Wednesday, 21 December 2011

T 866/08 – Of Mice And Dogs


The patent proprietor filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to revoke the opposed patent on the ground of insufficiency of disclosure.

The OD argued that the therapeutic effect of the claimed vaccine had not been established. The prior art did not contain a disclosure of the use of a polynucleotide vaccine formula for treating dog diseases. In view of document D12, which had been published after the effective date of the patent, there were doubts as to whether the polynucleotide vaccines could replace the existing effective vaccines. Therefore, it was not possible to extrapolate the results obtained with mice .

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read:
1. A vaccine inducing a protective response for canidae comprising a plasmid containing and expressing the G gene of the rabies virus and a suitable vehicle.
Here is what the Board had to say on sufficiency of disclosure:

*** Translation of the French original ***

[2] According to the established case law, when a claim covers a therapeutic application of a substance or a composition, it is not enough for the requirements of A 83 to be fulfilled that the skilled person can realize or obtain the compounds to be used based on the invention that is disclosed in the patent and/or on his common general knowledge; it is also necessary to establish that the claimed compound does indeed have a direct effect on a metabolic mechanism that is specifically linked to the disease to be treated. This mechanism may be known from the prior art or indicated in the application as such, e.g. via experimental trials. Once this has been proven, it is possible to take into account evidence that has been published at a later stage in order to support these conclusions (see T 609/02 [9]).

[3] In the present case, the patent does not provide any experimental data establishing that a plasmid expressing the G gene can induce a protective response against rabies in canidae.

[4] However, the OD has pointed out, in substance, that at the date under consideration there was no use of polynucleotide vaccines for treating dog diseases in the prior art for vaccinating dogs against rabies. Moreover, in view of document D12, which has been published after the effective date of the patent, there were doubts as to whether polynucleotide vaccines could replace the existing effective vaccines such as the vaccines against rabies. Based on these arguments, the OD was convinced that it was not possible to extrapolate in a systematic way the results of document D1, which had been obtained with a polynucleotide vaccine expressing the G gene in mice, to dogs, and that a vaccine tested on mice absolutely had to be tested on dogs in order to determine its effectiveness.

[5] The Board notes that the present patent under consideration covers a compound, the G protein of the rabies virus, which has been identified in the prior art as having the direct effect of producing an immune response in a great number of animals such as canidae (see e.g. documents D6 […], D13 […] and D18). In view of the common knowledge of the skilled person in the technical field under consideration, there was no doubt on the immunological effect of the claimed compound , i.e. its direct effect on the relevant metabolic mechanism, nor has the OD explicitly formulated such doubts.

[6] As a consequence, the impugned decision has to be understood as questioning the fact that polynucleotide vaccines carrying the G protein of the rabies virus can indeed induce the claimed effect (i.e. that the carrier used can produce the claimed effect in canidae) in view of the disclosure of document D12, which has been published at a later stage, rather than expressing doubts regarding the direct effect of the this gene on the immune system.

[7] First of all, the Board notes that document D12 has been published shortly after the priority date of the present patent and, therefore, was not part of the general knowledge of the skilled person. Moreover, table 1 of this document sums up 29 scientific articles that had been published during the three years preceding its publication and which deal with “DNA vaccines ... to induce some form of immunity against a dozen or more infectious agents” […], thereby establishing the functionality of those structures in a great number of animals. As the OD nevertheless indicated, document D12 expresses doubts as to whether polynucleotide vaccines could replace the existing effective vaccines. However, the Board notes that this does not shed doubt on the technical usefulness of those vaccines but only their superiority with regard to the existing effective vaccines. Therefore, the Board cannot endorse the opinion of the OD according to which document D12 can raise doubts that a polynucleotide vaccine such as the one claimed could lack functionality.

[8] The Board also notes that […] the impugned patent refers to document D1. It contains the statement that “as regards rabies, protection of mice against virulent challenge has been demonstrated after treatment with a polynucleotide vaccine expressing the gene for the G protein under the control of the SV40 virus early promoter [reference to D1], a similar result being achieved by using the CMV IE promoter.” The Board notes that document D1, therefore, also discloses that a vaccination with a plasmid carrying the gene for the G protein of the rabies virus induces a protective response against the rabies virus in mice.

[9] As a consequence, the Board considers that the disclosure of the prior art is such that the vaccine according to claim 1 is likely to be useful for the therapeutic application at which the claim is directed. Under these circumstances, the disclosure in documents D23, D29, D41 and D45 to D49, which have been published at a later stage, may be taken into account for supporting these conclusions. As a matter of fact, examples 20 and 21 of document D45, i.e. the U.S. patent that is equivalent to the impugned patent, contain experimental data which extensively disclose the short and long term protection of dogs that have been vaccinated with the plasmid disclosed in example 16 and administered according to the teaching of example 19 of the impugned patent.

[10] This is why the impugned patent is considered to disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art, as required by A 83.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 20 December 2011

T 1789/09 – Margin Of Error


This decision – dealing with an opposition that had been rejected by the Opposition Division – contains some interesting statements on the scope of a claim the decisive parameter of which was affected by a considerable margin of error.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read:
A process for the preparation of a granular detergent composition or component having a bulk density greater than 650 g/l, which comprises the step of dispersing a liquid binder throughout a powder stream in a high speed mixer to form granular agglomerates,
characterised in that the powder stream comprises crystalline zeolite A having an oil absorbing capacity of at least 40ml/100g. (my emphasis)
In what follows, the Board dealt with the interpretation of the claim, sufficiency of disclosure and novelty:

Interpretation and sufficiency of disclosure (all requests)

[1.1] The objections made by the [opponent] with respect to sufficiency of disclosure are based on the [patent proprietor’s] interpretation of the parameter “oil absorbing capacity” used in Claim 1 of all requests.

[1.1.1] According to the [opponent] this term referred to the initial oil absorbing capacity of the zeolite before any process step was carried out. Otherwise, there would be a lack of sufficiency of disclosure since Claim 1 covered the possibility of forming powdery agglomerates of the zeolite with other components before the powder stream is introduced into the high speed mixer. The other components might change the oil absorbing capacity of the zeolite. However, it was impossible for any skilled person to measure the oil absorbing capacity of the zeolite within such agglomerates.

[1.1.2] In the [patent proprietor’s] opinion this interpretation was against the gist of the invention as set out in the patent. It was apparent from the description that the invention did not cover embodiments where the oil absorbing capacity of the zeolite would be lost by combining the zeolite with other components prior to introducing the zeolite containing material into the powder stream.

The [patent proprietor] pointed to the first sentence of paragraph 17 of the patent in suit where the following is stated:
“It is an essential feature of the present invention that the Zeolite A used in the formation of the granular agglomerates has an oil absorption capacity of at least 40ml/100g”,
and argued that following the second sentence of A 69(1), according to which the description had to be used for interpretation, Claim 1 had to be construed such that the zeolite had the oil absorbing capacity of at least 40 ml/100g at the moment where the liquid binder is dispersed within the high speed mixer throughout the powder stream.

[1.1.3] A 69(1) relates to the extent of protection conferred by a European patent or patent application. According to the Protocol on the Interpretation of A 69 which was adopted as an integral part of the EPC to provide a mechanism for harmonisation of the various national approaches to the interpretation and determination of the protection conferred by a patent, this should be done so as not to overestimate either the literal wording of the claims or the general inventive concept disclosed in the description (see also G 2/88 [2.1, 3.3 and 4]).

The Board notes, however, that this does not mean that the scope of protection conferred by a claim is generally limited by the description.

However, the sentence cited from paragraph 17 of the patent does not even say that the zeolite exhibits the oil absorbing capacity only during the formation of the granular agglomerates in the high speed mixer. In the Board’s opinion, the term “in the formation of” certainly covers the process of forming granular agglomerates as such, as it is expressed in Claim 1.

Moreover, since the process of Claim 1 merely “comprises” the step of dispersing a liquid binder throughout the zeolite containing powder stream in the high speed mixer, further process steps like formation of the powder stream by agglomeration with other ingredients are not excluded.

The [patent proprietor] has agreed that it would not be possible for a skilled person to measure the oil absorbing capacity of the zeolite within such agglomerates.

Hence, in the Board’s opinion, defining a process by a parameter which clearly cannot be measured does not make technical sense to the skilled artisan.

[1.1.4] The Board concludes therefore, that anyone skilled in the art would understand the oil absorbing capacity mentioned in the claims as that of the zeolite as initially applied, i.e. before any process step is carried out in the course of which the initial capacity is changed. No other meaning can be attributed to the term in question.

As a corollary to this conclusion, consideration of the [opponent’s] objection under A 83 is redundant.

[1.2] Another disagreement concerns the parties’ interpretation of the value of the oil absorbing capacity.

According to the patent in suit […], the oil absorption values can be determined by following British Standard Part 7: 1982 which corresponds to ISO 787/5-1980, i.e. document D1.

[1.2.1] The [opponent] argued that this standard included an inaccuracy of measurement of ± 50%.

[1.2.2] According to the [patent proprietor], however, the error was much smaller since document D1 only mentioned a difference of at most 50% between the absolute measured values. Further, this error did not even apply to zeolites since document D1 concerned pigments and extenders.

[1.2.3] In the Board’s opinion there is no reason to assume that the error is smaller with zeolites, since the patent recommends the standard of document D1 for determining the oil absorbing capacity and does not mention a particular accuracy especially if zeolites are used.

Concerning the extent of the error, it appears that the [patent proprietor’s] understanding is the correct one (see document D1, page 1, second paragraph). However, even in this case, the error is still as high as ± 33.33% (± 1/3).

Due to this uncertainty of measurement, the Board considers the values mentioned in the claims not as selective points but as ranges of possible values. Accordingly, the value of the oil absorbing capacity mentioned in Claim 1 of the main request covers the range of 40 ml/100g ± 33.33%, hence values from about 26.7 to 53.3 ml/100g.

Novelty (main request and first auxiliary request)

[2.1] Lack of novelty of the claimed subject-matter has been objected to, inter alia, in view of Example H of document D2.

[2.2] This example discloses a process wherein the spray-dried powder of Example G is granulated with liquid nonionic surfactant as binder in a Fukae high speed mixer to form a granular detergent agglomerate having a bulk density greater than 650 g/l (pages 8 to 10).

The powder stream of Example G comprises zeolite A, specifically Wessalith P ex Degussa […]. The oil absorbing capacity of Wessalith P as measured according to document D1 is given as 36 g/100g […] which translates into 39 ml/100g […] and with the inaccuracy of measurement of document D1 into the range of 26 to 52 ml/100g.

[2.3] The [patent proprietor] argued that the inaccuracy of measurement in document D2 was not comparable with that of the patent in suit since it was based on a sample of 100g instead of 5g as in document D1 and the patent.

[2.4] However, the Board adopts in this respect the [opponent’s] view that the accuracy of measurement rather increases with increasing sample size.

[2.5] Thus, there exists a large overlap between the oil absorbing capacity of 26.8 to 53.2 ml/100g of the zeolite A used in the process of Claim 1 of the main request and that of the Wessalith P of 26.13 to 51.87 ml/100g used in Example H of document D2.

Since there is no hint in document D2 not to work within the overlapping area, hence with zeolite A having an oil absorbing capacity of 26.8 to 51.87 ml/100g, the Board concludes that document D2 anticipates the process of Claim 1 of the main request.

[2.6] The same reasons apply mutatis mutandis to Claim 1 of the first auxilary request which differs from that of the main request only in that the oil absorbing capacity of zeolite A is now at least 45 ml/100g. As this value covers the range from 30 to 60 ml/100g, it still overlaps to a large extent with that of the Wessalith P used in document D2 […].

[2.9] For all these reasons, the Board concludes that the subject-matter of Claim 1 of the main request and the first auxiliary request is not novel in view of Example H of D2 (A 54).

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Monday, 19 December 2011

T 1530/09 – The Whole Truth


Although it is in principle possible to amend claims based on figures, such an amendment will not be possible if the teaching of the application as filed as a whole does not provide any support for the amendment, as the present decision shows.

In this case, both the opponent and the patent proprietor filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board was identical to claim 1 as granted :
An emission control apparatus of an internal combustion engine (10) having a storage device (22) provided in an exhaust passage (18) of the internal combustion engine (10) that stores a threshold level of NOx, and control means (40) that reduce NOx stored in the storage device (22) to recover a NOx storing level of the storage device (22) by performing a rich spike control by temporarily shifting during a lean burn operation of the internal combustion engine (10) an engine air-fuel ratio to a fuel-rich ratio,
wherein the control means (40) limit an execution time of the rich spike control, and perform a stoichiometric burn operation in which the engine air-fuel ratio is stoichiometric, after the execution time limited by the control means (40) elapses,
wherein the control means (40) switch to the stoichiometric burn operation when the limited execution time of the rich spike control elapses without recovering the NOx storing level and switch from the rich spike control to the lean burn operation when the NOx storing level is recovered,
wherein the control means switch from the rich spike control to the lean burn operation when the limited execution time of the rich spike control set by the control means (40) is not achieved but the NOx storing level is recovered.
The opponent pointed out that the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted was not disclosed in the application as originally filed : the entire application as filed made no reference to a direct switch from rich burn to lean burn, but only to the prevention of deterioration of CH and CO emissions (itself caused by prolonged rich spike control) by using a stoichiometric burn operation between rich and lean burn modes. Such operation should not be understood as omitted by the flowchart of Figure 2. Although the flowchart included a logic pathway seemingly indicating a possible omission of stoichiometric burn, this would not be considered correct by the skilled person as it would not be consistent with the timing chart of Figure 3 which highlighted the step of stoichiometric burn as the distinguishing feature with respect to the prior art process shown in Figure 4.

The patent proprietor relied on the flowchart of figure 2.

What did the Board decide ?

[1.1] Claim 1 includes a combination of the features of originally filed claims 1, 2 and 7, whereby claim 7 as filed however did not depend on claim 1 but only on independent claim 5. Furthermore, the following feature has been added to the wording of claim 1:
“wherein the control means switch from the rich spike control to the lean burn operation when the limited execution time of the rich spike control set by the control means (40) is not achieved but the NOx storing level is recovered.”
[1.2] Hence, the subject-matter of claim 1 is directed to the embodiment disclosed in the patent in suit which concerns a control apparatus arranged to perform the sub-sequence of the steps: lean burn - rich burn - stoichiometric burn - lean burn, but wherein the control apparatus is arranged also to include an alternative of omitting stoichiometric burn under certain conditions. Claim 1 as originally filed however required the control means to be arranged to perform a stoichiometric burn operation between the rich burn and the lean burn.

[1.3] Figure 2, which was cited by the appellant (proprietor) as disclosing both options, is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of the NOx storing capability recovering process.


It is correct that this flowchart includes the logic pathway of omitting the step of stoichiometric burn. Such option depends on whether the time duration set for the rich spike burn has elapsed or not (S270). The option of switching directly from rich burn (S260) to lean burn (S310) concerns the case where the rich spike duration is shorter than the set value (i.e. S270 “NO”) and additionally where the NOx has been recovered (i.e. S290 “YES”), in which case step S300 follows and sets the XRICHS flag to the OFF position, whereupon the procedure continues with a switch to lean burn (S310) and then ends the program.

[1.4] Hence, the question of whether the skilled person would consider the omission of the stoichiometric burn as an option which was disclosed in the application as filed has to be assessed on the basis of the whole contents of the specification and thus taking into account the disclosure in the description.

[1.5] The description of the patent in suit highlights as the basic issue […] the control of HC and CO emissions effectively by avoiding prolonged rich spike control and thus switching from the rich spike control to a stoichiometric burn operation. The underlying concept therefore includes the complete recovery of the NOx storing level of the storage device during stoichiometric burn operation to thereby curb deterioration of NOx emissions while at the same time avoiding deterioration of HC and CO emissions even when the amount of exhaust gas becomes great. It is consistently disclosed […] to set the duration time for the rich burn to be sufficiently short so as to obtain recovery of the NOx storing level during the stoichiometric burn operation.


Such consistent timing chart is complementarily shown in Figure 3 which shows that it is precisely the presence of a stoichiometric burn period directly subsequent to the rich burn duration which distinguishes the process and control means of the patent in suit from the process of the related art shown in Figure 4.


Thus for a skilled person, the flowchart of Figure 2 has to be read in line with this underlying concept of the process steps and not in isolation.

[1.6] In this regard it is undisputed between the parties, that there is no disclosure whatsoever in the description that the step of stoichiometric burn should or could be omitted. According to the general references in the description, there is no doubt about the skilled person being aware of the various interactions in the emission procedure (e.g. type of combustion engine, materials, temperatures, velocities) and being capable of correctly calculating and determining a time interval for the duration of rich burn. This duration period has to be calculated on the basis of the amount of the stored NOx, and has to be set sufficiently short in order to curb HC and CO-emissions via a subsequent stoichiometric burn operation even though no details of such calculation or determination are disclosed. However the skilled person is well-trained and has experience in such field such that setting a suitable time period to achieve this would be well within his knowledge.

[1.7] Concerning the logic pathway possibility shown in the flowchart of Figure 2 of seemingly omitting the switch to the stoichiometric burn by directly changing from a rich spike to lean burn, the purpose of that pathway is however unambiguously evident from the description (see paragraph [0035] of the A-publication, which states: “At this moment, the rich spike control has just started, and the rich spike duration Tr is less than the set value. Therefore, the unit 40 proceeds to step S290, in which the unit 40 determines whether the amount of NOx stored has become “0”.”). Thus, that pathway is intended to be used only for the time at the beginning of the rich spike duration when the rich spike duration is less than the set value and hence, directly after switching to rich burn. At such time neither the rich spike duration Tr can have elapsed nor the amount of stored NOx can be zero and the procedure must, evidently, remain in the rich burn (sub-sequence of steps S270 “NO”, S290 “NO”, “END”, return to S220, and rich burn is continued (paragraph [0036] of the A-publication). Hence, this sequence of steps is entirely in line with the general concept given in the description of the application as filed.

[1.8] There are no conditions disclosed in the patent in suit (concerning the determination and setting of the duration time of the rich burn or the amount of stored NOx) which would even suggest to a skilled person another possibility or other purpose of the steps disclosed in the flowchart than the one described which includes a step of stoichiometric burn.

[1.9] Thus, although there is a logic possibility within the flowchart of Figure 2 not to enter the step of stoichiometric burn, the description of the patent in suit discloses clearly and unambiguously to the skilled person that the value for the duration of the rich burn must be set correctly, which means in the present case being sufficiently short in order to allow the step of stoichiometric burn to be entered. Although it might be the case that if the rich spike control duration were set to be sufficiently long, a direct switch from rich to lean burn might occur if the flowchart were considered in isolation, nothing in the application as filed discloses in an unambiguous manner that such a duration would be set. Indeed, avoidance of the stoichiometric burn operation (which is not disclosed) would in fact only be the result of an unintended and thus incorrect setting of the rich spike duration by a skilled person.

[1.10] Claim 1, however, defines a control means which is specifically arranged to include this alternative option disclosed in isolation only as a logic pathway in Figure 2, namely switching directly from the rich spike control to the lean burn operation without requiring a stoichiometric burn operation to be included. When considering the whole contents of the application as filed however, there is no unambiguous disclosure of the control means being arranged in such a manner that it could ever switch from rich to lean burn directly.

Although the proprietor argued that e.g. atmospheric conditions might exist under which the control system would switch directly from rich to lean burn, this is not disclosed anywhere in the application as filed. More importantly however, since the flowchart of Figure 2 is used together with the description to aid understanding thereof (notably also together with Figure 3), it may even be the case that other sub-routines not shown in the flowchart would account for any such conditions. Without any disclosure in the application as filed to indicate that a switch from rich burn to lean burn might indeed occur under a specific set of conditions, the proprietor’s argument is nothing more than mere speculation.

The subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request thus extends beyond the content of the application as originally filed (A 100(c)), whereby the main request is not allowable.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Saturday, 17 December 2011

T 1730/09 – Essentially


Both the patent proprietor and the opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read :
A viscoelastic fluid consisting essentially of:
(1) an aqueous medium;
(2) a surfactant represented by the formula (I):


wherein R1 is RCONHCH2CH2CH2(-) wherein R is an alkyl group containing from 14 to 24 carbon atoms, which may be branched or straight chained and which may be saturated or unsaturated,
R2 and R3 are each methyl;
R4 is a hydrocarbyl radical with a chain length of 1 to 4; and
(3) a member selected from the group consisting of organic acids, inorganic salts, and combinations of one or more organic acids with one or more inorganic salts;
wherein said fluid exhibits the property of viscoelasticity. (my emphasis)
Among other things, the opponent pointed out that in the absence of a definition in the patent in suit of the term “essentially”, the wording “consisting essentially of” would not identify precisely the amounts of components which could be contained in the claimed composition in addition to those explicitly listed; reference was made in this respect to decision T 728/98.

The patent proprietor responded that it was clear that the wording “consisting essentially of” allowed only the presence of impurities in addition to the specifically listed components.

What did the Board decide ?

[1.2.3] As regards the wording “consisting essentially of”, which is also part of claim 1, it was not contained in any of the granted claims. Therefore, the alleged lack of clarity of this term raised by [the opponent] can be objected in opposition appeal proceedings.

However, as reported in the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 6th edition (2010), II.B.5.2, referring to decisions T 759/91 and T 522/91, the wording “consisting essentially of”, at variance with the wording “comprising substantially”, has a defined meaning because of the unequivocal character of the words “consisting of”; therefore, the use of the unequivocal words “consisting of” in combination with “essentially” has been found to solve all interpretation problems of the unclear claims examined in such previous cases.

The cited decisions T 759/91 [2.2] and T 522/91 [2.2] both refer to the decision T 472/88 [3], wherein it was decided that the term “consisting essentially of” was clear and allowed the presence of other components in a claimed composition in addition to the components mandatory in the claim, provided that the essential characteristics of the claimed composition are not materially affected by their presence.

The Board agrees with these previous decisions. Therefore, even though the word “essentially” does not identify precisely the amounts of additional components which could still be contained in the claimed viscoelastic fluid, the wording “consisting essentially of” allows in the present case that the composition of claim 1, which must be viscoelastic, consists of the mandatory components listed in the claims and can contain additionally only other components which do not materially affect the essential viscoelastic characteristics of the composition, e.g. minor amounts of impurities as submitted by [the patent proprietor] during oral proceedings.

[1.2.4] The decision T 728/98, cited by [the opponent], concerns the clarity of the different wordings “substantially pure” or “substantially free of” (point [3] of the reasons), which do not contain the word “essentially”; therefore, this decision concerns a legal situation which is more similar to that of the previously cited decisions T 759/91 and T 522/91, wherein the wording “consisting substantially of” was found not to be clear. Consequently, this decision concerns a different legal situation and is not applicable to the present case.

The Board concludes that the wording “consisting essentially of” contained in claim 1 of auxiliary request 8 complies with the requirements of clarity of A 84 EPC 1973.

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Friday, 16 December 2011

T 2106/08 – Don’t Infer Too Much


All parties appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form. One of the issues raised before the Board of appeal was the validity of the priority claim:

[5.1] The opponent argued for the first time during the oral proceedings before the board that the claims were not entitled to the priority date of 21 February 2000, because the patent proprietor and former applicant is Borealis Technology Oy, whereas the GB priority document No. 0004043.6 was filed in the name of Borealis Polymers Oy. The opponent argued that Borealis Technology Oy and Borealis Polymers Oy were different companies and that there was no assignment of the priority between the two companies on file.

However the mere observation that the priority document was filed in the name of Borealis Polymers Oy whereas the originally filed patent application was filed in the name of Borealis Technology Oy does not necessarily mean that the priority is not validly claimed. The fact that no assignment document, or a similar document, is on file does not mean that such a transfer had not taken place (or was even not necessary in view of the relationship between the two companies).

In any event this objection could have been raised earlier in order to allow the board to investigate this issue and the patent proprietor to submit appropriate evidence. Admitting this objection at such a late stage of the proceedings would have required the adjournment of the oral proceedings. Hence, the board exercising its discretion under Article 13(3) RPBA decided not to admit this objection into the proceedings.

[5.2] The opponent also argued that Claim 10 was not entitled to the priority date and argued that the amended/corrected ranges of:
(a) 0.01 to 0.2 wt% for the organic phosphite or phosphonite antioxidant, and
(b) 0.01 to 0.5 wt% for the metal stearate
were not disclosed in the priority document.

However, the priority document discloses on page 16, lines 17-23, that the polymer moulding powder should preferably comprise 0.01 to 0.3 wt%, e.g. 0.1 to 0.2 wt% organic phosphite or phosphonite antioxidant, and 0.01 to 0.5 wt% metal stearate. The range of 0.01 to 0.2 wt% for the organic phosphite or phosphonite antioxidant results from the combination of the lower value of the broader range with the higher value of the narrower range, which, following the case law of the Boards of Appeal, is considered to be disclosed in the priority document and does not justify an objection to the entitlement to the priority.

[5.3] No further objections with regard to entitlement to priority were raised against the claims of the proprietor’s sole request. The board sees no reason to raise an objection of its own and therefore considers that all these claims are entitled to the priority date of 21 February 2000.

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Thursday, 15 December 2011

R 7/11 – Closed


The patent proprietor filed a petition for review after Board of Appeal (BoA) 3.3.09 had revoked his patent in decision T 120/08 (cf. my post on this decision)

The petition for review was based on A 112a(2)c) and d) and asserted that a fundamental violation of the right to be heard occurred and that the BoA had taken its decision without deciding on a request relevant to that decision.

During the oral proceedings (OPs) before the BoA on October 14, 2010, a thorough discussion took place on the question of whether or not the claimed invention was sufficiently disclosed in respect of the feature “vacuum 1000 mbar” according to step c) of Claims 1 of the main and auxiliary requests. During this discussion the petitioner filed Greek patents D and E, and another document F to show what the skilled person would understand. At the end of the OPs the BoA revoked the patent for insufficiency of disclosure.

The petitioner reconstructed the course of the OPs before the BoA as follows: There was a first session from about 9.15 until 10 am where the petitioner defended its patent and, to this end, it submitted the Greek patents. The BoA interrupted the proceedings to consider these new documents. After half an hour the proceedings were resumed and the floor was given to the opponents, who discussed the test D44. The petitioner had only five minutes to respond and at the end of these five minutes the chairman put a question that the petitioner’s representative had difficulties in answering. At this point in time there was, according to the petitioner a break in proceedings, during which the petitioner wanted to prepare counterarguments; but when OPs were resumed, the BoA issued its final decision. In fact, the petitioner argues, it cannot be concluded from the minutes of OPs, which simply state that the chairman closed the debate, that the petitioner had any reason to assume that a final decision would be imminent. The OPs had previously been interrupted and the debate been declared terminated before this previous interruption; after this first interruption, however, OPs had been resumed and the discussion continued. The petitioner expected that the same would be the case with the second interruption. Once the decision of the BoA had been issued, it was too late to issue an objection. Therefore the petitioner submits that this is a case where an objection pursuant to R 106 could not have been raised.

The Enlarged Board (EBA) did not agree:

[2] Pursuant to R 106 a petition for review based on a fundamental procedural violation under A 112a paragraph 2(a) to (d) is only admissible where an objection in respect of the procedural defect was raised during the appeal proceedings and dismissed by the BoA, except where such objection could not be raised during the appeal proceedings.

[2.1] Raising an objection pursuant to R 106 is a procedural act and a precondition for access to an extraordinary legal remedy against final decisions of the BoAs of Appeal. Therefore such an objection must be expressed by a party in such a form that the deciding body is able to recognize immediately and without doubt that an objection pursuant to R 106 is intended. For the same reason such an objection must be specific, that is the party must indicate unambiguously which particular defect amongst those exhaustively listed in paragraph 2(a) to (c) of A 112a and R 104 it intends to rely on. (see R 4/08 [2.1], R 8/08 [1.2.3])

The alleged procedural violation resulting from the non-hearing of the petitioner’s experts by the BoA during the OPs concerns an event which occurred during OPs; it is related to the conduct of OPs and it cannot be disputed that the absence of such a hearing was an event, or non-event, which was apparent to the petitioner at the time. This defect should therefore have been objected to during the OPs pursuant to R 106.

[2.2] It is however the submission of the petitioner that the BoA did not make clear that the closure of the debate could lead directly to a final decision and the petitioner was not able, as a consequence, to raise an objection with respect to the absence of a hearing of its experts.

[2.3] However, the minutes of the OPs drafted under the responsibility of one of the members of the BoA and the chair pursuant to R 124(3) (which unless duly corrected authenticate the facts they relate) indicate that the debate was closed but do not reflect any objection from the petitioner about a misunderstanding of what had been announced, or any protest that the debate had been prematurely closed or the BoA had omitted to decide upon a request to hear experts.

Furthermore it indeed appears clearly from the documents on file and particularly from the petitioner’s request for correction of the minutes of the OPs before the BoA and also its letter after the refusal by the BoA to correct them that the absence of a hearing of the experts was not the relevant point and was not, at that time, considered by the petitioner as constitutive of a fundamental procedural violation of its right to be heard: the petitioner never raised an issue about the closure of the debate or an omitted request; nowhere is it stated that the debate had been closed only partially […]; nor did the petitioner complain that one of its requests had been omitted or that it had not been able to object because of the unexpected closure of the debate.

In fact, the request concerned only the statements of the opponents’ expert which should, according to the petitioner, have been transcribed in view of the written decision and a possible use before the national courts. The fact that the petitioner’s experts had not been asked for their comments was incidentally mentioned twice in passing but the petitioner did not draw from this fact any consequence as a basis for a request or any submission.

[2.4] At this stage the EBA can only repeat that it is hopeless to try to reconstruct what happened during the OPs as already stated in R 15/09. But even if the steps as described by the petitioner are taken to be correct relying on the principle of good faith, the EBA notes that the debate was declared closed. The necessary meaning of the expression “the debate is closed”, which corresponds to an important procedural step, is not open to multiple or relative interpretations; its announcement after a discussion of an issue with the parties must alert the parties to the fact that, unless otherwise announced by the BoA, the BoA does not intend to come back to this discussion, except of course in exceptional cases where the BoA decides to reopen the debate. At this precise point the parties and all the more professional representatives must bear in mind that a negative conclusion on the particular issue may be fatal for all the requests on file and as a consequence may result in a final decision, which is what happened in the current case following the decision about A 83.

Accordingly, if the petitioner had had something to add, either a request or an objection because of a procedural defect or only a doubt, it should have mentioned it when the BoA was about to pronounce the closure, namely at a point in time when the BoA still had the possibility to reopen the debate or refuse to do so.

This analysis is in line with R 6/10 [3.2], where the EBA considered that neither the minutes of the OPs nor any other part of the file indicated that the appellant had objected to the closure of the debate without the witness having been heard.

This is also in line with what has already been indicated about the parties’ roles and duties in R 2/08 of [8.5, 8.10] where the EBA stated that it was not possible for a party to allege as an afterthought the violation of its right to be heard based on the fact that the BoA had accepted a procedural objection during the OPs.

The EBA, in the present case, does not see that there was any obstacle to prevent the petitioner from complying with the requirement of R 106. All the facts point to the conclusion that this is an attempt to dress up a challenge of the decision on its merits as a petition for review, using the alleged violation of the right to be heard as clothing.

[3] The outshot of this is that the petition is clearly inadmissible. […]

The petition for review is rejected as clearly inadmissible.

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Wednesday, 14 December 2011

T 1687/08 – The Gagged Lawyer


The patent proprietor appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to revoke his patent.

In the course of the proceedings before the OD, there had been oral proceedings (OPs) held on February 25, 2008. On January 16, 2008, the representative of the patent proprietor filed a letter headed “Substitute Authorisation”, in which he stated that he authorised Mr Gerd J. to represent the patent proprietor at the OPs, referring to Mr J’s entitlement to represent under A 134(8). Nevertheless, during the OPs, the OD refused to let Mr J. speak. The OD referred to the date set under R 71a EPC 1973 and to the fact that the letter dated 16 January 2008 was not in their file.

The patent proprietor requested the Board to set aside the decision. According to him, the OD incorrectly refused Mr J. permission to speak, because they considered him as an accompanying person, and therefore applied the conditions set down in decision G 4/95. That decision was not relevant, because Mr J. was authorised to represent the patent proprietor as a legal practitioner according to A 134(8). Moreover, the OD had given the patent proprietor no opportunity to resolve these issues. The decision not to allow Mr J. to speak had therefore denied the patent proprietor his right to representation, which thus constituted a substantial procedural violation, which in turn justified immediate remittal of the case to the department of first instance and reimbursement of the appeal fee.

Here is what the Board had to say:

[2] At the OPs held before the OD on 25 February 2008, the OD refused Mr Gerd J. permission to speak on behalf of the patent proprietor.

[2.1] The requirements for representation by a legal practitioner are defined in A 134(8) and in Article 2 of the Decision of the President of the EPO (PEPO) dated 19 July 1991 on the filing of authorisations (OJ EPO 9/1991, 489), as cited in the summons to OPs issued by the OD (in EPO Form 2310). With the exception of renumbering of Articles and Rules, this decision is equivalent to the decision dated 12 July 2007 (OJ EPO 2007, Special edition No. 3, 128), which entered into force on 13 December 2007, i.e. between the date when the summons to OPs was issued and the date when the authorisation of Mr J. was filed.

A 134(8) requires that the legal practitioner be qualified in a Contracting State, that he have his place of business in that State, and that he be entitled in that State to act as a professional representative in patent matters. The first sentence of Article 2 of the cited decision of the PEPO requires additionally that the legal practitioner file either a signed authorisation or a reference to a general authorisation already on file.

The letter from the representative of the patent proprietor dated 16 January 2008, headed “Substitute Authorisation” contained an authorisation for Mr J. to represent the patent proprietor in accordance with A 134(8). This letter indicated the address of Mr J’s place of business in Germany and his status as a Rechtsanwalt entitled to carry out representation as a legal practitioner within the meaning of A 134(8), and was signed by the patent proprietor’s authorised representative, Mr B. The board therefore concludes that this letter represents an authorisation which establishes that Mr J. was entitled under A 134(8) to carry out representation and which fulfils the requirements of the first sentence of Article 2 of the cited decision of the PEPO.

[2.2] From the minutes of the OPs of 25 February 2008 and the decision under appeal, it is apparent that the OD did not consider Mr J’s status as a legal practitioner under A 134(8), at least in part because they did not have the letter of 16 January 2008 in their (paper) file. Instead, they treated Mr J. as an accompanying person, and therefore applied the requirements set out in decision G 4/95. In particular they based their refusal to allow Mr J. to speak on the failure of the patent proprietor to announce his intention that Mr J. should be able to make oral submissions before the date set in the summons to OPs pursuant to R 71a EPC 1973 (i.e. 21 December 2007).

[2.3] Since the patent proprietor requested Mr J’s participation in the OPs as a legal practitioner under A 134(8), not as an accompanying person within the meaning of decision G 4/95, the OD’s decision not to allow him to speak was taken under the wrong legal provision. Moreover, since for the reasons indicated […] above, Mr J. was entitled under A 134(8) to represent the patent proprietor, the outcome of that decision, i.e. not allowing Mr J. to speak, was incorrect. The board thus concludes that the OD denied the patent proprietor his right to be represented in the manner he chose. Such a denial of the right of representation has to be considered as a substantial procedural violation.

[2.4] The [opponent’s] arguments in this respect are not found convincing for the following reasons.

[2.4.1] In his written submissions (see his letter of 4 October 2011), the [opponent] questioned whether Mr Brunner had had the power of sub-authorisation when filing the letter of 16 January 2008. However, during the OPs before the board, the representative of the appellant stated that he had a general authorisation from the appellant dating back to 18 August 1997, which included the right to sub-authorise. The appellant did not challenge that statement, and the board has no reason to doubt its correctness.

[2.4.2] The [opponent] has also argued that the authorisation in the letter of 16 January 2008 was late-filed, because R 71a EPC 1973 was applicable to the filing of authorisations, as was clear from the fact that in the summons to OPs issued by the OD, the reference to the decision of the PEPO concerning authorisation of legal practitioners was immediately followed by the indication of the date set under R 71a EPC 1973, and because it is clear from the requirement in the second sentence of the cited Article in that decision, that some form of time limit is necessary to allow the filing and checking of such authorisations.

The board does not consider this issue to be relevant to the present case, since from the minutes of the OPs of 25 February 2008 and the decision under appeal, it is apparent that the OD did not consider whether Mr J. was duly authorised under A 134(8). Had they considered that question, and concluded that they had doubts on this matter, they would have been obliged to give the patent proprietor the opportunity to address those doubts, but since they do not seem to have addressed that issue at all, the question did not arise.

Moreover, the board notes firstly that R 71a(1) EPC 1973 concerned only the filing of “written submissions” and “facts and evidence”, but that authorisations do not fall into either of these categories, and secondly that since, as indicated in paragraph 2.1 above, the letter of 16 January 2008 satisfies the requirements of the first sentence of Article 2 of the cited decision of the PEPO, the second sentence of that article, referring to the practitioner being required to file an authorisation within a period to be specified by the EPO, is not applicable.

[2.4.3] Finally, the [opponent] argued that, even if the decision of the OD not to allow Mr J. to speak were to be considered as a procedural violation, it did not represent a substantial procedural violation which would justify immediate remittal to the department of first instance, because a procedural violation could only be considered to be substantial if it had an effect on the outcome of the procedure. He argued further that in the present case that requirement was not satisfied, because it was apparent from the outcome of the OPs held on 26 February 2008 concerning the patent granted on a divisional application from the application on which the patent in suit is based, in which the issues were similar, and at which Mr J. had been allowed to speak, the outcome was the same. The board is not convinced by this line of argumentation, because any conclusions as to what might have happened at the OPs in the present case had Mr J. been allowed to speak are merely speculation, regardless of the outcome of the related OPs held the next day.

[2.5] The board therefore concludes that the decision of the OD not to allow Mr J. to speak at the OPs of 25 February 2008 represents a substantial procedural violation.

[3] In the light of this conclusion, the board considers it appropriate to follow the appellant’s request to remit the case to the department of first instance for further prosecution, in accordance with Article 11 RPBA, and to order the reimbursement of the appeal fee, in accordance with R 103(1)(a).

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Tuesday, 13 December 2011

T 1188/10 – Range Picking


The applicant appealed against the decision of the Examining Division (ED) refusing the application.

Claim 1 on file before the Board read:
1. Use of a cationic preservative derived from the condensation of a fatty acid and an esterified dibasic amino acid, according to the following formula:


as a preservative in food preparations,
wherein the preservative is added to such food products at a concentration from 0,006% to 0.015%. (my emphasis)
The ED held that the amended concentration range from 0,006% to 0,015% in claim 1 was not originally disclosed and that its upper and lower limit was formed by a generalisation of single values taken from the examples. In its view, the concentration of the cationic preservative (hereinafter: LAE) would be influenced by the nature of the food product and it was thus not admissible to isolate features from a set of features which have been disclosed in a specific combination in the examples.

The amendment was, therefore, not in compliance with A 123(2).

The Board disagreed:

[2] The Board notes that, in the application as filed, the broadest general range relating to the concentration of LAE in food products is from 0,0001% to 1% as disclosed in claim 5. The new range of 0,006% to 0,015% fully lies within this broadest range and therefore constitutes a limitation.

This new range, however, was formed by taking, as end points, single values from examples 2 and 4 relating to the use of LAE as preservative in two different specific food products at different growth temperatures, namely 150 ppm for a chicken product at 10°C in example 2 and 60 ppm for a blackberry juice at 34°C in example 4.

[2.1] In order to assess whether this new range complies with A 123(2) it has to be considered whether a skilled person, in analogy to T 201/83, would generalise these values in the sense that he would recognise them as not only associated with the specific food products and temperatures used in the examples.

In this context, it emerges from table 1 of the application as filed that LAE as preservative is active against a number of gram-positive and gram-negative bacteria as well as fungi and yeast. It is furthermore stated on page 1, lines 4 to 5 from the bottom that “LAE and related compounds are particularly suitable to be used in the preservation of all perishable food products”. From this the skilled person would therefore recognise that the preservative effect of LAE is universal and not limited to specific bacteria and food products.

This is confirmed by the results presented in tables 2 to 9 of the experimental part of the application depicting for different food products the growth of bacteria and/or mould & yeast (expressed in the number of colony forming units, cfu/g,) preserved with various LAE concentrations in comparison with the respective control samples without LAE.

The following can be deduced

(a) all examples of the application as filed lie within the new range formed by the end values of 0,006% (60 ppm) and 0,015% (150 ppm) LAE taken from examples 2 and 4;

(b) at the beginning of the test (0 days) the food-specific number of colony forming units (cfu/g), is similar in the respective food samples with and without LAE (control);

(c) with progressing time (after 3, 5, 14 and 43 days) the increase of the number of cfu/g in the control samples is considerably higher than in the samples preserved with LAE in various concentrations and at various growth temperatures;

(d) the observations under (b) and (c) not only apply for the series of examples 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8 with LAE concentrations of 100 ppm, but also for the examples with LAE concentrations higher or lower than 100 ppm, including the two samples with the LAE concentrations of 60 ppm and 150 ppm in examples 2 and 4 forming the end values of the claimed range;

(e) the trend observed under (b) to (d) is common to all examples, regardless of the kind of preserved food products and the bacterial growth temperatures.

[2.2] From the above, the skilled person would conclude that, at least within the new concentration range of 0,006% to 0,015%, the LAE activity is not bound to a specific concentration, food product or bacterial growth temperature. The skilled person would therefore unambiguously extract from the application as filed that, within the broadest general LAE concentration range of from 0,0001 to 1%, the narrow range formed by taking the LAE concentrations of 60 ppm (0,006%) and 150 ppm (0.015%) of examples 4 and 2 as end values can also be generalized.

The range claimed in claim 1 therefore complies with A 123(2). […]

I would say that this finding is quite out of line with the established case law. I guess most Boards would not have accepted such an amendment.

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NB: Le blog du droit européen des brevets was quicker in reporting this decision (here).

Monday, 12 December 2011

T 1235/07 – A Wider View


The applicant filed an appeal against the decision of the Examining Division (ED) refusing the application under consideration for lack of inventive step.

Claim 1 of the main request read as follows:
A computer-implemented method for displaying data points stored in an OLAP multidimensional database, the data points being defined as locations of data records along at least two dimensions including a first dimension and a second dimension, each of the dimension divided into at least three levels having a parent level, a first child level and a second child level in a hierarchical structure, the method comprising the steps of:
  • receiving a selection of the first dimension;
  • in response to receiving the selection, extracting a parent data point from the multidimensional database;
  • displaying the parent data point as an icon in a data point tree;
  • receiving a selection of the parent data point icon from the data point tree;
  • extracting, from the multidimensional database, a plurality of first level child data points under the parent data point along the first dimension;
  • displaying the first level child data points as respective icons in the data point tree;
  • receiving a selection of one of the child data icons from the data point tree;
  • displaying a menu associated with the selected first level child data point, the menu containing the first and second dimensions;
  • receiving a selection of the second dimension from the menu;
  • in response to receiving the selection, extracting, from the multidimensional database, a plurality of second level child data points under the selected first level child data point along the second dimension; and
  • displaying the second level child data points as individual icons in the data point tree, together with the relationships between the selected first level child data point and the second level child data points.
The application

[2] The structure of data in a multidimensional database recognises generic aspects, or “dimensions”, of the data. The application gives examples of “Time”, “Customers”, “Regions” and “Products” (Figure 3 […]). Within each dimension, the data has a hierarchical structure with each “level” in the hierarchy having a name. Thus in the “Customers” dimension in Figure 3, the customers each have a “Name” the names belong to a “Sector” and the sectors belong to a “Channel”. For the “Regions” dimension, each “City” is part of a “State Prov”, which is part of a “Country”, which is part of a “Region”.

[3] Figure 4D shows some actual data in the “Customers” dimension. The “Channel” data includes “Direct” and “Indirect” customers. The “Direct” channel contains the sectors “Corporate”, “Educational”, “Government”, and the “Indirect” channel contains the sectors “Distributor”, “OEM” and “Reseller”. The “Reseller” sector has the customer names “Aberdeen Information Syst”, “Advance & Partners” etc.


[4] The invention uses a tree diagram to view and navigate through the dimensions and levels of data in a multidimensional database. For example, Figure 16 shows the percentage of total sales in the customer dimension broken down in the “Corporate” sector by customer “Name”, which is in the same dimension.


This is called a “drill-down” in the customer dimension, which is a commonly used technique to find out more detailed information. When analysing results, the user may want to ask the question: What is the breakdown of “Corporate” sector sales by “Country” (instead of “Name”)? This requires taking a slice of the data (the “Corporate” sales) and breaking them up in another direction, hence the term “slice-and-dice”. Figure 3 shows that “Country” is the second level in the “Region” dimension. The invention allows this dimension and level to be entered via respective menus (Figure 16: 1604, 1606) to show the required result (Figure 17).


Thus, Figure 17 represents a drill-down in the customer dimension, a slice by the “Corporate” sector, and a dice (with drill-down) in the “Region” dimension. Alternatively, this can be seen as part of a pivot of the customer data by sector and country. In summary, the invention uses a tree diagram to show arbitrary combinations of “drill-down” and “slice-and-dice”. In the diagrams the lowest values are all grouped in the box labelled “Bottom” to prevent cluttering.

Main request

[5] It is common ground that D1 is the closest prior art. D1 discloses […] displaying data points in a multi-dimensional database in the form of a data point tree including a parent level and a number of child levels. This corresponds to the opening part and the third, fifth and sixth features of claim 1.

[6] It is also common ground that claim 1 differs from D1 by the features identified by the ED, namely by selecting a data point (e.g. “Corporate” in Figure 16) in one dimension (e.g. “Customers/Sector”), selecting a desired new dimension (e.g. “Region”) from a menu (1604) and displaying the child data points (e.g. “USA”, “Germany”, “Canada”, etc.) along this dimension under the selected data point (Figure 17). These are the last five features of the claim.

[7] According to […] the grounds of appeal, the appellant appears to be expressing doubts that D1 discloses the selection of the first dimension and the selection of the parent data point in the first dimension, i.e. the first and fourth features of the claim. However, in the Board’s view, the tree can only start from one of the available dimensions, which must therefore be selected somehow, so that this feature is implicit. However, D1 does not disclose selecting any of the data points themselves.

[8] D1 discloses at column 23, line 5, that the tree can represent multi-dimensional data. This leads to the question of whether the data points in the tree 136 are all in one, or are in more than one dimension. Assuming the former, it represents different levels of data in that dimension, i.e. already represents a drill-down. Thus, in the Board’s view, claim 1 differs additionally from D1 by performing this drill-down in response to selecting a data point. This is in fact the most favourable interpretation for the appellant since, if the tree contained points in different dimensions, it would additionally disclose the claimed slice-and-dice operation.

[9] It is common ground that the effect of the distinguishing features is to allow navigation through dimensions while preserving relationships between parent data points and child data points. The appellant considers that this is the problem to be solved, for which there is no motivation to consider a slice-and-dice operation. The ED argued that since slice-and-dice was known, the skilled person would have strived to implement it as part of the normal design strategy. Thus the problem was seen as how to provide an interface having this effect. Essentially, the ED incorporated the idea of using the slice-and-dice operation into the objective problem by arguing that it was an obvious problem to solve.

[10] However, in the Board’s view a more compelling reason for incorporating the slice-and-dice operation into the problem is that it has no technical character. A slice-and-dice operation is merely a manipulation of data, like taking a square root, that does not in itself have technical character. According to the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal this cannot contribute to inventive step. Similarly, showing the results in the tree structure is a presentation of information that has no technical character. Finally, the Board cannot see anything technical in the nature of the information itself, which not being tied to any particular application, just represents abstract data. The same applies to the drill-down operation, although this operation is already inherent anyway in the tree structure of D1 as discussed above. Thus, in the Board’s view the problem solved by the invention boils down to showing the user what he wants to see in the tree structure, in this case the result of a slice-and-dice or drill-down analysis.

[11] The Board is thus in this case taking a wider view of “presentation of information” than just the actual information that is displayed, the so-called cognitive content, to include also structural aspects of how the information is displayed. In the Board’s view, such additional aspects can only contribute to inventive step if they have technical character.

This broader meaning is supported by almost the only reference to presentation of information in the travaux préparatoires, namely the Record of the Washington Conference, 1970 at point 1183. When asked what “mere presentations of information” meant, “Mr. Fergusson (United Kingdom) said that the intent of the provision was to remove from what an International Searching Authority had to search just ‘a presentation of information,’ say in tabular form, particular ways of writing, and that sort of thing.” Although the discussion was in connection with Rule 39 PCT, A 52(d) was ultimately based on the same provision (see “Minutes of the 9th meeting of Working Party I held from 12 to 22 October 1971, in Luxembourg”, BR/135/71, point 95). These examples show that it was envisaged that parts of how the information, namely the form and way it is presented, may also be part of the presentation of information. In the Board’s view, this applies to the arrangement of information in the tree diagram in the present case.

[12] Moreover, there is jurisprudence in this field holding that similar presentations of information are not technical. In particular, T 1143/06 discussed some of this jurisprudence and concluded that representing, by the speed of an element moving on a display, the relevance of data in a database to sort statements had no technical effect. The case was similar in that the information was presented to the user in a way that made it easier to evaluate and the user could then respond by selecting and displaying data (see point [3.8]). The Board noted that the information was known per se, but only differed in the visual form in which it was displayed; i.e. speed of a moving element instead of in tables. In the Board’s view, the present case is even less convincing because the invention is merely a visual display of a known analysis technique using known means, whereas in T 1143/06 the idea of varying the speed of the element was at least not known.

[13] The Board essentially agrees with the ED that the solution is the implementation of user choices using known techniques that would be matters of routine design. In particular, the Board considers that, faced with the problem of showing the user the results of a slice-and-dice operation, it would be self-evident that the value at a child point on the tree already gives the “slice” in a certain dimension. Thus, the skilled person would be faced with the practical problem of selecting the required “slice”. Furthermore, since, by definition, the “dice” is the set of values along another dimension, this dimension must also be selected. The use of mouse clicks and menus to make such selections are routine design options in this field and are common general knowledge. The same applies to implementing the “drill-down” operation. D1 also confirms the common general knowledge of selecting various data types by using a menu, an icon or double clicking […].

[14] The appellant argues that D1 only discloses navigation in connection with the “n-gonal” representation, but not in a tree structure. Moreover, the tree structure would not be suitable because it grows wider and taller with each successive level and thus requires scrolling to view all the data. However, these arguments relate to aspects of the invention that concern the presentation of the information, which as mentioned above, do not contribute to inventive step. The only technical contribution is how to present a particular piece of data at a particular point using menus and selections.

[15] Having said that, the Board considers that D1 does actually disclose the techniques of analysing multi-dimensional data, including drill-down and slice-and-dice, as well as all the essential navigation functions of the invention. Thus the user can specify a hierarchy of data points (Figure 18: 50), each data point having a dimension (47a - e.g. “Country”, “Manufacturer”, “Racket Attribute” or “Racket Type”), in turn having levels (48 - e.g. “Badminton”, “Racket Ball”, “Squash”, “Table Tennis” or “Tennis”). The hierarchy can then be transformed into a “n-gonal” representation (e.g. as in Figure 10). The user may perform analyses on the data and change the hierarchy if necessary […]. Thus the invention could be considered to differ only in the presentation as a tree rather than an “n-gonal” structure. However, the passage in D1 […] states that the “n-gonal” representation 138 is more compact and visually understandable than the equivalent tree structure 136, which would tend to imply that they are alternative presentations.

[16] Accordingly, claim 1 of the main request does not involve an inventive step (A 56 EPC 1973). […]

The appeal is dismissed.

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Saturday, 10 December 2011

T 1037/09 – He Loves Redundancy


This decision is not particularly noteworthy but it contains a statement on the attitude of the skilled person that might come in handy from time to time.

[3.5] […] Nor is the Board convinced that the skilled person is generally disinclined to combine measures with the same effect. Combination often offers useful redundancy, or combined effects may complement each other. As for the increased costs of combining similar measures this is a routine economical concern that can hardly be equated to a generally existing technical prejudice.

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