Thursday, 17 June 2010

T 659/07 – There’s Nothing We Can Do


In this case the patent was opposed on the grounds based on A 100(a), (b) and (c). During the proceedings, the opponent withdrew its objection based on A 123(2) against the feature “at regular intervals”. The Opposition Division (OD) finally maintained the patent in amended form. New claim 1 still contained the feature “at regular intervals”. Only the patent proprietor filed an appeal. Before the Board, the opponent requested a remittal to the OD and justified this request by invoking a fundamental deficiency: according to the opponent, the OD coerced it to withdraw the objection based on A 123(2).

Procedural issues

[2.1] Before descending on the substantive merits of the claim requests on file, the Board needs to examine whether the case may require a remittal to the department of first instance as a result of the alleged substantial procedural violations, as requested by the [opponent].

[2.2] In this respect, the Board concurs with the [opponent] that the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius is not an absolute one, as demonstrated by G 1/99 [headnote]. A remittal of the case should normally be ordered if the first instance proceedings are tainted with a fundamental deficiency (Article 11 RPBA). A substantial procedural violation may certainly be regarded as a fundamental deficiency justifying a remittal. However, the fact that only the proprietor filed an appeal, changes the picture. This means that the decision under appeal is scrutinized only to the extent that it did NOT allow the maintentance of the patent as requested by the proprietor. Thus it is an open question if a substantial procedural violation by itself is sufficient reason for ordering a remittal against a proprietor who is a sole appellant especially in light of the fact that the opponent invoking the substantial procedural violation was not prevented from recognising this violation and filing an appeal himself. But even that question needs not be answered by the Board in the present case, as the Board sees no prima facie case of a substantial procedural violation.

The Board then examines the minutes and the statements of the parties and comes to the conclusion:

[2.3.4] [… T]here is no conclusive evidence before the Board that the OPs before the opposition were tainted with a substantial procedural violation. The Board also sees no reason to examine the issue any further on its own, because such a further examination of this question would go beyond the scope of these appeal proceedings.

[2.3.5] The [opponent’s] second main argument for a remittal is a contradiction between the order of the decision under appeal and the reasons of the decision, following the principles laid down in decision T 1178/04. In that case the deciding Board held that under certain circumstances the principle of ex officio examination takes precedence over the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius. For example, certain absolute or indispensable procedural pre-conditions (“Absolute, unverzichtbare Verfahrensvoraussetzungen”) are always to be examined ex officio.

The deciding Board of case T 1178/04 takes this statement of principle from the commentary “Patentgesetz mit Europäischem Patentübereinkommen”, 7th edition (2005), by Dr Rainer Schulte and others, paragraph 7.6.1, note 72, at page 986 which concerns the appeal procedure under German law. This very same citation also lists specific examples which fall under those absolute or indispensable procedural preconditions which need to be examined ex officio, among them the existence of a contradiction between the order and the reasons of the decision under appeal (loc. cit. paragraph 8.2.(g), note 77, at page 987. (“Widerspruch zwischen Tenor und Gründen der angefochtene Entscheidung”).

[2.3.6] However, in the light of the finding that a procedural violation during the first instance proceedings is not conclusively proven, the Board holds that the second argument of the [opponent] concerning the insufficient reasoning of the decision under appeal has no merit either. Having established that the opposition grounds under A 100(c) were withdrawn (except for the feature “wall”), there was no need for the OD to elaborate this question in more detail in its decision. The feature “wall” was duly examined in the decision […]. In this manner there is no recognisable contradiction between the order and the reasons of the decision under appeal.

[2.3.7] The reasoning why the OD did not pursue the issue of the “at regular intervals” feature on its own motion need not be particularly lengthy and detailed, given that it is within the discretionary power of the OD to maintain an opposition ground ex officio or not. It is noted that in the present case the opposition as a whole was not withdrawn, only an aspect of an opposition ground was withdrawn. Under such circumstances the OD could presume that the opponent wants to concentrate on those grounds and aspects which are more promising for the purpose of having the patent revoked. Certainly it can not be expected from an OD to oppose a patent even more vigilantly than the opponent himself would do, at least as long as the opponent himself does not withdraw the opposition and remains an active party in the proceedings. Under such circumstances any overly active involvement of the OD on the side of the opponent could easily be perceived as a bias in favour of the opponent. Accordingly, the Board holds that the decision under appeal is sufficiently reasoned and in itself free from contradictions. It is another matter whether the Board would have arrived at the same conclusions given the same facts.

[2.3.8] Thus in the absence of a proven procedural violation the Board sees no reason to remit the case to the department of first instance, and is not precluded from deciding on the matter before it.

The Board then examines the main request and the first auxiliary request and comes to the conclusion that both do not comply with A 123(2) because of the feature “at regular intervals” (!). It then deals with the second auxiliary request:

[5.1] The set of claims of this request is identical with the set of claims held allowable by the OD in its interlocutory decision.

[5.2] From a procedural point of view, such a request per se may be considered formally inadmissible, given that in respect of this request, the appellant is not adversely affected by the decision under appeal as required by A 107. However, this request is interpreted by the Board as in substance being a request for the dismissal of the appeal, in the sense that the Board should not issue a decision even more adverse to the appellant, such as a revocation of the patent as requested by the opponent in the present case.

Exception to the prohibition of “reformatio in peius”

[5.3] As stated above […], the Board holds that the [opponent] failed to prove that any substantial procedural violation occurred, and therefore the Board needs not to decide if such a violation would have justified an exception to the principle.

It remains to be decided if the “manifestly invalid” patent could be revoked, thus creating an exception to the principle, based on the fact that the Board has found that the “regular interval” feature contravenes A 123(2).

[5.4] It is noted that neither the decisions G 4/93 and G 9/92, nor the cited decision T 1178/04 appear to support such an interpretation. Whether or not this principle should be applied does not depend on the extent to which the claimed subject-matter is patentable or not.

It is clear from the reasons of G 4/93 and G 9/92 that when arriving at its answer, the Enlarged Board (EBA) considered the purely procedural aspects of the appeal proceedings, without considering the - undoubtedly undesirable - consequences of the maintenance of “invalid” patents. The Board sees no reason to deviate from the view expressed in G 4/93 and G 9/92 that it is the appeal of the sole appellant which determines the extent of the appeal proceedings.

In G 4/93 [1] the EBA pointed out that the “initial request” of the appellant determines the extent of the proceedings. This is known as the principle of party disposition (“ne ultra petita”).

In G 4/93 [14] which relates specifically to appeals where the patent proprietor is the sole appellant, the EBA considered that if the non-appealing opponent files a request for revocation of the patent, the scope of the appeal is exceeded, so that such a request cannot be examined.

Further as noted by the EBA in decision G 1/99 [4.1]:
“It is undisputed that decision G 4/93 decided that the principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius should be applied in cases where the patent proprietor is the sole appellant against an interlocutory decision maintaining the patent in amended form. This is clearly the wording of paragraph 1 of the order. A patent proprietor can therefore not be placed in a worse position than if it had not appealed. This means that the patent as maintained by the OD in its interlocutory decision cannot be objected to by the Board of Appeal, either at the request of the respondent/opponent or ex officio. This is balanced by the option open to the opponent to file a request for the revocation of the maintained patent at the national level.”
This makes clear that the maintained patent cannot be objected to ex officio by the Board of Appeal.

Moreover, in G 4/93 [6], the EBA said that:
“The extent of the power of the Boards of Appeal to decide upon the proper scope of the patent should be considered in conjunction with the effect of withdrawal of the appeal”
and added that:
“Once the or each appeal has been withdrawn, there is no power to continue the proceedings”.
The present Board only adds that it is normally expected from parties to administrative and court proceedings that they cooperate with the other party and the deciding body in all stages of the proceedings, in order to arrive at a decision. Such cooperation is made difficult if a sole appellant must constantly be prepared to withdraw its appeal, in order to prevent a decision which would put him in a more unfavourable situation than his starting position.

[5.5] From this it follows that the applicability of the legal principle of the prohibition of reformatio in peius depends on the procedural status of a case, and the examination of this procedural status must precede any examination of the substantive merits of a request. This is also in line with the cited decision T 1178/04 [24-26], which restricts the necessity of ex officio examination to procedural preconditions.

However, there can be no doubt that the issue raised here, i.e. the invalidity concerns the very substance of a patent and has nothing to do with the procedural preconditions. In this manner there is simply no room to establish to what extent a request or a patent may or may not fulfil the usual substantive criteria, so from a legal point of view there is also no room to establish whether there is any invalidity. In other words, even if this fact should be manifestly apparent for all parties and the Board, the Board can not order any legal consequences thereof.

This can best be illustrated by the fact that a patent proprietor is not even required to present a request on appeal which would correspond to the version of the patent as upheld by the first instance. In that case it is perfectly clear that a Board is simply procedurally barred from examining, and even less deciding on that form of the patent. On the other hand, this does not hold for procedural preconditions and such facts, which are apparent from the decision under appeal, and which can be examined even without having to examine the actual substantive requests (i.e. the claim requests) in the appeal.

[5.6] As explained above, since there is no reason why the above mentioned decisions G 9/92, G 4/93 and G 1/99 should not apply to the present case, the patent as maintained by the OD in its interlocutory decision cannot be objected to by the Board of Appeal either at the request of the non-appealing opponent as a party to the proceedings as of right under A 107, second sentence, EPC 1973, or ex officio even if the patent as maintained would otherwise have to be revoked on the ground that a feature present in both claim 1 as granted and amended claim 1 as maintained introduces added subject-matter contrary to A 123(2).

Moral of the story: It is a dangerous thing to withdraw grounds of opposition without good reason. It may relieve the OD of some work, but you might regret your kindness later on. And: If ever a decision of the OD adversely affects you, you may want to seriously consider filing an appeal. Otherwise, the prohibition of reformatio in peius may make you regret not having spent the 1180 Euro appeal fee.

To read the whole decision, you may click here.

Wednesday, 16 June 2010

T 2271/08 – No Referral For Review


From time to time the Boards are confronted with legal creativity. In the present case, the patent proprietor filed a hybrid request mixing elements of legal means provided under A 112 and A 112a. The resulting request could be qualified as “referral for review”.

** Translation from the German **

[4] The third auxiliary request filed during the oral proceedings reads:
“Alternatively it is requested, as a third auxiliary request, that the decision be referred to the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA) for review, in order to ensure uniform application of the law concerning inventive step, and in particular of the interpretation and the application of the so-called “could-would approach”.”
It is to be noted that the Board is not competent to decide on a petition for review based on A 112a. The Board understands from the explanations of the [patent proprietor] that a request for referral under A 112(1)(a) is meant as it aims at uniform application of the law and as the request was filed during the proceedings before the Board. Moreover, none of the grounds referred to in A 112a(2) have been given.

Referrals to the EBA are governed by A 112. The aim of a referral is to ensure uniform application of the law (if there are contradictory decisions of the Boards) or to answer legal questions of fundamental importance (which, if necessary, can also be referred if the legal question arises for the first time). However, it is established case law of the Boards of appeal that no technical questions but only legal questions of fundamental importance can be considered for a referral (see “Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 5th edition (2008), chapter VII.D.13.2). According to A 112(1)(a) the Board concerned can also refer a question to the EBA following a request from a party to the appeal if the Board considers that a – preceding – decision of the EBA is needed in order for it to come to a decision on the substance of the case (see also T 520/01 [4.1]).

It can be deduced that a referral to the EBA is only possible if the Board cannot answer a question that is relevant for its decision or sees itself unable to derive a uniform answer to such a question from the case law. It follows that the decision of the EBA (and a fortiori the referral) in any case has to precede the decision by the Board.

In contrast, the request of the [patent proprietor] explicitly (ausweislich) aims at the review of the decision of the Board by the EBA, which would only be possible after [a decision has been taken] (nachträglich). As a consequence, the request aims at something that has not been provided for by the lawmaker under A 112.

Consequently, the request has to be dismissed.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Tuesday, 15 June 2010

T 2271/08 – Time Factor Denied


From time to time decisions of the Boards of appeal refer to the so-called “secondary indicia” for inventive step such as the existence of a prejudice, commercial success of the invention, and so on. The present decision deals with a case where the patent proprietor argued that the time factor played in favour of inventiveness, and provided some corresponding evidence.

** Translation from the German **

[2.3.4] According to the case law of the Boards of appeal, a period of 23 years between the date of publication of the document disclosing the closest prior art and the priority date of the impugned patent can be considered to be an indication of inventive step [if the relevant technical field is] a highly active (stark bearbeitet) technical field of economic importance.

In the present case there is no evidence that the claimed subject-matter [an immersion pump] is part of a technical field of economic importance. Even the hardcopy of search results in class F04D 13/14 showing 527 documents for the period since 1900 does not prove that there has been a particularly high activity during the 20 years that separate the publication date of document E1 and the priority date of the present patent.

Moreover, it cannot be excluded that commercial considerations deterred the skilled person from industrially applying the immersion pump according to E1 with corresponding modifications. As a matter of fact, if the users considered the old technology to be satisfying and if this technology left margin for improvement, there was no reason to invest the high amounts needed for industrially applying the new technology.

[2.3.5] Therefore, the subject-matter of claim 1 […] does not involve an inventive step as required by A 56 EPC 1973.

We will come back on this decision tomorrow, if you like.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Monday, 14 June 2010

T 795/06 – Extent Of Protection Of A Use Claim


Claim 1 as granted read:

Use of the botulinum neurotoxins from Clostridium botulinum of type A, B, C, D, E, F or G or a mixture of two or more of these neurotoxins, characterised in that the neurotoxin or mixture of neurotoxins is free from the complexing proteins which naturally form complexes with the botulinurn neurotoxins, for the manufacture of a pharmaceutical preparation for cosmetic treatment or treatment of dystonia or disorders of the nervous system in a human or animal patient who has already formed neutralizing antibodies against botulinum neurotoxin complexes.

Claim 1 of the main request before the Board was identical to Claim 1 as granted.

Claim 2 of the main request read:

Use of a pharmaceutical preparation comprising botulinum neurotoxins from Clostridium botulinum of type A, B, C, D, E, F or G or a mixture of two or more of these neurotoxins, characterised in that the neurotoxin or mixture of neurotoxins is free from the complexing proteins which naturally form complexes with the botulinurn neurotoxins, for cosmetic treatment or treatment of dystonia or disorders of the nervous system in a human or animal patient who has already formed neutralizing antibodies against botulinum neurotoxin complexes.

No such use claim was comprised in the claims as granted.

The Board deals with the question of whether A 123(3) has been infringed. It has some very interesting remarks on A 64(2) and G 2/88.

** Translation from the German **

[6.1] A 123(3) prohibits amendments of the granted claims during opposition proceedings if these amendments extend the extent of protection of the European patent. As confirmed in decision G 2/88 [headnote 1] of the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA), the extent of protection conferred by the claims before and after the amendments have to be compared. The first step that is required when doing so is to determine the extent of protection conferred by the claims as granted, because it is mandatory to establish what the extent of protection conferred by the unamended patent corresponds to. The determination of the extent of protection has to be carried out in accordance with A 69(1) and its Protocol, which provides a guide to the manner in which the technical features of the claim are to be interpreted. (G 2/88 [4]).

Interpretation of use and process claims

[6.2.1] The EPC allows both process claims and use claims. According to the EBA in decision G 1/83 [11], it is often only a matter of preference whether an applicant claims an activity as a process for carrying out the activity, setting out a sequence of steps, or whether he seeks protection for the activity, which may naturally comprise a series of steps, as the use (Anwendung oder Verwendung) of a thing for a stated purpose. The EBA did not consider this to constitute a substantive (sachlich) difference.

[6.2.2] In its decision T 958/94 [3.4], the Board examined whether there was a substantive difference between a claim directed to “a process for manufacturing a medicament intended for the new therapeutic use, characterised in that the substance is used” and a claim directed to the “use of a substance to manufacture a medicament intended for a new therapeutic use”. Considering the fact that manufacturing a medicament does in practice involve a sequence of mandatory and standardized steps, the Board came to the conclusion that according to decision G 1/83, both claims encompass in the same way the activity of formulating the active substance for a medicament, i.e. the process for manufacturing the medicament. The subject-matter of the claimed invention remained the same, which meant that the two claims were substantively equivalent.

[6.2.3] In the case underlying decision T 292/04 [5-6], claim 1 concerned the use of a substance in the manufacture of an antimicrobial agent and was drafted in the Swiss-claim format. On one hand, the agent was intended for use in methods which are referred to in A 52(4), on the other hand it was also intended for use in processes not referred to in this provision, for example for formulating contact lens solutions. When assessing whether the claim was novel and inventive with respect to the prior art, following the principles set out in G 1/83, the Board came to the verdict that the claim, insofar as it was not restricted to a therapeutic use of the manufactured agent, has to be understood as referring to a process for the manufacture of a liquid antimicrobial agent.

Extent of protection of claim 1 of the patent as granted

[6.3.1] Having in mind this case law of the Boards of appeal, the Board is of the opinion that the aspect of claim 1 as granted which refers to the use of botulinum toxins for the manufacture of a pharmaceutical preparation for cosmetic treatment in a human or animal patient cannot be distinguished, on a substantive level, from a claim directed to a process for the manufacture of a pharmaceutical preparation using botulinum toxins. As both claims concern the same activity and naturally comprise the same process steps, they also confer the same extent of protection (see also T 279/93 [4]).

[6.3.2] A 64(2) provides that if the subject-matter of a European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the patent shall extend to the products directly obtained by such process, even if the latter are not patentable per se. Consequently, the extent of protection conferred by a claim directed to a process for the manufacture of a pharmaceutical preparation using botulinum toxins also extends to the pharmaceutical preparations directly obtained by this method.

[6.3.3] The protection conferred by A 62(4) [sic] for products directly obtained by a process depends on the breadth of the wording of the claimed manufacturing process. In the present case the only step that characterises the manufacturing process is the use of botulinum toxins. Therefore, the Board comes to the conclusion that the protection conferred by A 64(2) extends to all pharmaceutical preparations which are directly obtained by any manufacturing process using botulinum toxins.

[6.3.4] As taught in G 2/88 [5, 3rd §], it is a principle underlying the EPC that the protection conferred by a claim directed to a substance (Stoffanspruch) is “absolute”; that is, it comprises, among other things, any kind of use of the substance, regardless of whether it has been disclosed or known by the inventor. In view of this principle the EBA has come to the understanding that whenever claims directed to a substance or a composition comprising this substance are amended so that the amended claims are directed to the use of that substance or the use of the composition for a particular purpose, the amended claims are not open to objection under A 123(3) [headnote 2].

[6.3.5] In summary, the Board notes that part of claim 1 as granted refers, in substantively equivalent form (in sachlicher Äquivalenz), to a process for the manufacture of a pharmaceutical preparation using botulinum neurotoxin. Pursuant A 64(2) and in view of the fact that granted claim 1 does not comprise any feature defining this manufacturing process in detail (see [6.3.3] above) the protection conferred by this claim would cover any pharmaceutical preparation comprising any botulinum neurotoxin. In view of the principles established by the EBA in G 2/88, present claim 2, which corresponds to the use of a pharmaceutical preparation comprising botulinum neurotoxins for the cosmetic treatment of certain patients, is not open to objection under A 123(3).

Applicability of A 64(2)

[6.4.1] In view of the outcome of the above analysis, the question of whether A 64(2) is applicable in the determination of the extent of protection of claim 1 is crucial.

[6.4.2] In decision G 2/88 [3.3] the EBA has established that there is a clear distinction between the extent of a protection conferred by a patent and the rights which are conferred by a European patent. Whereas the protection conferred by a patent is determined by the content of the claims (A 69(1)) and in particular by the categories of such claims and their technical features, the rights conferred on the proprietor of a European patent (A 64(1)) result from the legal provisions of the designated Contracting States.

[6.3.4.] A 64(2) refers to the “rights conferred by a European patent”. Therefore, the question of whether A 64(2) is to be taken into consideration for the determination of the extent of protection of a granted claim has to be answered.

[6.3.5] In its decision G 2/88, the EBA has examined the effect of A 64(2) on the answer to the question of whether an amendment consisting, for instance, in a change from a claim directed to a substance to a claim directed to a use of this substance increases the extent of protection. Thereby the EBA has indicated that A 64(2) is to be taken into account in the assessment of the extent of protection conferred by a claim.

The EBA has established that an amended “use claim” which is equivalent to a manufacturing process using the originally claimed substance, would extend the protection to the product of this process according to A 64(2), which would correspond to increasing the extent of protection within the meaning of A 123(3). However, in the case that was actually presented to the EBA, wherein the amended “use claim” corresponded to a claim directed to a process using the originally claimed substance in order to achieve an effect (and not to manufacture a product), the EBA came to the conclusion that as a rule, there was no such effect of A 64(2), as this use claim was not a process claim within the meaning of A 64(2).

[6.4.5] A number of decisions of Boards of appeal have followed the EBA in this application of A 64(2) (see, for example, T 5/90 [4.1]; T 73/92 [7]; T 20/94 [4.3.1]; T 277/95 [7]; T 401/95 [4.3.2]; T 570/96 [2.3-6]; T 1013/96 [2]; T 651/03 [4.2]; T 423/04 [3]; T 1026/04 [23.2] and T 304/08 [3.3.2]).

[6.4.6] The Board is aware of decision T 1286/05 [2.5] wherein the competent Board explained in an obiter dictum concerning A 123(3):
“the change from the only independent claim of the patent as granted relating to a process of preparation (“Use of a lipophilic surfactant component for the manufacture of a pharmaceutical composition …”) to a claim referring to a use for achieving a particular effect (“Use of a lipophilic surfactant component for reducing the inhibitory effect of the hydrophilic surfactant …”) would extend the protection conferred.”
However, as this opinion is not reasoned in decision T 1286/05, the Board is not in a position to examine its correctness.

[6.4.7] Therefore, the Board is convinced that A 64(2) is to be taken into account when considering the extent of protection conferred by claims. This holds true both for the assessment of the extent of protection of an amended claim such as the claim in the case presented to the EBA in G 2/88, and for the assessment of the extent of protection of a granted claim.

[6.5] As already mentioned in paragraph [6.3.5] above, the Board is convinced that claim 2 complies with the requirements of A 123(3).

NB: When translating this decision, I encountered the difficulty of translating the term ‘Verfahren’. The EPC itself is not consistent; when the German version says ‘Verfahren’, the English version sometimes has ‘method’ (e.g. A 53c)) and sometimes ‘process’ (e.g. A 64(2)). To make the confusion complete, the present decision also sometimes refers to a ‘Prozess’. As far as I can see, the terms ‘method’ and ‘process’ are used interchangeably in the case law and these terms are strictly equivalent under the EPC.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Saturday, 12 June 2010

R 14/09 – On The Right To Be Heard


[5] The Petitioner argues in essence, that he had not been given a reasonable chance to realise in time, i.e. before the Board of Appeal took the decision under review, the relevance which the Board attributed to Attachment A, so that he was not able to comment on it as it is his right pursuant to A 113(1). This contention is, however, not supported either by the facts or by the law:

[6] True, when the Petitioner received that document more than 14 months before the oral proceedings (OPs), at the end of which the decision under review was taken, the members of the Board of Appeal had been replaced as required by A 24(4). However, this interim composition of the Board did not and could not have any bearing on the decision on the substance of the case.

What matters is rather the fact that the document in question is nothing else than a set of colored drawings with commentaries, all made up by the then appellant (patent proprietor) and submitted for an enhanced comprehensibility of his arguments in support of the patentability of the claims according to the “1st Auxiliary Request” and that the parties, about three months before the OPs, were informed by the Board of Appeal in its second communication, that the reasoning provided in support of inventive step would be relevant also in respect of the appellant’s main request. Under these circumstances the Petitioner, even if he (wrongly) assumed that Attachment A was not formally in the proceedings, he could not reasonably have trusted that this document would not be considered at all by the Board of Appeal.

The Petitioner did not allege and there are no indications whatsoever, that during the OPs he had been hindered by the Board of Appeal to comment on that document or on the Petitioner’s arguments referring to it before or after he had, according to his own account, unsuccessfully objected to the use of that document.

[7] It follows that the Petitioner had actually been given the opportunity to present his comments within the meaning of A 113(1) also on Attachment A insofar as it is to be considered as grounds or evidence on which the decision under review is based.

[8] It is then irrelevant for the purposes of A 113(1), whether and when Attachment A became (legally) part of the file within the meaning of R 147(1), and it is immaterial that, as the Petitioner maintains, he became aware of the purported relevance of that document only when reading the reasons for the decision. That would certainly have been too late for a successful plea, but could not alter the fact that his right to be heard before the Board of Appeal decided against him was not infringed.

It is pointed out in this context, that it is not the purpose of that right to provide – and the A 112a(2) (c) and A 113(1) may not be construed as providing – to any party to the proceedings a further opportunity to argue its case.

[9] The Petitioner relies also on purported violations of A 114 in conjunction with R 116(1) and (2) or, respectively, R 101 and 99(2). However, these provisions are not listed in A 112a(2) or R 104 as grounds on which a petition may be filed.

[10] The “Technical Opinion on the Submissions of the Patent Proprietor concerning the Parameters of EP 0 802 341 B1” was filed during the period provided in A 112a(4), first alternative. However, the right to be heard or “the opportunity to present comments” (A 113(1)) is by definition not related to the content and/or the merits of the comments. Hence, there is no need that the party affected demonstrate that it would have produced convincing evidence (or arguments) if sufficient opportunity to comment had been given to it. It follows that the “Technical opinion” cannot be considered in the review of the impugned decision, irrespective of whether it contained “substantiated and substantive submissions, which would have considerably influenced the decision of the board of appeal”.

You can download this decision here.

Interpretative spotlight : “comprising”


[29] The meaning of the word “comprising” is generally interpreted as encompassing all the specifically mentioned features as well as optional, additional unspecified ones, whereas the term “consisting of” only includes those features as specified in the claim.

Therefore, “comprising” includes as a limiting case the composition specified by “consisting of”. The board is satisfied, therefore, that the amendment from the former into the latter does not extend beyond the content of the application as originally filed (see also e.g. decisions T 457/98 [2.1.1] and T 425/98 [3.1]).

Admittedly, this finding is not surprising, but it is always good to have a decision where it is clearly stated.

To read the whole decision (T 997/06), please click here.

Friday, 11 June 2010

T 360/07 – Striving For Purity


[3.2] Document D3 discloses […] the production of amorphous (S)-omeprazole magnesium salt by dissolving (S)-omeprazole magnesium salt in ethanol and introducing the solution into CO2 as an antisolvent.

[3.3] Whereas claim 4 of the main request requires that the magnesium omeprazole has “a residual organic solvent content of less than 7% by weight”, document D3 does not specify the organic solvent content of the products disclosed therein. Therefore, it is to be assessed whether or not this feature of claim 4 renders its subject-matter novel.

[3.4] The [patent proprietor] considered decision T 142/06 to apply to this case rather than T 990/96 […].


[3.4.1] Decision T 990/96 [7] states that
“... a document disclosing a low molecular chemical compound and its manufacture makes available this compound to the public in the sense of Article 54 EPC in all grades of purity as desired by a person skilled in the art” if “Conventional methods for the purification ... such as recrystallisation, distillation, chromatography, etc., which normally can be successfully applied in purification steps, are within the common general knowledge of those skilled in the art.”
This statement is preceded by the following:
“It is common general knowledge that any chemical compound obtained by a chemical reaction will normally contain impurities for various reasons, such as sidereactions, incomplete conversion of starting materials, etc., and that it is not possible for thermodynamical reasons to obtain a compound, which is - in the strict sense - completely pure, i.e. totally free of any impurity.” (see point [6] of the reasons).
This clearly indicates that the conclusion drawn in point [7] of the reasons for the decision not only applies to the type of impurity of the specific case (here the threo isomer in the respective erythro isomer) but to impurities in general, namely to any undesired compound present in the desired product.

[3.4.2] The [patent proprietor] considered residual solvent not to be an impurity. It referred to US patent D20 which defines that “references herein to ‘impurities’ are to be understood as not including residual solvents ...” […]. However, the word “herein” in this citation indicates that said definition was made only for the purpose of this document, possibly in contrast to the general meaning of the term “impurity”.

Magnesium omeprazole is used as an active agent in pharmaceutical compositions (see document (D7) […]). High contents of organic solvents in general are undesirable and even moderate contents of methanol (the most preferred solvent according to the patent in suit) inacceptable in pharmaceutical compositions (see document D22 […]). Consequently, residual organic solvents in general and methanol in particular are to be regarded as impurities whenever present in magnesium omeprazole. Hence, the decision T 990/96 might be relevant for the present case.

[3.4.3] Decision T 142/06 [3.27-3.3.2] refers to T 990/96. Under point [3.29] of the reasons it bases its deviation from T 990/96 on the fact that only the low content of chlorine in the latex enables the production of films of the desired oxygen barrier and boil blushing properties. The present case differs from the one of T 142/06 in that here the desired therapeutical effect is only based on magnesium omeprazole as such. Therefore, the reasons to deviate from T 990/96 indicated in T 142/06 do not apply to the present case. Consequently, there is no reason to apply the conclusions drawn in T 142/06 to the present case.

[3.4.4] Decision T 990/96 [7] states that the absence of impurities cannot contribute to novelty only if said purification can be achieved by conventional means. Such conventional means include the evaporation of the solvent as suggested in example 6 of document D7. Furthermore, detailed methods for the effective removal of residual solvents by drying were known from the review article D22 […].

[3.4.5] Consequently, there is no reason to deviate from the decision T 990/96. All the features of claim 4 are explicitly disclosed in […] D3 except the requirement that the residual organic solvent content has to be less than 7% by weight. As this range for the organic solvent content cannot contribute to novelty, the subject-matter of claim 4 of the Main Request lacks novelty under A 54(3) […].

To read the whole decision, click here.

Thursday, 10 June 2010

T 349/09 – Wrong Target


The present decision reminds us that unlike oppositions, appeals attack decisions, not patents. Therefore, it is risky to file a statement of grounds of appeal that only restates the arguments set forth in the notice of opposition without pointing out the shortcomings of the decision against which the appeal has been filed.

[4] The appellant conceded that the statement of grounds of appeal is “more or less an adaptation or condensation of the notice of opposition”. There can be no doubt at all that the statement of grounds of appeal was prepared by simple editing of the earlier notice of opposition so as, for example, to refer to claims numbered as in the request allowed by the Opposition Division (OD).

Moreover, the editing was clearly done in great haste and/or with insufficient attention so that some obvious mis-spellings occurred and an objection in the notice of opposition (that under A 53a) was retained even though, as a result of the decision under appeal, it had become redundant.

The respondent almost correctly observed that the only reference to the decision under appeal was in the request to set it aside - in fact there were two such references, on each on the first and last pages of the statement of grounds of appeal, and a third mention of the decision also on the first page in the sentence beginning "Claim 1 of the opposed patent as mentioned with the Interlocutory Decision pertains to...". That third reference immediately precedes the use of some twenty-one pages of text, recycled with slight editing from the notice of opposition, which contain no other reference whatsoever to the decision under appeal, let alone any attempt to relate its content to that decision. The respondent was beyond doubt correct to say it was a “copy and paste” version of the notice of opposition. The appellant was beyond doubt correct to say that there is no verbatim or explicit link between the grounds of appeal and the decision.

[5] A 108, third sentence, is the basic legal provision relating to statements of grounds of appeal. It requires that:
Within four months of notification of the decision, a statement setting out the grounds of appeal shall be filed in accordance with the Implementing Regulations.
The importance of this provision is that, by requiring a statement of grounds of appeal, it calls for something more than, and different from, submissions made at first instance. As to what form that should take, one must turn to the Implementing Regulations.

[6] The relevant provision of the Implementing Regulations is R 99(2) which sets out in general terms the required contents of a statement of grounds of appeal. It reads:
In the statement of grounds of appeal the appellant shall indicate the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned, or the extent to which it is to be amended, and the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based.
This makes quite clear that the statement of grounds of appeal must, first, supply the appellant’s reasons for attacking the decision under appeal and, second, put forward the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based. Again, it is significant that R 99(2) refers here to the appeal and not to the opposition. Of course, R 99 governs appeals against other decisions than those of the OD. However, even within the limited ambit of opposition proceedings, the obligatory requirement is to substantiate the appeal and not just refer to or repeat the substantiation of the opposition. This distinction - namely, that oppositions attack patents, but appeals attack decisions - is crucial and the attack must be presented accordingly.

[7] Additionally, Article 12(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) requires:
The statement of grounds of appeal and the reply shall contain a party’s complete case. They shall set out clearly and concisely the reasons why it is requested that the decision under appeal be reversed, amended or upheld, and should specify expressly all the facts, arguments and evidence relied on.
The similarity of Article 12(2) RPBA to R 99(2) is clear. Again, there is the requirement to give reasons for attacking the decision under appeal and to put forward the facts, arguments and evidence relied on, which clearly means relied on in the appeal. Additionally, the statement of grounds of appeal must contain an appellant’s complete case (if only because later amendments are not necessarily allowable - see Article 13(1) RPBA) and the facts, arguments and evidence must be specified “expressly”.

[8] Similarly, the case-law of the Boards of Appeal has consistently considered it to be incumbent on an appellant to file, by the end of the four month time limit, a statement of grounds which (either in itself or together with the notice of appeal) presents the Board with the appellant’s case why it considers the decision under appeal to be wrong. A detailed survey of the case-law in question is at pages 621 to 625 of “Case Law” in the section VII.D.7.5 entitled “Statement of grounds of appeal”.

It is sufficient to mention here the general principles established by early case-law, namely that

(a) the statement of grounds of appeal should specify the legal or factual reasons on which the case for setting aside the decision is based, present clear and concise arguments to enable the board and the other party or parties to understand immediately why the decision is alleged to be incorrect, and on what facts the arguments are based, without first having to make investigations of their own; and

(b) to be sufficient for admissibility, the grounds of appeal must be analysed in detail vis-à-vis the main reasons given for the contested decision.

[9] Just as there is a noticeable similarity between R 99(2) and Article 12(2) RPBA as already noted (see [7] above), so there is also an equally noticeable similarity between Article 12(2) RPBA and the basic principles of the case law (see [7] and (a) and (b) in [8] above). This is not coincidental. As has been observed elsewhere (see T 87/05), the RPBA are in part at least a codification of the case-law on procedural practice. It would indeed be surprising if the RPBA did not reflect the case-law. This means that compliance with the basic principles of the case-law on substantiation will often ensure compliance with Article 12(2) RPBA - and vice versa. It also means that recourse to the case-law is unlikely to avoid a finding of inadmissibility if Article 12(2) RPBA has not been complied with. Article 12(2) RPBA provides the essential test of substantiation which the case-law supplements but over which it does not take precedence. The [opponent] referred to Article 12(2) RPBA as “crucial” and the Board agrees.

[10] To summarise, the legislation and the case-law are unanimous in the requirement that a statement of grounds of appeal must present a reasoned case against the decision under appeal. All of A 108 and R 99(2) and Article 12(2) RPBA require reasons to support the appeal and both R 99(2) and Article 12(2) RPBA require those reasons to say why the decision under appeal is attacked.

While clearly implicit in those legislative requirements, the caselaw adds that the grounds of appeal must be analysed vis-à-vis the reasons in the decision under appeal and must enable the board and the respondent to understand immediately why the decision is alleged to be incorrect: what the Board in its communication called the need for “argument or reasoning linking the matters set out in the statement of grounds with the reasons given by the OD in its decision”.

The legislation does not say in more detail how that link is to be made but, by requiring a complete case setting out expressly the facts, arguments and evidence relied on, Article 12(2) RPBA indicates it should, to use the appellant’s word, be verbatim. If not spelled out in terms, the link must be at the very least be apparent from the expressly-stated contents of the statement of grounds of appeal, since the board and the other party or parties must be able to understand the appellant’s case from the statement without having to make investigations of their own (see point 8(a) above). […]

The appeal is rejected as inadmissible.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

NB: This decision has already been reported on the Blog du droit européen.

Wednesday, 9 June 2010

T 938/09 – Mind Your Guide


Why entrust an appeal to a professional representative? Wouldn’t it be cheaper to be represented by an employee (or, as far as small businesses are concerned, by the CEO)? Wouldn’t it be simpler to entrust the appeal to the legal practitioner who already represents the party before national jurisdictions? That may well be. But these persons, although allowed to represent a party before the EPO, might be insufficiently familiar with proceedings under the EPC. And this is what appears to have happened in the present case.

Here an application of the Symbasis company was refused by the Examining Division on January 27, 2009. Mr. Z., a legal practitioner (Rechtsanwalt) took over the representation and filed an appeal on March 11, 2009. A second appeal was filed by the CEO of Symbasis, Dr. T. No appeal fee was paid.

The renewal fee for the seventh year having fallen due on October 31, 2008, Dr. T. enquired on March 25, 2009 whether it was correct that he could still pay the renewal fee. The EPO having confirmed this possibility, a payment of 1500 € was received on March 31, 2009.

On April 21, 2009, Mr. Z. enquired why he had not received any confirmation for the filing of the appeal nor an invoice concerning the appeal fee. The EPO replied that it was too late for paying the appeal fee but that re-establishment could be requested. Mr. Z. followed this advice. He explained that in a telephone call made on February 26, 2009, he and Dr. T had agreed that Symbasis would pay the appeal fee. Dr. T. had asked his associate, Mr. S., to transfer the appeal fee. Mr. S. had transferred 1500 € on March 30, 2009. The EPO had entered this as a payment of the renewal fee. Dr. T. might have confounded the fees because he was professionally overburdened at that time. Both Dr. T. and Mr. S. filed declarations in lieu of oath (eidesstattliche Versicherungen) that it was intended to pay the appeal fee and that there had been a confusion.

Here is what the Board had to say:

** Translation from the German **

[3] Pursuant A 122(1) the applicant who, in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken, was unable to observe a time limit shall, upon application, have his rights re-established. If the party is represented by a professional representative, re-establishment can only be granted if it can be shown that both the applicant and the representative have taken all due care (J 5/80 [headnote 1]). It is part of the duties of a representative to ensure that current time limits are met so as to avoid unintentional losses of rights. In doing so he has to know the relevant legal provisions. Ignorance of the law is not a valid ground for re-establishment (see e.g. J 6/07 [2.4]).

[4] In the present case the representative apparently did not now the regulations concerning time limits and fees because he told the EPO in his letter dated April 21, 2009, that he had not received an invoice concerning the appeal fee that had fallen due and that he requested such an invoice. Apparently he acted on the assumption that he would receive a request for payment and did not know that the appeal fee had to be paid within two months of delivery of the decision and that the amount to be paid is fixed in the Rules relating to fees. The Board cannot endorse the argument of the representative that this letter was legally irrelevant (unbeachtlich) because it was written after the expiration of the time limit for the payment. As a matter of fact, when assessing whether all due care was taken the overall circumstances always have to be taken into account. Also it is not clear how the letter could be an office error (Büroversehen) because it had been signed by the representative himself.

[5] Even assuming that the representative, in his telephone call on February 26, 2009, mentioned the need to pay the appeal fee in due time, it would have be part of his duties to mention the amount of the fee to be paid and how concretely the time limits would expire. Apparently the applicant is not familiar with patent matters and insufficiently informed on how time limits operate. This can be seen, for instance, in its request for an extension of the time limit to file an appeal (February 26, 2009) or in its enquiry concerning the payment of the renewal fee (March 25, 2009). In such a case, it is the duty of the representative to explain to the applicant until when a fee is to be paid and what the amount is. He cannot have done so in the telephone call on February 26, 2009, because he himself was not aware of these matters, as can be seen from his letter dated April 21, 2009.

[6] The Board cannot endorse the argument of the representative according to which, even if he had not known the time limit on April 21, 2009, he must have known it at least on February 26, 2009, because otherwise he could not have mentioned the need to pay the appeal fee in due time. This does not fit the common experience of life (allgemeine Lebenserfahrung). It rather appears that the representative mentioned the need to pay the appeal fee in due time in general terms (pauschal) without concretely explaining what this means in detail. He left it to the applicant to procure itself the relevant pieces of information. This is not in conformity with the due care a representative [is expected to take]. For this reason alone, the request for re-establishment cannot be granted.

As my boss once said, “if a blind man leads a blind man, both will fall into a pit”. (Mt 15.14)

To read the whole decision (in German), please click here.

Tuesday, 8 June 2010

T 760/08 – Too Short On Substance


The present decision deals with an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division (OD) to revoke the patent for lack of novelty of claim 1 with respect to documents D2 and D3. The patent proprietor filed a new set of claims and the following statement:
“New claim 1 according the main request has the features of claims 1 and 4 as granted, wherein the features of claims 1 and 4 as granted form the preamble of new claim 1 and the feature of claim 6 as granted forms the characterising part of new claim 1. New claim 1 is followed by new claims 2 to 12 which correspond to claims 2, 3, 5 and 7 to 14 as granted, only the references to preceding claims having been adapted.

As the prior art does not contain a heating with all the features of claim 1, in particular with the characterising feature of new claim 1, the subject-matter of claim 1 according to the main request is novel over the prior art.

Moreover, [its] subject-matter also involves an inventive step because the prior art does not disclose the feature of the characterising part of new claim 1, so that combinations of two documents of the prior art cannot lead to the subject-matter of the main request in an obvious way. Therefore, the request to set aside the decision dated February 12, 2008 and to maintain the patent in amended form is fully justified.”
The Board deals with the question of whether the appeal is admissible:

** Translation from the German **

[2] In conformity with the case law the Board assumes that a statement of grounds of appeal can be considered to be sufficiently substantiated if a new factual situation (Tatbestand) which deprives the contested decision of its basis (T 252/95) is presented, in particular via the filing of new sets of claims (T 934/02). The Board is of the opinion that the appellant has two options as regards the statement of grounds of appeal. Either it attacks the decision of the OD by claiming that an error has been made and that this error would oblige the Board to completely set aside the decision if the Board followed the statement of facts (Sachvortrag) made by the appellant. This requires a conclusive statement of facts concerning all the grounds on which the decision is based on behalf of the appellant. Or the appellant makes it possible for the Board to redress its situation by filing amended sets of claims, which the appellant believes to be suitable for remedying the deficiencies that have been objected in the decision.

[3] However, in the latter situation it is not sufficient to simply file a new set of claims without any comment. Rather the appellant has to justify why and to what extent the amended set of claims takes into consideration the factual and legal appreciations on which the OD has based its decision and overcomes them to the extent that the decision is to be set aside. (T 220/83 and T 145/88) What matters is not the length (Umfang) of the statement of grounds of appeal but its factual content:
The requirement of A 108 is for a statement which sets out the substance of the Appellant’s case; that is, the reasons why the appeal should be allowed and the decision under appeal should be set aside. […] a well-drafted Statement of Grounds of Appeal should contain reasoning that is full but concise. And, in general, it is obvious that the less reasoning that a Statement contains, the greater will be the risk that the appeal will be rejected as inadmissible for non-compliance with A 108. (J 22/86 [2])
[4] These considerations are reflected in Article 12(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of appeal (RPBA):
The statement of grounds of appeal and the reply shall contain a party’s complete case. They shall set out clearly and concisely the reasons why it is requested that the decision under appeal be reversed […] and should specify expressly all the facts, arguments and evidence […] (emphasis by the Board)
[5] One may expect from a statement of grounds of appeal which contains the complete case (Sachvortrag) of the appellant within the meaning of Article 12(2) RPBA that it is self-consistent (widerspruchsfrei), unambiguous and sufficient.

[6] In the present case the patent has been revoked for lack of novelty of the subject-matter of claim 1. When filing the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant has presented a new main request and has explained it as cited above. The first paragraph of the statement refers to the amendments that have been made, the second paragraph deals with novelty and the third with inventive step.

[7] Paragraph 1 of the statement of grounds of appeal first indicates that as far as the newly filed main request is concerned, “the features of claims 1 and 4 as granted form the preamble of new claim 1”. Claim 4 of the patent as granted refers to an electrical resistance heating. However, this feature is not in the preamble but in the characterising part of new claim 1, which now has two new features, i.e. the electrical resistance heating from claim 4 as granted and the thick-layer heating body from claim 6 as granted. Therefore, the justification is to some extent contradictory.

[8] The second paragraph of the statement of grounds of appeal refers to the “characterising feature” (Merkmal des Kennzeichens), which feature is not unambiguous, for the reasons mentioned above. As a matter of fact two new features have been incorporated into the characterising part. Apparently only one of them is suitable for restoring novelty. Moreover, the second paragraph does not deal with the decision of the OD and the documents D2 and D3 cited by it but only mentions the “prior art” in general terms. As the OD has justified the objection of lack of novelty with documents D2 and D3, one might presume that the “prior art” designates those documents. However, this is not unambiguous because the third paragraph, which deals with inventive step, also mentions the “prior art” but arguably refers to other documents than only D2 and D3. Therefore, there is no unambiguous reference to the prior art from which the appellant wishes to distinguish itself.

[9] Because there is no unambiguous definition of the prior art and of the “characterising feature” (Merkmal des Kennzeichens) the last two paragraphs of the statement of grounds of appeal reads as if they were standard phrases which do not refer to the impugned decision in a concrete manner. If the term ‘heating’ was replaced by the term ‘device’, they could be found in submissions (Schriftsatz) in any patent case in the field of mechanics. Therefore, these paragraphs are not suitable for dealing with the impugned decision in a concrete manner. They do not point out which features justify novelty or why these features are novel over D2 or D3. The appellant leaves it to the Board to clarify the contradictions in the first paragraph, to define the prior art mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 and to consider which of the two features that have been incorporated into the characterising part, isolated or together, the appellant believes to make the claims novel or patentable.

[10] During the written proceedings and partly also during the oral proceedings, the appellant has cited the following decisions in order to support its submissions on the requirements for statements of grounds of appeal: J 2/87, T 563/91, T 729/90, T 105/87, T 162/97, T 833/00.

In J 2/87 the written approval to the grant of a patent was accepted as statement of grounds of appeal. This case is not comparable with the present case because there were no amendments requiring an explanation.

In T 105/87 it was stated that “by limiting the subject-matter of the claim and by submitting reasons for the patentability of such a claim the Appellant has sufficiently dealt with the ground of the decision of the first instance”. Therefore, in this case there were reasons for the patentability of the claim, which means that the case is not comparable with the present case.

In T 833/00 [1.2] the appellant had requested that the patent be maintained on the basis of the claims which the OD had considered allowable and had filed again all the arguments in favour of patentability of the remaining claims it had already presented. Therefore, this case is not comparable either.

On the other hand, T 563/91 [1.2], T 729/90 [1.2] and T 162/97 [1.1.2] are decisions that could support the position of the patent proprietor.

However, there are several other decisions that have not been cited by the patent proprietor which establish rather more strict requirements for statements of grounds of appeal. In particular, one may cite T 220/83 and T 1045/02 [5] where a similar factual situation triggered the following statement: “If an application is rejected on the ground of lack of novelty the statement of grounds of appeal should at least make it clear which feature of the claimed object the appellant believes not to have been disclosed in the relevant prior art (here D2). The duty of justification has not been complied with when the Board has to speculate for which reasons the appellant considers that the impugned decision is incorrect”.

[11] This Board has already made clear in decision T 922/05 that it considers that the principles underlying Article 12(2) RPBA appear to be a suitable standard (Maßstab) for the admissibility of an appeal that generalises the above case law which is not always uniform and which in most cases depends on the concrete circumstances of the individual cases. For the reasons given in points [7] to [9], the present statement of grounds of appeal does not comply with these principles.

[12] Therefore, the Board comes to the conclusion that the statement of grounds of appeal filed by the appellant is insufficient. Arguments filed after the time limit fixed in A 108 cannot be taken into consideration for assessing the admissibility of the appeal. Thus the appeal is to be rejected as inadmissible under R 101(1).

I find this decision very tough on the appellant. Maybe something happened during the proceedings which exasperated the Board? Be that as it may, the decision is a useful reminder that statements of grounds of appeal should be drafted very carefully.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

Monday, 7 June 2010

T 354/07 – Bad News For Meta-Methodists


This decision deals with the patentability of meta-methods used for software creation.

** Translation from the German **

[2] The lack of inventive step already results from actual claim 1, which concerns a method for creating software programs by means of an electronic data processing system. As a rule, such a method comprises both technical and non-technical features. However, as long as such non-technical features and aspects of the invention do not have a direct interaction with technical features, in view of a technical effect, they cannot establish an inventive step (see T 154/04 [14 et sequ.]).

[3] As far as information modelling as a stage of software development is concerned, the Board has already stated that it is as such an intellectual activity (gedankliche Tätigkeit) and, therefore, in analogy to the objects and activities mentioned in A 52(2)(a) and (c), not an invention within the meaning of A 52(1) (see T 49/99 [5-7]). The Board (differently composed) has come to a very similar conclusion in the more ancient decision T 204/93 for the transposition of generic program specifications into a concrete software program.

[4] Software development and software creation comprise several stages, starting with the analysis of needs (Anforderungsanalyse), encompassing various design phases and ending in the software implementation. During all these phases it is essentially (dem Wesen nach) an intellectual activity, which may be compared to an engineer’s construction activity even though this work may be supported by programming tools and even though the object of the construction is a technical system.

The design and programming in particular of complex systems require [the person carrying out this work] to act like an engineer and to apply technical expertise but the achievement aimed at and obtained in each of these stages does not consist in providing a technical solution to a technical problem, but a specification of needs, a model for data, processes and/or functions, or a program code.

This assessment is all the more true for meta-methods which on an even more abstract level concern the process of software creation itself, e.g. by providing instructions (Handlungsanleitung) to the software developer on how to structure and organise the development process or which modelling methods are to be used.

As a rule, such conceptual methods and meta-methods of software creation do not possess technical features relevant for patentability and, therefore, cannot establish inventive step, unless in a particular case (im Einzelfall) it can be shown that there is a direct causal connection with a technical effect that is relevant for the solution of a technical problem.

[5] As the production of software is object of the claimed invention, the assessment of inventive step requires a careful distinction between the technical and the non-technical aspects of the invention.

The present invention mentions that the invention aims at creating an improved method (and device) for porting (Portierung) software to a target platform, by means of an electronic data processing system […]. [The invention] is said to make it possible to port technical solutions that have already been conceived (erdacht) to a new target platform with as little need for modification as possible.

This problem is said to be solved by the invention by means of a new method for porting software to a target platform, by means of an electronic data processing system comprising the following steps:

“1. Establishing of a first function chart (Funktionsplan) for a problem to be dealt with by a software program, the first function chart being independent of the platform.

2. Establishing a second function chart by means of the first function chart, the second function chart being adapted to specific requirements of the target platform.

3. Creating the software program for the target platform by means of the second function chart.”

[6] The expression “function chart” is used with very different meanings in the common technical usage (Sprachgebrauch), both for graphic representations of processes, programs, etc., as for designating particular graphical programming languages or programs that have been graphically encoded on the basis of such languages. The ambiguity of the expression requires an interpretation on the basis of the present application.

In paragraph 0011 of the A1-document the “first function chart” is described as “a graphical representation of a technical solution that is clear (übersichtlich) for the expert”. The first functional charts could be established by means of graphic editors wherein the functional blocks (Funktionsbausteine) would be placed in a working area (Arbeitsbereich), parameterised, and connected (verschalten). […] They could, for instance, be materialised as hardcopies on paper or as an electronically readable data file (Datei). The second function chart represented the software program in graphical form, which could be executed on the target platform […]. This required the transposition of the pieces of information contained in the second function chart into software code […].

[7] Therefore, the function charts within the meaning of the present application are nothing but graphical representations of a model of the control system (Steuerungs- und Regelungssystem) to be established, on different levels of abstraction, without there being an interaction with the system or the control procedures (Steuerungsprozesse) as it could be the case, for example, for a graphical user interface for a device control (Anlagensteuerung). The first function chart shows the functions and processes that are control-related (steuerungsrelevant), e.g. from the point of view of a system analyst, whereas the second function chart shows the model from the point of view of the programmer who has to take into account details of the implementation.

An influence on the portibility (Portierbarkeit) of software, as claimed in the application, exists only to the extent that the software developer can re-use the pieces of information contained in the function chart that is independent of the platform. However, it is a common feature of all information models that they are applicable in an area the extent of which depends on the level of abstraction on which the model is based, such that that it is possible to concretely express the model in this area in view of different hardware requirements.

The claimed concept which consists in establishing two function charts is a meta-method for structuring the modelling process. As no technical effect causally connected with the application of this method is apparent, this concept cannot be taken into consideration in the assessment of inventive step.

[8] The claimed method also comprises aspects the technical nature of which is indisputable. The software programs are created “by means of an electronic data processing system” and the elements (connection, interface, etc) of the first function chart are transposed into elements of the second function chart “by means of a rule base (Regelbasis) deposited in the electronic data processing system”.

[9] The Board and the appellant agree that document D1 is the closest prior art and a suitable starting point for the assessment of inventive step.

This document already discloses a method for creating a software program by means of an electronic data processing system (“on IBM AT and compatibles”). In this method, a first function chart (“block diagram”) is established in a first step by means of a graphic programming tool (“The Realizer by Actum Solutions … a fully graphics oriented program”). This first function chart is platform independent. The platform independence results from the indication that the block diagram drawn with the programming tool consists of standardized symbols (“standardized industrial control symbols”). Then the programming tool creates an “intermediate software” […] from the block diagram. This software is platform dependent because the programming tool relies on particular micro-controllers and controllers programmable from memory (speicherprogrammierbare Steuerungen) which are specific to certain manufacturers (“86HC05, Siemens PLCs, …”).

Finally the software program for the target platform is created with the intermediate software (“a postprocessor is started to refine the intermediate software for a specific hardware environment”).

[10] The only differences between the method of the present claim 1 and the method known from document D1 are that the intermediate software, or the model on which the intermediate software is based, respectively, is represented graphically as (second) function chart and that the automatic transposition of the elements of the first function chart into the corresponding elements of the second function chart is carried out by means of a rule base deposited in the electronic data processing system.

The graphic representation in the form of a second function chart only concerns the organisation and structuring of the development process, i.e. when which information model is visualised during the development process, without there being any direct causal connection with obtaining a technical effect. Structuring the development process in such a way may facilitate the intellectual work carried out by the software developer, but it does not make any technical contribution to the state of the art and, therefore, cannot be taken into account in the assessment of inventive step.

Finally, the method step according to which the elements of the first function chart are transposed into corresponding elements of the second function chart “by means of a rule base deposited in the electronic data processing system” cannot provide a basis for acknowledging inventive step. As is well known, a rule base is an integral part of “intelligent” knowledge-based methods, which have found various applications also in programming tools for developing software and which are generally known to the person skilled in the field of software development. This is also expressed in document D1 which refers to “intelligent” allotment of resources by the programming tools. The feature of obtaining such (artificial) intelligence by means of a knowledge-based method is obvious with respect to the general technical knowledge.

Therefore, the subject-matter of claim 1 lacks inventive step and cannot be patented. Thus even the method claim in the version as it stands cannot be granted. As there is no version of the claims that can be granted, the appeal has to be dismissed.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

NB: This decision is being reported parallely on Laurent Teyssèdre's blog.

Saturday, 5 June 2010

T 862/08 – Let Lexicographers Be Warned


[5.1] Document D6 is concerned with laser-glazing of a binary eutectic Fe83B17 alloy. This process comprises remelting at least in part the surface of the material through a laser-glazing pass to produce a track of an amorphous structure […]. This first laser-glazing pass complies with the step (1) of the claimed method.

The second laser-beam pass according to the known process overlaps part of the first laser-glazed pass so that the overlapping zone is re-crystallized at least in part because of heat affecting. As a consequence thereof, ultra-fine precipitations of primary crystals are formed in the heat affected zone (HAZ) which satisfies claimed step (2) of devitrifying at least a portion of the metallic glass to a nanocrystalline grain size […].

The [patent proprietor’s] argument that document D6 did not disclose explicitly the formation of nanocrystalline grain sized material cannot be followed for the following reasons.

Firstly, the term “nanocrystalline” as such is open to interpretation in that it does not clearly define a specific range for the grain size. The patent itself explains that the nanocrystalline grains can be “in the order of 10^–9 m” […], or “below 1 μm” […]. Hence, the term “nanocrystalline” fails to permit a clear distinction from the “ultra-fine precipitations of primary crystals” identified in the HAZ according to document D6.

The appellant referred to the definition of “nanocrystalline” which was accepted as being below 100 nanometres in the professional community, as confirmed by statements of Mr Jeffrey E. Shield and Dr Kureti of the University of Karlsruhe (D21). Since however the patent specification itself gives the above mentioned meaning of the term “nanocrystalline”, the statements of Mr Shield and Dr Kureti cannot lead to a different explanation of this term.

However, the appellant’ argument that document D6 is concerned with a binary eutectic Fe83B17 alloy which neither comprises carbon nor a metal of the group of elements specified in claim 1 is agreed with. The subject mater of claim 1 of the main request is therefore novel.

To read the whole decision, click here.

NB : This decision is also commented on Le blog du droit européen.


A related post can be found here.