Thursday, 10 November 2011

T 334/08 – No Surprise


When requests filed by the patent proprietor one month before oral proceedings (OPs) have not been transmitted to the opponent, will this have an effect on the admissibility on the requests? That is one of the questions the Board had to deal with in the present case.

The patent proprietor filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division maintaining the opposed patent – the claims of which were directed to flame-retardant epoxy resins and flame retarders for epoxy resins – in amended form.

He filed new requests at the beginning of the OPs. In what follows, the Board discusses the admissibility of those requests.

*** Translation of the German original ***

[3.1] At the beginning of the OPs the [patent proprietor] has filed a new main request and new auxiliary requests 1 and 2.

[3.2] The [opponent] criticized the new requests as late filed and requested [the Board] not to admit them into the proceedings. In particular, the [opponent] argued that he had only become aware of the written submissions of the [patent proprietor] dated February 24, 2011, on March 18, 2011, i.e. six days before the OPs, by precautionary inspection of the EPO “on line” file. The [patent proprietor] had not communicated those submissions to him and he had not received the corresponding communication of the registrar (Geschäftsstelle) dated March 4, 2011, until that date. Therefore, he had been surprised such that he had not been able to sufficiently familiarize himself with the new requests, consulting his client – both had ignored the new requests when meeting at the beginning of March – and to file appropriate comments. Moreover, there was no justification for the late filed requests because the factual situation had not changed for more than four years. Also, the submission dated February 24, 2011, did not explain to which extent these requests met the objections of the Board. The [opponent] referred to decisions T 755/96, T 1105/98, T 401/02 and T 153/85 in order to support his plea.

The [opponent] also referred to the complexity of the amendments, in particular of the amended main request and the second auxiliary request. For example, independent claim 16 of the main request introduced a new feature (a phosphor content of at least 50% by weight chemically bonded to the epoxy resin). In view of the great number of claims of the original main request and the different alternatives comprised therein, this amendment was practically tantamount to introducing a feature of the description and, therefore, led to a new factual situation for the assessment of which the [opponent] had not had enough time. In this context the [opponent] referred to decision T 681/02. The second auxiliary request contained amendments which had never been filed before in this form. Moreover, it was not to the point because it was not clear which objections it was intended to meet. The claim still contained the compound DOP, which was also disclosed in document D6 in view of which the [patent proprietor] wanted to delimit [the claims].

[3.3] The admission of late filed requests into the proceedings is within the discretion of the Board (article 13(1) and (3) RPBA). According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal, complexity of the new subject-matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy submission are decisive criteria [to be taken into account] when exercising this discretion.

[3.4] The amendments in the new main request as well as in the new first and second auxiliary requests consist in the deletion without replacement of a series of independent claims as well as of claims that depend from them or which refer back to them, as well as in further limitations of the independent claims 11 and 16 (the latter being deleted as well in the first and second auxiliary requests). The feature of dependent claim 18 has been incorporated into claim 16 and claim 11 has been limited to one group of compounds encompassing one preferred embodiment. These amendments rather contribute to reducing the complexity of the case. Moreover, they can be considered to be a serious attempt of meeting the objection of lack of novelty raised by the Board in its summons. The [patent proprietor’s] letter dated February 24, 2011, also contains reasons to that effect. The second auxiliary request corresponds to a further attempt of the [patent proprietor] to delimit the claims in view of document D6 which the Board had considered relevant both for novelty and inventive step.

[3.5] Moreover, it is to be noted that the new main request and the new auxiliary request as such had already been filed as third and fourth auxiliary requests, respectively, one month before the OPs. Considering the simplicity of the amendments (deletion of many claims and, as far as claim 16 is concerned, incorporation of features from dependent claims) the period of one month can normally be considered sufficient for allowing the [opponent] to prepare himself adequately. Moreover, the [patent proprietor] was not obliged to inform the [opponent] on its submission, even though this is often done by the parties, because it can rely on the fact that the EPO will send the submission to the [opponent] pursuant to R 100(1) and R 79(3).

[3.6] However, in the present case the [opponent] apparently has not received the communication of the registrar dated March 4, 2011. As far as the Board can see, for some obscure reasons the communication was sent by registered letter to the former address of the representative of the [opponent]. This error was not detected until the receipt of the letter of the [opponent] dated March 18, 2011, because the registered letter only came back to the Office on March 14, 2011. The Board regrets this error and the fact that the [opponent] only became aware of the submission of the [patent proprietor] a few days before the OPs through his own efforts. However, the Board is convinced that this fact has no decisive influence on the assessment of the admissibility of the requests into the proceedings in the present case because the [opponent] did not have to face a surprising new factual situation and no new questions have been raised which would have required a postponement of the OPs.

The deletion without replacement of a part of the independent claims and of claims that refer to them, whereby the subject-matter of a set of claims is further delimited towards the subject-matter of the invention discussed during the proceedings, does not modify the matter at issue (Prozessstoff) in a way that would be inacceptable to the parties. Nor can it come as a surprise to the [opponent] if the [patent proprietor] deletes claims that have been attacked in answer to objections of the Board and of the [opponent] himself […]. The same holds true for the amendment of claims that have been attacked by incorporation of further limiting features from dependent claims. Claim 16 of the new main request corresponds exactly to dependent claim 18 of the main request filed together with the statement of grounds of appeal, which exclusively referred to claim 17, which exclusively referred to claim 16. Contrary to the opinion of the [opponent] this situation is not equivalent to the situation where an arbitrary (beliebiges) feature, which could not have been foreseen by the Board or the [opponent], is incorporated into the claim from the description.

Moreover, the Board points out that the subject-matter of claim 18 had already been attacked by the [opponent] in its response to the statement of grounds of appeal based on documents D6 and D17 […]. Therefore, it is not clear why the [opponent] should be surprised by a situation which it had already taken into account or why this would necessitate a further consultation of the client, because there are no new aspects related to this claim as compared to the main request that had originally been filed together with the statement of grounds of appeal.

The same holds true for the amended auxiliary request, wherein the subject-matter of the invention to be discussed is further limited by deletion without replacement of claims 16 to 21 of the new main request.

[3.7] New auxiliary request 2, which has been filed at the beginning of the OPs contains further limitations to independent claim 11, whereby the [patent proprietor] wanted to delimit [his claims] even more clearly with respect to the teaching of document D6, which, in contrast to the opposed patent, referred to halogenated epoxy resins. The [opponent] was of the opinion that this request was not relevant because it still contains the DOP compound, which was disclosed in document D6, too. However, the Board points out that the parties disagreed on the question of whether the use of DOP as flame retardant in epoxy resins, to which claim 11 refers, was disclosed in the prior art or made obvious by the latter. Moreover, this limitation does not change the factual situation but only concentrates it on the use of a group of compounds encompassing the preferred embodiment DOP. In view of the documents filed by the [opponent] during the opposition proceedings, for instance document D6, this group of compounds is not “new” to the [opponent], i.e. [a group] which it had not taken into account yet. Therefore, the Board cannot see why the limitation to this issue should have surprising aspects for the [opponent].

[3.8] In view of the decision on which the [opponent] bases his arguments, the following has to be said:

[3.8.1] Decision T 755/96 [4.3] pointed out that a particular concern was that in oppositions other parties are not taken by surprise. Therefore, there could be good reasons not to admit new requests filed after the time limit pursuant to R 116, in particular if they would require that the professional representative consult his client and the latter’s technical experts. As stated under point [3.6], the Board cannot see any surprising facts which would require a further consultation of the client in the new requests.

[3.8.2] The facts underlying decision T 1105/98 were different. Here claim 1 of the patent comprised two alternatives. The objections of the opponent concentrated essentially on one of them. The Board was of the opinion that the limitation proposed during the OPs would have required a further search. This is not necessary in the present case. Claim 16 as limited results from dependent patent claims which had already been attacked by the [opponent] during the opposition proceedings. Claim 16 as amended still encompasses DOP and, therefore, does not shift the subject-matter to an unsearched alternative. By the way, decision T 1105/98 [3.7] also confirms that the opponent has to expect such amendments and has to be prepared accordingly.

[3.8.3] In decision T 401/02 the Board has not admitted an auxiliary request that had only been filed during the OPs, because neither the Board nor the adverse party could have been expected to deal with the request. Its admission might have required, in particular in view of the inventive step assessment, to postpone the OPs or, as requested by one party, to remit the case to the first instance. However, in the present case, there is no need for postponing the OPs or for remitting the case to the first instance because there is no new and surprising factual situation. Nor did the parties request either of those measures.

[3.8.4] In decision T 153/85 the Board refused to admit the main request which had been filed during the OPs and which referred to a further alternative with different limitations than in the sets of claims filed so far. The Board found that there was no justification for filing the alternative set of claims during the OPs because the examination of the appeal was terminated to a large extent and it was contradictory to the purpose of the OPs, i.e. to come to a decision at the end of the proceedings. Moreover, the set of claims was not novel, either. In the present case, the second auxiliary request filed during the OPs is an attempt of the [patent proprietor] to more clearly delimit his [claims] from document D6 which the Board and the [opponent] had considered to be relevant. This request does not correspond to an alternative that had not be taken into account so far but it represents a further limitation of the group of compounds that had already been discussed in the proceedings.

[3.8.5] In decision T 681/02 the Board refused to admit the auxiliary request because its claim 1 had been amended by adding a feature taken from the description. The Board acted on the assumption that this feature had not been searched (see point [3.4] of that decision). By contrast, only features of a dependent claim as granted have been incorporated in the present case. It may be assumed that this subject-matter had been searched, so that a final assessment was possible.

[3.9] Under these circumstances the Board has decided to admit the new main and auxiliary request as well as the new second auxiliary request into the proceedings.

The Board finally dismissed the appeal.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Wednesday, 9 November 2011

T 189/09 – Sweet ’N’ Risky


This decision deals with an appeal against the refusal of an application by the Examining Division.

It contains a reminder of what is to be understood as plant varieties within the meaning of the EPC.

Claim 1 before the Board read (in English translation):
1. Glyphosate tolerant sugar beet plant, characterized in that

a) a DNA fragment can be amplified from the genomic DNA of said sugar beet plant, parts or seeds thereof, using polymerase chain reaction with a first primer having the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 3 and a second primer having the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 3, wherein the DNA fragments shows at least 95% identity with the nucleotide sequences of SEQ ID NO: 6, and/or

b) a DNA fragment can be amplified from the genomic DNA of said sugar beet plant, parts or seeds thereof, using polymerase chain reaction with a first primer having the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 9 and a second primer having the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 10, wherein the DNA fragments shows at least 95% identity with the nucleotide sequences of SEQ ID NO: 12, and/or

c) a DNA fragment can be amplified from the genomic DNA of said sugar beet plant, parts or seeds thereof, using polymerase chain reaction with a first primer having the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 14 and a second primer having the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 16, wherein the DNA fragments shows at least 95% identity with the nucleotide sequences of SEQ ID NO: 17.
In what follows, the Board examines whether this subject-matter is excluded from patentability pursuant to A 53(b).

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2] According to decision G 1/98 [3.1] a plant defined by single recombinant DNA sequences is not an individual plant grouping to which an entire constitution within the meaning of the definition provided by the Community Regulation on Community Plant Variety Rights can be attributed. It is not a concrete living being or grouping of concrete living beings but an abstract and open definition embracing an indefinite number of individual entities defined by a part of its genotype or by a property bestowed on it by that part.

[3] The subject-matter of claim 1 is a sugar beet plant which has been made glyphosate tolerant by incorporation of a CP4-EPSPS-gene within the plant genome. The plant is characterised by at least one of three PCR amplification fragments comprising, entirely or partly, the transgene insert. As the claimed plant is defined only by single recombinant DNS sequences it is not a plant variety according to decision G 1/98.

Therefore, the subject-matter of the claims does not violate the requirements of A 53(b).

To download the whole decision (in German), click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 8 November 2011

T 345/09 – Not Enough


Even in the mechanical arts, one single example will not always be enough for establishing sufficiency of disclosure, as the present decision shows.

All four opponents filed appeals against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) maintaining the opposed patent in amended form.

Claim 1 of the main request on file read (in English translation):
1. Process for the manufacture of a part with very high mechanical properties obtained after shaping by quenching when cooling, shaped by stamping of a strip of rolled steel sheet and more particularly hot rolled and coated with zinc or a zinc based alloy zinc ensuring protection of the surface and the steel, wherein:
  • the steel sheet is cut to obtain a steel sheet blank,
  • the steel sheet blank is hot stamped to obtain the part,
  • an alloyed intermetallic compound is provided on the surface before the stamping, ensuring protection against corrosion, against steel decarburization, which intermetallic compound may provide a lubrication function, said compound being obtained by transforming the coating into an intermetallic alloy by raising the temperature beyond 700°C,
  • the excess material from the steel sheet required for the stamping operation is trimmed. (the underlined parts correspond to amendments with respect to claim 1 as maintained by the OD)
The Board dealt in detail with the question of whether the invention was sufficiently disclosed (A 100(b) and A 83):

*** Translation of the French original ***

[3] According to claim 1 of all the requests, the claimed process results in “very high mechanical properties” […]. Therefore, first of all the question has to be answered which mechanical properties have to be considered for the invention and which values they have to be attain in order to be qualified as “very high” according to claim 1 of all the requests.

“Very high”

[3.1] The [opponents] have pointed out that claim 1 and the description of the patent do not provide clear information on that topic. They mention “very high mechanical properties” (paragraph [0004]) “high mechanical properties” (paragraph [0014], which does not concern the invention according to the patent any more, and paragraph [0021] in the context of quenching). Also in the context of quenching, [the description] mentions “high hardness and high surface hardness of the coating” in paragraph [0005]. No values for these properties are mentioned at all, with the exception of the breaking strength (résistance à la rupture) (1500 MPa) in figure 1.


The Board is of the opinion that these aspects do not need to be discussed because the invention is not sufficiently disclosed, for the following reasons.

Which mechanical properties?

[3.2.1] By amending claims 1 and the descriptions of all the requests (“very high mechanical properties obtained after shaping by quenching when cooling” … “in order to undergo quenching … by which said high mechanical properties are obtained”), the [patent proprietor] wanted to limit the claimed “very high mechanical properties” to those obtained at the end of the process, after quenching. The mechanical properties obtained before quenching, after hot rolling, even if “very high” did not play any role.

The Board cannot accept this argument because the patent as granted already claimed this result before the quenching in claim 1 and in the relevant parts of the description (paragraphs [0004], [0010] and [0020]). According to claim 2 of the patent as granted and to paragraphs [0005] and [0021] the high mechanical properties were also obtained by quenching.

In this context the argument of the [patent proprietor] according to which it was already implicit in the process of claim 1 of the patent as granted that the process included quenching and that claim 2 only added the value for one of these mechanical properties (hardness) cannot be accepted either because this distinction was clearly present in the patent as granted and is even underlined by the amendments of the description which the [patent proprietor] had to propose in order to eliminate it.

Also, the argument of the [patent proprietor] according to which the claimed process only concerned “press hardening” cannot be endorsed because none of the claims 1 on file does contain any indication that the quenching was carried out in the press.

[3.2.2] As a consequence, the opposed patent affirms in its paragraphs [0010] and [0020] that high (or increased) resistance to abrasion, wear and fatigue is obtained after the treatment consisting in raising the temperature, but before the stamping and even before the quenching. By alloying the coating with the steel, this treatment ensures not only a high hardness of the coating (paragraph [0015]) but also good lubricant properties (paragraphs [0021] and [0023]).

The quenching has to result (paragraph [0005]) in high hardness of the steel and of the coating and in high breaking strength (1500 MPa, figure 1).

As the process requires a sheet of rolled steel to be hot stamped, it is also obvious that the deformability (e.g. ductility and a certain resistance to rupture) before the stamping step constitutes one of these high mechanical properties, see also figure 1 showing a breaking of 500 MPa before stamping.

For all those mechanical properties – with the exception of the hardness of the coating of the rolled steel sheet after stamping – there is no example in the opposed patent. Even for this hardness (600 HV 100 g) the steel composition, which is important for forming an alloy with the rolled zinc (or zinc-based [alloy]) which then forms the coating.

[3.2.3] In consideration of the above, nine mechanical properties are referred to. Even taking into account the fact that there is a relationship between the hardness of the steel and its tensile strength (which is not identical to the breaking strength mentioned in the opposed patent, see above), in order to satisfy the requirements of A 83 there are still eight mechanical properties to be established by trials to be conducted by the skilled person in order to carry out the invention.

Parameters to be taken into account in the process steps

[3.3] The sole example of a final product in the opposed patent deals with corrosion resistance, which, however, is not a mechanical property.

In order to remedy the absence of relevant examples regarding the above-mentioned mechanical properties, which are essential to the invention, the skilled person would have to carry out a certain number of trials in order to establish what the invention is.

In such a case, when the question of whether the invention is sufficiently disclosed within the meaning of A 83 is to be answered, one has to establish whether the skilled person has to make an excessive effort when carrying out those trials, over the whole range covered by claim 1. It is also necessary to establish the parameters that are to be taken into account for those trials.

[3.3.1] The composition of the steel forming the sheet, which has to alloy with the zinc that is rolled onto the sheet in order to form the coating having the above-mentioned high mechanical properties, is one of the essential parameters. According to the sole example 1 of the patent the composition by weight of the steel (given in %) is as follows: carbon: 0.15 to 0.25; manganese: 0.8 to 1.5, silicon: 0.1 to 0.35; chrome: 0.01 to 0.2; titanium: less than 0.1; aluminium: less than 0.1; phosphor: less than 0.05, sulphur: less than 0.03; boron: 0.0005 to 0.01 (see paragraph [0022]). The example for a heat treatment by heating to 950°C does not mention this steel composition at all.

The claims 1 of all the requests do not give any indication on the steel composition; in view of the fact that quenching is needed following the hot shaping, the [patent proprietor] has also argued that that a carbon content between about 0.15 to 0.8 % by weight – which range is greater than the range given in the description of the patent – essentially determines the quenchability.

The steel composition and in “particular at least the content in carbon, in elements which are able to form carbides (i.e. manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, tungsten, niobium and titanium) and in boron have an influence on the quenchability. R1 [Guy Murry, “Transformations dans les aciers”, Techniques de l’ingénieur; traité matériaux métalliques, 1998; vol. MD1, dossier M1115], which is, as noted by the [patent proprietor] a compilation of general knowledge in the field of quenching steels when cooling them, shows these influences […].

As a consequence, at least the elements C, Mn, Mo, V, W, Nb, Ti and B of the steel composition correspond to at least eight parameters that have an influence on the quenchability and, therefore, on the mechanical properties of this steel after quenching when cooling.

The Board is of the opinion that even for such a carbon content of 0.8 % by weight, the opposed patent does not inform the skilled person allowing him to determine how to adapt the other components of the steel, not to mention carbon contents between 0.25 and 0.8 % by weight, which would still have to be included in the trials, assuming that claims 1 of all requests are indeed at least directed at steels that are hardenable by quenching.

[3.3.2] The trials on different steel compositions also have to take into account the zinc percentage that is to be used because claims 1 of all requests also refer, not only to a coating with 100 % of zinc but also to a coating with an “zinc based alloy”, as argued by [opponent] 03, i.e. having a zinc percentage of above 50 %.

[3.3.3] As some of the above-mentioned mechanical properties (coating hardness, lubrication function, resistance to abrasion) that are necessary for the stamping step have to have their origin in the heating step resulting in a coating alloy, the above-mentioned trials also have to be repeated for different temperatures above 700°C, as claimed. The Board can accept that the skilled person, when carrying out those trials, will not go beyond temperatures which are detrimental to the coating or which can destroy it, contrary to the argument of [opponent] 04 based on B11. However, the range of temperatures to be taken into account would still have to extend to at least 950°C, mentioned in paragraphs [0023] and [0024], for obtaining the austenitization of the steel mentioned therein.

As the deformability during stamping is also one of the properties mentioned, the influence of the temperature to which the rolled sheet is heated on its deformability also has to be part of the trials to be carried out.

In view of the result of the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure […] it is not necessary to consider the question regarding the temperature of the heat treatment in the range between 700°C and the AC1 point of the Fe-C system, i.e. 723°C, or the question of whether an Fe-C-Mn alloy can be transformed at a temperature of 700°C or not.

Moreover, the trials have to be repeated for different durations during which the high temperature is applied, because figure 1 mentions a duration of between 2 and 10 minutes and the example at 950°C mentions a duration of 5 minutes, as well as for different speeds at which the temperature is increased (°C/s) during that step. These two parameters have an influence on the austenitization of the steel, which is also influenced by the steel composition […].

[3.3.4] This composition of the rolled steel in its state of total or partial austenitization, following the heating step at a temperature beyond 700°C also determines the final structure after the quenching step. As a matter of fact, the trials necessary for establishing the sufficiency of disclosure also have to take into account the search for this relationship. It is clear that quenching after partial austenitization results in any case in mixes of, for instance, ferrite + perlite + bainite or ferrite + bainite + martensite. This implies that the mechanical properties of a steel resulting from such a treatment are different from those of a steel obtained from a process including complete austenitization.

[3.3.5] As far as the quenching step is concerned, it is clear that the cooling speed and the final temperature determine the final mechanical properties of the rolled sheet and of the above-mentioned coating, i.e. the hardness of the steel vs. tensile strength. […] These parameters also have to be part of the trials to be carried out.

[3.3.6] As a consequence, the number of parameters to be observed is of at least fourteen.

Conclusions

[3.4] In view of the mechanical properties (eight or even nine) and the parameters to be followed (fourteen), in combination with the ranges to be applied to those parameters and the repetition of the trials – which are necessary for some of the mechanical properties that have to be guaranteed before and after quenching – all of it being required for carrying out the invention, the Board can only conclude that the skilled person is faced with a research programme that is so broad that it represents an excessive effort. Consequently, the description of the invention underlying claims 1 of all the requests […] is insufficient and the requirements of A 83 are not fulfilled.

It is noted that the above conclusion does not depend on the question of whether the skilled person has the required knowledge for carrying out these trials. The Board can accept that R1 represents the general knowledge of the skilled person in this technical field. The conclusion is based on the quantity of properties and the parameters to be observed therein, the ranges to be applied and the repetitions to be carried out for the different steps of the process. […]

The patent is revoked.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in French), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

NB: Le blog du droit européen des brevets also comments this decision (here).

Monday, 7 November 2011

T 923/08 – Close To The Bone


The applicant appealed against the decision of the Examining Division (ED) refusing the application under consideration. The ED was of the opinion that the subject-matter of claim 1 contained surgical steps and as such was excluded from patentability.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board read (in English translation):
Method for determining the change or change in length of a first object (b) which is connected in an initial state to a second object (d) via a joint (k) and which has been changed after having been detached from the second object (d), wherein a reference system (e1) is attached to the second object (d) and the first object is attached to a second reference system (e2) that is not directly fixed to the first object (b), [wherein] at least one reference mark (f) is gathered (erfasst) on the first object (b) and the relative position between the at least one reference mark (f) and the reference system is determined and/or stored, wherein, after the first object has been disconnected from the second object (d), the first object (b) has been treated and the treated first object (b) and the second object have been assembled, the first object (b) is oriented with respect to the first reference system (e1) attached to the second object (d), using the position determined by the second reference system (e2), and a change of the first object (b) is determined by gathering anew the position of the at least one reference mark (f), or another reference mark the relative position of which with respect to the latter is known, with respect to the first reference system (e1) and by comparing it with the relative position between the at least one reference mark (f) and the first reference system (e1) gathered in the initial state.

Claim 1 of the auxiliary request read:
Method for determining the change in length of a femur (b) which is connected in an initial state to a pelvic bone (d) via a joint (k), consisting in a first reference system (e1) which can be directly and preferably tightly attached to the pelvic bone (d), a second reference system (e2) comprising a ribbon (j) which can be attached to a skin (c), which surrounds the femur (b) and which is movable with respect to the femur (b), by means of the ribbon (j), as well as a pointer (g) allowing to gather the position of at least one characteristic point (f) on the femur, and a navigation system (m) allowing to gather the positions of the first reference system (e1), the second reference system (e2) and the pointer (g), and to determine the change in length of the femur (b).
The appellant also requested the following question to be referred to the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA):
Does A 53(c) prohibit the grant of patents for any method having a preceding surgical intervention as a prerequisite for achieving the objective of the method?
Here is what the Board had to say:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2.1] Pursuant to A 53(c) European patents shall not be granted in respect of methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery.

In decision G 1/07 ([headnote 1]) the EBA has answered the question of whether an imaging method for a diagnostic purpose, which is to be carried out before or during a surgical intervention and which comprises or encompasses a step consisting in a physical intervention practised on the human or animal body, was to be excluded from patent protection under A 53(c) even if this step did not per se aim at maintaining life and health, as follows:
A claimed imaging method, in which, when carried out, maintaining the life and health of the subject is important and which comprises or encompasses an invasive step representing a substantial physical intervention on the body which requires professional medical expertise to be carried out and which entails a substantial health risk even when carried out with the required professional care and expertise, is excluded from patentability as a method for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery pursuant to A 53(c).
[2.2] A similar situation underlies the present case. Here, too, the claim is directed at a method that is carried out in the context of a surgical intervention. As can be seen from the description, the claimed method is in particular designed to determine the change in length of a femur when, for instance, a damaged femur head is cut off during a hip replacement surgery and is replaced by an implant. This allows to determine the length of the operated femur as compared to its original length so that the reassembled hip joint differs as little as possible from a healthy joint […]. As a consequence, the recovery of the health of a human or animal body is relevant when the claimed method is carried out.

An indispensable requirement for carrying out the claimed method consists in that in the initial state, i.e. before the hip replacement surgery has begun, or at its beginning, a first reference system is, preferably directly, attached to a pelvic bone, for instance by screwing it into the bone […]. As admitted by the appellant, the desired determination of the change in length of the femur cannot be obtained without a reference system that is firmly attached to the pelvic bone.

Attaching the reference system to the pelvic bone is an invasive step representing a substantial physical intervention on the body which requires professional medical expertise to be carried out and which entails a substantial health risk even when carried out with the required professional care and expertise. This has not been questioned by the appellant.

However, the appellant is of the opinion that the attachment of the reference system to the pelvic bone is carried out before the claimed method has begun and that, consequently, the claimed method as such does not comprise an invasive step. This has been underlined in claim 1 according to the main request by the wording that the first reference system is attached to the second object.

[2.3] However, a claimed method is excluded from patentability pursuant to A 53(c) even if it only encompasses (umfasst) a surgical step (G 1/07 [first headnote]).

In the present case claim 1 of the main request neither expressly indicates that the claimed method is designed to determine the change or the change in length of a femur, nor that the first reference system is to be attached to the pelvic bone. However, the description clearly expresses that the claimed method is designed to determine the change or change in length of a femur. It does not describe any other application. Moreover, it clearly follows from it that the attachment of the first reference system to the pelvic bone is indispensable for the claimed method and represents an essential feature of this method because it is required for solving the problem underlying the claimed method.

The method claimed in claim 1 of the main request starts from a known method for determining the change or change in length of a femur, wherein a reference system (reference star) is directly attached both to the pelvic bone and to the femur, e.g. by screwing into the respective bone (EP-A-1 911 421, paragraph [0003]).

According to paragraph [0004] the present invention aims at providing a method allowing a more simple measurement of the change, in particular the change in length of a joint part (femur).

As a consequence, a claimed method that is proposed for solving this problem has to comprise all features or method steps that are indispensable for obtaining a simplified determination of such a change. One of the requirements for this is that a first reference system is firmly attached to the second object (pelvic bone), a second reference system is directly attached to the first object (femur) and a reference mark is attached to the second (sic) object (femur). As already mentioned above (see second paragraph of [2.2]) it is impossible to determine the change or the change in length of the first object (femur) with the claimed method without these measures.

According to EP-A-1 911 421 […], contrary to the closest prior art mentioned above, the invention does not require a second reference system to be directly attached to the femur, so that there is no need for a surgical intervention at this point. If follows, in reverse, that it is not possible not to directly attach the first reference system to the pelvic bone.

Therefore, the attachment of the first reference system to the second object (pelvic bone) is an indispensable step of the method according to the invention, which is encompassed by the method claimed in claim 1 of the main request, even if it is not mentioned in the claim. (The ED has referred to this step as being “implicit” in the claim.)

[2.4] If such a step is not encompassed by the claim the requirements of A 84 (EPC 1973) are not complied with. As a matter of fact, A 84 (EPC 1973) together with R 29 (EPC 1973) requires a claim to give all the essential features that are necessary for defining the invention.

This requirements has also been affirmed in decision G 1/07 [4.2.2; 3.3.1 – should read 4.3.1]. According to this decision, the assessment of whether a method step that is excluded from patentability may be omitted (ausgeklammert) from a claim, whether by leaving it out or by wording [the claim such that it] indicates that this step is carried out outside the claimed method, depends on whether the claimed invention is fully and completely defined by the remaining features of the claim without that step.

As already explained, in the present case, the attachment of the first reference system to the second object (pelvic bone) is to be considered to be an indispensable and thus essential feature of the claimed method without which the invention is not fully and completely defined.

[2.5] Therefore, the method according to claim 1 is not patentable pursuant to A 53(c), so that the main request of the appellant is to be dismissed.

[2.6] In decision T 836/08 cited by the appellant claim 1 was directed to a method for determining the distal end of a bone guidance wire by means of a medical-technical optical tracking and navigation system. This was done – in a way similar to the present situation – by means of reference apparatus situated both on the proximal end of the wire and on the bone. However, in this decision the Board has assessed the method steps that are mandatorily required in a different way and has, therefore, come to the conclusion that claims 1 to 3 only define the way in which a technical device operates and that, as a consequence, the method was optical rather than surgical (see T 836/08 [3]).

It may well be that the different assessment results from the fact that the Board has attached more importance to the claim category than the Board in that decision. However, this shows that finally there is some margin of assessment in any individual decision and that there is no entitlement to identical decisions. Such margins of assessment, which are necessary when decisions are to be taken, are only infringed if the principles of logic or essential basic facts have been disregarded or if some other logic (Denkgesetze) has been violated. This appears not to have been the case and has not been invoked by the appellant.

The Board then dealt with the auxiliary request, which it found to comply with A 123(2), A 84, A 54 and A 56. It remitted the case to the ED with the order to grant a patent based on this request.

Finally, the Board dismissed the request to refer the appellant’s question to the EBA:

[4] In order to ensure uniform application of the law, or if an important point of law arises, the Board of appeal shall, during proceedings on a case and either of its own motion or following a request from a party to the appeal, refer any question to the EBA if it considers that a decision is required for the above purposes (A 112(1)(a) EPC 1973).

[4.1] As explained under [2.6], decision T 836/08 is based on the fact that that Board had assessed the method steps that are mandatorily required in the respective method in a different way and has, therefore, come to a conclusion in favour of the applicant, which is the same as in the present case. The reason for this was that the margin of assessment – to which any deciding body is entitled in its decision – for technically assessing the claimed features, and not a deviant use of the relevant general decision parameters developed by case law. This follows from the mere fact that this decision also applied the principles of G 1/07.

[4.2] The question proposed by the appellant does not correspond to an important point of law either. As a matter of fact the question of whether A 53(c) prohibits the grant of patents for any method having a preceding surgical intervention as a prerequisite for achieving the objective of the method is so broad and indefinite that the answer to it is not necessary in order for the referring board to be able to decide on the appeal (cf. Case Law, 6th edition, 2010, VII.E.14.2). In particular, the expressions “any method” and “for achieving the objective of the method” are too indefinite to allow for a meaningful answer to the question which would allow to develop higher principles to be used in individual decisions.

NB: The Board has also provided a headnote:
If a method designed to gather data on the human or animal body mandatorily requires a surgical step for fixing a measuring element that is indispensable for carrying out the method to the human or animal body, this step is to be considered as an essential feature of the method which is comprised by such a method, even if there is no feature in the claim that is expressly directed to this step. Such a method is excluded from patentability pursuant to A 53(c).

The omission of such a surgical step, whether by wording [the claim] such that [it indicates that] the surgically attached measuring element was already attached to the body before the beginning of the method or by means of a disclaimer violates A 84 EPC (1973) because such a method claim then does not contain all essential features of the claimed invention.
To download the whole decision (in German), click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Saturday, 5 November 2011

T 132/90 – Schizo Prio


Some colleagues preparing for the EQE have questioned me about this decision, which I did not know (although it is reported here in the Case Law Book). As the underlying case is somewhat exotic, I thought it would be a perfect weekend post.

NB: All the passages cited below are translations of the German originals.

One of the key points of this case concerns a claim to the priority of a Swiss application filed on March 11, 1983. The European application claiming its priority had been filed on March 9, 1984.

Claim 1 of the patent as granted read
1. Projecting plate connection member for the insulated, non-positive connection to a projecting plate, with a parallelepipedic insulating member (2) and reinforcing rods passing through the same, characterised in that the reinforcing rods (3-6) are constructed as closed loops in a vertical plane, which are interconnected by transverse rods (7-14) running approximately parallel to the parallelepipedic insulating member (2) and in that the upper and lower parts of each loop (3-6) are interconnected by means of a clip (39).

The patent was opposed by another Swiss company. During the opposition proceedings, the patent proprietor initiated infringement proceedings against the opponent, which led the latter to examine the priority very closely. In a letter dated April 14, 1988, the opponent made the following statement:
“… It has turned out that the original Swiss application was filed on March 11, 1983. As new parts have been added, in particular Figures 6 and 7 and the corresponding description, the Swiss date of filing was shifted to July 1, 1983. As far as the European patent is concerned, this means that these new parts do not have the priority of March 11, 1983 but that the effective date (Stichtag) for the prior art for those figures 6 and 7 is March 9, 1984 because, as stated on the cover sheet of the European patent specification 0 119 165 only the priority of March 11, 1983 has been claimed. In this context [the opponent] refers to A 88(3) according to which the right of priority shall cover only those elements of the European patent application which are included in the application or applications whose priority is claimed. Annex 3 corresponds to the order concerning the shift of the date of filing of the patent application from March 11, 1983 to July 1, 1983, as well as the original office copy, where it is stated that this is above all relevant for the subject-matter of claim 3, i.e. the clips 39. As the clips, i.e. above all figure 6 and the corresponding description, which correspond to one of the features of claim 1 of the opposed European patent, do not benefit from the priority and, therefore, the corresponding effective date for the prior art is March 9, 1984, and as the attorney of the applicant has explained in his writ of July 21, 1987 […] that Egco AG has produced projecting plate connection members according to the invention since June 1983 […] and as it has to be assumed that either the members or at least leaflets comprising a complete description have circulated before March 9, 1984, i.e. within nine months from the start of production, this feature is most certainly deprived of novelty. …”
On February 22, 1989, the OD explained its point of view:
“… The present patent […] claims the priority of a prior Swiss application dated March 11, 1983. In view of the fact that the subject-matter of a claim that has been amended in the course of the proceedings was not disclosed in the original documents as filed, the Intellectual Property Agency has shifted the date of filing to July 1, 1983, after approval by the applicant.

Regarding the disclosure of [the elements] contained in the original application dated March 11, 1983, [the OD] acts upon the assumption that this date is to be considered as the date of the first application within the meaning of A 87.

The requirements of A 87(4) are not complied when the date of filing is shifted; the situation does not correspond to the case where a previous application has been withdrawn, abandoned or refused.

In the present case, even an application of Article 4C, paragraph 4 CPU on A 87(4) would not lead to the conclusion that July 1, 1983 could be considered to be the date of the first application in view of the disclosure [of the elements] contained in the original application dated July 11, 1983.

One requirements for considering a subsequent application to be the first application, pursuant to A 87(4), is that the previous application has not served as a basis for claiming a right of priority already. However, this is the case here because the European patent claims the priority of March 11, 1983.

As far as the present patent is concerned, this means: Insofar as the patent, and in particular, claim 1, claims an invention consisting in a combination of features at least one of which had not been disclosed on March 11, 1983 but only at a later time, the European patent, from a substantive point of view, cannot claim the priority of March 11, 1983 or July 1, 1983 because the priority of a claimed embodiment of an invention can only be unitary. A 88(2) only allows claiming of multiple priorities only if and to the extent that an application or a claim encompasses several embodiments of an invention (each of which as such is complete).

In the present case, this means that the date of filing is considered to be relevant for the assessment of the prior art. …”
In his response dated August 22, 1989, the patent proprietor argued as follows:
“… The communication dated February 22, 1989, correctly states that regarding the disclosure of [the elements] contained in the original application dated March 11, 1983, this date is to be considered as the date of the first application within the meaning of A 87. The claimed priority of the Swiss prior application n° 1361/83 dated March 11, 1983, is based on a regular filing under the national law of the state of filing (A 87(2)).

The application that had been filed at that date was sufficient for allocating a date of filing. Whether this application was withdrawn, abandoned or refused. A 87(3) expressly states: “… whatever may be the outcome of the application”.

Moreover, A 87(4) contains a cumulative clause dealing with the cases where there were several previous applications concerning the same subject-matter. This is not the case here. A mere amendment of the application documents of the first application cannot be considered to be a previous application. Such an interpretation would be arbitrary and would clearly be in conflict with A 87(3).

The right of priority shall cover only those elements which were already included in the application whose priority is claimed (A 88(3)). In the present case this holds true for all the features, with the exception of the clips 39.

Therefore it has to be examined whether the opposed patent, considering the disclosure [of the elements] contained in the document dated March 11, 1983, on which the priority claim is based, amounts to a patentable invention and whether the clips, which were known at the date of filing of the European application, are essential to the invention or merely constitute an overdetermination (Überbestimmung). If the answer to both questions is yes, then the patent has to be maintained as granted and the opposition has to be dismissed. …”
The OD maintained its position and revoked the patent because there had been public disclosures between July 1, 1983 and Marc 9, 1984.

In his statement of grounds of appeal, the patent proprietor changed his argumentation and pled that July 1 was the priority date to be taken into account.
“… We are of the opinion that there was only one application bearing reference n° 1361/83-8 and that its date of filing was July 1, 1983.

The priority of this reference has been claimed. The date of filing has been corrected by the Agency. This correction was carried out at a time where the European application had already been filed and the priority had been claimed and expired. Therefore, the applicant has claimed the correct priority, based on the data and information at his disposal, and the reference is still correct today. Therefore, the public has not been misled. The opponent has found out without any difficulties that the Swiss patent n° 652 160, which has been granted on the basis of the application the priority of which is claimed that the date of filing was July 1, 1983.

Therefore, when a change of date has been carried out, one has to act on the assumption that there has been no application dated March 11, 1983. Therefore, only the priority of July 1, 1983, has been claimed. The only problem arises from the fact that the date of filing was changed only at a very late stage, i.e. in 1985, by means of an order to this effect.

If the Federal Intellectual Property Agency had decided the shift of date immediately after the filing of the amended documents, then the March 11 date would not have been appeared at all and only the July 1 date would have been mentioned. Before the decision to shift the date had been taken, the applicant could not claim anything else than what he had claimed, i.e. the priority of a first filing bearing the reference n° 1361/83 …”
Here is how the Board handled this tricky problem:

[3.1] Document D7 explains that the possibility to shift the date serves the purpose of sparing the applicant the burden of having to file a new application in cases where the technical documents have to be completed. It may be left unanswered whether the shift of date is to be understood as a withdrawal of the original application combined with a new filing (see GRUR Int., 1972, 1, pages 23 and 25). What is decisive is that the shift of date has an ex nunc effect and that, therefore, the original application exists until the date of the shift. As, pursuant to A 87(3) the outcome of the application is irrelevant from the point of view of the right of priority, this application can, therefore, be the basis for claiming a right of priority and the original date of filing can be acknowledged as the priority date.

[3.2] The (original) application filed on March 11, 1983 before the Swiss Federal Intellectual Property Agency is a regular national application within the meaning of A 87(3) the priority of which had been regularly claimed according to the requirements of A 88(1) and R 38. As this application can be the basis for a right of priority […] it has to be acknowledged as such.

[3.3] As this priority has been regularly claimed, A 87(4) does not apply in this case. Therefore, the application as amended, which had given rise to the shift of the date of filing to July 1, 1983, could only have been the basis for claiming a right of priority insofar as it comprises features that had not been disclosed in the original application filed on March 11, 1983. However, the appellant has not claimed such a right of priority. Therefore, the application as amended is not to be considered any more.

[3.4] According to A 88(3) the right of priority covers only those elements of the European patent application which are included in the application or applications whose priority is claimed. Thus in the present case, the right of priority is delimited as to its content by the certified copy of the Swiss patent application 1361/93 filed pursuant to A 88(1), which bears the annotation “Date of application: 11.03.83” […].

I let you imagine how things would work out in the (admittedly somewhat unlikely) case where the priority document is a European patent application that has been redated upon filing of missing parts under R 56 after the filing of a subsequent application claiming its priority.

To download the whole decision (in German), click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Friday, 4 November 2011

T 2115/08 – White & Deadly


The opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form.

Claim 1 as maintained by the OD read (the additions with respect to claim 1 as granted are underlined):
A white sealable, flame-retardant, biaxially oriented polyester film with at least one sealable outer layer A, one base layer B, and one other outer layer C, characterised in that the sealable outer layer A comprises from 40 to 95 mol% of ethylene terephthalate and from 60 to 5 mol% of ethylene isophthalate, has an average roughness Ra smaller than 30 nm and has a surface gas flow time of from 500 to 4000 s, the minimum sealing temperature being smaller than or equal to 110°C and its seal seam strength smaller than or equal to 1.3 N/15 mm, in that the non-sealable outer layer C has a coefficient of friction COF smaller than 0.5 and an average roughness of from 40 to 100 nm, in that the outer layer C and, where appropriate, the sealable outer layer A and/or the base layer B, comprise a flame retardant, and in that white pigments have been added to the base layer B.
The Board found this claim to lack clarity:

*** Translation of the German original ***

[2.1] Claim 1 of the main request differs from claim 1 as granted, inter alia, in that the polyester film was limited to a white polyester film. The feature of a “white polyester film” is not contained in any of the granted claims. Therefore, it has to be examined whether this feature complies with the requirement of clarity pursuant to A 84.

According to A 84, the claims have to be clear. As explained in decision T 560/09 [2], this requirements implies that the skilled person can without any doubt distinguish embodiments encompassed by the claim from embodiments that are not encompassed by it. Therefore, in the present case, it has to be examined whether the feature “white polyester film” is clear for the skilled person reading claim 1 and in particular whether it is possible without any doubt to distinguish white polyester films from polyester films that are not white.

[2.1.1] The only information provided in claim 1 with respect to the whiteness of the polyester film is that there have to be white pigments in the base layer of the polyester film. If the content of white pigments in a transparent polyester film is increased, then the film will lose its transparency and become more and more cloudy (“milky”) until finally a white film is obtained. However, the claim does not give any indication for the amount of white pigments. In particular, there are no indications which degree of cloudiness or which white pigment content allows to consider the polyester film to be a “white polyester film”.

[2.1.2] Moreover, polyester films and the pigments contained therein can comprise not only white parts but also parts of different colour, such as grey or yellow parts. From page 6, line 58 of the opposed patent (“Thus the film has a brilliant, white appearance without having a yellow tint.”) one may conclude, by inverse inference, that white polyester films may have a yellow tint. However, there are no indications until which content of yellow a polyester film is to be considered “white” within the meaning of the claim.

[2.1.3] Finally, contrary to the assertions of the [patent proprietor] the white polyester film of claim 1 is not defined by a degree of whiteness above 70. Rather this definition is contained only in claim 4, which depends on claim 1, which implies that this is only a preferred feature. Thus claim 1 also encompasses embodiments that do not have this feature, i.e. polyester films having a degree of whiteness smaller than 70. However, the claim does not provide any information until which degree of whiteness polyester films are still covered by the claim feature “white polyester film”.

The [patent proprietor] has argued in this context that the definition of the degree of whiteness in claim 1 followed from the description, and in particular from the degree of whiteness of greater than 70 indicated in Table 1 of the opposed patent.

Table 1 as published in the corresponding U.S. patent
(“Inventive range” should perhaps have been translated as “Range according to the invention”)

The Board agrees with the [patent proprietor] that Table 1 indicates that a degree of whiteness of greater than 70 is said to be the range according to the invention. However, this conflicts with the claims of the opposed patent from which it follows that claim 1 comprises films having a degree of whiteness smaller than 70 (see the first paragraph of [2.1.3]).

Moreover, the wording of A 84 makes clear that a claim as such has to be clear (see, for instance, T 1129/97 [2.1.2-3]). Therefore, an explanation of the term “white” in the description of the opposed patent cannot lead to the expression “white polyester film” in claim 1, which as such is unclear, being considered to be clear.

[2.2] Therefore, the skilled person working in the field of polyester films cannot assign an unambiguous meaning to the feature “white polyester film” in claim 1 of the main request. In particular, he cannot determine the limit with respect to the degree of cloudiness/portion of white pigment, portion of yellow and/or degree of whiteness until which a film complies with the feature “white polyester film”. Thus it is not possible to distinguish without doubt between polyester films according to the claim and polyester films that are not covered by the claim. Therefore, the limitation to white polyester films which the [patent proprietor] has introduced into the claim leads to claim 1 being unclear.

[2.3] In its response to the appeal dated July 20, 2009, the [patent proprietor] has argued that the term “white” was a merely qualitative property assignment which helped the skilled person to understand the invention. Therefore, this term did not call for any closer definition.

This understanding appears to imply that the requirement of clarity is less stringent for qualitative features. However, this is in conflict with A 84, which does not provide for any distinction between qualitative and quantitative features but requires that claims have to be clear. Therefore, this argument of the [patent proprietor] cannot succeed. […]

The patent […] is revoked.

Should you wish to download the whole decision (in German), just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Thursday, 3 November 2011

T 974/10 – Quite Exceptional


In the present case, only the opponent filed an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to maintain the opposed patent in amended form. This creates a situation where the prohibition of reformatio in peius applies: in principle, the patent proprietor cannot amend the claims on file in a way that would leave the opponent in a worse position than if he had not appealed. But there are exceptions to this principle, and the Board has an interesting obiter dictum on this topic:

[2.1] In a case where the opponent is the sole appellant against an interlocutory decision maintaining a patent in amended form, the patent proprietor is primarily restricted during the appeal proceedings to defending the patent in the form in which it was maintained by the OD in its interlocutory decision, see the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) G 9/92 [point 2 of the order, first sentence]. The defence may include proposing amendments to the claims if they are appropriate and necessary.

The prohibition of reformatio in peius is the principle that, if defending the patent in the form in which it was maintained is not possible, the respondent (patent proprietor) should not be allowed to pursue claims which, if held allowable, would put the appellant in a worse situation than if it had not appealed.

In decision G 1/99 [order] the EBA allowed an exception to this principle:
“However, an exception to this principle may be made in order to meet an objection put forward by the opponent/appellant or the Board during the appeal proceedings, in circumstances where the patent as maintained in amended form would otherwise have to be revoked as a direct consequence of an inadmissible amendment held allowable by the OD in its interlocutory decision.”
The EBA laid down a strict order of possible amendments that a patent proprietor was allowed to file in order to overcome the deficiency.

The EBA also stated (see decision G 1/99 [12, last sentence]):
“However, in particular if the patent cannot be maintained for reasons which were not raised at the first instance, the non-appealing proprietor deserves protection for reasons of equity” (emphasis added).
In the present case the clarity objection […] was raised by the Board for the first time in appeal. The respondent must therefore be allowed to file amendments as foreseen in decision G 1/99 […], which decision gives due regard to the principle of equity (see also point [13] and point [14], last sentence, of the reasons).

However, the Board then found that the request under consideration, if held allowable, did not put the appellant in a worse situation than if it had not appealed. Therefore, the procedure laid down in G 1/99 was not relevant.

To read the whole decision, click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Wednesday, 2 November 2011

T 1973/09 – Ultra Vires


On January 7, 2005, the Examining Division (ED) decided to refuse the European application under consideration because it considered that the subject-matter of claim 1 lacked an inventive step. 

The applicant filed an appeal against that decision, together with amended claims. 

The Board (decision T 697/05) considered it appropriate to remit the case to the ED so as to give the appellant the possibility to argue its case before two instances.

On May 8, 2009, the ED refused the application again, for lack of inventive step and lack of clarity. This time the applicant did not file an appeal in time but filed a request for re-establishment on August 26, 2009.

The professional representative of the applicant pointed out that the applicant had taken all due care by issuing instructions in good time (on June 5, 2009). He then explained the circumstances of the appeal:


On September 8, 2009, the representative filed a copy of the relevant fax transmission report:


On September 23, 2009, the formalities officer of the ED sent a written decision allowing the request for re-establishment. The ED then decided not to rectify its decision and transmitted the case to the Board of appeal.

The Board did not like the way in which the request for re-establishment had been handled:

Request for re-establishment of rights (A 122)

[1.1] By its decision dated 23 September 2009, the formalities officer acting on behalf of the ED allowed the applicant's request for re-establishment of rights dated 25 August 2009. This decision had the effect that the notice of appeal was deemed to have been filed in due time and the proceedings were continued.

[1.2] Under R 136(4), the department competent to decide on a request for re-establishment of rights is the department competent to decide on the omitted act.

[1.3] In the present case the omitted act is the filing of the notice of appeal, which is to be carried out within the time limit defined under A 108. The department competent to decide whether the appeal is inadmissible for non-compliance with A 108 is, under R 101(1), the Board of Appeal.

Therefore only the Board of Appeal is entitled to decide upon the request for re-establishment of rights.

[1.4] A 109(1), which empowers the department of first instance in ex parte proceedings to set aside its own decision if it considers an appeal to be “admissible and well founded” (emphasis added by the Board), provides an exception to the principle of general devolutive effect of the appeal, in order to allow an interlocutory revision. This exception, as such, has to be construed narrowly in connection with the interlocutory revision, and not as a broader entitlement for the first instance to decide whether an appeal is admissible (T 473/91, T 808/03, and Case Law of the Boards, 6th. edition 2010, VI.E.3.1, page 495). This is reflected in the Guidelines for Examination (E-VIII, 2.2.7) which indicate that the request for re-establishment is only then to be considered by the competent department if interlocutory revision is to be granted, which in the present case it was not.

This exception is necessary since interlocutory revision requires that an appeal exists before a positive decision can be taken for the appellant to grant the interlocutory revision. When it considers the appeal to be well-founded, the department of first instance is required therefore to form an opinion as to the admissibility of the appeal. This does not infringe upon the power of the Boards of Appeal to decide upon the admissibility of appeals since it applies only to well-founded appeals which in the case that they are also considered by the department of first instance to be admissible never reach the Boards of Appeal. Since the department of first instance only takes positive decisions on admissibility of an appeal in the case of well-founded appeals the rights of the appellant, at least in so far as it has not requested the refund of the appeal fee, are preserved, since it achieves what it has requested without the necessity of going through a complete appeal procedure.

[1.5] The department of first instance, however, in the present case followed neither A 109(1) nor the Guidelines for Examination since it decided upon the request for re-establishment of rights to conclude that the appeal was admissible, but not well founded. The decision of the department of first instance was thus ultra-vires.

[1.6] Since the department of first instance was not empowered to take the decision that it did, the Board sets aside the decision of the department of first instance to allow the request for re-establishment of rights.

Admissibility of the appeal

[2.1] The Board has considered the fax transmission report submitted by the appellant with its letter of 8 September 2009 and concludes from this that the letter dated 29 June 2009 containing the notice of appeal in the present case was sent and received by the EPO on that same date.

[2.2] However, the Board notes that the facsimile number of the addressee of the fax (+49 089 2399 2528) is in fact the number of the Treasury and Accounts department of the EPO, i.e. it is not the facsimile number (+49 089 2399 4465) of the filing office of the EPO in Munich (Article 3 of the Decision of the President of the EPO dated 12 July 2007 concerning the filing of patent applications and other documents by facsimile, Special edition 3/2007 of OJ EPO, page 7, and point 3 of Notice from the EPO dated 12 July 2007 concerning the availability of the EPO filing offices, Special edition 3/2007 of OJ EPO, page 6).

[2.3] Should it have been established that the said notice of appeal was not duly filed at the EPO, the appellant could at least legitimately have expected to receive a corresponding warning from the EPO that its filing was deficient, i.e. that it was sent to the wrong fax number, because the deficiency was readily identifiable for the EPO. Since 20 days then remained for the appellant to file a notice of appeal at a correct EPO address, the Board is convinced that the appellant would have filed its already prepared notice of appeal again at the correct address, both in due time and in due form.

[2.4] Therefore, applying the established case law on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, the Board deems that the notice of appeal was filed on 29 June 2009, i.e. in due time.

Since the order for payment of the appeal fee was part of the same letter dated 29 June 2009, the same applies to the payment order.

[2.5] Consequently, the Board deems the appeal to be admissible without any necessity to consider a re-establishment of rights.

Re-imbursement of the fee for re-establishment of rights

[3.1] In view of the above finding that the appeal was admissible without consideration of the request for re-establishment of rights, the request for re-establishment of rights has no more basis.

[3.2] Therefore, the Board orders the reimbursement of the corresponding fee already paid by the appellant.

The Board then dismissed the appeal on substantive grounds.

Should you wish to download the whole decision, click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

Tuesday, 1 November 2011

T 711/07 – Nothing New Under The Sun


וְאֵין כָּל-חָדָשׁ תַּחַת הַשָּׁמֶשׁ

as wise man Qohelet put it, “There is nothing new under the sun.” Apparently Munich is under the sun, at least as far as admissibility is concerned.

The patent proprietor appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division to revoke the opposed patent.

In response to the communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings (OPs), the patent proprietor filed two auxiliary requests replacing the auxiliary request on file.

The patent proprietor did not attend the OPs.

The Board found the main request on file not to comply with the requirements of A 123(2).

It admitted the first auxiliary request because it was an appropriate response to the objections raised in the summons. However, it dismissed this request because its subject-matter lacked inventive step.

The Board then dealt with the second auxiliary request. It found that the subject-matter of this request introduced a number of new complex issues at a time when this was not appropriate from the point of view of procedural economy and the state of the proceedings and could not be dealt with in the absence of the appellant. Therefore, it decided not to admit the second auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings in application of Article 13(1) RPBA. The decision also contains an interesting paragraph on the famous Article 12(4) RPBA:

[5.9] In his letter of 1 April 2011 the appellant argued with respect to the admissibility of the second auxiliary request under Article 12(4) RPBA that in the time since the opposition had been filed the practice of the boards had changed significantly. It used to be the case that a party to an appeal could rely on being able to submit amendments at various points in the procedure without being questioned as to why the amendments had not been first introduced in the opposition procedure.

In respect of this argument it is sufficient to note that the board declined to admit the second auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings in application of Article 13(1) RPBA, and not of Article 12(4) RPBA referring to the power of the boards “to hold inadmissible facts, evidence or requests which could have been presented or were not admitted in the first instance proceedings”. The latter provision had been cited by the board in respect of the auxiliary request filed with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal. However, the appellant submitted further amendments in reply to the board’s communication accompanying the summons to OPs which introduced a number of new complex issues at a time when this was not appropriate from the point of view of procedural economy and the state of the proceedings and could not be dealt with in the absence of the appellant.

It is therefore only for the sake of completeness that the board adds that the provisions of Article 12(4) RPBA, previously numbered Article 10a(4), have applied to proceedings before the boards in which the notice of appeal was received after 1 May 2003, i.e. long before the opposition was filed in February 2005, see Articles 2 and 3 of the decision of the Presidium of 28 October 2002 (OJ EPO 2003, 62) in conjunction with Article 2 of the decision of the Administrative Council of 12 December 2002 (OJ EPO 2003, 61). Article 10a was renumbered as Article 12 by the decision of the Presidium comprising the amended RPBA of 12 September 2007 (OJ EPO 2007, 537), with the wording of paragraph 4 left unchanged. This decision was approved by the decision of the Administrative Council of 25 October 2007 (OJ EPO 2007, 536). Pursuant to Article 24 RPBA,
“[t]hese Rules of Procedure shall enter into force upon entry into force of the revised text of the EPC in accordance with Article 8 of the Revision Act”.
The date of entry into force of the revised text of the EPC was 13 December 2007. Thus the renumbering of Article 10a as Article 12 became effective as of 13 December 2007.

Should you whish to download the whole decision, just click here.

The file wrapper can be found here.

NB: There is nothing new on this blog - this decision has already been reported on Le blog du droit européen des brevets.