent proprietor filed an appeal against the decision of the opposition division (OD) revoking his patent which had been granted on the basis of a Euro-PCT application.

In its decision the OD held, inter alia, that, as concerns the description, only description pages 1, 2 and 26 to 43 were entitled to the international filing date of 4 December 2001 and that the subject-matter of the patent as granted extended beyond the content of the application as filed. A main request that the patent be maintained as granted was therefore not allowable.

Here is what the Board had to say on this case:

[1.1] The appellant argued that the international application, on which the patent in suit was based, was completely filed on the date of filing, i.e. 4 December 2001, and that it therefore included, inter alia, description pages 3 to 25. Further, the appellant argued that, since the arguments given by the opponent in support of the opposition grounds were solely based on the assumption that these description pages were not part of the application as filed, the opponent’s arguments had to fail and, hence, that the opposition had to be rejected.

[1.2] In the present case it is therefore necessary to determine which documents made up the application as filed and, in particular, whether or not the description pages 3 to 25 were part of the application as filed on 4 December 2001.

[1.3] In this respect the board notes that in the proceedings before the IPEA, in the present case the EPO, the applicant submitted on 3 July 2002 a Demand under Article 31 PCT together with amendments under Article 34 PCT. In the accompanying letter the applicant made it clear that the amendments were to be taken into account by the IPEA only if the Receiving Office (RO), in the present case the International Bureau (IB), were not to grant a petition which was pending before the RO and in which the applicant requested that it be held that the international application was completely filed on 4 December 2001, i.e. including, inter alia, the description pages 3 to 25. The amendments under Article 34 PCT consisted of “new pages” 3 to 25, i.e. new paragraphs [0006] (second part) and [0007] to [0057]. In a table, the applicant indicated for each of these “newly added pages” and for each paragraph thereof which parts of the application as originally filed, i.e. description pages 1, 2 and 26 to 43, Figures 1 to 23, and claims 1 to 52, provided a basis.

The board further notes that, subsequently, in a communication dated 6 August 2002 the IB informed the applicant and the IPEA that following a decision:
  • the originally filed pages 3 to 25 of the description were held to be null and void and were to be disregarded;
  • the international filing date was corrected to read 4 December 2001;
  • the earliest priority date, i.e. 5 December 2000, was reinstated; and
  • the international application would be published as such, i.e. without pages 3 to 25 of the description, with an indication to this effect.
In accordance with this decision, the application was published without the above-mentioned description pages 3 to 25 and with international filing date 4 December 2001. The description as published included the following note between pages 2 and 26: “ATTENTION: PAGES 3-25 WERE MISSING UPON FILING”.

The International Preliminary Examination Report (IPER), dated 20 March 2003, was based, inter alia, on description pages 1 to 45 “as received on 01/03/2003 with letter of 25/02/2003” and which were annexed to the IPER. More specifically, paragraphs [0001] to [0005](first part) of the annexed description correspond to paragraphs [0002] to [0006](first part) of the application as published, whereas paragraphs [0005](second part) to [0008] and [0021] to [0068] of the annexed description respectively correspond to paragraphs [0006](second part) to [0009] and paragraphs [0010] to [0057] of the description pages as filed by the applicant by way of amendment under Article 34 PCT. The renumbering of the paragraphs was due to deleting paragraph [0001] and inserting a new section concerning the prior art, namely paragraphs [0009] to [0020].

On entry of the European phase, the applicant indicated that the proceedings before the EPO as elected Office were to be based on the documents on which the IPER was based.

With the communication under R 51(4) EPC 1973 the applicant was informed that the examining division (ED) intended to grant a patent on the basis of, inter alia, description pages 2 to 5 and 7 to 45 as annexed to the IPER. An annex to the communication included bibliographic data of the patent application, including, inter alia, 4 December 2001 as the date of filing of the application. By filing the translations of the claims and by paying the fees for grant and printing, the applicant approved the text intended for grant. The decision to grant was issued on 2 November 2007 and mentioned 4 December 2001 as the date of filing.

The above observations were not contested by the appellant.

[1.4] From the above, it follows that the IB held that the description as originally filed, i.e. on 4 December 2001, did not include pages 3 to 25 and that, in accordance with the applicant’s conditional request, the IPEA took into account the amendments submitted with the Demand, which resulted in the addition to the description as filed of new paragraphs [0005](second part) to [0008] and [0021] to [0068].

[1.5] In the board’s judgement, there can therefore be no doubt that the preliminary examination and the patent in suit were partly based on new description pages which had been submitted in the course of the international preliminary examination procedure by way of amendment and which were missing from the application as originally filed. The board therefore concludes that the application on which the patent in suit is based was not completely filed on the international filing date, i.e. 4 December 2001, in that it did not include description pages 3 to 25.

[1.6] The question of whether or not the decision given by the IB acting as RO, in which it was held that the description pages 3 to 25 were not filed on the date of filing of the international application, was correct does not alter the above facts and findings based thereon and, hence, need not be further considered by the board in the present decision. In fact, the board observes that neither before the EPO acting as IPEA in the international phase nor before the EPO ED in the regional phase did the applicant raise the issue of the missing pages or request a correction of the filing date (cf. J 03/00). Nor did the applicant contest that the preliminary examination or the patent to be granted was partly based on new description pages which were only submitted in the course of the international preliminary examination procedure by way of amendment and which were missing from the application as originally filed. Nor subsequently did the applicant file a request for correction of an error in the decision to grant.

[1.7] The appellant’s argument that the arguments submitted by the opponent in support of the opposition grounds had to fail for the reason that they were solely based on the wrong assumption that description pages 3 to 25 were not part of the application as filed, is therefore not convincing.

[1.8] The board concludes that the OD was correct when it held that the application as filed did not include the description pages 3 to 25. Further, the board notes that the OD gave a detailed reasoning as to why the opposition ground set out in A 100(c) prejudiced the maintenance of the patent as granted and that in the statement of grounds of appeal the appellant did not submit any arguments against this reasoning. Since the board does not see any reason to deviate from the reasoning given by the OD, it concludes that the opposition ground set out in A 100(c) prejudices the maintenance of the patent as granted.

[1.9] The appellant’s sole request is therefore not allowable.

[2] The sole request not being allowable, it follows that the appeal must be dismissed.

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Monday, 26 December 2011

J 22/10 – Foreign Affairs


The present case was triggered by the late payment of extension fees.

The applicant had requested entry into the European phase on February 5, 2008 ; in the request the “extension” box was ticked but no extension states were explicitly mentioned:


In a letter dated April 7, 2008, the applicant’s representative stated that all five extension states were to be designated; he requested the EPO to debit five extension fees and five late payment surcharges from his deposit account.

In this letter, the representative cited the Guidelines, chapter A-III 12.2 and pointed out that the underlying interpretation of the Extension Agreements was incorrect.

According to him, the only sensible interpretation of the Extension Agreements with Albania, Macedonia and Serbia was “to use R 85a(2) EPC 1973 as was”. As there was no counterpart to R 85a(2) EPC 1973 under the EPC 2000, the old rule had to be applied. The representative also offered arguments why late payment or further processing should be available for Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia. So the extension fees for all five extension states could be paid at least two months late with payment of late payment surcharges or further processing fees.

The Receiving Section (RS) of the EPO was not persuaded : it refused the late payment and ordered the refund of the fees. It stated that the procedure for payment of the extension fee were not be governed by the EPC. All provisions relating to the implementation of the extension were established by national law in the relevant (extension) state, whereas the extension agreements merely established the amount of the extension fee. The respective national laws of the extension states became obsolete with the entry into force of the EPC 2000 and the deletion of R 85a (2) EPC 1973.

The applicant filed an appeal against this decision.

In compliance with earlier decisions on related matters, the Legal Board found itself to lack competence, and the appeal to be inadmissible:

[3] As noted by the Legal Board of Appeal in its communication dated 19 August 2011, the appeal proceedings are essentially concerned with the question whether such a denial of the RS is open to an appeal and, therefore, whether the appeal is admissible.

[3.1] According to the exhaustive provisions of A 106(1), only those decisions of the EPO may be contested which are taken by the departments listed therein, i.e. by the RS, Examining Divisions, Opposition Divisions and the Legal Division, acting within the framework of their duties under the EPC.

[3.2] The Legal Board of Appeal found in a number of cases that decisions taken by the EPO when carrying out its obligations under the co-operation agreements with certain states extending the protection conferred by European patents (Extension Agreements) were not based on the EPC itself but solely based on the Co-operation Agreements between the EPO on the one hand and the extension states on the other hand; it, therefore, rejected the respective appeals as inadmissible (J 14/00; J 19/00; J 9/04; J 2/05; J 4/05).

[3.3] Starting from this, the following aspect is relevant in deciding the current case:

[3.3.1] It follows already from the very nature of the Extension Agreements relevant in these appeal proceedings (Albania, OJ EPO 1995, 803 and 1996, 82; Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ EPO 2004, 619; Croatia, OJ EPO 2004, 117; Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ EPO 1997, 345 and 538; Serbia and Montenegro, OJ EPO 2004, 583, 2007, 406 and 2010, 10) that any decisions based on such international treaties do not fall within the scope of the EPC and, as a result of this, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Boards of Appeal.

[3.3.2] The procedure for payment of the extension fees is determined by the Extension Agreements alone. Although there are certain parallels between the formal procedures of extension of protection under the Extension Agreements on the one hand and the designation of a contracting state under the EPC on the other hand (A 78(2) and A 79(2) EPC 1973, R 38(1) and R 39(1) EPC), the Extension Agreements form a legal system of their own that is distinct from the legal system created by the EPC.

References within the Extension Agreements to the EPC, in particular to the so-called period of grace under R 85a(2) EPC 1973 (in combination with A 79(2) EPC 1973, R 107(1)(d) EPC 1973 and the EPO Rules relating to Fees), do not override this fundamental distinction.

Consequently, the legal nature of any decision taken on the legal basis of the Extension Agreements remains within that legal system and does not extend to the legal system of the EPC.

[3.3.3] The Extension Agreements make it absolutely clear that references to provisions of the EPC are exhaustive and, thus, that there can be no corresponding application of other provisions, including those of A 106 et seq. concerning the appeals procedure.

Neither is there anything in the structure or legal nature of the Extension Agreements to support the appealability of the contested decision within the legal framework of the EPC. As bilateral agreements, the Extension Agreements essentially deal – exhaustively and strictly separated from the EPC – with matters pertaining to the integration of extended European applications and protective rights into the respective national law and their relationship to national applications and rights based on the law on industrial property of the extension states.

Nor do the Extension Agreements provide for a transfer of jurisdiction on the EPO and its Boards of Appeal. Such a transfer could only have been established by an explicit and clear provision to this effect in the Extension Agreements. Particularly with regard to the principle of sovereignty of the extension states, there is no room for acknowledging an implicit transfer of jurisdiction from the respective national law and the national courts to the EPC and the Boards of Appeal.

[3.4] The Legal Board of Appeal is not competent to decide a case that is solely governed by a “foreign” legal system.

[4] All this has been brought to the appellant's attention by way of the communication of the Board dated 19 August 2011 to which the appellant chose not to reply. Having reviewed the facts and legal issues involved in this appeal case, the Board maintains the opinion already expressed in said communication and reiterated above.

[5] Since the contested notification of the RS dated 21 August 2009 refusing its request for late payment of the extension fee concerning the European patent application Nr. 06 752 688.9 is not open to an appeal according to A 106 the appeal has to be rejected as inadmissible.

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Saturday, 24 December 2011

T 491/09 – Clairvoyance



Member of an Opposition Division consulting the DG3 oracle
The opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the patent in amended form, based on the third auxiliary request, which had been filed during oral proceedings (OPs)

The opponent claimed that the OD should not have admitted this request into the proceedings.

Here is what the Board had to say on this matter:

[1.1] The Board notes that if the way in which a department of first instance has exercised its discretion on admitting requests filed during OPs is challenged in appeal, it is not the function of a Board to review all the facts and circumstances of the case as if it were in the place of the department of first instance, and to decide whether or not it would have exercised such discretion in the same way as or different from the department of first instance. A Board of Appeal should only overrule the way in which a department of first instance has exercised its discretion if the Board concludes it has done so according to the wrong principles, or without taking into account the right principles, or in an unreasonable way (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 6th edition 2010, VII.E-6.6).

[1.2] The question therefore arises whether the OD exercised its discretion properly according to the above stated criteria.

[1.3] In chapter E-III, 8.6 of the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO is stated that in exercising its discretion according to R 116(1) and (2)
“the Division will in the first place have to consider ... the allowability of the late-filed amendments, on a prima facie basis. If these ... amendments are clearly not allowable, they will not be admitted. Before admitting these submissions, the Division will next consider procedural expediency, the possibility of abuse of the procedure (e.g. one of the parties is obviously protracting the proceedings) and the question whether the parties can reasonably be expected to familiarise themselves in the time available with ... the proposed amendments”.
Prima facie allowability

[1.4] It transpires from points 3 and 4 of the minutes of the OPs that the OD regarded the then final 3rd auxiliary request as prima facie overcoming the opposition grounds based on A 100(b) and A 100(c) (in combination with A 123(2)) and thus as prima facie allowable in these respects. The appellant argues, however, that the OD did not examine the prima facie clarity of the claims, which it should have.

[1.4.1] The Board observes in the first place that the minutes of the OPs before the OD are silent on any issue of clarity raised by the appellant as a hindrance to admitting the request in question. Also at the OPs before the Board the appellant could not recollect having made such an objection in this particular respect.

To the contrary, the minutes, page 3 state that “the opponent raised no other objections than those already discussed”, which clearly could lead the OD to assume that no further formal issues remained, nor that any new formal objections were raised.

Admitting this request in such circumstances can already for that reason alone not be criticised.

[1.4.2] The appellant argued that the OD should ex officio have examined the entire claim for clarity, following the principles of T 1459/05 and T 656/07.

The Board wishes to point out that the OD could hardly take account of T 656/07 which was issued in 2009, i.e. after the OPs in opposition held on 10 November 2008. Remains only one decision T 1459/05, which was decided on 21 February 2008.

Apart from the fact that ODs can hardly be held to have immediate knowledge of any single decision when it issues, the Board cannot find fault with an OD which does not follow a decision which itself explains why its case is so particular that it warrants departing from otherwise consistent case law. It should be kept in mind that the allowability is examined merely on a prima facie basis and all the more so only in connection with a discussion on admissibility of a request.

Procedural expediency, abuse

[1.5] In the first place, due to the direct treatment of the 3rd auxiliary request by the OD, instead of returning to written proceedings, a protracting of the proceedings was avoided and the [patent proprietor] did not benefit from any further delay of the final decision on the part of the OD. Secondly, it is clearly the purpose of OPs before the department of first instance that all concerned are aware of the outstanding issues and which positions are taken on them, including those of the OD. Not allowing simple further amendments to resolve such issues would clearly run counter to this purpose.

In fact, the Guidelines, chapter E-III, 8.7, makes this clear by referring to the fact that it should be ensured (by the OD) that the parties file requests which are to the point and that claims are formulated appropriately. If the OD finds that some patentable subject-matter results from a limitation/amendment, it may even inform the proprietor of the fact and allow him an opportunity to submit amended claims thereon.

In view of the above, the Board can only conclude that the [patent proprietor] needed quite some prompting to finally come up with this request addressing the point under discussion, but not that this amounts to an abuse of proceedings by, nor to/an unwarranted advantage for the [patent proprietor].

Opponent reasonably expected to familiarise itself

[1.6] As argued by the [patent proprietor], the 3rd auxiliary request filed during the OPs was not going in a different direction, but was prepared on the basis of the 3rd auxiliary request filed before the deadline of one month before the OPs. Its claim 1 follows the course of the discussions during the OPs, in that it differs from claim 1 of the earlier 3rd auxiliary request by the expressions “blades, a base opposite to the blades”, “said adapter unit being adapted to be snap fitted ... toward the base” and “fixedly” having been deleted. These had been criticized by the appellant in its letter dated 30 April 2008, section 2.3, which was repeated at the OPs (see point 3 of the minutes). Further, the expressions “at least one of the second adapter engagement member and the handle engagement member being resiliently yieldable” and “such that said snapping may occur” have been added in reply to objections raised in this respect in the OPs. The three latter amendments exactly address the issues the appellant was well aware of before the OPs since it raised objections on them at the OPs.

The OPs were therefore proceeding towards resolution of the outstanding issues.

[1.7] From the minutes of the OPs it transpires that a number of interruptions have taken place, which the Board considers as sufficient for the appellant.

This is confirmed in the first three paragraphs of page 3 of the minutes where it is further stated:
“The chairman interrupted the OPs at 15:05 to allow the patentee to prepare a new and final request.

After reopening of the proceedings by the chairman, the patentee submitted a third auxiliary request (Annex AIII) and explained the amendments done.

The opponent raised no other objections than those already discussed”.
The Board can therefore only conclude that the appellant had sufficient opportunity to familiarize itself with the amended subject-matter.

[1.8] In summary, the Board sees no indication that the OD exercised its discretion to admit the 3rd auxiliary request into the proceedings according to the wrong principles, or without taking into account the right principles or in an unreasonable way.

This request is therefore in the proceedings.

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Friday, 23 December 2011

T 146/07 – Unsigned


The opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form.

The parties were summoned to oral proceedings (OPs) to be held on January 20, 2011. After the opponent had announced that he would not attend the OPs and had withdrawn his request for OPs, the Board cancelled the OPs on January 10.

On January 18, the Board received anonymous third party observations (TPO).

Would it take them into account?

[3] Anonymous TPO were received by the board at a very late stage, i.e. after the scheduled OPs had already been cancelled in view of appellant’s announcement not to attend these proceedings and the withdrawal of its subsidiary request for OPs.

According to R 114(1), any observations by a third party shall be filed in writing. This requirement implies that the observations have to be signed (see R 50(3) and R 86) in order to allow an identification of the third party (see Schachenmann in: Singer/Stauder, EPÜ, 5th ed., A 115, marg. n° 13). Identification is particularly important in the context of opposition proceedings in order to allow the competent organ of the EPO to verify whether the observations are indeed filed by a third party rather than by a party to the proceedings. Otherwise, a party might be tempted to submit late observations and/or documents by means of anonymous TPO in order to avoid negative procedural consequences such as apportionment of costs.

[4] When a party to the proceedings submits an unsigned document, the document is deemed not to have been filed if, after a corresponding invitation has been sent out by the EPO, it is not signed in due time (see R 50(3)). Since unsigned anonymous TPO do not allow the EPO to send out such an invitation at all, they necessarily remain unsigned. This has the consequence that they are deemed not to have been filed.

[5] The board is aware that anonymously filed TPO may nevertheless be adopted by a party to the proceedings as its own or may even trigger objections by the competent organ of the EPO of its own motion (see decision T 735/04 [2], dealing with the exceptional situation that a highly relevant patent application of one of the patent proprietors had been submitted by an anonymous third party). However, in the absence of such a further procedural act, anonymous TPO are to be disregarded altogether. This view is in line with the decisions G 1/03 and G 2/03 in which the Enlarged Board of Appeal refused to take into account an anonymously filed third party statement (see Section VI(3) of the decisions).

[6] Thus, the anonymous observations under A 115 received on 18 January 2011 are deemed not to have been filed and are disregarded by the board.

If the approach set forth in Singer’s commentary is followed, TPO simply cannot be anonymous.

This may be formally correct (although I doubt that the lawmaker had TPO in mind when drafting R 36(3) EPC 1973, which has become R 50(3)), but I do not think that it is in the interest of the EPO (and of the public at large) to require the parties filing observations to reveal who they are. The question of apportionment of costs is too marginal to balance the benefit that can be drawn from allowing anonymous TPO. Yes, there may be cases of abuse of proceedings (this is also possible when straw men act as opponents), but I guess the vast majority of TPO are just that, and many of them would not have been filed if anonymity was not allowed.

As has been found in T 458/07, TPO filed during opposition (appeal) proceedings should be treated as late filed documents, in compliance with the rules the Boards have developed for such documents (considering prima facie relevance, procedural economy, …). In the present case this would have allowed the Board not to take into account the TPO, without even considering whether they were signed or not, which I believe to be irrelevant.

But let us imagine that the present approach prevails. I wonder whether the signature of a professional representative would be considered sufficient if the third party was not identified. After all, one of the parties could have requested the representative to file the observations.

Also, would the use of the EPO third party observation website (here) lead to a R 50(3) notification? The corresponding form allows to identify the third party, but as far as I can see, there is no easy way of signing the form.

Be that as it may, if you are a professional representative and you are asked to file TPO in opposition proceedings, the safest way, obviously, would be to reveal the identity of the party and sign the observations. But what should be done if the third party wants to stay incognito, as it most likely will? I think I would sign the observations as a professional representative and make a clear declaration that the third party is not a party to the proceedings. Perhaps this would dispel any doubts of the EPO about a possible abuse of proceedings.

Any thoughts?

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Thursday, 22 December 2011

T 2375/10 – Empty Hands And Heavy Hearts


Sometimes Examining Divisions (ED) are too concise in their decisions refusing an application. This invariably leads to the a remittal, as in the present case.

The relevant part of the decision read:


Too short, says the Board:

[2] According to established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, to satisfy the requirement of R 111(2) a decision should contain, in logical sequence supporting arguments. The conclusions drawn by the deciding body from the facts and evidence must be made clear. Therefore all the facts, evidence and arguments which are essential to the decision must be discussed in detail in the decision including all the decisive considerations in respect of the factual and legal aspects of the case. The purpose of the requirement to reason the decision is to enable the appellant and, in case of an appeal, also the Board of Appeal to examine whether the decision could be considered to be justified or not (see T 278/00; T 87/08 and T 1366/05).

In the present case the ED decided against the Appellant, that the subject-matter of claim 1 according to the sole then pending request did not involve an inventive step (A 56).

A 56 requires that the assessment of inventive step is made having regard to the state of the art. Accordingly, the logical chain of reasoning of the ED in the decision under appeal, to justify the above conclusions under A 56, has to contain a proper assessment of the question of obviousness in the light of the prior art.

The only part of the section “Reasons for the Decision” of the written decision under appeal dealing with the issue of inventive step is to be found in point 3, comprising two paragraphs.

Paragraph 3.1 merely summarizes the arguments of the Applicant and does not reflect the ED’s own considerations, this paragraph in fact should rather belong to the section “Facts and Submissions” of the written decision under appeal. The mere summary of a party’s submission is not per se a reasoning proper to the deciding body.

Consequently, paragraph 3.2 is the sole portion of the written decision under appeal which may reveal the reasoning of the Opposition Division (sic) on the issue of inventive step and, thus, is the sole portion of the decision which could justify the ED’s conclusion of lack of inventive step. However, there is no reference at all in this paragraph to any prior art, paragraph 3.2 merely stating that the claimed subject-matter did not comply with the requirements of A 56 since the technical effect of pressure reduction in a wellbore fluid was only demonstrated for graphite as the resilient material, but that this effect had not been shown for the other cited materials and therefore the selection of materials recited in claim 1 did not solve the technical problem in its entire breadth.

Therefore, the ED arrived in the appealed decision at the conclusion that the claimed subject-matter lacked inventive step merely by declaring that a purported effect has not been achieved by other cited materials, i.e. the technical problem as defined in the application as filed had not been solved in the entire breadth of the claims, without reformulating the problem in a less ambitious way and without assessing obviousness of the claimed solution to that reformulated problem in the light of the cited prior art.

Since, the requirement of inventive step defined in A 56 is based on the state of the art, the decision of the ED, by arriving at a conclusion of lack of inventive step without reference to prior art, is insufficiently reasoned in the sense of R 111(2).

[3] This failure amounts to a substantial procedural violation requiring that the decision under appeal is set aside and the case is remitted to the first instance (see T 278/00 [5]). The appeal is thus deemed to be allowable and the Board considers it to be equitable by reason of the substantial procedural violation to reimburse the appeal fee pursuant to R 103(1)(a).

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