Friday, 9 December 2011

T 1172/08 – Empty Shell


The patent proprietor and the opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 of the granted patent read:
A method for determining T-cell epitopes within a protein comprising the steps of:
(a) obtaining from a single human blood sample a solution of dendritic cells and a solution of naïve CD4+ and/or CD8+ T-cells;
(b) promoting differentiation in said solution of dendritic cells;
(c) combining said solution of differentiated dendritic cells and said naïve CD4+ and/or CD8+ T-cells with a peptide of interest;
(d) measuring the proliferation of T-cells in said step (c). (my emphasis)
Claim 1 of the request found allowable by the OD read:
A method for determining T-cell epitopes within a protein comprising the steps of:
(a) obtaining from a single human blood sample a solution of monocyte cells and a solution of naive CD4+ T-cells;
(b) promoting differentiation of said monocyte cells to dendritic cells by a method as described in Example 1;
(c) combining said solution of dendritic cells and said naive CD4+ T-cells with a peptide of interest;
(d) measuring the proliferation of T-cells in said step (c). (my emphasis)
One of the key issues was the compliance of this request, which was also the main request before the Board, with A 123(3).

A 123(3) and A 69

[6] According to A 123(3), “the European patent may not be amended in such a way as to extend the protection it confers”.

According to A 69(1), “the extent of protection conferred by the patent ... shall be determined by the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims.”

[7] The interpretation of the protection conferred by a patent according to A 69 is in general not one of the duties of the boards of appeal (cf. e.g. decision T 175/84). For the purpose of establishing whether the amendments of the main request fall foul of the provisions of A 123(3), it is however necessary to do so.

[8] Parts (a) and (b) of claim 1 as granted referred to obtaining dendritic cells from a human blood sample and to promoting the differentiation in said solution of dendritic cells, while the respective parts of claim 1 of the main request refer to obtaining monocyte cells and to promoting the differentiation of said monocyte cells to dendritic cells.

It is evident, and it has not been contested by the parties, that obtaining a solution of monocyte cells from a blood sample is not the same as obtaining a solution of dendritic cells from a blood sample. Thus, claim 1 as granted and claim 1 of the main request, when read on their own, provide protection for different subject matter.

[9] [The patent proprietor] agreed that normally such a shift in the extent of protection would not be allowable. It argued however that the case at issue was very particular because the claims as granted did not embrace the subject matter of the only example of the patent specification. Under such circumstances, the skilled reader would have realised that the claim language was inconsistent with the patent specification, and that what the patentee really wanted was protection for the method described in Example 1.

[10] It has therefore to be established whether the amendments of claim 1 result in an extension of the scope of protection conferred by the patent as a whole.

[11] According to the protocol on its interpretation, “A 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that the extent of the protection conferred by a European patent is to be understood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the claims, the description and drawings being employed only for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in the claims” (Protocol on the interpretation of A 69, Article 1, first sentence).

[12] From this, [the patent proprietor] concluded that what determined the scope of protection in the present case was not the literal meaning of the term dendritic cells. Since the literal meaning of the term dendritic cells was not consistent with Example 1, in which monocytes were isolated, the skilled person would have concluded that the granted patent conferred protection for a method for determining T-cell epitopes comprising the steps of obtaining monocyte cells and differentiating those monocyte cells to dendritic cells. Thus, on a proper construction of claim 1, there was no extension of the scope of protection.

[13] The board agrees with [the patent proprietor] only insofar as the protocol on the interpretation of A 69 states that the description and drawings should be used for interpreting the claims even if there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the claims. But Article 1 of the protocol also makes reference to the balance that has to be struck between the interests of the patent proprietor in obtaining fair protection and a reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties (Protocol on the interpretation of A 69, Article 1, third sentence). To give some guidance in this respect, it also explicitly states that A 69 should not “be taken to mean that the claims serve only as a guideline and that the actual protection conferred may extend to what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the art, the patent proprietor has contemplated” (Protocol on the interpretation of A 69 EPC, Article 1, second sentence).

[14] The board has no doubts and the parties have not disputed that dendritic cells and monocytes are different cell types characterized by different features. Both cell types can be distinguished by morphological features as well as phenotypic and molecular markers, and the isolation of enriched dendritic cell fractions from blood samples was for instance disclosed in prior art document D8.

Thus, the skilled person would a priori not have had any reason to read a different technical meaning into the term “obtaining from a blood sample a solution of dendritic cells”. Had he wondered, as argued by [the patent proprietor], what sublineage of dendritic cells was used for the differentiation in said solution of dendritic cells, he might have turned to the description and Example 1 and would have found that monocytes were isolated and in vitro differentiated into dendritic cells. He might have wondered why the claim referred to isolating dendritic cells, but in the board’s opinion, the protocol on the interpretation of A 69 does not leave room for going a step further and reading [the patent proprietor]’s interpretation into claim 1. Doing so would require the skilled reader to completely ignore the wording of granted claim 1, which per se was not technically meaningless, with the consequence that the wording of claim 1 would merely serve as an empty shell.

This is clearly not in the sense of A 69 nor in the sense of the protocol on its interpretation. Moreover, the interest of third parties in legal certainty would be completely ignored, if [the patent proprietor]’s interpretation were found to be acceptable.

[15] [The patent proprietor] repeatedly referred to the amendments in claim 1 as removing an inconsistency between the claims and the description. To support its case, it cited several decisions from the boards of appeal relating to this issue.

In decision T 108/91, the competent board stated that the amendment of a granted claim to replace an inaccurate technical statement, which was evidently inconsistent with the totality of the disclosure of the patent, by an accurate statement of the technical features involved, did not infringe A 123(3). Importantly, in said case the technical term used in the claims was inconsistent with the totality of the disclosure of the patent. This is however not comparable to the present case where the general parts of the description of the application documents define the invention exactly as in granted claim 1 […], and the term monocytes is used only in Example 1 but nowhere else in the description.

In decision T 140/99, the meaning of a literally clear term in a claim was altered by adding a statement how the term had to be interpreted. The board accepted this amendment because it considered it to remove an inconsistency between the claim and the description. This is also not comparable to the present case where a literally clear technical term was not altered by stating how it had to be interpreted but instead was removed and replaced by a term with an equally clear but distinct technical meaning.

In decision T 371/88, the replacement of a restrictive term, which in its strict literal meaning did not clearly embrace a further embodiment of the description, by a less restrictive term clearly embracing also this embodiment was held to be permissible if two conditions are met. The conditions are: a) the restrictive term is not so clear in its technical meaning in the given context that it could be used to determine the extent of protection without interpretation by reference to the description and drawings of the patent, and b) it is quite clear from the description and the drawings of the patent and also from the examination procedure up to grant that the further embodiment belongs to the invention and that it was never intended to exclude it from the protection conferred by the patent. The present case differs from the case underlying decision T 371/88 because already the first condition is not met. The replacement of the terms “obtaining dendritic cells” and “promoting differentiation in said solution of dendritic cells” by “obtaining monocyte cells” and “promoting differentiation of said monocyte cells” cannot be regarded as the replacement of a more restrictive term by a less restrictive term. The term monocytes does not embrace dendritic cells.

In decision T 314/03, the replacement of a feature of the claim in plural form by the same feature in singular form, was considered to remove an inaccuracy or inconsistency which was said to be obvious to the skilled person upon reading the description. The present case is however about replacing a technically meaningful term with a technically entirely different and equally meaningful term. This constitutes an entirely different situation.

In conclusion, the board does not agree with [the patent proprietor]’s interpretation of the cited decisions and their applicability to the present case.

[16] In view of the above considerations, the board comes to the conclusion that the amendment of claim 1 extends the protection conferred by the granted patent. The main request does not meet the requirements of A 123(3). […]

The patent is revoked.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 8 December 2011

T 1282/08 – You’re Too Greedy


Both opponents filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the patent in amended form. About one year after having filed his statement of grounds of appeal, opponent 1 filed document D34, an article published in the journal of the Entomological Society of America in 1978. He requested the document to be admitted into the appeal proceedings and, as an auxiliary request, that the case be remitted to the OD.

The Board found D34 to be highly relevant because it prima facie disclosed all the features of use and method claims 1 and 15 and because it apparently indicated that the invention could not be carried out over the whole scope of the claims. It therefore admitted it into the proceedings.

The Board then dealt with the question whether the case should be remitted and whether costs should be apportioned:

*** Translation of the French original ***

[13] [Opponent 1] has not argued very strongly against a remittal. He has even filed an auxiliary request for a remittal if document D34 was admitted into the proceedings, as it indeed was. His only argument against a remittal, i.e. that the document had not been filed belatedly because it had been filed as soon as it had been discovered, is not convincing. Otherwise, any party could wait for the moment it deems appropriate for filing evidence, without giving any thought to the legal requirements concerning, for instance, the time limit for filing an appeal (A 99(1) and R 76(2)(c)) or to the completeness of the case on which an appeal is based (Articles 12(2) and (4) RPBA). Obviously, it is unacceptable to allow parties to decide themselves on what is belated and what is not.

[14] In the present case, [opponent 1] has found document D34 only on August 18, 2009, and has filed it immediately afterwards. The sole reason for not having done so at an earlier stage was that the document had only been found when carrying out a search on an apparently unrelated topic. However, it cannot be accepted for such a situation to turn to the disadvantage of the [patent proprietor] who could expect the statement of grounds of appeal to inform him on the complete case made against him (see Article 12(2) RPBA). The Board agrees with the [patent proprietor’s] submission that if the document had been produced together with the statement of grounds of appeal, there would not have been any necessity for a remittal: it would not even have been envisaged.

[15] As the document changes the case in a significant way […] and as the sole argument against a remittal is unacceptable, the Board comes to the conclusion that it is appropriate to remit the case.

Apportionment of costs

[16] The [patent proprietor] has requested apportionment of costs so that the [opponent 1] would pay all his costs, i.e. not only the costs related to the present appeal, but also to the additional proceedings before the OD. As far as the costs related to the appeal are concerned, he has argued that the fact that document D34 was taken into account changed the case in such a way that all the expenses related to the appeal were made in vain (en pure perte). [Opponent 1] has countered this request by pointing out that apportionment of costs was only justified if there had been an abuse of procedure, and that there had not been such an abuse in the present case.

[17] The Board does not endorse this argument, simply because of Article 16(1) RPBA:
(1) Subject to A 104(1), the Board may on request order a party to pay some or all of another party’s costs which shall, without limiting the Board’s discretion, include those incurred by any
(a) amendment pursuant to Article 13 to a party’s case as filed pursuant to Article 12(1);
(b) extension of a time limit;
(c) acts or omissions prejudicing the timely and efficient conduct of OPs;
(d) failure to comply with a direction of the Board;
(e) abuse of procedure.
[18] These provisions clearly show that an abuse of procedure is only one item among a non-exhaustive list of situations that can justify apportionment of costs. The Board agrees that the late filing of document D34 by [opponent 1] does not constitute an abuse of procedure, but this is not sufficient for avoiding apportionment. As a matter of fact, the non-exhaustive list of Article 16(1) RPBA also mentions the case of an amendment pursuant to Article 13 to a party’s case, i.e. an amendment made after the filing of the statement of grounds of appeal or of the response thereto. As such amendments are allowed only if the Board choses to do so, they do not always result in apportionment of costs, but it is clear that the RPBA considers apportionment of costs in a situation that is identical to the present case.

[19] [Opponent 1] has also pointed out that document D34 could not have been found with the available search tools at the beginning of the opposition proceedings. This argument has only been made during the oral proceedings, without any proof. However, even if this argument is accepted provisionally, it cannot have any impact on the present case because the [patent proprietor’s] request only concerns the costs related to the appeal and the additional opposition proceedings and does not extend to the costs related to the prior opposition proceedings.

[20] [Opponent 1] has not alleged that the results that could be obtained with the search tools available in August and September 2009 (when D34 was found and filed) could not have been obtained during the period of four months ending on September 28, 2008 (when the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal expired). As a matter of fact, it follows from what the Board has stated in points [13] to [15] above that [opponent 1] could (and should) have filed document D34 together with his statement of grounds of appeal. This misbehaviour (manquement) cannot be excused ; as it has created additional costs for the [patent proprietor], the Board is of the opinion that apportionment of costs is appropriate.

[21] However, the Board does not share the [patent proprietor’s] opinion that [opponent 1] has to pay all the costs related to the appeal and for the first instance proceedings to come. As far as the costs related to the appeal are concerned, the Board is of the opinion that at most the expenses related to the [patent proprietor’s] response to the statements of grounds of appeal filed by the [opponents] qualify as having been made in vain. As pointed out by the [patent proprietor], the remittal could have been avoided if at least one of the statements had invoked D34. Then the [patent proprietor] would have been aware of the whole case made against him and could have treated all its elements in his response. As document D34 has only been filed at a later stage, and as its relevance is such that it changes the case to the point that a remittal to the OD is justified, the expenses related to this response were made in vain and it equitable to let [opponent 1] bear those costs.

[22] Regarding the costs related to the first instance proceedings to come, the Board notes that certain Boards of appeal have sometimes ordered apportionment of costs for expenses to be made in the future (see T 847/93 [4] and T 715/95 [4]). Apportionment of costs is always at the discretion of the Board, and it may well be that those Boards were confronted, in the cases cited above, with different situations. However, the Board feels unable to arbitrate, at the appeal stage, on apportionment of costs that would arise in subsequent proceedings, on the progress (déroulement) and outcome of which one can only speculate for the time being. Each case of this type comprises some uncertainty, which makes it preferable to wait for the outcome of the subsequent proceedings before deciding on apportionment of costs. In the present case, if document D34 turns out to be decisive for the outcome of the opposition, then it would be more equitable to apportion the costs of the earlier proceedings rather than those of the subsequent proceedings. Therefore, the Board considers that in the present case apportionment of costs relating to the opposition proceedings, if such costs are to be apportioned, has to be decided by the OD at the end of the opposition, based on the situation that prevails at that time, and the requests that will have been submitted to it. Decisions T 758/99 [2], T 890/00 [5, 4th §] and T 1182/01 [4.3] are examples where the Boards have left it to the OD to decide on apportionment of costs arising in subsequent first instance proceedings.

[… Opponent 1] has to bear the costs which the [patent proprietor] had to bear in relation to his response […] to the statement of grounds of appeal.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Wednesday, 7 December 2011

T 624/08 – Artificiality


The patent proprietor filed an appeal after the Opposition Division had revoked the opposed patent, in particular on the grounds of insufficiency of disclosure and lack of compliance with A 123(2).

Claim 1 before the Board read:
1. A composition comprising aqueous fluid absorbent polymer particles which have been heat-treated at temperatures greater than 170ºC for more than 10 minutes, wherein the composition has been remoisturized, after the heat-treatment, with an aqueous additive solution containing a mono- or multivalent metal salt in the absence of an organic solvent or water-insoluble, non-swellable powder, wherein the composition comprises 1 to 10 percent by weight, based on the total weight of the composition, water and wherein the composition is characterized by the ability to absorb at least 20 grams of a 0.9 weight percent aqueous saline solution under a pressure of 0.3 psi (21,000 dynes/cm2), that is, a 60 minute 0.3 psi (21,000 dynes/cm2) absorption under load (AUL) greater than 20 grams/gram. (my emphasis)
The Board found the request on file to comply with A 123(2) and then examined its compliance with A 83:

[3] The objections raised under A 83 essentially concerned the parameter “a 60 minutes 0.3 psi (21,000 dynes/cm2) absorption under load (AUL) greater than 20 grams/gram.

The [opponents] argued that the contested European patent did not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art because:
  • the above parameter did not define the AUL of the entire absorbent polymer composition;
  • the open-end range of AUL did not allow the skilled person to perform the patent over the whole claimed range; and 
  • the patent did not disclose the invention in a manner such that the skilled person could systematically obtain compositions satisfying the AUL-parameter.
The [opponents] raised an additional objection under A 83 concerning an alleged contradiction between Claim 1 (absence of organic solvent) and Claims 6 and 11 (further comprising propoxylated polyol, which is an organic solvent).

Method of measuring AUL

[3.1.1] The board acknowledges that the claims do not comprise a definition of the method to be used for the measurement of the AUL of the composition. Nevertheless, the patent specification […] provides a clear and unambiguous disclosure of the method to be used, stating that the composition is characterised by the ability to absorb 20 grams of a 0.9 weight per cent aqueous solution under a pressure of 0.3 psi, that is:

“a 60 minutes 0.3 psi (21,000 dynes/cm2) AUL greater than 20 grams/gram as measured in accordance with the Absorption Under Load Test set forth in U.S. Patent No. 5,147,343”. [This document corresponds to D1 of the appeal proceedings].

The board is satisfied that D1 […] discloses this test in full detail and thus enables the skilled person to carry out this test – something which was not contested by the [opponents]. The board, however, acknowledges the potential artificiality of this test, which is actually the origin of the dispute between the parties, namely that it does not use all polymer granules from the claimed composition in the measurement of AUL but only a fraction thereof. Thus a sample is prepared by pre-screening the granules through a U.S. standard #30 mesh and keeping only those retained on a U.S. standard #50 mesh. The AUL is then determined by measurements carried out on this fraction, which thus contains only particles with a size ranging between around 300 and around 600 mym. As a matter of convention, the AUL-value measured for this particular fraction is then attributed to the sample composition as a whole, i.e. to a composition including all polymer granule fractions.

The board observes that neither D1 nor any other of the cited documents provides a technical explanation for the selection of the specific particle size fraction in the AUL measuring method. Nor could such an explanation be provided by the parties at the oral proceedings. This is, however, immaterial since D1 gives the skilled person clear instructions how to carry out the measurement.

[3.1.2] The board acknowledges that the potential artificiality underlying the AUL-test described in D1 may be even more artificial in the present case. In particular, Claim 1 relates to a composition comprising aqueous fluid absorbent polymer particles but attributes the AUL to the whole composition. The board accepts that the AUL-value measured on a particular particle fraction of such a composition may indeed be even less representative for a composition comprising, besides the absorbent polymer particles, further components (e.g. non-absorbents) than for a composition essentially consisting of only absorbent polymer particles. Nevertheless, the convention or artificiality stemming from D1 is not invalidated by this fact.

[3.1.3] In the Board’s view, this convention cannot be validly objected to under A 83. A person trying to repeat the invention has merely to pre-screen the composition through a U.S. standard # 30 mesh, to retain the particles on a U.S. standard # 50 mesh, carry out the AUL-test on the retained sample of granules and then attribute the resulting value - in accordance with the convention - to the composition as a whole.

Under these circumstances it is not necessary to further consider whether the AUL-value depends on the particle size.

[3.1.4] In the board’s view there can also be no doubt that the claim requires that the composition indeed comprises particles of the required size. If no such particles are present in the composition, no AUL-value can be measured using the prescribed method, so that such a composition would in any case not fall within the scope of the claims.

[3.1.5] However, the particularity of the AUL-test may lead to the parameter as defined in Claim 1 being, at least to a certain extent, technically meaningless. For example, a composition may have, in accordance with the convention of the AUL-test, the required AUL-value, but may in fact have a rather “bad” absorbency under load in practice, for example because the composition contains only a very small amount of the material responsible for it. In the board’s view, however, this aspect relates not to insufficiency of disclosure, but rather is to be evaluated in the assessment of inventive step.

[3.1.6] Finally the board does not consider that the conclusions of T 137/01 on sufficiency of disclosure apply by analogy to the present case. In T 137/01 the claimed invention was also defined by parameters of the superabsorbent material, namely the “Resistance to Deformation Under Load” and the “Wicking Index”, although these are different from the AUL parameter used to define the present invention. In T 137/01, the patent, as with the present patent, only disclosed how to measure the parameters for absorbent particles with sizes between 300 and 600 mym.

In T 137/01 [2.2.1] the board took the view that since the claim was not limited to composites only having absorbent particles lying within this range, and since the patent did not disclose how much of the absorbent material should consist of particles lying within this range, there was not enough information enabling the skilled person to say that the absorbent material as a whole would be suitable for achieving the desired effects, these effects being achieved when the measured values of the parameter of the “whole superabsorbent material [fell] within specific numerical ranges.”.

[3.1.7] The present board reads the present patent differently. The board considers that it would be apparent to the skilled person that the AUL-value to be attributed to the composition for the purpose of the claimed invention cannot be the actual AUL-value for the “whole” composition because the stipulated AUL determination method requires sieving, as already explained. Since the composite is likely to have also absorbent particles with sizes lying outside the 300 - 600 mym range (see e.g. the reference to the problem of polymer particles in the form of dust […]) the AUL-value obtained is at best only likely to be representative of the actual AUL characteristics of the composite (except in the unlikely case of the composite comprising only polymer particles falling within the claim range). How representative the value will be for the whole composition will depend on the particular circumstances, in particular on the nature of the absorbent polymer used and the constitution of the composition as a whole. But the parameter is, nevertheless, capable of being measured and the skilled person will be able to tell if any particular composition falls within the claimed parameter value range. As already indicated, however, the stipulated method of determining the AUL-value will clearly become highly relevant when it comes to evaluating inventive step.

AUL value defined as an open-ended range

[3.2.1] The composition referred to in the claims (see for example Claim 1) must have an AUL-value of greater than 20 g/g. In essence it was argued that this open-ended range was unduly broad so that it would embrace values of AUL which were not yet known and/or it was not known how they could be achieved. In fact, the highest AUL-value in the examples of the contested patent is 30.5 g/g […]. However, the Board does not construe the AUL-value range as claimed, i.e. without defining a specific upper-end, as being unlimited.

[3.2.2] This objection is based on an erroneous interpretation of the subject-matter covered by the claims. It is clear for a skilled reader that a claim such as present Claim 1 including an open-ended range is limited in practice. In fact, values of the parameter not obtainable in practice would not be regarded by the skilled reader as being covered by the claim and thus could not justify an objection of insufficiency of disclosure (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 6th edition 2010, Section II.A. 6.1; see also point 2.3 of T 1018/05 [2.3] and T 297/90 [2.2]). The use of an open-end formulation simply seeks to embrace values which should be as high as can be technically attained above the specified minimum, given the other parameters of the claim.

In the present case there is a clear teaching in the patent specification, including numerous examples, how to achieve compositions with the desired value of absorbency under load greater than 20 g/g. Moreover Claim 1 includes process features (heat treatment of a starting material and its remoisturization with a specific aqueous additive solution), so that the skilled reader would immediately understand the practical repercussions of these limitations, namely that the starting material and the method for the preparation of the water-absorbent powder set the practical limitations for the value of absorption under load.

[3.2.3] The [opponents] did not question the examples in the patent in suit nor did they submit any experimental evidence showing that the invention could not be performed. Consequently, the board is satisfied that the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure with regard to the open-ended range for the AUL is met.

[3.2.4] In reaching this conclusion the board has also considered the decision T 1008/02 [3.3-4]. There, the board concluded that the auxiliary request under consideration did not fulfil the requirements of sufficiency because none of the examples showed the claimed properties, in particular an absorbency under load of “at least 27 ml/g”, and no evidence had been produced that a superabsorbent having inter alia this property was available to the skilled person. Thus, the situation in that case differs from the present case where the patent provides various examples with values of absorbency substantially greater than 20 g/g (e.g., 30.5 g/g).

Performance of the invention so that AUL values 
systematically fall within the claimed range

[3.3.1] The board is satisfied that the experimental part of the contested patent exemplifies compositions with an AUL falling within the claimed range. The board does not dispute the fact that a comparison of the examples in the patent in suit with regard to the AUL-values before and after remoisturization indicates that the AUL-value can either increase […] or decrease […] or even remain the same […]. Nevertheless, the board observes that in all these examples referred to by the [opponents], the measured AUL has a value falling within the claimed range. Thus sufficiency of disclosure cannot be plausibly contested. In particular since commercial products are used as the starting materials […].

[3.3.2] Even if remoisturizing were to decrease AUL of the heat-treated polymer particles, it appears to be an obvious measure to use heat-treated polymer particles with a sufficiently high AUL-value in the first place so that despite a decrease after remoisturizing the AUL-value would still be above the lower limit.

The contradiction between Claim 1 and Claims 6 and 11

[3.4.1] According to independent Claim 1 the composition is remoisturized with a specific aqueous additive solution in the absence of an organic solvent. On the other hand, Claims 6 and 11, both dependent on Claim 1, specify that the aqueous additive solution further comprises a propoxylated polyol, which is, as pointed out by the [opponents], normally considered to be an organic solvent.

[3.4.2] The board accepts that there is a prima facie contradiction between Claim 1 (absence of organic solvent) and Claims 6 and 11 (further comprising propoxylated polyol). Nevertheless, the board considers that a skilled person would understand from reading the claims that, in the context of the present patent, propoxylated polyols are not considered to be organic solvents which have to be excluded. This is in fact supported by paragraph [0017] of the patent specification which describes, in addition to sodium, potassium or aluminium ions, propoxylated polyols as suitable additives, in particular to further bind the fine dust of the final superabsorbent polymer. Thus, the patent specification attributes to the propoxylated polyols a particular function different from the “normal” solvent function.

[3.4.3] In fact this issue relates to clarity, namely the interpretation of the terms used in the claims, rather than to sufficiency of disclosure. In any event, the apparent contradiction is resolvable, as explained above.

Admissibility of additional arguments regarding sufficiency of disclosure

[4.1] With its letter dated 13 January 2011 [opponent 1] filed numerous additional arguments relating to sufficiency of disclosure. The most relevant among these arguments concerned the absence of any disclosure of the method of measuring the water-content of the claimed composition. According to Claim 1 the composition comprises 1 to 10 percent by weight water, based on the total weight of the composition.

[4.2] These new arguments were filed long after [opponent 1’s] reply to the statement of grounds of appeal (filed with letter dated 10 October 2008) and also after the board had issued the summons to attend oral proceedings (11 August 2010). These arguments and lines of attack were therefore submitted very late and would have required amendment to [opponent 1’s] case (Article 13(1) RPBA), as well as prolonging and complicating the appeal. Furthermore, these new arguments are not prima facie relevant. In particular with regard to the method of measuring the required water-content of 1 to 10 wt%, the board observes that the originally filed application […] and the patent specification […] disclose that the moisture-content of the superabsorbent polymer resin is determined by weight loss at 105ºC for 3 hours. This method corresponds exactly to the disclosure of D28 where the following is stated […]:
“Traditionally the determination of moisture in superabsorbent polymers has been obtained gravimetrically after heating the sample at 105ºC for 3 h.”
Thus, apart from the fact that the method of measuring the water-content is disclosed in the patent specification itself, this method even appears to belong to the common general knowledge of a person skilled in the art.

[4.3] In view of the above considerations, the board exercising its discretion power under Articles 13(1) RPBA decided not to allow [opponent] 1 to amend its case and thus to admit the additional arguments relating to sufficiency into the proceedings.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 6 December 2011

T 95/10 – Too Concise


The patent proprietor appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) revoking the opposed patent. He filed a very concise notice/statement of grounds of appeal (cited in the decision).

The Board found the appeal to be inadmissible, for the following reasons:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1] A statement of grounds of appeal only qualifies as such if it deals with the impugned decision and does not only refer to submissions made during the opposition proceedings (established case law of the Boards of appeal, e.g. T 220/83 and T 213/85). There are three reasons for this:

First, the appeal proceedings are not a continuation of the opposition proceedings. They are distinct proceedings wherein all the facts, evidence and arguments that are considered essential may have to be filed anew. The Enlarged Board of appeal has referred to the independent legal nature of the appeal proceedings in its decisions G 10/91, G 9/92 and G 4/93.

Secondly, the statement of grounds of appeal presupposes that the appellant deals with the impugned decision. Just as the EPO has to grant the parties the right to be heard (A 114) by not only noting the submissions of parties but by dealing with them in a visible manner, the request for a legal dialog between the Board, the appellant and the respondents that is made when an appeal is filed requires the appellant to deal with the arguments of the impugned decision which he considers erroneous.

Thirdly, it is necessary that [the statement of grounds of appeal] deal [with the impugned decision] because otherwise neither the Board nor the respondents can understand for which reason the impugned decision is considered erroneous. However, this knowledge is needed if the respondents are to oppose the arguments of the appellant, and the Board is to be enabled to make a factual decision.

[2] In the present case the notice of appeal dated December 10, 2009, makes the following statement:
“The OD has neither taken into account nor even considered our statements regarding novelty and inventive step of July 15, 2009; therefore, it has violated the constitutional (verfassungsmäßig) right to be heard. As a consequence, the appeal is admissible and reasoned.”
[3] Decision T 574/91 has found a statement of grounds of appeal which only contained the indication that the OD had “missed the point in its decision” to be sufficient. This decision cannot be applied to the present case. First, the facts underlying the cited decision show that the appealing patent proprietor had filed a new set of claims together with the statement of grounds of appeal, which, according to the established case law of the Boards of appeal is sufficiently substantiated as such (e.g. T 934/02). Moreover, apparently the factual situation underlying T 574/91 was such that the OD had based the lack of inventive step on one singles reason and, therefore, it was not difficult for the Board of appeal and for the respondents to determine what the appeal was directed at. In the present case, however, the OD has given very carefully drafted and detailed reasons why the European patent was neither novel (in view of D12) nor inventive (D801 and D3; D801 and D9; D802 and D3; D12 and D801 or D12 and D 802). Therefore, the appeal could only have been allowed if none of the cited documents as such or in one of the above mentioned combinations could have led to the revocation of the patent. Therefore, the appellant would have had to deal with these reasons on which the impugned decision was based, as explained in T 213/85.

[4] The Board cannot see why these requirements for the duty to substantiate established by the Boards of appeal in their constant case law “generally and obviously does not guarantee the indispensable level of protection in the instances of the EPO” as the appellant submitted in his letter of March 31, 2011.

[5] However, the appellant does not have to comply with the above requirements for substantiating an appeal if the decision of the OD itself does not deal with the facts and arguments submitted by the appellant during the opposition proceedings (which in itself is already a substantial procedural violation), which resulted in the appellant being caused and enabled to reformulate and to substantiate its arguments filed during the opposition proceedings in the light of the decision. This is exactly what the appellant has submitted by complaining in its notice of appeal that the OD had neither taken into account nor even considered his statements regarding novelty and inventive step filed on July 15, 2009.

In its written submission of July 15, 2009, the patent proprietor comments the three oppositions. As far as the facts and arguments of opponent 2 are concerned, he states, for instance:
“D8 (DE 19 746 563 A) does not disclose an unregulated high-pressure pump. Moreover, D8 does not disclose an control device either, nor does it disclose a high-pressure pipe with a high-pressure reservoir.

Moreover, the connection of a control valve with an injection valve is not disclosed in column 3, lines 39 to 36.”
The OD on its part has precisely analysed the documents referred to by the opponents. When dealing with document D8 mentioned just before, the OD explains briefly, but clearly, where and why it considers the features mentioned by the patent proprietor (high-pressure pump, control device, high-pressure pipe with a high-pressure reservoir, connection of a control valve with an injection valve) to be disclosed in D8. When doing so, the decision of the OD refers to items that are found either in the description or in the drawings. Therefore, the Board is of the opinion that it cannot be affirmed that the OD when taking its decision has neither taken into account nor even considered the – anyway, very brief and general – submissions of the patent proprietor contained in his letter dated July 15, 2009.

[6] In its decision the OD has dealt with all the documents referred to by the opponents and given them due regard. Based on this appreciation it has held the European patent to be neither novel nor inventive. Therefore, a statement of grounds of appeal would have required the appellant (patent proprietor) to deal with the OD’s analysis and to try to disprove all the lines of argument used by it. However, the appellant has not done this for any of the lines of argument. […]

The appeal is dismissed as inadmissible.

To download the whole decision (in German), click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Monday, 5 December 2011

T 571/08 - Plausible


The opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the opposed patent in amended form.

Claim 1 before the Board read (in English translation):
1. A centrifuge comprising a trough (2), a rotor (3) intended to be arranged in the trough (2), and means (4) for driving the rotor (3) in rotation about a central axis of rotation (A) at speeds greater than 10.000 rpm, wherein a number n of seats (81, 82, 101 and 102) for receiving a product to be centrifuged are provided in the rotor, the seats being arranged eccentrically relative to the axis of rotation, characterised in that the geometric image (I) of at least a first seat (81), through a geometric rotation about the axis of rotation (A) in a first direction of rotation (S1) and an angle of 360°/n, is different from a second seat (101) which directly follows the first seat (81) in the first direction of rotation (S1), wherein the seats (81, 82, 101, 102) are of a substantially analogous shape, elongate in a respective longitudinal direction (D), and in that the second seat (101) is substantially the image, through a geometric transformation, of the geometric image (I) of the first seat (81),and in that said geometric transformation comprises a geometric rotation by a non-zero angle (α) in a plane orthogonal to the axis of rotation (A) and/or a geometric translation by a non-zero distance (d) in a plane orthogonal to the axis of rotation (A), the direction of the translation being inclined with respect to the longitudinal direction (D) of the geometric image (I) of the first seat.

In what follows the Board dealt with an alleged prior use that had only been invoked when the appeal was filed.

*** Translation of the French original ***

Admissibility of new evidence

[1.1] Together with its letter dated December 12, 2007, the [patent proprietor] has filed new sets of claims in the form of auxiliary requests, in view of the oral proceedings (OPs) held on January 16, 2008.

In its decision, the OD has considered that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the second auxiliary request was novel and inventive. In particular, the OD has considered that the technical feature according to which there are means for driving the rotor in rotation about a central axis of rotation at speeds greater than 10.000 rpm supported inventive step […]. This lower limit for the speed or rotation was decisive for the decision of the OD […].

This technical feature was not comprised in the claims of the patent as granted and first appeared in the main claim of the second auxiliary request.

[1.2] Therefore, the [opponent] was first confronted with a new technical feature about one month before the OPs.

The [patent proprietor] considers that the [opponent] had enough time for carrying out the necessary search and find, at this stage of the proceedings, documents that were only submitted together with the statement of grounds of appeal.

The Board notes that the [opponent] was faced with this question on short notice at the end of the year, which is a period where the workload is always increased in companies, especially in the accounting and finance departments which are concerned by such a search, because of the end of the financial year in the one hand and the end-of-the-year holidays of the staff on the other hand.

Searching for evidence for a prior use is not easy and often very time-consuming for the persons concerned. As a rule, it is necessary to find somebody who recalls the prior use. The staff concerned has to precisely recall what has been sold and when. Sometimes the date is imprecise at first. In such cases it is necessary to carry out searches in different directions in order to find documents concerning the sale and the delivery as well as documents establishing what has been sold. In view of the priority date, the documents concerned go back several years and, therefore, were not necessarily easily accessible. Quite often different documents are kept in different departments and places.

Thus the Board comes to the conclusion that the evidence did not necessarily have to be submitted before or during the OPs before the OD. The Board considers that in view of the new auxiliary requests filed shortly before those OPs, the documents, which are part of a response to one of those requests, have not been filed belatedly. The [opponent] has introduced these documents providing evidence for this prior use as soon as possible, i.e. together with his statement of grounds of appeal, in response to the decision of the OD accepting the auxiliary request comprising the above mentioned additional feature.

[1.3] The [patent proprietor] considers that the [opponent] should have requested a postponement of the OPs before the OD. The Board cannot accept this argument. First, the [patent proprietor] has indicated, in response to a question of the Board, that he might have objected to such a postponement. Moreover, the [opponent] had arguments concerning a lack of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter, based on documents that were already part of the proceedings. It was, therefore, not clear that such a postponement was necessary.

[1.4] The appeal is based in particular on a new prior use consisting in the sale of a particular rotor. In what follows the Board will refer to a “rotor sold” without making clear each time that there is only an allegation of a sale. This is done only for the sake of easier drafting and reading of the reasons for the decision and should not be taken as an indication that the Board considers that it has been proven that the rotor under consideration has actually been sold and delivered before the priority date.

[1.5] When a decision has to be taken on whether a prior use is to be admitted and whether the case has to be remitted to the first instance, the relevance of the prior use may play a role. The Board does not have to arrive at the conclusion that the prior use is proven but only that the evidence is sufficient for justifying an examination by the OD. Therefore, a remittal cannot be understood as a decision that the prior use has been proven.

[1.6] Regarding the technical features of the sold rotor, the evidence offered consists in drawing D6 and the proposal to hear Mr Wende as a witness.


The Board notes that drawing D6 as such does not form part of the prior art; therefore, one cannot simply decide on what is disclosed in this document. The drawing is evidence concerning the technical features of the rotor sold. Thus the document has to be examined in order to establish the technical features of the rotor sold.

According to the drawing it appears that the rotor has room for 12 strips (“Streifen”) each of which has twelve seats (which can be seen on the drawing and which are mentioned in documents D7 and D8). The orifices giving access to the seats of each strip are arranged along a straight line. Therefore, it is at least possible to interpret the drawing such that the axes of the seats a strip are parallel to each other. This appears to be the case for the two seats of different strips that are shown in section. If the axes of the seats of a strip are parallel to each other the rotor has the technical features of the rotor defined in claim 1 (see also figure 3 of the patent).


However, the drawing apparently does not exclude that the axis of the seats are oriented towards the axis of the rotor, that is to say that they might not be parallel to each other in radial sections. In this case, the rotor would not have the technical features of the rotor defined in the claim. However, in this case there would have had to be another figure in the technical drawing showing the particular orientation of the seats, because this is not a simple schematic representation but a production drawing intended to be used for providing all the relevant information on the whole rotor, its lid and how the lid is attached. The fact that there is no such drawing might be evidence supporting that the seats of a strip are all parallel to each other.

Therefore, the prior use appears to be relevant because if it is concluded that for the rotor shown in drawing D6 the axes of the seats of a strip are parallel and if it is decided that the rotor has been made available to the public, these elements might have an impact on the novelty and/or inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1.

It may also be relevant in view of novelty and/or inventive step to establish whether the indication of 14.000 rpm (“14000/min”) that is apparent on the drawing was also present on the rotor sold.


The drawing constitutes evidence supporting this theory, but it remains to be decided whether the evidence is sufficient and whether the witness offered could possibly contribute to establishing this element.

If it is decided that the rotor sold had the indication “14000/min” apparent in the drawing, it is possible that this could have an impact on the novelty and/or inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1. The impact on novelty appears to depend on the actual features of the centrifuge in which the rotor was mounted. Apparently there is no evidence for the use of the rotor so far.

[1.7] Moreover, it is necessary to consider whether the rotor sold was delivered before the priority date.

First it has to be established whether the indications for the delivery (delivery slip D7, invoice D8 and VAT certificate D11) as well as the general considerations concerning the reliability of the sender and the usual duration of transit are sufficient proof. The Board is of the opinion that in principle these indications may be sufficient but it does not decide that they are sufficient in the present case.

Then it has to be established whether the indications of sending together with the information contained in the extract from the bank statement (annual account D9) are sufficient proof that the rotor has been received, and when. A payment that clearly corresponds to the purchase of a well-defined object may indeed contribute to supporting the assertion that the object has been received. However, such a payment is not necessarily tantamount to an acknowledgement of receipt because it can happen that an accounting department pays a bill independently of the notification of receipt of the object, which may be incumbent on another department.

Document D6 has number 12104. Document D7 has the same number 12104, as well as number 2001-14804 as reference for the confirmation of the order (“Auftragsbestätigung”) and number 2001-05953 as registration number (“Belegnummer”). Document D8 also has number 12104 as well as number 2001-05953 as certificate of dispatch (“Lieferschein”) and number 2001-35609 as registration number (“Belegnummer”). Document D10 has number 12104. Document D11 has number 2001-14804. Therefore, apparently those documents may be linked together.

The amount mentioned in invoice D8 is 716.17 €, which may be reduced by 2% to 701.85 € if the payment is made within less than 14 days. However, the amount mentioned in the bank statement D9 is 1400.71. The [opponent] has indicated that this difference may be explained by the fact that the amounts in invoice D8 are given in euros whereas the amount given in the extract from the account D9 is in Deutsche Mark, considering that the latter is exactly 1.95583 times greater than the first, which corresponds to the conversion rate from Deutsche Mark to Euros that is mentioned in D10.

Moreover, it has to be noted that the article bearing reference 12104 in D10 is associated with reference 1-5K/2-16/K15, which is different from the reference 1-15K;2K15 associated with reference 12104 in D6 but identical to the indication in D4. This is an indication for the centrifuges with which the rotor can be used (“suitable for” in D10). This is consistent with the reference 12104 in price list D10 which applied as from March 2001, corresponding to D4 established on September 8, 2000, as D4 not only has number 25032 but also number 12104 as reference to the list of items (“Stückliste”). Drawing D6 has been established before July 2001 and, because of the engraving concerning the maximum speed of rotation may refer to list of appropriate centrifuges that is different from the list on D4 and D10. Therefore, the fact that the indication in D10 is different from the one in D6 is not inconsistent.

The Board notes that the finding that the pieces of evidence are linked does not necessarily prove that they are sufficient. However, the Board considers that the evidence is at least plausible for establishing a prior use. It may also be that the offered witness might contribute to the evidence.

[1.8] Therefore, the Board has come to the conclusion that the prior use that has been asserted for the first time in the appeal proceedings may be relevant and admits documents D6 to D11 into the proceedings.

As you might have guessed, the Board then remitted the case to the OD for further prosecution.

To download the whole decision (in French), click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

I owe the knowledge of this decision to the 2011 FNDE meeting in Lyon. To my best knowledge, I have not presented it before on this blog. ;-)

Saturday, 3 December 2011

T 467/08 – No Way


The patent proprietor filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) revoking the opposed patent.

In what follows the Board deals with the request of opponent 03 to disregard comparative test results filed by the patent proprietor during the opposition proceedings :

[1.2] [Opponent] 03 requests the Board to disregard the comparative test results filed by the appellant with letter of 22 October 2007 for being late filed. With this, the [opponent] 03 in essence wants the Board to exclude a party’s submission made in the opposition proceedings retrospectively; this was confirmed by the professional representative of the [opponent] 03 when asked by the Board during the oral proceedings (OPs).

However, neither the EPC itself nor the RPBA provide for such a decision of the Boards of Appeal. The Boards of Appeal can merely review a decision taken by the OD concerning the admittance or non-admittance of late filed submissions, documents and requests filed in those earlier proceedings, or it can decide whether or not to admit submissions, documents and requests filed in the appeal proceedings.

[1.2.1] The former is subject to certain limitations.

Having regard to the somewhat contradictory setting of limits by the OD in its summons to OPs (22 October 2007) on the one hand and in the annexed communication (two months before the date of the proceedings, i.e. 22 September 2007) on the other hand, the Board can only establish that the issue of whether or not the comparative test results should be admitted into the opposition proceedings has been discussed at the OPs of 22 November 2007 before the OD as derivable from points 3 and 4 of the minutes of the OPs. The minutes, however, do not mention any result of this discussion except the statement that “the Proprietor is allowed to file any document to defend his case upto [sic] the limitation date set by the OD”.

Since the decision under appeal is entirely silent on this issue, the Board is not in a position to review whether and how the OD exercised its discretion. However, the Board cannot - as requested by the [opponent] 03 - put itself in place of the OD and review as such all the facts and circumstances. That is not the function of the Boards of Appeal (see G 7/93 [2.6]).

In contrast, the fact that the issue was discussed during the OPs and that the OD did not take an explicit decision to refuse to admit the comparative test results leads the Board to the conclusion that said submission of the appellant was part of the opposition proceedings.

The two cited decisions T 569/02 and T 718/98 concern two cases different from the present wherein very shortly (i.e. one month and about one week, respectively) before the date of the scheduled OPs before the Board experimental evidence and other documents were submitted by parties, which then in accordance with the established case law decided not to admit these documents into the proceedings (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 6th edition 2010, chapter VII.C.1.3.4).

[1.2.2] Remains the question whether there are reasons to not consider the appellant’s submission of 22 October 2007 and its test results in the appeal proceedings.

The Board could reject a party’s submission merely within the framework of Articles 12 and 13 RPBA. However, none of the prerequisites provided for in said Articles are met:

As a consequence of the conclusion that said submission was part of the opposition proceedings it cannot be late filed in the appeal proceedings according to Article 13 RPBA. For the same reason they cannot be eliminated by the Board on the basis of Article 12(4), 1st alternative RPBA. In addition to this, they were not (explicitly) rejected by the OD and, therefore, cannot be disregarded on the basis of Article 12(4), 2nd alternative RPBA. Neither can it be held that the [opponent]s did not have sufficient time to react to them and to produce, if necessary, their own comparative tests, as they have been filed more than three years ago.

In this context it is to be noted that according to Article 12(2) RPBA the reply to the appeal should contain the [opponent’s] complete case. In this respect [opponent] 03 chose to limit itself to argue solely on the admissibility of this submission but not on its content. That is the choice of the [opponent]; however, it cannot expect the Board to provide intermediate rulings on such requests so as to facilitate the [opponent’s] decision whether to react in substance to such a submission or not.

[1.2.3] Taking account of the above deliberations the Board cannot accede to [opponent] 03’s request to exclude from the present proceedings the test results and further submissions based on it.

To download the whole decision, click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Friday, 2 December 2011

T 2377/09 – Alternative Grounds


In order to have the appeal fee reimbursed, the appellant has to convince the Board that the first instance proceedings were affected by a substantial procedural violation (unless R 103(b) applies, that is), but the existence of such a violation will not always make the reimbursement equitable within the meaning of R 103(a), as the present decision reminds us.

Claim 1 of the Euro-PCT under consideration read (in English translation):
A method for measuring the shape of a reflective surface with a system which comprises at least one pattern for reflection at the reflective surface and at least one camera for viewing, pixel by pixel, the pattern which is reflected at the surface , wherein the position and the orientation of the camera and of the pattern as well as the viewing direction of the camera for each pixel are known, wherein, from the viewing directions of the camera, which are known for the pixels, and the positions of the pattern, which correspond to the mapping of the reflected pattern on pixels of the camera, the surface angle and the surface height are determined for the purpose of measuring of the shape, wherein for the accurate determination of the surface height a linear object of known shape is arranged in front of the pattern such that at least one point of the linear object covers a point of the pattern, the spatial position of the object being known, wherein subsequently a plane is determined from the known viewing direction of the pixel which maps the point of the pattern, and the point of the pattern, and [wherein] the point is established as the point of intersection of the thin object with the plane, and the basis point [is established] as the point of intersection of the known viewing direction of the pixel which maps the point of the pattern with the straight line passing through the point of the pattern and the point.

The ED objected to this claim, which led the applicant to amend the claim by replacing the two occurrences of “linear object” by “thin object of known shape” and “thin object”, respectively.

The ED then rejected the application because
(1) claim 1 was unclear (A 84) because it is impossible to determine the point of intersection of a thin object, which can also be a sheet, with a plane;
(2) the description referred to alternative embodiments that were contradictory to the claimed subject-matter (A 84), which were irrelevant for the understanding of the invention or even made it more difficult (R 48(1)(c)); and
(3) the description had not been adapted to the claims (R 42(1)(c)).

The applicant filed amended claims and an amended description and requested reimbursement of the appeal fee. He pointed out that the ED had not exercised its discretion under A 94(3) as it should have (“.. as often as necessary …”). The Guidelines (C-VI 4.6) stipulated that the DE had to contact the applicant if there were further deficiencies.

The ED granted interlocutory revision but did not grant the request for reimbursement, which was transmitted to the Board.

Here is the provisional opinion of the Board, which has become definitive because the applicant did not comment on it and had withdrawn his request for oral proceedings:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[1] First it is to be noted, with respect to the repeated submissions of the appellant concerning the Guidelines, that the ED has a certain discretion to depart from the general directives in a particular case, as long as it remains within the bounds defined by the EPC. Therefore, the question that is decisive here is whether the ED has acted in accordance with the provisions of the EPC, and not whether it has correctly applied the Guidelines (see e.g. T 162/82 [9]).

The […] submissions of the appellant all converge to the question to be examined here, i.e. whether the refusal of the application was a violation of the provisions of A 113(1) EPC 1973 and/or those of A 94(3).

[2] In its first objection the ED objected, inter alia, that the subject-matter of claim 1 then on file was unclear (A 84 EPC 1973) because the claim was directed at a method comprising, inter alia, the determination of the point of intersection of a linear object with a certain plane, without specifying that the spatial position of the object was known, so that the determination of the point of intersection was impossible (Notification dated February 19, 2009, point 2.2).

When responding to this notification of the ED, the appellant filed an amended set of claims, on which the decision to refuse the application is based. Inter alia, claim 1 was amended such that the feature “the spatial position of the object being known” was incorporated. However, the claim was also amended by replacing the expression “linear object” by the expression “thin object”.

In the reasons for its decision, the ED noted that claim 1 as amended was unclear because the point of intersection of a thin object, which could, for instance, have the shape of a sheet, with a plane cannot be determined because the intersection of a sheet with a plane is a line rather than a point. The ED came to the conclusion that the objection raised in its notification had not been completely overcome because it was still impossible to determine the point of intersection ([…] point 1 of the reasons).

First, the Board notes that the objection raised in the notification (indefiniteness of the point of intersection of a plane with a linear object of unknown position) and the objection raised in the decision (indefiniteness of the point of intersection of a plane with a thin object) are based on the same legal basis (i.e. the requirement of clarity enshrined in A 84 EPC 1973) and on the same conclusion (i.e. the impossibility of determining the point of intersection within the framework of the respective claimed method) but also on different facts (a linear object of unknown position vs. a thin object of known position) and on different technical considerations (the indefiniteness of the point of intersection due to the unknown position vs. the indefiniteness of the point of intersection as such, because the form of the intersection of a thin object of known position with a plane depends on the cross-sectional shape of the object and, as a rule, does not correspond to, or allow to determine, a point.

However, as the “grounds” within the meaning of A 113(1) EPC 1973 comprise, not only the legal, but also the essential factual grounds on which a decision is based (see e.g. T 187/95 [8] and T 105/93 [6]) and as the essential facts and the technical considerations on which the objection of lack of clarity raised in the decision, regarding the determination of the point of intersection is based, significantly differ from those on which the corresponding objection in the notification of the ED is based, the decision was based on grounds which the appellant had no opportunity to comment. De facto the notification of the ED invited [the appellant] to clarify claim 1 such that the spatial position of the object was known in order to overcome the objection of indefiniteness of the point of intersection (points 2.2 and 2.10 of the notification) and claim 1 was amended by the appellant as proposed by the ED […]. The fact that the application was refused on the same ground of indefiniteness of the point of intersection must have come as a surprise to the appellant because the objection is based both on new facts (the replacement of the expression “linear object” by “thin object” in claim 1) and on new technical considerations that had not been communicated to the appellant beforehand.

Therefore, the Board agrees with the appellant that the decision of the ED, insofar as it is based on the grounds mentioned above, was taken in violation of the right to be heard pursuant to A 113(1) EPC 1973 and, therefore, is flawed by a substantial procedural violation.

[3] However, it also has to be noted that the decision to refuse [the application] is also based on additional grounds […] that are independent from the grounds mentioned above and which do not give rise to a substantial procedural violation.

In particular, the ED had also raised objections pursuant to A 84 and R 71(1)(c) and R 34(1)(c) EPC 1973 in its sole notification and has substantiated them by referring to several passages of the description (point 2.9 of the notification) that these passages were contradictory to the claimed invention and did not contain claimed alternative embodiments, which resulted in these passages making the claims unclear (A 84 and R 27(1)(c) EPC 1973) or being irrelevant for understanding the claimed invention (R 34(1)(c)). These objections essentially correspond to the factual and legal grounds on which the alternative […] main grounds of the impugned decision are based.

When responding to the notification, the appellant has, inter alia, filed amended pages of the description and has pointed out that the amendments comprise an adaptation of the introduction of the description to the claims as well as clarifications “marking the parts of the description that do not belong to the invention” and that “the corresponding passages of the description […] were not deleted in order not to lose necessary connections which also belong to the disclosure and which make it easier to understand the invention”. However, the ED found those amendments and the arguments of the appellant insufficient for overcoming the above mentioned objections raised in the notification, as can be seen from points 2 and 3 of the reasons for the decision. The Board is of the opinion that these objections were sufficiently clear to allow the appellant to adapt the description accordingly.

Moreover, the appellant has not requested oral proceedings or other requests (e.g. amendments presented in the form of auxiliary requests) which could have safeguarded the appellant’s position.

It follows that
  • the appellant had been granted the right to be heard pursuant to A 113(1) EPC 1973 regarding the factual and legal grounds on which the alternative […] main grounds for the decision were based, and
  • the Board cannot see any circumstances – and the appellant has not made any concrete assertions – from which it would have to be concluded that the ED would have had to give the appellant a further opportunity to comment on the same […] objections mentioned above or that it has exercised its discretion arbitrarily or in a way that failed to comply with the requirements of the rules when taking its decision – as far as the [further] objections mentioned above are concerned – immediately after the response to the first notification (see T 161/82 [11]).
In this context it has to be noted that a further written notification of the ED pursuant to A 94(3) would have had to essentially repeat the objections raised in the first notification, which goes beyond the requirements of A 94(3). Therefore, it is irrelevant for the question that is dealt with here that the refusal of the application occurred after only one notification of the ED. The Board shares the opinion of the appellant according to which it would have been appropriate [for the ED] to call the appellant in order to inform him of the factual situation and to warn him that the application might be refused under those circumstances ; however, this course of action is not mandatory under the EPC and its absence cannot result in a substantial procedural violation pursuant to R 67 EPC 1973.

The further submissions of the appellant according to which several objections under A 84 and R 27(1)(c) raised by the ED were incorrect cannot support the appellant’s point of view because what matters in the assessment of whether there has been a procedural violation is whether the procedural requirements enshrined in the EPC were complied with, and not whether the objections raised by the ED were correct or convincing, as the case may be (see “Case Law of the Boards of appeal”, 6th edition, 2010, VII-E 17.4.5.

[4] In view of the above explanations the Board is of the opinion that a reimbursement of the appeal fee is not equitable pursuant to R 67 EPC 1973 based on the above mentioned procedural violation alone because the decision to refuse the application was also based on alternative grounds which […] do not give rise to any substantial procedural violation and which would in any case have required the appellant to file an appeal in order to obtain that the decision be set aside (see T 893/90 [5.3], T 219/93 [6], T 4/98 [13.3] and T 978/04 [4]).

To download the whole decision (in German), click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.