Saturday, 19 November 2011

T 715/09 – Classy


The inventive step assessment carried out in this decision contains an interesting statement on patent classification.

The Opposition Division maintained the opposed patent in amended form. Claim 1 of the request found allowable read as follows :

A glow plug for diesel engines, comprising:

  • a metal tubular body (12) provided with means (14) for fixing it to the cylinder head of an engine;
  • a metal sheath (24) carried by a the tubular body (12) and driven with interference into a cavity (16) of the tubular body;
  • a first electrical terminal (30) connected to a heating resistor (33) set inside the aforesaid sheath (24);
  • a second electrical terminal (32) electrically connected to the sheath (24); and
  • means for electrical insulation of the metal sheath (24) from the metal tubular body (12), wherein said sheath (24) comprises a layer (36) of insulating material applied on a portion (34) of the outer surface of said sheath (24),
characterized in that said layer (36) of insulating material is applied by means of plasma deposition.

The Board examined whether this claim involved an inventive step :

[4.2.4] The claimed glow plug differs from the embodiment shown in Figure 4 of E3 only that the coating of insulating material has been applied by plasma deposition.


Objective Problem

[4.3] E3 simply states that the insulation is formed by a ceramic coating and no indication is given as to how the coating is to be applied […]. The objective problem to be solved is therefore, as formulated by the [opponent], to select a suitable method for coating the metal sheath, bearing in mind that the coating lies between two parts that are held together by means of an interference fit.

Solution

[4.4.1] Plasma deposition is a generally well known technique for coating objects with a ceramic layer that is hard and wear resistant, but the question is whether it is obvious to use plasma deposition for applying the insulating coating as described in E3.

Documents E7, E8 and E9 all describe the manufacture of glow plugs in which a ceramic coating step carried out by plasma deposition.

[4.4.2] E7 discloses a glow plug having a metal sheath (17) and a tubular body (11) that corresponds to tubular body (12) of the disputed patent. The metal sheath (17) extends beyond tubular body (11), and in this region it is coated with two insulation layers (23 and 27); a heating element (24) is sandwiched between these layers. These insulation layers are applied by plasma deposition. Hence plasma deposition is known for coating the metal sheath, albeit not in the region between the metal sheath and the tubular body which, as pointed out by the [patent proprietor], is coated with glass.

[4.4.3] E8 also concerns a glow plug and describes coating the plug by plasma deposition with a protective layer to protect the plug from the corrosive environment. Use of such a coating to form an insulating layer between a metal tubular body and a sheath is not described.

[4.4.4] E9 describes the application of a coating (20) by plasma deposition to the surface of a glow plug (see last paragraph on page 5). The coating (20) is porous and is intended to reduce the effects of thermal gradients (see sentence bridging pages 4 and 5); it is applied on top of a dense, abrasive resistant, insulating coating (13); it is not said how the latter coating (13) is applied.

[4.4.5] The skilled person reading E3 is looking for a means for applying the insulating coating. None of the documents E7, E8 or E9 explicitly discloses plasma deposition of an insulating coating in the region between the tubular body and sheath of a glow plug, hence the opposition division concluded that the claimed subject-matter had an inventive step.

[4.4.6] In addition, the [patent proprietor] submits that the skilled person versed in the art of glow plugs would not, as part of his common knowledge, be aware of plasma deposition technology. Support for this submission is that glow plugs and surface treatment techniques are in two completely different classes according to the international patent classification scheme, namely F23Q7/00 and C23C respectively. The Board disagrees for the following reasons.

IPC classification alone is no reason for determining whether or not two pieces of prior art can be combined. The mere fact that two documents have the same classification is no reason for saying the combination of the teachings is obvious (see T 745/92 [1.4]). Likewise the mere fact that the technologies have been given different IPC classes does not necessarily mean that they cannot be combined.

[4.4.7] In the present case E7 to E9 indicate that it is well known to use plasma deposition in the manufacture of glow plugs. Faced with the problem of finding a suitable method for applying the insulation coating shown in Figure 4 of E3, the skilled person would first turn to known methods in the field of glow plug manufacture.

Aware that plasma deposition generally provides hard, wear resistant ceramic coatings, it does not require any inventive activity for the skilled person to select this technique for making the glow plug of Figure 4 of E3.

[4.5] Consequently, the glow plug of claim 1 lacks an inventive step.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Another decision dealing with classification can be found here.

Friday, 18 November 2011

R 3/10 – A Misunderstanding


Oops, they did it again: another petition for review has been granted!

The patent proprietor filed a petition for review after Board 3.2.04 had revoked his patent in decision T 136/09. He complained that he had not had an opportunity to comment on inventive step during the OPs that led to the revocation for lack of inventive step.

The Enlarged Board (EBA) found the petition to be sufficiently reasoned and to comply with R 106. It then dealt with the allowability of the petition:

[2.1] It is undisputed by the parties that the discussion of the main request in the oral proceedings (OPs) only turned on novelty. The course of the discussion was that the representative of the opponents was invited to speak first. He presented his arguments against the novelty of the main request. When he had done so, the representative of the petitioner was invited to respond. He explained why he thought the main request was novel. The questions raised by the Board only concerned aspects related to the issue of novelty. It is, furthermore, undisputed that when thereafter closing the debate, the Chairman indicated that the Board would decide on patentability.

[2.2] The petitioner’s submission is that, when the Chairman closed the debate, in the circumstances of the case the petitioner had no reason to assume that the Board would decide on more than had been discussed so far orally, which was only whether the main request was novel.

[2.3] In the signed declarations of the persons who attended the OPs before the Technical Board on behalf of the petitioner it is indicated that the Chairman opened the discussion by stating that the Board would like to discuss novelty, but that in the opening remarks the Chairman gave no indication that novelty and inventive step were to be discussed together. Furthermore, when closing the debate after the parties’ submissions on novelty, the Chairman stated “that the Board will decide on patentability” but nothing was specifically or explicitly mentioned about the Board’s intention to decide on both novelty and inventive step of the main request.

[2.4] In the minutes of the OPs one of the reasons given for dismissing the objection raised by the proprietor (after the announcement of the decision concerning the main request) is:
“The objection was dismissed by the Board, by pointing out that before the closing of the debate on the main request, the Chairman has explicitly stated that the Board will decide on both novelty and inventive step, …”.
There is, however, no direct entry in the minutes stating that before closing the debate the Board had informed the parties that the Board will decide on both novelty and inventive step.

In point 2 of the reasons for rejecting the request for correction of the minutes, which were issued in close temporal connection with the OPs, the circumstances in question are described in a different manner. It is said therein,
“Further, the Board is of the firm opinion that the Chairman indeed expressly stated that the issue of patentability will turn on both novelty and inventive step. This statement was made not only before closing the debate, but also at the commencement of the debate concerning the main request.”
It emerges from the terminology used that these remarks mainly refer to what was said at the commencement of the debate. The expression “patentability will turn on novelty and inventive step” makes no sense as a statement made after the discussion with the parties, when closing the debate.

[2.5] More importantly, however, the statement that the issue of patentability will turn on both novelty and inventive step cannot on an objective view be understood as meaning that novelty and inventive step were to be discussed and decided together. It can in fact mean no more than it says - that both issues are to be discussed and decided. Neither in the minutes nor in the reasons for rejecting the petitioner’s request for correction is it stated anywhere that the Board had informed the parties before or after the discussion on novelty that the discussion of and/or the decision on novelty and inventive step would take place together.

[2.6] It appears that, as a result of the Board’s statement that the issue of patentability would turn on novelty and inventive step, a very unfortunate misunderstanding arose. While the Board may have intended to Say that novelty and inventive step would be discussed together and decided together, that was not, or at least not clearly, expressed. The Board’s statement in fact only told the parties that novelty and inventive step were both issues to be discussed and, that being the apparent meaning of the statement (see point [2.5] above), the petitioner assumed accordingly that both those issues would be discussed before any decision was taken. That the petitioner did not understand that the Board intended to discuss and decide both issues together is also apparent from its representative’s answer “no” to the Chairman’s question, before he closed the debate after the discussion on novelty, whether the parties had any further comments. The same answer “no” from the representative of the respondents, who had also only addressed the Board on the issue of novelty of the main request, can have done nothing to alleviate the petitioner’s misunderstanding. Thus the petitioner only presented arguments on novelty because he thought, understandably, that there would be an opportunity later to address the Board on inventive step, in the event that the Board should acknowledge novelty and that a discussion of inventive step should thus become necessary. Such an expectation was all the more justified, since in its communication accompanying the summons to OPs, the Board had itself dealt with novelty and inventive step as separate points, its reasoning on each of those points having been based at least partly on different prior art and different arguments.

[2.7] In Chapter 1 of Part II of the EPC the term “patentability” covers a variety of potential objections; the Chairman cannot have meant to address all those objections when he used the term “patentability”, since most of them had never been a subject of the appeal proceedings. Hence, it is clear that the meaning to be attributed to the word “patentability” depends on the context in which it is used. Considering the circumstances of the present case set out above it has to be acknowledged that, when the debate was closed after the discussion on novelty, the petitioner had no reason to assume that the Board’s decision would address more than had been previously discussed orally, i.e. novelty.

[2.8] According to A 112a(2) (c) ( 5 ) the petition for review is allowable, and hence must be allowed, if a fundamental violation of A 113 EPC occurred in the appeal proceedings.

Whether or not that is the case must be determined on an objective basis.

It is not relevant that the Board did not deliberately deny the petitioner the opportunity to speak on inventive step. It appears clear that in the present case the members of the Board thought that the parties did not wish to make separate submissions on that issue and, once a formal decision on the main request had been given, there was no possibility for the Board to reopen the debate on inventive step.

The boards of appeal have constantly held that determining whether a substantial procedural violation justifying the reimbursement of the appeal fee has occurred in first instance proceedings (R 103(1) (a) EPC, R 67 EPC 1973), is to be decided exclusively on an objective basis (J 7/83, J 32/95, T 405/96 making reference to further decisions, T 400/02).

A “substantial procedural violation” is an objective deficiency affecting the entire proceedings (J 32/95 [4.1], making reference to earlier decision J 7/83). As the Legal Board of Appeal acknowledged in decision J 32/95, there can be a substantial procedural violation even if the deciding body acted in good faith. It does not imply that the deciding body should be reproached in any way.

Thus, a substantial procedural violation was e.g. acknowledged to have occurred in cases in which a request for OPs had not reached the file and, the deciding body not knowing that OPs had been requested, the decision was taken without OPs (T 405/96 [2], T 400/02 [2-3]).

Such an objective approach must also be applied when it comes to determining whether a fundamental violation of the petitioner’s right to be heard within the meaning of A 112a(2)(c) occurred. It is therefore not relevant that it was not the deciding Board’s intention in any way to deprive the petitioner of its right to be heard orally on the issue of inventive step.

[2.9] In the present case it cannot be denied that the violation of the petitioner’s right to be heard orally was objectively a fundamental one. As a result of the misunderstanding between the Board and the petitioner as to which aspect the Board’s decision on the main request would address and of the Board having announced a formal decision on the lack of inventive step, the petitioner had no possibility to speak on inventive step at all. Since the Board’s decision rejecting the main request was based only on lack of inventive step, while its novelty was acknowledged, the negative decision on the main request was exclusively due to the denial of inventive step by the Board.

[2.10] In the OPs before the EBA the respondent argued that in the case under appeal the relevant considerations for the assessment of inventive step were very close to the discussion having taken place on novelty. It could at best be said that claim 1 of the main request was just novel but it was then clearly obvious. In the context of review proceedings the EBA is not entitled to go into the merits of a party’s case. It is not entitled to assess whether or not and to what degree, if any, a party’s standpoint which it alleges it would have taken had it been given the opportunity to present it, would have been well founded. More importantly, however, in the context of determining whether a party’s right to be heard has been violated, this is not a relevant issue. The right to be heard is a fundamental right of the parties which has to be safeguarded, irrespective of the merits of the party’s submissions. The necessity to respect it is absolute and therefore cannot be made dependent on a prior assessment of the merits of the party’s submissions, which in the present case would involve an assessment of the degree of likelihood that the arguments of the petitioner would have convinced the Board to acknowledge inventive step.

It is the very essence of the right to be heard that the party is given a full opportunity to defend its case and to persuade the deciding body that its position is the correct one. This right would be undermined if it were made dependent on an evaluation as to whether the party’s standpoint is likely to be justified.

In order to answer the question of whether a fundamental violation of the petitioner’s right to be heard occurred as a result of the petitioner’s not having been heard on inventive step, it is therefore irrelevant whether the respondents are right in their assessment of the clear obviousness of the claimed solution.

[2.11] In a case such as the present, in which the ground of opposition, i.e. lack of inventive step, on which the revocation was based, was not discussed at all in the OPs, it is also irrelevant that that issue was discussed in writing between the parties.

The purpose of OPs is to allow each party to make an oral presentation of its arguments, to allow the Board to ask each party questions, to allow the parties to respond to such questions and to allow the Board and the parties to discuss issues, including controversial and perhaps crucial issues. The value of OPs is that matters may as a result be clarified and the Board may ultimately be satisfied that a party’s position is the right one, although it was not so satisfied by the written submissions alone.

Subject to the exception made in A 116(2) for OPs before the Receiving Section, the right of any party for OPs to be held on request and to present its case orally is absolute. It is, with respect to the party’s right to be heard on its case, a more specific embodiment of the general principle enshrined in Article 113(1) EPC, but is by no means subordinate to the latter provision or less important in any respect.

According to the established jurisprudence (see e.g. T 125/89 [7]) the parties’ absolute right to be heard in OPs, A 113(1) and A 116(1), is not restricted to new and substantial arguments which have not yet been presented in writing. Therefore, the fact that the petitioner made submissions on inventive step in writing is not a valid reason for denying that the petitioner’s right to be heard under A 113 was violated in a fundamental manner, as a result of its not having had the opportunity to present its arguments orally on the decisive issue of inventive step, entailing the rejection of the petitioner’s main request.

[2.12] For these reasons, the decision under review has to be set aside and the proceedings have to be reopened, in order to give the petitioner the opportunity to present its arguments on inventive step orally. The petitioner’s further objection, that the impugned decision relied on arguments which had not previously been put to the petitioner, need therefore not be dealt with here.

[3] Pursuant to R 110 the fee for the petition for review shall be reimbursed.

You can download the whole decision and have a look at the file wrapper here.

Thursday, 17 November 2011

T 45/10 – Gotta Be Right


The patent proprietor appealed against the decision of the opposition division (OD) revoking the patent under consideration ; claims 1 of the main request and the second auxiliary request on file was found to lack inventive step.

During the oral proceedings (OPs) before the Board, the patent proprietor filed a main and five auxiliary requests.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board was very similar to the second auxiliary request on which the OD had decided (additions underlined):
1. A honeycomb structural body (30) made of a columnar porous ceramic block (35) of silicon carbide in which a large number of through holes (31a, 31b) are placed in parallel with one another in the length direction of the said through holes with a wall portion (33) interposed therebetween,
wherein
said large number of through holes comprises: a large-capacity through hole group and a small-capacity through hole group, the total sum of the areas of the through holes constituting the said large-capacity through hole group on a cross-section perpendicular to the length direction of the said through holes being greater than the total sum of the areas of the through holes constituting the said small-capacity through hole group on the said cross-section,
each of said through holes in the large-capacity through hole group is sealed at an end on an exhaust gas outlet side of said honeycomb structural body and has an open end on an exhaust gas inlet side, each of said through holes in the small-capacity through hole group is sealed at an end on an exhaust gas inlet side of said honeycomb structural body and has an open end on an exhaust gas outlet side, and
a surface roughness (greatest height) Ry, measured based upon JIS B0601, of the wall face of said through holes is set in a range from 10 to 100 μm,
wherein
a density of the through holes on a cross-section perpendicular to the length direction is set in a range from 15.5 to 62 pcs/cm2, and
wherein
the large number of through holes are constituted by two kinds of through holes, that is, large-capacity through holes each of which has a relatively greater area on a cross-section perpendicular to the length direction of the said through holes and small-capacity through holes each of which has a relatively smaller area on said cross-section perpendicular to the length direction of the said through holes, and
wherein
the shape of a cross section of a through hole perpendicular to the length direction of each of the through holes is an octagonal shape for each of the large-capacity through holes and a quadrangle shape for each of the small-capacity through holes.
The Board found the none of the requests to be admissible and revoked the patent.

Here is what it had to say on the main request:

Procedural aspects

[2.1] In the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the requests made during the first instance proceedings were no longer pursued. All requests filed in the written phase of the appeal proceedings, whether with the grounds of appeal or following receipt of the communication of the Board (annexed to the summons to OPs), comprised an amended claim 1 containing additional features with regard to the manufacturing process of the honeycomb body and with respect to the functioning of the honeycomb body when in use.

[2.2] Contrary thereto, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request as filed during OPs and now under consideration is substantially identical to the subject-matter of claim 1 of the second auxiliary request before the OD (the only amendments being the limitation to silicon carbide as material for the ceramic block and the specification of the method for determination of the surface roughness Ry). The amendments made in all requests filed in the written phase of the appeal proceedings thus included additional features which were then the subject of objections in the appeal proceedings. These additional features were then in effect deleted as the result of the new request filed during OPs. In this way, claim 1 has been broadened significantly with respect to claim 1 of the various requests filed during the written phase of the appeal proceedings. Thus, the framework of the appeal would be altered completely if the new main request were to be admitted.

[2.3] Article 12(1)(a) RPBA states inter alia that appeal proceedings are to be based on the notice of appeal and statement of grounds of appeal filed pursuant to A 108. So far as concerns an appellant, Article 12(2) RPBA requires that the statement of grounds of appeal should contain its complete case and set out clearly and concisely the reasons why it is requested that the decision under appeal be reversed, or amended, and should specify expressly all the facts, arguments and evidence relied on.

[2.4] According to Article 13(1) RPBA, it lies within the discretion of the Board to admit any amendment to a party’s case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply and states that “the discretion shall be exercised in view of inter alia the complexity of the new subject-matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy.”

Application of these procedural principles to the main request

[3.1] Comparing the subject-matter of claim 1 with the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted, the subject-matter of dependent claims 2, 3 and 5 has been added. Such subject-matter corresponds essentially to the subject-matter of claim 1 of the second auxiliary request before the OD, which was found to lack an inventive step.

[3.2] Beyond these amendments, claim 1 has been further limited to specify the material of the columnar porous ceramic block as being silicon carbide, and the surface roughness has been defined as being “measured based upon JIS B0601”.

[3.3] Such specification of the material of the porous ceramic block and the insertion of the determination method do not prima facie alter the reasons which were given by the OD concerning lack of inventive step of the then second auxiliary request. It is also noted that A1, used by the OD as a starting document for the problem/solution approach, already cites in its paragraph [0016] silicon carbide as a suitable ceramic material. Hence, this amendment is prima facie not appropriate for overcoming the objection of lack of inventive step. The insertion of the determination method for the surface roughness has no influence on the reasons for the refusal of the patent either. The OD already implicitly assumed such a determination method in its reasoning. Accordingly, the reasons given by the OD for its finding of lack of inventive step still apply prima facie and have not been commented on otherwise during the written appeal proceedings.

[3.4] When taking into account the proposed amendments/deletions of features in claim 1, it is clear that they raise issues which neither the Board nor the other parties could be expected to deal with since the appeal had not been based at all upon such subject-matter. In order to be admitted, any late-filed request should, for procedural economy reasons at least, be prima facie allowable, which is not the case here in view of the subject-matter having been held non-inventive by the OD. 

[3.5] Neither in the statement of the grounds of appeal nor in any subsequent submission did the appellant explain why the decision of the OD on inventive step of the second auxiliary request should be overturned. The appellant’s argument that sections 3 to 5 in the grounds of appeal equally applied to the requests before the OD is not convincing.

Section 3 refers in particular to the functional feature relating to the release of ashes, which feature was not present in the first instance requests.

Section 4 specifically comments on the improvements added via the manufacturing process of extrusion moulding, which feature was also not present in the requests before the OD.

Section 5 adds further statements concerning the mechanism to remove ashes and hence only provides arguments for the functioning of the honeycomb body when in use.

Thus, all arguments previously filed in the appeal proceedings concern the impact of additional features.

Although not decisive, it may also be added that D25 highlights the function of removing ashes as a crucial feature of the invention and compares the exfoliation of ashes when applying silicon carbide sheets in comparison to cordierite sheets. However, this test is not related to a honeycomb structural body having the claimed features and is also not related to the use in an exhaust gas purifying device. Therefore, the test results of D25 lack relevance for the claimed subject-matter.

[3.6] Furthermore, the communication of the Board had already highlighted clarity objections to the amended features. Hence, in view of the maintenance of similar features in all subsequent written submissions, it could not have been expected that a request deleting these features would have to be considered at the OPs for the first time.

[3.7] If the request were admitted, the Board as well as the parties would be faced for the first time with new arguments as to why this claimed subject-matter would be inventive and why the OD’s decision was incorrect. Accordingly, the deletion of these features has the effect of changing the appellant’s case from that set out in the grounds of appeal and in a direction which, objectively, could not be expected. Such a request and supporting arguments could have been submitted earlier and their submission is thus not consistent with the requirements set out in Articles 12 and 13 RPBA.

[3.8] Hence, the Board exercised its discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA not to admit the main request.

Note that the Board presumes the inventive step assessment carried out by the OD to be correct: a claim equivalent to a claim found to lack inventive step by the OD is considered to be prima facie unallowable.

To download the whole decision, click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Wednesday, 16 November 2011

T 1456/06 – All Things Considered


Both the patent proprietor and the opponent appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) maintaining the opposed patent in amended form.

The Board found the main request and the first auxiliary request not to comply with the requirements of A 123(2). It then examined the second auxiliary request, and in particular its compliance with A 123(3).

The relevant claims of the file as granted read:
1. A polynucleotide comprising a sequence encoding a polypeptide capable of exhibiting a telomerase catalytic activity when associated with a telomerase RNA and which is:
(a) a polynucleotide having the sequence of the insert of plasmid ATCC 209016; or
(b) a polynucleotide which hybridizes to (a) under stringent conditions; or
(c) a polynucleotide which hybridizes to SEQ ID NO 3 or SEQ ID NO 8 under stringent conditions; or
(d) a polynucleotide sequence which is degenerate as a result of the genetic code to the sequences defined in (a) or (b).

44. The use of a polypeptide obtainable by expressing the polynucleotide of claim 1 in a vector of claim 5 or an immunogenic fragment thereof in the preparation of a vaccine capable of eliciting an immune response.

46. An immunogenic peptide of human telomerase protein, said peptide comprising at least 8, optionally at least 10, amino acids of a human telomerase protein encoded by the polynucleotide of claim 1 for use in medicine.

47. The use of an immunogenic peptide of human telomerase protein, said peptide comprising at least 5, optionally at least 8 or at least 10, amino acids of a human telomerase protein encoded by the polynucleotide of claim 1 for the manufacture of a medicament for the treatment of a condition mediated by cells expressing high levels of telomerase.
The second auxiliary request introduced some amendments:


Did the deletion of the reference to the “at least 8 amino acids of a human telomerase protein” violate A 123(3), as argued by the opponent?

The OD did not think so when it discussed the then first auxiliary request:


And the Board came to the same conclusion:

[21] Claim 46 of auxiliary request 2 […] is identical to claim 47 of auxiliary request 1 in opposition proceedings. In the decision under appeal, the OD held that, although the feature “..., comprising at least 8 amino acids of a human telomerase protein …” had been deleted in the amended claim 47, the scope of the claim had de facto remained the same. Consequently, the OD found that A 123(3) was not contravened. This finding has been contested by [the opponent].

[22] Albeit for different reasons, the board reaches the same conclusion as the OD.

[23] A 123(3) rules that a European patent may not be amended in such a way as to extend the protection it confers. According to the established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, the legal notion of “protection conferred” in A 123(3) does not necessarily refer to the scope of protection of each single claim as granted, but rather to the totality of the protection established by the claims as granted as a whole. Thus, in order to assess whether or not an amendment introduced to the claims as granted offends against A 123(3), the question to be decided is whether or not, in comparison to the claims as granted, the protection conferred by the totality of the claims has been extended (see decision T 579/01).

[24] In the present case, the board is persuaded that, although the deletion of the feature “..., comprising at least 8 amino acids of a human telomerase protein ...” may possibly result in a different scope of amended claim 46 compared to that of claim 47 as granted from which the amended claim is derived, the protection conferred by the totality of the claims as granted has not been extended by the amendment because the subject-matter of amended claim 46 is within the scope of protection conferred by the patent as granted.

[25] Amended claim 46 is directed to the use of an immunogenic peptide of the human telomerase according to the invention for the manufacture of a medicament “... for the treatment of cancer by eliciting a Class I MHC restricted cytotoxic lymphocyte response against cells expressing high levels of telomerase”. In the board’s judgement, a medicament which elicits a lymphocyte response is nothing else than a vaccine. Thus, in other words, amended claim 46 is directed to the use of an immunogenic peptide of the human telomerase for the manufacture of a vaccine, in particular a therapeutic vaccine (“... for the treatment of cancer ...”) which elicits a specific type of immune response, namely a Class I MHC restricted cytotoxic lymphocyte response.

[26] Claim 44 as granted was directed to the use of an immunogenic fragment of the human telomerase according to the invention in the preparation of a vaccine capable of eliciting an immune response. Claim 44 as granted was not restricted to the treatment of a particular disease or to a specific type of immune response, as it is the case in amended claim 46. Thus, the more limited subject-matter of amended claim 46 falls within the scope of claim 44 as granted. The slight difference in wording between the two claims (amended claim 46 reads “... for the manufacture of...” instead of “... in the preparation of ...” as in claim 44 as granted) does not appear to have any significance with regard to the claim scope. If anything, the wording “... in the preparation of ...” in claim 44 as granted could be considered to have a broader meaning.

[27] For these reasons, [the opponent’s] argument that, as a result of the amendment introduced into claim 46, the protection conferred by the patent has been extended, cannot be accepted.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, you can do so by clicking here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 15 November 2011

T 2198/08 – One Too Many


In the present case the Opposition Division (OD) had revoked the opposed patent for lack of novelty over some A 54(3) prior art.

The request on file before the OD contained 16 claims: claims 1 to 7 were directed at a process for dyeing a textile fabric with indigo and claims 8 to 16 to a system for exploiting this dyeing process.

Before the Board of appeal, the patent proprietor filed three requests.

The main request consisted of eight claims. Claims 1 to 7 were identical to the claims on which the OD had based its decision and another dependent claim 8 was added. The features of newly added claim 8 were taken from system claim 9 of the set of claims before the OD.

Auxiliary request I had a claim 1 corresponding to a combination of claims 1 and 8 of the main request.

Auxiliary request II corresponded to claims 1 to 7 of the set claims on which the OD had based its decision.

The Board found the main request to be inadmissible:

*** Translation of the French original ***

[3] The main request comprises a new dependent claim 8. It has been established by the case law of the Boards of appeal (6th edition, 2010, VI.D.4.1.3a) that the addition of a dependent claim cannot possibly be a response to an objection that the claimed subject-matter (the process of claim 1) is not patentable because it neither limits nor amends the subject-matter claimed in the relevant independent claim (claim 1). As a consequence, the addition of claim 9 is not allowed and the main request is inadmissible (R 80).

Auxiliary request I was then found to be allowable and new and the case was remitted to the OD for further prosecution.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Monday, 14 November 2011

T 386/08 – Eighty-three Issues


Both the patent proprietor and the opponents appealed the decision of the Opposition Division maintaining the opposed patent in amended form.

The claims on file were directed at a particular humanized antibody, or fragment thereof.

The Board found the main request on file to violate A 123(2) and the first auxiliary request to lack clarity because of the expression “a light chain framework sequence substantially identical to a native human light chain framework”.

The decision contains some interesting paragraphs dealing with the sufficiency of disclosure of auxiliary request 2:

A 83

[43] The patent discloses in SEQ ID Nos. 11 and 12 (describing sequences of the variable and constant regions for the heavy and light chain of the humanized antibody) the sequence of a specific humanized antibody having CDR sequences as recited in claim 1 and modified human framework sequences. In particular, the framework sequences of the heavy chain variable region framework according to SEQ ID No. 12 are derived from the human germline VH segment DP53 and J segment JH4 with amino acid substitutions according to the Queen procedure (see paragraph [0040] of the patent). The light chain variable chain framework according to SEQ ID No. 11 originates from the human germline Vkappa segments DPK18 and J segment Jkappa1 with amino acid substitutions according to the Queen procedure […]. This exemplified humanized antibody is the one denoted as “Hu266” (see paragraph [0112] of the patent).

[44] The patent moreover discloses in SEQ ID Nos. 7 and 8 […] positions labelled as “XAA” which denote potential sites of variation of the sequence of the specifically disclosed Hu266 antibody. More precisely, ten and eight sites, respectively, for modification in the light and heavy chain variable regions are listed in SEQ ID Nos. 7 and 8 with two to three and two to four, respectively, possible amino acid substitutions at each of those sites.

[45] Thus, the patent discloses not only one, but many examples. The opponent does not contest that the skilled person is able to obtain Hu266 and its disclosed derivatives.

[46] The opponent’s argument however is that, because the framework sequences are defined in claim 1 as framework sequences from a human immunoglobulin light or heavy chain, this claim does not only encompass the specifically disclosed antibody Hu266 and its disclosed derivatives, but also humanized antibodies with framework sequences unrelated to the exemplified one.

[47] According to the opponent these variants (in the following “variants at issue”) cannot be obtained when following the disclosure in the patent. The reason is in the opponent’s view that the only method for the preparation of humanized antibodies disclosed in the patent is that developed by Queen et al. This method requires knowledge of the sequence of the non-human donor antibody from which the CDRs are derived. However, the sequence of, in the present case, the mouse donor antibody Mu266, is not disclosed in the patent (nor in the prior art) and there is no disclosure either in the patent or in the prior art of how humanized antibodies could be obtained without knowledge of the sequence of non-human donor antibody. Thus, the opponent concludes that the disclosure in the patent, even when taking into account common general knowledge, does not enable the skilled person to carry out the invention over its whole claimed scope and therefore, the requirements of A 83 are not fulfilled.

Burden of proof

[48] The opponent has suggested that in a case such as the present where neither the patent nor the prior art expressly disclose how to obtain particular embodiment of the claim, it should not be for the opponent to prove that the variants at issue cannot be obtained, but rather the burden should be on the patentee to prove that the variants at issue can be obtained.

To support its view the opponent refers to decisions T 792/00 and T 397/02 and argues that the patentees have not provided evidence that the invention is enabled with respect to the variants at issue.

[49] The board in T 792/00 [9] alludes to the general rule that
“he who asserts something positive has the burden of proof”
and concludes thus that
“if a patentee asserts that an example in a patent works as stated, and an opponent denies this, it is up to the patentee to provide proof. However, if the example contains a complete experimental protocol and the patentee affirms that the results reported have been obtained, a Board is likely to accept that the patentee has done enough to shift the burden of proof to the opponent to provide a repeat of the experiment to show that it does not, in fact, work as stated. Finally, however, the board must be satisfied, considering all the evidence, that the example works as stated.”
[50] The board in decision T 792/00 considered that the burden of proof was on the patentee because (i) the claimed invention went against a prevailing technical opinion and (ii) the patent contained only an example which was expressly labelled as a hypothetical experimental protocol.

[51] In the case underlying decision T 397/02 the board emphasized that the invention did not consist in adapting an already known method to make it simpler or more efficient, but the claimed method was conceptually different from the approach taught in the prior art (see point 12 of the reasons). There was one example, but it was not suited to show that the claimed subject-matter was enabled (see point [7] of the reasons), i.e. an example was in principle absent. As is apparent from points [13] to [16] of the decision, the board in that case considered that these were circumstances where the proprietor had to demonstrate that the claimed invention worked because, since it was not convinced of the patentee’s arguments that the invention worked, it denied sufficiency of disclosure.

[52] The circumstances of the present case are different from those dealt with in decisions T 792/00 and T 397/02 insofar as the concept of and methods for humanization are known and can, from a technical point of view, be applied to each antibody donor-acceptor pair, i.e. also to a humanized donor-human acceptor pair […]. The opponent’s submission that there is no disclosure that any-one has applied the known method to this particular situation does not necessarily establish that there was a prevailing opinion that this could not be done. In addition, the patentees submit that there was no obstacle.

[53] In the present board’s view, the situation in the case at issue here rather coincides with the situation mentioned by the board in T 792/00 [10] – a situation which was considered not to be present in case T 792/00:
“[I]n the special situation where an opponent accepts that the invention can be carried out as stated in the examples, but alleges that there are other circumstances where something falling under the claim cannot be carried out, then Boards of Appeal would normally expect the opponent to provide concrete evidence of this (cf. Latin legal tag “Qui excipit, probare debet, quod excipitur” : he who raises an objection should prove it)”.
[54] In conclusion, in the board’s view, in the present case it is the opponent who should prove that the variants at issue cannot be made.

Enablement

[55] It is established case law that the disclosure of a European patent is only considered as sufficient in the sense of A 83 if the skilled person is able to obtain substantially all embodiments falling in the ambit of the claim (for example, decisions T 409/91 and T 435/91).

[56] Yet, the concept of “sufficiency of disclosure over the whole scope of the claim” does not mean that, for a disclosure to be considered as sufficient, it has to be demonstrated that each and every conceivable embodiment of a claim can be obtained.

[57] This is explicitly acknowledged in decision G 1/03. The Enlarged Board of Appeal states in point [2.5.2] of the reasons that if a claim comprises “non-working” embodiments this may have different consequences with regard to the fulfilment of the requirements of A 83, depending on the circumstances. There may be situations where the specification contains sufficient information on the relevant criteria for finding appropriate alternatives (“variants”) over the claimed range with reasonable effort. Under these circumstances the non-availability of certain variants encompassed by the claim at the priority date is considered immaterial for the sufficiency of disclosure.

[58] An example where this was not so is the case underlying decision T 601/05. In that case the board found that a whole class of compounds falling under the terms of a claim - antibodies binding with a high affinity to TNF alpha - could not be produced on the basis of the teaching in the patent and/or the common general knowledge and that the class concerned was the very class which was particularly aimed at by the scientific community. Moreover, also the single example disclosed in the patent was an antibody which did not have high affinity (see points [24] to [44] of this decision).

[59] The present situation differs however from that in case T 601/05 in that the present patent describes quite a number of appropriate alternatives and in that the allegedly non-obtainable variants are “hypothetical” variants.

[60] Taking into account the above mentioned case law and in view of the number of examples given the patent, the board comes to the conclusion that the requirements of A 83 are fulfilled.

[61] Since most of the parties’ arguments in relation to sufficiency of disclosure dealt with the question of whether or not the variants at issue, humanized antibodies with framework sequences unrelated to the exemplified one, could be made, the board has nevertheless considered the situation that the present case was one where the requirements of A 83 could be considered as fulfilled only if there was evidence that the variants at issue could be made. Starting from this assumption, the board agrees with the opponent that these variants cannot be obtained by following the “classical” Queen-procedure disclosed in the patent, because this procedure requires knowledge of the non-human donor sequence.

[62] However, this finding would be irrelevant for sufficiency of disclosure as long as the skilled person knows other ways of making the variants at issue. It is established case law that the skilled person may use his/her common general knowledge when it comes to carrying out an invention.

[63] Thus, the question is whether or not there is any other way available to the skilled person by which the variants at issue could be made. The board can only come to the conclusion that the requirements of A 83 are not fulfilled, if it is convinced that there is not a single method for obtaining the variants at issue.

[64] The opponent argues that the variants at issue cannot be made by, for example, a) a modified Queen procedure, i.e. by applying the Queen-technology to humanized antibody Hu266 as the donor antibody or b) by random site-directed mutagenesis or c) by reconstruction of the mouse sequence and subsequent application of the Queen method.

[65] It is established case law that an objection of lack of sufficiency of disclosure only succeeds, if there are serious doubts that claimed subject-matter is enabled, and these doubts are supported by verifiable facts.

[66] As for example to method a) above, the opponent submits that screening the database of human germline immunoglobulin sequences for sequences with highest identity - this is a central step of the Queen procedure - with the sequence of the humanized Hu266 would result in the provision of sequences with an identity that was much lower than that which would result if the database was screened with the sequence of the mouse parent antibody. It appears that the opponent’s implicit conclusion is that the identity is in fact so low that the framework would not be suitable to properly support the specific CDRs from the mouse parent antibody Mu266 and that therefore an antibody constructed with these low-identity frameworks would not have a useful affinity and may even have lost the binding specificity.

[67] The opponent – who has the burden of proof, see points [48] to [57] above – has not provided, for example, tangible evidence that homology-screening with the humanized antibody Hu266 would result in finding only framework regions with a sequence identity that was lower in relation to the original mouse antibody framework sequence than the identity of sequences that would be found if screening was made with the parent antibody Mu266. Even if this was assumed to be so, there is also no evidence that the retrieved sequence, even if it had a lower identity, would not properly three-dimensionally position the specific CDRs of the Mu266 antibody.

[68] It appears that there have been cases where the grafting of CDRs to framework sequences which were not selected on the basis of sequence identity resulted in functional humanized antibodies. It is reported in, for example, document D7 on page 4285, in the middle of the second column and document D18B page 70, in the middle of the first column, that simple transplantation of CDRs without changes to framework residues resulted in antibodies with the expected specificity and affinity:
“In some cases, transplanting hypervariable loops from rodent antibodies into human frameworks is sufficient to transfer high antigen binding affinity (16, 18) whereas in other cases it has been necessary to also replace one (17) or several (20) framework region (FR) residues.”; “[a]lthough CDR grafting was successful in some cases [10,11], [...]”.

[69] Evidence allowing the verification of alleged facts may vary in nature according to each case, i.e. experimental data are certainly not always necessary as a means of proof. However, in the present case, as in particular shown by the observations in point [67] above, without such experimental data the board cannot verify the facts alleged by the opponent.

[70] Thus, the board is not convinced that the variants at issue cannot be obtained by a “modified” Queen procedure or the procedures referred to in documents D7 or D8.

[71] The opponent has relied on decisions T 792/00 and T 397/02 to support its case. However, in both cases sufficiency of disclosure was denied because not a single embodiment could be obtained on the basis of the disclosure in the patent and even less on the disclosure in the prior art. Thus, these cases do not help in the present situation where the question of the obtainability of a particular embodiment is at stake.

[72] Thus, even assuming that the present case was one where the requirements of A 83 could be considered as fulfilled only if there was evidence that the variants at issue could be made, the board would come to the conclusion that no case of lack of sufficiency of disclosure has been made.

[73] The requirements of A 83 are fulfilled.

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Saturday, 12 November 2011

T 971/10 – Substantially Circular


This appeal deals with the refusal of the application under consideration by the Examining Division (ED).

Claim 1 of the application as filed (which was also claim 1 of the main request before the Board) read:
1. A gas-liquid contacting tray suitable for horizontal mounting in a normally vertical column, which tray comprises
  • a tray plate with substantially circular circumference and having top and bottom surfaces, which tray plate is provided with passages for gas between the bottom and the top surface, and on which tray plate two semi-circular tray sections are defined by a virtual diametrical line of the tray plate; and
  • a total of three downcomers for guiding liquid from the top surface of the tray plate to below the tray, each downcomer extending from an inlet opening arranged in the tray plate to a downcomer outlet opening below the tray,
wherein two of the downcomers are arranged in the corners of one of the semi-circular tray sections, and wherein the third downcomer is arranged on the other tray section substantially along a radius of the tray that is perpendicular to the diametrical line.
The ED held that the claim features “substantially circular” and “substantially along a radius” did not fulfil the requirement of clarity of A 84.

The applicant also filed an auxiliary request wherein these features were deleted.

Main request

[1.1] According to A 84 the patent claims must define the subject-matter for which protection is sought and be clear. The importance of the clarity requirement is due to the necessity of legal certainty, as the purpose of the claims is to enable the protection conferred by a patent to be determined (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 6th edition, 2010, chapter II.B). Insofar, the Board agrees with the appellant.

In the present case, the question at issue is whether the expressions “substantially circular circumference”, “substantially along a radius of the tray”, “normally vertical column” and “substantially conforming to the circumference of the tray” mentioned in the claims to define a gas liquid contacting tray fulfil the above requirements.

[1.2] The appellant admitted that the terms in question introduce a certain level of unclarity but was of the opinion that this level did not exceed the one generally inherent in patent claims. Their deletion would unjustly limit the patent protection since it was clear from the description of the application that the trays need not be exactly circular.

By referring to decisions T 198/01 and T 386/07, the appellant argued that the term “substantially” was found clear in decisions of the Board of Appeal. There was no reason to apply to the present claims the requirement of clarity more strictly than usual. Decision T 728/98 cited by the ED did not apply in the present case since the feature “circular” was not essential for delimiting the present invention from the prior art.

[1.3] The Board agrees with the appellant insofar as decision T 728/98 does not seem to be relevant for the present case. In this decision, it was found that the term “substantially pure” used to define a chemical compound was unclear. On a first sight, it might appear that the term “substantially pure” would display the same “level of clarity” as the terms “substantially circular” and “substantially along a radius”. However, upon deleting the expression “substantially” it is apparent that the term “pure” in relation with a chemical compound is still vague as it does not define any particular level of purity. In contrast, the terms “circular” and “along a radius of the tray” define a particular geometry of a physical device.

The Board further agrees that it would be unfair to restrict the claimed subject-matter to “perfectly” circular trays.

However, as is established in R 35(12) EPC (1973), last sentence, patent applications should contain only technical terms which are generally accepted in the field in question. Accordingly, for the purpose of A 84, a particular technical term has to be given the meaning it usually has in the particular technical field concerned.

This means that in the field of gas-liquid contacting apparatuses the term “circular” used for defining the shape of a tray never means ‘exactly’ or ‘perfectly’ circular but only circular within those tolerances which are usual in the manufacture of such apparatuses. The same applies to the term “along a radius of the tray” used to define the location of the third downcomer.

As a consequence, the use of the term “substantially” in combination with “circular” and “along a radius” suggests that deviations are included which are larger than those accepted tolerances. Since there is no explanation of what the deviations might be, the terms become vague and undefined with the result that it is no longer possible to determine the extend (sic) of protection conferred by the application (see also decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal G 2/88 [2.5]).

On the contrary it might appear to be intended that the application shall include future embodiments, not thought about at the application date, since the application in suit does not disclose any other than a circular shape of the trays or any other arrangement of the third downcomer than along a radius of the tray.

The same arguments apply to the term “normally vertical column” when compared with the definition given on page 84 of “The Petroleum Handbook” filed by the appellant during the examining proceedings and to the term “substantially conforming to the circumference of the tray” used in dependent Claims 5 to 7 of the main request.

Concerning decisions T 198/01 and T 386/07, the Board observes that the assessment of clarity is dealt with in a different manner. In particular, those decisions do not consider the fact that the meaning of technical terms in claims is neither absolute nor theoretical but governed by what is generally accepted in the technical field in question.

Further, the compositions of the Boards of Appeal vary from case to case, depending on the specific technical field. Hence, the assessment of the merits of a case may also vary to a certain degree due to different approaches with respect to the assessment of technical features. There cannot be an ultimate right for an equal assessment in all cases since such assessments are generally subject to mental development.

[1.4] Having regard to the above, the Board concludes that the claims of the main request do not comply with the requirements of A 84 since the terms “substantially” and “normally” render the claimed subject-matter vague.

The Board then found the auxiliary request to be clear and remitted the case to the ED for further prosecution.

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Friday, 11 November 2011

T 75/09 – Don’t Look Away


The present appeal deals with the refusal of an application by the Examining Division (ED).

The core issue was clarity/sufficiency of disclosure, and in particular the definition of the parameter “through plane thermal conductivity”

The way in which the ED had handled the requests on file triggered some general observations by the Board:

[2] In view of the course of the examination proceedings before the ED, and in particular the different conclusions drawn by the ED with regard to the different requests of the applicant, but also the [applicant’s] argument [according to which the introduction of a further limiting feature reduced the importance of the measurement of the thermal conductivity with regard to A 83] the Board deems it appropriate to add some more general observations concerning the examination of a case like this, before turning to the [applicant’s] individual requests.

[2.1] As set out […] in the minutes of the oral proceedings (OPs) before the ED on 31 January 2008 and in […] the annex to the Communication under R 71(3) (hereinafter “the Annex”), the ED had taken the view that all requests higher ranking than the sixth auxiliary request filed at the OPs could not be allowed for the reason of lack of clarity. In the decision under appeal […], this view was again confirmed with regard to the main request and first auxiliary request […].

[2.2] The reason for this finding was explained with regard to Claim 1 of the main request in […] the decision now under appeal […]:
[3.15] Since the determination of the “thermal conductivity” is significantly dependent on the measurement conditions used, the indication of the measurement conditions is part of the clear definition of the parameter “thermal conductivity”, and hence of the clear definition of the claimed product in accordance with A 84.

[3.16] This lack of information results in uncertainty as to the definition of the parameter “thermal conductivity”, and therefore said parameter cannot limit the subject-matter of claim 1 of the [main request] in any clear way. In other words, claim 1 is not clear as required by A 84.
Despite the identification of the measurement “according to ASTM Method D5930” in its Claim 1, the same conclusion had been drawn with respect to the first auxiliary request in […] the Annex and confirmed in […] the decision under appeal […], because the measuring temperature had not been defined in its Claim 1. Furthermore, this conclusion had also been drawn with regard to Claim 1 of the third auxiliary request […]. Consequently, the ED had held that neither auxiliary request complied with A 84.

[2.3] Moreover, based on the statement “the parameter ‘thermal conductivity’ would remain the only distinguishing feature and thus this claim would remain unclear” or in similar words […], the ED had come to the same conclusion with regard to each of the second, fourth and fifth auxiliary requests.

[2.4] By contrast, the ED had indicated in the Communication under R 71(3) that it deemed the sixth auxiliary request to be in compliance with the requirements of the EPC.

[2.4.1] A closer look at Claim 1 of this request shows that it contained a combination of features which had as such also been incorporated in those higher-ranking auxiliary requests and which had been considered there as not being suitable for overcoming the objection under A 84 EPC against those requests […]:


[2.4.2] In view of the reasoning for the refusal of the main and the first auxiliary request in the decision under appeal and additionally for the second to fifth auxiliary requests in the Annex, the Board can only conclude that the ED had apparently taken the view as regards the sixth auxiliary request
  • that the above objection of lack of clarity in respect of the definition of the thermal conductivity could be left aside/disregarded, because the “thermal conductivity” did not “remain(s) the only distinguishing feature” (with respect to the prior art) and
  • that, therefore, a patent could nevertheless be granted despite this lack of clarity in both independent claims of this request.
[2.5] However, such an approach is not, in the Board’s opinion, in accordance with the requirements of the EPC.

[2.5.1] A 18(1) states that “The EDs shall be responsible for the examination of European patent applications”, i.e. in all its aspects.

[2.5.2] The articles of the EPC relevant to the examination proceedings as a whole are organised in different Parts and Chapters of the Convention. Thus, Part III “The European Patent Application”, Chapter I “Filing and requirements of the European patent application” contains A 75 to A 86, whilst A 52 to A 57 concerning the grant of a patent, in general, and novelty, inventive step and industrial application, in particular, are found in Part II “Substantive Patent Law” Chapter I “Patentability”.

[2.6] In view of this structure of the EPC, the Board takes the view that articles in one chapter of the EPC concern requirements different from those defined in articles of the other chapter of the EPC and that, consequently these different requirements have to be treated separately and independently from one another.

[2.7] It follows that the assessment of the substantive requirements for grant, i.e. novelty, inventive step and industrial application, can only be brought to a meaningful and appropriate end, in particular can only result in the grant of a patent, after any problems concerning (i) the “Filing and requirements of the European patent application” as such and (ii) the “Common provisions governing procedure” (Part VII Chapter I of the EPC), namely those laid down in A 123(2), have positively been solved.

This implies, in the Board’s opinion, that any problems concerning the requirements of A 83 (sufficiency of disclosure) and of A 84 (requiring the claims to be clear and concise and supported by the description - without making in this respect any distinction between independent and dependent claims) and, in the case of amendment, those of A 123(2) have to be dealt with independently from and prior to the question of patentability.

[2.8] Moreover, it should be kept in mind that a feature in an (independent or dependent) claim, which prima facie does not appear to be relevant for the decision on patentability at any time during or at the end of the examination procedure, may at a later stage in the life of the granted patent, e.g. in opposition proceedings under A 99 before the EPO or in revocation proceedings before a court under A 138, become highly relevant or even decisive for the validity of the European patent.

However, a deficiency concerning the requirements of A 84 is neither a ground for opposition before the EPO under A 100 EPC nor a ground for revocation under A 138(1). Consequently, such a deficiency cannot be dealt with, let alone remedied in either proceedings.

Reference can be made in this respect to established jurisdiction, namely to the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal G 9/91 [19] and e.g. decisions T 301/87 [3.8] and T 690/00 [4.1], cf. also Chapter VII.D.4.2 in the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 6th edition, 2010).

[2.9] In other words, where - as in the present case - there are multiple requests and a feature common to all requests is held not to meet the requirements of A 84, as a consequence of which higher ranking requests are refused, all lower ranking requests retaining this feature have to be refused for the same reason.

The fact that in a lower ranking request the offending feature no longer has to be relied upon to establish a distinction over the prior art does not overcome the defect pursuant to A 84. Nor does it give the deciding body the discretion to disregard the deficiency.

In particular it has to be borne in mind that the significance of a feature may become apparent only at a later stage in the life of a patent, e.g. in opposition or revocation proceedings.

The appeal was finally dismissed because the cited ASTM standard and, as a consequence, the application did not explain how to measure thermal conductivity through a plane, and, therefore, violated A 83.

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