Saturday, 5 June 2010

Interpretative Spotlight : “desired”


Claim 1 of the main request read:

1. A printed document of value having at least one authenticity feature in the form of a luminescent substance based on a host lattice doped with at least one rare earth metal which absorbs and is excitable substantially in the visible region of the spectrum and is transparent in at least parts of the IR spectral region, whereby the rare earth metal is holmium and the luminescent substance is present in the volume of the document of value in a concentration such that the desired properties (gewünschte Eigenschaften) of the document of value are only just not impaired.

The Board comes to the conclusion that this claim lacks clarity:

** Translation from the German **

[2.2] The wording of a patent claim has to be clear so that it is possible to examine whether an object is inside the extent of protection of the claim or not.

Claim 1 of the main request […] contains the following wording: “such that the desired properties of the document of value are only just not impaired.” In order to verify whether a document of value reproduces this feature, it is necessary to know whether its “desired properties” are impaired. This presupposes knowledge of what are the desired properties of the document are. There is no definition of these properties in the claim itself. The expression “desired properties” is found in paragraphs [0010] and [0040] of the description of the impugned patent. However, there is no explanation of what is meant.

A skilled person having to assess any document of value among the great number listed in paragraph [0016] of the impugned patent, is not able to ascertain in each and every case which properties were desired by the manufacturer of the respective object. Even if the person carrying out the assessment knew in a particular case, he could not know, when comparing two objects, whether the conformity or the difference concerning one property were desired or not.

Therefore, the wording: “such that the desired properties of the document of value are only just not impaired” is so unclear that it cannot unambiguously characterize the document of value.

[2.3] In [parallel] case T 1312/07 the [patent proprietor] had explained that “desired properties” designated the respective product specification. Even if this interpretation were to be followed, the expression would have to be considered as unclear. It cannot be excluded that product specifications change for various reasons over the period of manufacture of the product. This could entail that an object that did not comply with a specification does so at a later moment in time, or vice versa. In such cases it would not be clear which of the properties are the “desired” properties. There are no indications in the impugned patent that the specification that is valid at the moment of manufacture is decisive. However, a patent claim has to be clear on its own. It follows that the above mentioned interpretation presupposes that the claim, or at least the description, mentions a specification, which the impugned patent does not.

Thus even the interpretation put forward in case T 1312/07, i.e. that the desired properties of a document of value were to be understood as the product specifications of the product of value, cannot lead to a clear claim. […]

[2.5] Thus claim 1 of the main request […] worded in a clear manner and, therefore, does not comply with the requirements of A 84.

To read the whole decision T 1313/07, please click here.

Friday, 4 June 2010

T 1365/09 – Dealing With Contradiction


What happens when an Opposition Division (OD) revokes a patent during oral proceedings (OPs) but then sends a communication stating that the patent is maintained in a form that corresponds to the patent as granted? What is the legal basis for dealing with such a contradiction?

** Translated from the German **

[1.2] The reasons for the decision mentioned in the impugned decision concern the rejection of the main request and of all auxiliary requests for lack of inventive step. However, the written decision sent to the parties used form EPA 2327 and declared that the patent […] was maintained “in amended form” on the basis of the description, pages 2 to 5, of claims 1 to 13 and the figures 1 to 5 of the patent specification,  these documents being apparently equivalent to the patent as granted.

[1.3] This contradiction had the consequence that the [patent proprietor] was not able to understand whether the patent was maintained or revoked. Moreover, [the proprietor] was not represented during the OPs where the decision was given.

Therefore, the [patent proprietor] had to assume, by way of precaution, that the patent was revoked. The mere contradiction concerning the effect of the decision adversely affects [the proprietor] and entitles him to file an appeal (A 107).

[1.4] Thus the appeal is admissible.

Rule 111(1)

[2.1] R 111 concerns the form of decisions and communications of the EPO. According to R 111(1) decisions may be given orally during OPs held before the EPO. Such decisions are then to be put in writing and notified to the parties.

Obviously, the decision given during the OPs has to be the same as the decision put in writing as both sentences of R 111(1) mention only one decision. This is clear especially in the English version (“… the decision may be given orally. The decision shall subsequently be put in writing …”).

[2.2] The written version of the decision of revocation that had been given orally differed at least from the printed form EPA 2327 which mentions the maintenance of the patent […] in amended form. However, there can only be one unambiguous decision. Therefore, the requirements of R 111(1) have not been complied with.

As a consequence, the impugned decision is unclear and has to be set aside.

Lack of reasoning

According to R 111(2), first sentence, decisions of the EPO which are open to appeal shall be reasoned. The impugned decision also violates this requirement because the reasons sent on April 14, 2009 do not give any reasons for the maintenance of the patent.

Therefore, the impugned decision is to be set aside.

Reimbursement of the appeal fee (R 103)

[4.1] According to R 103(1)(a) the appeal fee shall be reimbursed if the appeal is successful and if the reimbursement is equitable by reason of a substantial procedural violation. It is therefore necessary to examine whether there is such a substantial procedural violation.

[4.2] The decision notified in writing violates the duty to provide a reasoning (Begründungspflicht) pursuant R 111(1). This duty to provide a reasoning is a particular embodiment of the right to be heard enshrined in A 113(1), as a party also has a fundamental right to know why a decision having the stated effect has been taken. According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal of the EPA, a violation of the right to be heard is a substantial procedural violation.

The contradiction between the decision that had been given orally and the decision that had been notified in writing violates the requirements of R 111(1) and also constitutes a substantial procedural violation (see T 666/90 [2.2.2], where R 68(1) EPC 1973 was applied).

[4.3] Both substantial procedural violations justify the reimbursement of the appeal fee for reasons of equity.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

Thursday, 3 June 2010

T 867/05 – Reinstatement Questioned


[11.1] The claims of the requests underlying the decision under appeal concerned artificial kidneys and a method of producing a polymeric membrane material.

[11.2] The claims of the requests annexed to the statement setting out the grounds of appeal of the proprietors appellants respectively concerned:
  • an artificial kidney (Main, and Subsidiary Requests 1 to 7),
  • a use, in in vitro dialysis, of the membrane material (Subsidiary Requests 8 to 10) and
  • a method of producing an artificial kidney (Subsidiary Requests 11 and 12, as well as most of the previous requests as a further independent claim).

[11.3] In response to a communication of the Board in preparation for oral proceedings, the proprietors appellants, with their letter dated 11 September 2009, submitted 18 fresh requests concerning respectively:
  • an artificial kidney (Main, 1st, 2nd and 15th Auxiliary Requests);
  • a membrane material for use in an artificial kidney (3rd to 5th and 16th Auxiliary Requests);
  • a membrane material as defined in the claims as granted (6th Auxiliary Request);
  • a more limited membrane material as in Claim 7 as granted (7th, 8th and 17th Auxiliary Requests);
  • a method of producing an artificial kidney (9th and 12th Auxiliary Request);
  • a method of producing a polymeric membrane comprising the features of Claims 1, 7 and 13 as granted (10th, 11th and 14th Auxiliary Requests);
  • a method of producing a membrane for use in an artificial kidney (13th Auxiliary Request).
[11.4] As regards the requests containing claims directed to a membrane material […], the opponents objected that the patent proprietors were not adversely affected by the decision under appeal, which did not deal with a membrane material, so that those requests were inadmissible.

[11.5] The question of whether or not a party is adversely affected by a decision taken by an authority as defined in A 106 arises in connection with A 107 in order to establish who may appeal. In the present case, the proprietors were adversely affected by the decision of the Opposition Division (OD), which did not accede to e.g. their Main Request, so that the appeal of the patent proprietors was admissible, which fact is not contested.

[11.6] The objection raised by the opponents indeed concerns the question of whether or not in opposition appeal proceedings broader claims (i.e. broader than those underlying the decision under appeal) may be reinstated (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 5th edition 2006, VI.J.3.2.2(b)).

[11.7] According to the case law, where as in the present case the patent is maintained in amended form and the patent proprietors are themselves appellants, they may in appeal proceedings pursue claims which are broader than those held to be allowable by the OD.

[11.8] However, the opponents have referred to T 528/93, mentioned in the case law, in which it was decided that in appeal proceedings the patent proprietors may only pursue claims which were the subject of the decision at first instance, as they were not adversely affected with respect to claims requests that were not the subject of the decision under appeal, e.g. because the claims requests had been withdrawn before the OD. According to the opponents, that case was similar to the present one.

[11.9] The case law also mentions decision T 168/99 [1], in which it was decided that withdrawal of subject-matter (there, of the granted claims before the OD had commented on them) did not necessarily mean that it had formally been abandoned. Hence, the reinstatement of the claims as granted as the Main Request was allowed, in particular because objections under A 123, paragraphs 2 and 3, had been raised against the requests containing amended claims.

[11.10] It is apparent from the above that T 528/93 deals with claims being substantially identical, withdrawn before the OD and represented before the Board, whereas T 168/99 concerns a case in which there was no explicit abandonment of the claims as granted and issues under A 123(2)(3) were raised against the claims of the auxiliary requests.

[11.11] Since in the present case the claims as granted had not been explicitly abandoned, Claim 1 of the 4th Auxiliary Request had never been presented before the OD and issues under A 123(2)(3) were raised against the claims of the Main and 1st to 3rd Auxiliary Requests, the present case is similar to T 168/99 rather than to T 528/93.

[11.12] Hence, there is no conflict with T 168/99 and the conflict between T 528/93 and T 168/99, if any, does not affect the present case.

[11.13] In view of the case law and in the absence of any conflicting decision to the present case, a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal as invoked by the opponents is not necessary.

[11.14] Therefore, the […] request is admissible.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Wednesday, 2 June 2010

T 867/05 – You Must Be Kidneying


The patent as granted contained independent claims directed to a membrane material (for use in dialysis) and a method of producing such a membrane. During the opposition proceedings, the patent proprietor filed requests concerning an artificial kidney using such a membrane, but the Opposition Division rejected these requests as violating A 123(3) and maintained the patent on the basis of a claim directed to a membrane. 

The Board reconsiders whether the “artificial kidney” claim complies with A 123(3):

[5.1] The opponents have also objected that the amendment “artificial kidney” extends the protection conferred by the patent as granted.

[5.2] According to the proprietors’ arguments, an artificial kidney contains not only a membrane suitable for haemodialysis but also more components such as tubing, fittings and controls, which fact is no longer disputed by the opponents.

[5.3] Hence, the amendment “artificial kidney” implicitly imports in Claim 1 as granted not only more specific properties of the membrane, which actually would restrict the scope of protection of Claim 1 as granted, but also operative components of an apparatus, which were not defined in any of the claims as granted and which (as the casing, the tubing, the valves, etc.) have no interrelationship with the membrane, i.e. are not suitable to impart any limitation to the membranes.

[5.4] Since the product claims as granted defined a composition of matter (membrane material of Claims 1 to 9 and permselective material for use in dialysis of Claim 12), and since the amended product claims define an apparatus (an artificial kidney), there has been a shift of the definition of the invention from a physical entity to a more complex physical entity which was not encompassed by the terms of the claims as granted. That shift implies that further components of an apparatus are encompassed by the terms of the present claims. This extends the protection conferred by Claim 1 as granted to subject-matter which is foreign to that as granted (aliud), and so violates A 123(3).

The decision has a slightly American flavour (“composition of matter”); it would have been perfect statutory language to call the kidney a “machine” rather than an “apparatus”.

More seriously, I am somewhat surprised by the reasoning. The claim as granted covered a specific membrane and would have allowed the proprietor to prohibit any exploitation whatsoever of this membrane, for example in an artificial kidney. How could a claim to such an artificial kidney comprising the membrane be said to extend the protection conferred by the patent? I can’t believe that the Board got it right.

I may be wrong but I think that if the reasoning of the Board were correct, then it would NOT be possible, for instance, to accept an amendment “from a claim to a physical entity per se ... to a claim to a physical activity involving the use of such physical entity” (to use the language of G 2/88 [5]). However, such an amendment has been explicitly allowed by the EBA.

It might be appropriate to recall what T 1149/97 [6.1.10] has called the “guiding principle under A 123(3)”: once a European patent has been granted, an act by a third party which would not infringe the patent as granted should not be able to become an infringing act as a result of amendment after grant. I believe that the amendment from a claim directed to a membrane to a claim directed to an artificial kidney comprising such a membrane does not go against this guiding principle.

What do you think?

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Tuesday, 1 June 2010

T 1726/08 – What Does Cross-Check Mean?


[12] In accordance with A 122(1), an applicant shall have his rights re-established upon request if he was unable to observe a time limit vis-à-vis the EPO “in spite of all due care required by the circumstances having been taken”. Where the applicant has authorised a professional representative to represent itself before the EPO, the due care requirement applies to the professional representative (see, e.g., decision J 3/93 of [2]). It is the established case law of the Boards of Appeal that this due care requirement is fulfilled if the non-compliance with the time limit results from an isolated mistake within a normally satisfactory system for monitoring time limits (see, e.g., decision T 428/98 [3.3]). The systems used for the monitoring of time limits may include the use of specialised computer systems or software. However, whether any system fulfils the requirement of the taking of “all due care” depends on the individual circumstances of each case (see, e.g., decision T 902/05 [6]).

[13) To qualify as a “normally satisfactory” time monitoring system, the case law has established that such system needs to include an independent cross-check which could, for example, be implemented through a check by a third person (i.e., neither the representative nor his or her assistant) near the due date whether or not an action listed in the time monitoring system has been performed (e.g. decisions T 828/94 [2], T 1465/07 [19]). Only in cases where the representative is working in a small unit or firm, a system without such cross-check mechanism may be satisfactory for A 122(1) (e.g., decision T 428/98 [3.5]). Since the representative’s firm employed some 40 attorneys at four locations, such exception for small firms/units cannot apply in the present case.

[14] The time monitoring system used by the representative and his assistants was exclusively based on the software “Patricia”. After the decision under appeal was notified to the representative, the term no. 670 associated with the status text “Refusal by patent office, external due date” and the required action “shall the refusal be appealed?” was entered into the system on 21 April 2008, together with the next due date of 18 June 2008. These text entries, which could be viewed by the person operating “Patricia”, appeared partially on the personal term lists of the attorney and his assistants, i.e., only the action texts appeared. The text did not change until the term was actively acknowledged by the person operating “Patricia” and therefore not until the required action had been performed before or on the due date.

[15] The board considers it relevant that term no. 670 and its text entries reminded of the due date for filing an appeal but did not contain any separate reference to the payment of an appeal fee. On the other hand, the board finds it irrelevant that the standard text entries (terms) could, if necessary, manually be changed or replaced by the person operating “Patricia” as such modification of the term was not part of the standard procedure at the firm and was not effectuated in the present case.

[16] The action text “shall the refusal be appealed?” in term no. 670 may be understood as implicitly referring to two actions; filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the appeal fee. Indeed, the appellant argued that the representative knew about the requirement to pay the appeal fee within the time limit for filing the notice of appeal and that the assistant regularly cross-checked that all formal requirements were fulfilled as provided by the action to which the submission was in reply. The appellant argued that said cross-check performed by the assistant constitutes a cross-check as required by the case law.

[17] The representative’s knowledge and the assistant’s checking the appealed decision before the appeal is filed is not what in the case law is considered as a reliable reminder that the fee payment requirement is fulfilled. On the one hand, the legal knowledge of the representative cannot be considered to be part of a reminder system if it has not materialised as concrete action-specific information recorded in a paper-based or software-based information system. On the other hand, it is not adequate to rely on the assistant’s check for formal requirements if an entire procedural step, the payment of the appeal fee, cannot be monitored separately (see point [15] above).

[18] The board notes furthermore in this context that the decision under appeal (like any decision refusing a European patent application) did not include any explicit reference to the appeal fee. The standard text accompanying the appealed decision mentioned that the decision was open to appeal, and referred to A 106 to A 108. Only by looking up A 108, second sentence, the representative’s assistant could have read and be reminded that the filing of the notice of appeal had to be accompanied by the payment of the appeal fee.

[19] The board concludes that the information that the appeal fee had to be paid before or on the due date for the listed action was not compelling from the “Patricia” term no. 670 for the persons involved in the prosecution of the file at the firm, taking into account that said term did not contain any explicit reference to the appeal fee and that said term was not accompanied by any other reminder (such as a separate term) related to the appeal fee. Consequently, the personal term lists available before the filing of the notice of appeal could not reliably remind the representative and his assistant of the necessity to pay the appeal fee.

[20] The appellant argued that the standard procedure at the representative’s firm also involved a second crosscheck as required by the case law for a “normally satisfactory” reminder system. After the representative and his assistant had reacted to the entry in the term list and the notice of appeal had been signed by the representative, the assistant performed the next step in the standard procedure by closing term no. 670 and thereby adding term no. 680 in “Patricia”. Only after this change, an explicit reference to the appeal fee appeared for the first time in the system (“Formal appeal and appeal fee sent to patent office” / “request new due date”). As, according to the appellant, term no. 680 is only relevant for proceedings before the Swedish Patent Office, the representative’s assistant immediately acknowledged term no. 680 by clicking “OK”, thereby triggering term no. 681 with the action text “file complete appeal” and a reference to the next action due date 18 August 2008.

[21] However, these steps cannot be considered as a crosscheck, i.e. a back-up of a first reminder. Firstly, there was no first reminder of the due date for the fee payment. In fact, the described interactions with “Patricia” were performed by the representative’s assistant only. The representative himself, when consulting his updated term list, could not see any reference to the fee payment even after the terms had been changed because the term lists only showed the relevant action text (“file complete appeal”).

[22] The assistant was presented, only after having processed the notice of appeal and performed the first term change, the changed status text “Formal appeal and appeal fee sent to patent office”. However, the system did not require the assistant to confirm separately the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the appeal fee. The assistant was only required to confirm the next action “request new due date”, which was not applicable in the EPO proceedings, in order to trigger the next term with a maintained status text and a new action text “file complete appeal”. Under these circumstances, the assistant’s attention was not drawn properly to the necessity to pay the appeal fee, said necessity being a legal requirement per se.

[23] The representative’s involvement ended after signing the notice of appeal […]. He was not involved and was not supposed to be involved in the described “Patricia” updating process. Unlike a person actively operating Patricia, he could therefore not see the status message containing the reference to the fee payment. The fact that only the representative’s assistant, operating Patricia, could have been reminded of the required fee payment means that the cross-check, if the term changes in Patricia were to be considered a cross-check at all, was not independent.

[24] In the board’s judgment, a software-based time monitoring system that does not explicitly remind of the required payment of the appeal fee (an action distinct from the filing of the notice of appeal) on any to-do-list or term list before and after the due date for such payment and only refers to the payment in a status text after the notice of appeal is signed (when the time-monitoring system is updated by the representative’s assistant) is inadequate to monitor the timely payment of the appeal fees.

[25] The appellant further referred to four other appeals that had been filed by the professional representatives at the representative’s firm during the last five years without any fee payment issues […). The board notes that evidence for the efficient operating of a monitoring system during many years may weigh in favour of a finding of a normally satisfactory character but will be counterbalanced by evidence that main features of such a character, such as an independent cross-check, go missing (see decision T 1465/07 [19]).

[26] The appellant has further argued that according to decision T 1465/07, the principle of proportionality requires that the due care requirement pursuant to A 122 must not be interpreted in an excessive manner. In this respect, the board concurs with the finding in the referred to decision T 1465/07 [19] where it was held that the requirement of an independent cross-check was not disproportionate.

[27] For the sake of completeness, the board notes that even if the knowledge of the representative of the requirement to pay the appeal fee and the regular checking of the formal requirements by the assistant, together with the acknowledgement by the assistant of the status text referring to the completed payment, was considered a normally satisfactory system for the monitoring of the time limits for paying the appeal fee, the time monitoring system as operated in the representative’s firm failed in two respects.

Firstly, the representative’s assistant who was finalising the notice of appeal failed to submit a payment instruction (EPO Form 1010) to the representative.

Secondly, the representative signed the notice of appeal without realising that the notice of appeal should be accompanied by a payment instruction. Two mistakes cannot be considered an isolated error in a normally satisfactory system (see decision T 808/03 [2.2]).

[28] For the reasons set forth above, the time limit monitoring system used in the present case did not qualify as a normally satisfactory system. The due care requirement of A 122(1) was not met.

Consequently, the appellant’s request for reestablishment of rights has to be refused.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

A Word On Translations


As you will know, most but not all decisions of the Boards of appeal are given in English. Some of them are given in German, relatively few in French. Only very few decisions (i.e. those found worthy of being published in the Official Journal) are translated into the other official languages of the EPO.

Nevertheless, on this blog, all the extracts cited are in English. This is because I translate the relevant passages of German or French decisions, so as to bring them within the reach of a greater number of readers.

It now occurred to me that I should state this clearly so as to avoid any misunderstanding. The translations given here are in no way official or approved by the EPO. They are just a courtesy service I provide to the readers of this blog.

As I am not a professional translator, I cannot guarantee the exactness of the translations, and even if a were a perfect professional, I would still have to face the traduttore traditore problem. If ever you have to rely on a decision the translation of which you found on this blog, and if you cannot cope with the original, please have the translation checked.

I do my best but sometimes I might get things wrong.

Monday, 31 May 2010

T 1726/08 – Good Faith And Appeal Fees


The present decision is a straightforward application of G 2/97. Its particularity lies in the fact that the applicant had evidence that somebody at the EPO had noticed that the appeal fee had not been paid: for some unknown reason an incomplete internal EPO memo “Processing of an appeal” was accessible through Epoline file inspection. But this element does not really bear on the logic of G 2/97.

[1] In its decision G 2/97 [4.1-2], the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) held that the principle of good faith does not impose any obligation on the board of appeal to notify an appellant that an appeal fee is missing when the notice of appeal is filed so early that the appellant could react and pay the fee in time, if there was no indication – either in the notice of appeal or in any other document filed in relation to the appeal – from which it could be inferred that the appellant would, without such notification, inadvertently miss the time limit for payment of the appeal fee.

[2] In decision J ../87, the Legal Board of Appeal held that in the absence of any circumstances which may create a legitimate expectation to receive a warning or notice, the EPO has no obligation to inform an applicant or his representative that a fee has not been paid in due time.

[3] By referring to a printout of an incomplete internal EPO memo “Processing of an appeal” (Form 2701), the appellant argued that somebody at the EPO had noticed that, although the notice of appeal had been filed, the corresponding appeal fee had not been paid at a moment in time when there was still time enough to pay the appeal fee within the time limit.

[4] The board notes however that it is unclear from the referred to document whether the EPO had noticed the lack of payment of the appeal fee before or after the time limit for the payment had expired since the same document indicates that the statement of the grounds of appeal had already been filed (which was actually filed on 21 August 2008). The appellant had no explanation for this fact.

[5] Although the board cannot exclude that indeed an earlier (incomplete) version of Form 2701 had been present in the electronic file and therefore had been accessible via online file inspection before the completed form was added to the same file on 2 September 2008, the board considers it actually irrelevant whether or not the incomplete Form 2701 was produced and made accessible on 12 June 2008. Even if an officer at the EPO had noticed on 12 June 2008 that the notice of appeal had been filed but the corresponding appeal fee had not been paid, he or she had no information as to whether any non-payment might not be on purpose and therefore conclude that the appellant, in the absence of any notification, would inadvertently fail to pay the appeal fee within the time limit.

[6] There was still enough time to pay the appeal fee between 12 June 2008, when the EPO arguably had noted that the fee payment was lacking, and the end of the two month period of A 108, which ended on 30 June 2008 while it was recorded by the appellant’s representative as ending on 18 June 2008 to avoid any risks related to the application of R 126(2). The appellant argued however that, in contrast to the case underlying decision G 2/97 (where the notice of appeal was filed five weeks before the expiry of the time limit), the time period during which the fee could be paid after the filing of the notice of appeal in the present case was much shorter, i.e. one week if the ten day period under R 126(2) was not considered. This period could therefore not be construed as so long that the appellant could react and pay the appeal fee in time, as it was in the case underlying decision G 2/97.

[7] The board notes that it is not uncommon in the field of patenting that the payment of an appeal fee is handled separately from the filing of the notice of appeal (i.e., by third parties processing payments), which means that a payment may well arrive at the EPO later than the notice of appeal but still within the time limit. It may well be that the payment of appeal fees is withheld deliberately, both in inter-partes and in ex-parte proceedings. For example, a representative may file a notice of appeal and withhold the payment of the appeal fee until final instructions on the effective lodging of the appeal are received (see, for example, decision T 1465/05 [VII]). In fact, nothing in the EPO file indicated that the appellant may inadvertently fail to pay the appeal fee within the time limit. Therefore, the board cannot see any factual difference to the case underlying decision G 2/97 which would justify a different legal position.

[8] Further in this respect, the present case also differs from earlier cases referred to by the appellant […]. In the case underlying decision T 923/95, the appellant paid an insufficient appeal fee. In the case underlying decision J 13/90 […] the applicant, in a request for re-establishment after its failure to pay a renewal fee, announced to pay this renewal fee only after re-establishment was granted (disregarding the provision that the omitted payment should be completed within the time-limit for filing the request for reestablishment). In both cases the filed documents indicated that some error(s) had occurred on the appellant’s side and that the appellant was likely to inadvertently fail to make a timely payment.

[9] In the present case however, no evidence is on file that the EPO could have inferred from the filed documents that without a notification, the appellant would inadvertently miss the time limit for paying the appeal fee. Therefore and following the general findings in decisions G 2/97 and J ../87 the board decides that the principle of legitimate expectations does not apply.

We shall see another aspect of this decision tomorrow, if you like.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Saturday, 29 May 2010

R 19/09 – You Need A Causal Link


The present petition for review deals with decision T 1874/06 where the opposed patent was revoked.

[5] The discussion during the appeal proceedings mainly concerned inventive step pursuant to A 56 in view of document E2A and, in particular, the following question: Was it obvious for the skilled person aiming at further improving the performance of tools to increase the QI value of the layer system known from E2A to a value of at least 5?

It is in this context that the petitioner referred to measuring results disclosed in tables 1 and 2 of his patent. Together with the grounds of appeal he filed “sketch A” representing the values of these tables in the form of two characteristics showing the cutting performance versus the QI values. It was submitted that both characteristics showed an unexpected increase of the cutting performance of the tool at QI values of at least 5. This was one of the proprietor’s arguments in support of inventive step.

[6] Neither in the Board’s communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings (OPs) nor anywhere else in the file is there any indication that the issue of an allegedly “wrong comparison” between the QI values of the top characteristic and those of the bottom characteristic in “sketch A” was raised. It therefore appears that this reason of the Board of Appeal for not acknowledging an unexpected effect […] was indeed never discussed in the appeal proceedings. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the petitioner’s right to be heard was disregarded in this respect.

[7] In […] the petition and at the OPs before the Enlarged Board of Appeal […] the petitioner submitted that the violation of his right to be heard was fundamental as there was a causal link between this violation and the final decision (thereby implicitly applying the jurisprudence of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in case R 1/08). As conceded by the petitioner such a link can only be assumed to exist if the Board had refused to acknowledge an unexpected effect solely based on the “wrong comparison” argument (on which the petitioner was not heard). If, on the other hand, the Board had refused to acknowledge the unexpected effect also for other reasons on which the petitioner was heard it could not be argued that the procedural deficiency causally determined the final decision.

[8] The “wrong comparison” argument referred to above is discussed in point [5.5.1] of the decision under review. Point [5.5.1] is clearly devoted to a discussion of the arguments forwarded by the petitioner. These considerations are preceded, in point [5.5], by a comprehensive reasoning of the Board concerning inventive step having regard to document E2A. Based on the teaching of document E2A alone, in particular of its examples 1 and 7, the Board comes to the conclusion that “the application of a bias voltage of -50V in combination with the discharge current and the nitrogen pressure being held constant at those of examples 1 and 7 (...) would inevitably produce a QI value above 5. Therefore the person skilled in the art would inevitably arrive at the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request II without any inventive skill”(emphasis added). Whether this argumentation is correct in substance cannot be the subject of review proceedings (see R 2/08 [5]; R 9/08 [6.3]). In any case the line of reasoning in point 5.5 is independent of a possible unexpected effect of the claimed subject-matter and therefore independent of “sketch A”.

9. For this reason it is highly questionable whether the procedural deficiency referred to in point [6], supra, could have been causal for the final decision. However, this question can be left open since, as will be shown in the following, the “wrong comparison” argument was not the only reason of the Board for not acknowledging an unexpected effect.

[9.1] Point [5.5.1] of the reasons deals, in a first paragraph, with the appellant’s counter-arguments in respect of the teaching of document E2A. In a second paragraph the Board then analyses appellant’s “sketch A” in view of the alleged unexpected effect. Based on the “wrong comparison” argument the Board concludes that “it has not been shown that this effect has its origin in the distinguishing feature”. Then the Board goes on to state: “Furthermore, as evident from examples 1-7 a higher QI value does not imply an increased cutting distance”, followed by an analysis of the QI values and the corresponding cutting distances of various examples of table 1 of the patent.

Independently of whether or not this analysis is correct in substance, it shows that the Board considered the alleged effect of an increased cutting distance at higher QI values not only under the aspect of a supposedly “wrong comparison” between two different layer systems, but also based on an analysis of the QI values and the cutting distances belonging to one specific layer system. Even if it is true that the Board of Appeal did not explicitly refer to “sketch A” in this connection, its analysis refers to measuring values substantially as contained in the bottom characteristic of “sketch A” from which the petitioner derived the existence of an unexpected effect. The conclusion drawn by the Board from these measuring values that “a higher QI value does not imply an increased cutting distance” is to be considered as a direct answer to the appellant’s argumentation of an unexpected effect. The Board thus denied the existence of an unexpected effect for a second reason on the same factual basis as “sketch A” submitted and discussed by the appellant/petitioner during the appeal proceedings. The question whether or not this finding of the Board of Appeal was correct in substance cannot be the subject of the review proceedings.

[9.2] The Enlarged Board of Appeal therefore concludes that the “wrong comparison” argument was only one of two grounds for which the Board did not acknowledge the existence of an unexpected effect and that the second ground given in the decision under review was a reaction to the submissions of the appellant on this issue. Consequently, for this reason alone there is no causal link between the procedural deficiency as specified in [6], supra, and the decision under review. Due to such a lack of causal link the violation of A 113 is clearly not fundamental within the meaning of A 112a(2)(c).

To read the whole decision, click here.

NB : This decision has also been discussed on the Blog du droit européen.

Interpretative Spotlight : “about”


Claim 1 of the request under consideration read:

1. A method for cultivating L.intracellularis bacteria comprising obtaining culture cells infected with L.intracellularis, incubating said infected cells at an oxygen concentration of less than about 18 percent while maintaining said infected cells in suspension, wherein harvesting is done when greater than about 70% of the cells as determined by the TCID50 method are infected.

[7] An objection for lack of clarity was raised against the term “about” in the expression “wherein harvesting is done when greater than about 70% of the cells as determined by the IFA method are infected”. In accordance with the case law (e.g. T 190/99), a patent must be construed by a mind willing to understand, not a mind desirous of misunderstanding. Here, the skilled person would be fully aware that, because of the number of parameters which may influence cell growth, it will not be possible exactly to predict when the number of cells will reach a defined mathematical value (70%). Yet, he/she would have no problem in evaluating when the cell culture has reached an essentially equivalent stage (here “about 70%”).

For this reason, there is no lack of clarity in claim 1.

To read the whole decision (T 692/08), click here.

Friday, 28 May 2010

T 281/07 – Revival Is Possible


When a request has been withdrawn in opposition proceedings, can it be resurrected in appeal proceedings ? In T 390/07 the Board had found such a request inadmissible. The purpose of an appeal being to review what has been decided at first instance (and, by necessary corollary, not to review what has not been decided), the only basis on which a request withdrawn at first instance might be admitted on appeal - so the Board - was that, as in the case of any other request filed on appeal, it might overcome the reasons for the decision actually given on another request.

The present Board is more relaxed. It allows the resurrection of a formerly withdrawn request and explains why the reasoning of T 390/07 should not apply.

[2.1] Claim 1 of the […] main request is identical with claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 that had been filed during oral proceedings before the Opposition Division […] and then withdrawn, so that it is not part of the impugned decision. […] However, the claims as granted (main request during the opposition proceedings), which had been found not to be patentable under A 123(2) because of an unallowable disclaimer, are part of the impugned decision. […] These claims have been maintained as main request upon filing of the appeal and have been replaced by the present main request by a letter dated October 13, 2009.

Therefore, the present case differs from the situation underlying decision T 390/07 where the auxiliary request that had been withdrawn during the opposition proceedings was again filed as main request from the very beginning of the appeal proceedings (see T 390/07 [X]). Moreover, also in contrast to T 390/07, the main request in the appeal proceedings has been filed with the intention to overcome the ground of opposition mentioned in the impugned decision and to improve the position with regard to novelty and inventive step by limiting the claimed subject-matter to particularly preferred embodiments. This is a legitimate way of proceeding that corresponds to the aim of the appeal proceedings. Therefore, the Board has exercised the discretion conferred to it by Article 13(1) RPBA and admitted the amended main request.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

Thursday, 27 May 2010

R 21/09 – Autonomous But Not Autistic


This decision deals with an alleged violation of the right to be heard. The crucial fact was that the Board had accepted evidence filed before the High Court of Justice – Chancery Division – Patents Court, which had led to the revocation of the UK part of the patent, without examining in detail all the documents that had been filed before that Court.

After having established that the petition was not clearly inadmissible, the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA) deals with its allowability:

[2.1] The petitioner distinguishes between the violation of its right to be heard and the violation of the principle of independence of the law under the EPC with respect to national law, which principle gives a party to appeal proceedings before the Boards of appeal the right to independent proceedings (instance indépendante). When asserting that the right to be heard has been violated, the petitioner criticizes the Board for not having allowed a new discussion of the whole set of documents that had been filed before the English jurisdictions. The second point of the petition for review points out in detail why the Board, therefore, was believed to have adopted the position of the English judge without examining directly the evidence.

The EBA considers that in reality each of these two infringements concerns the right to be heard: the petitioner has been deprived of its right to present a complete defence because the decision has taken into account partial elements, i.e. elements taken from the English decisions, without allowing for a discussion of the whole set of evidence that had been filed before these jurisdictions.

[2.2] The central point of the impugned decision is to know whether example 3D of document D1 destroyed the novelty of claim 1 of the patent under consideration and, more precisely, whether crystalline form α was a direct implicit and inevitable result of this example. The Board of appeal has come to the conclusion that this crystalline form α was indeed produced when example 3D of D1 was carried out.. It is the elements of proof (elements de prevue) on which it relies that are criticized by the petitioner.

[2.3] As far as principles are concerned, the EBA fully agrees with the petitioner. The proceedings before the Boards of appeal are autonomous and decisions of national jurisdictions have no legal authority (autorité en droit). This principle has been asserted in the case law of the Boards of appeal already at a very early stage (see T 452/91 [5.4]). It follows that before the Boards of appeal the parties may expect to dispose of intact rights as to the organisation of their defence.

Any infringement of this principle would not only affect the integrity of the rights of the parties but would also be incompatible with the principle of independence of the members of the Board of appeal asserted in A 23(3), which members shall comply only with the provisions of this Convention and shall not be bound by any instructions.

[2.4] However, this principle does not exclude a certain interaction between national judicial systems and the European system, in particular in view of the elaboration of a harmonious European jurisprudence (see for example the decision of the High Court of Justice, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in case n° A3/2009/0675 Actavis UK Ltd. V. Novartis AG, where the English judge analyzes the problem-solution approach as practised by the EPO and concludes in paragraph 63 that the decision on the obviousness of the solution provided by the patent under consideration to which he had come would have been the same if the problem-solution approach had been applied).

[2.5] In its decision T 665/95 (cited by the impugned decision) the Board has not considered this principle to be an obstacle when it refused further taking of evidence and relying on testimonies taken in Dutch proceedings. It is true that there is nothing to be said against parties introducing national decisions or documents filed during a national law suit into proceedings before the Boards of appeal of the EPO, but the Boards have to take utmost care when treating such facts and evidence which are somewhat different from ordinary documents, so that the independence of mind (liberté d’esprit) is safeguarded during the assessment of these documents so that the Board can come to a conviction of its own.

[2.6] Anyway, the filing of documents that have already been filed before national jurisdictions and of decisions of these jurisdictions has to comply with the general rule according to which each of the parties has to file the documents which it intends to use in the various proceedings, respectfully of the defence or the right to be heard. As matter of fact, even if the parties are the same, the appeal proceedings are distinct proceedings from national proceedings, and autonomous.

[2.7] These principles having been recalled, what is criticized in the decision [of the Board] is not that it had taken into account documents that had not been part of the proceedings (mis aux débats) but that it had not allowed the petitioner to discuss the documents filed, which according to the petitioner are incomplete, within the general context from which they had been extracted.

[2.8] Therefore, it is necessary to examine if the circumstances of the filing of the English decisions have deprived the petitioner of the right to be heard (A 113). This requires [the EBA] to check whether the petitioner has had the time needed to be prepared to discuss these decisions and the elements pertaining to these decisions, depending on whether it had to expect that they would be discussed during the oral proceedings.

[2.9] In its conclusion that crystalline form α was inevitably present in example 3D of document D1, the Board relied both on the experimental results filed by the opponents during the opposition proceedings […] and on the statements of experts before the English court […].

[2.10] In its preliminary communication, the EBA had already pointed out that the elements taken from the decision of the English first instance judge had not been the sole basis for the revocation of the patent and, therefore, there was no causal link between the alleged procedural violation and the decision to revoke the patent.

Thereupon, the petitioner has made a distinction between the effects proven on laboratory scale and on industrial scale. According to the petitioner, the Board had entirely relied on the assessment made by the English judge in the second case.

[2.11] Without entering into the discussion of the evidence retained by the Board of appeal, which corresponds to a substantial re-examination (réexamen au fond) and as such cannot be object of revision proceedings, the EBA comes to the conclusion that it is not true that the petitioner has been deprived of the right to defend itself using all of the elements taken into consideration by the Board of appeal, comprising those filed before the English jurisdiction, for the following reasons.

[2.12] There is no trace in the written submissions (écritures) filed by the petitioner during the appeal proceedings, nor in the minutes of the oral proceedings before the Board of appeal, nor in its decision [that would corroborate] the argument raised after the communication annexed to the [summons to ?] oral proceedings before the EBA, according to which the trials that Apotex had filed two months before the oral proceedings as third party observations did not correspond to those filed before the English jurisdiction.

Apotex had presented these trials as the trials filed before the English jurisdiction. In its written submission, […] Apotex declares that it has carried out four trials for the purpose of presenting them in the law suite in the UK and explains how the experimental conditions under which the trials were carried out could be guaranteed. It also indicates that the minutes of the trials and the X-ray diffraction pattern of the product are attached. […]

[2.13] In its written submissions filed as a response to these observations, the patent proprietor has expressed its astonishment […] that Apotex “made up its mind about two years after having filed them in the English proceedings …”. Then it criticized the results as to their substance (sur le fond) but did not allege that the trials were different from the trials presented to the English judge.

[2.14] The arguments made by the petitioner before the EBA in order to establish that the trials were not the same as those filed before the English jurisdiction reaffirm its arguments as to the substance of the case (de fond) made before the Board of appeal and do not contribute anything new as to the characterisation of the violation of its right to be heard. In particular, […] the petitioner has not established that it was unable to obtain the trials filed before the English jurisdiction for confidentiality reasons, as it mentioned orally when answering the questions of the EBA.

[2.15] In conclusion, it follows […] from the preceding assessment that the petitioner, who as the patent proprietor was a party to the proceedings before the English jurisdiction, knew two months before the oral proceedings before the Board of appeal that Apotex, its opponent in the infringement proceedings, had filed trials presented as those filed before the English judge. It has not pointed out, at that time, that the trials were different and that it had been refused access to the trials, or the whole set of trials, used by the English judge. Quite to the contrary, it has referred to their filing before the English judge. It has also discussed the substance of these trials. Moreover, the English decision had been filed as soon as September 3, 2007.

[2.16] Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to expect the patent proprietor to use all the means at its disposition for defending its patent, without compartmentalizing between the different proceedings which have to decide on the validity of the title. The attention of the patent proprietor had been drawn to trials that were potentially detrimental to the maintenance of the patent because they had already been decisive for the revocation of the patent by the English judge. It is true that these trials were only referred to in third party observations, but the third party, Apotex, was also the opponent in a law suite that ended in the revocation of the patent. As from this moment in time, it was predictable that the elements introduced into the proceedings by Apotex and presented as those already filed before the English judge, resulting the known consequences, could be used by the opponents in the appeal proceedings, as well as the decisions based on them. The petitioner chose not to complete the file of appeal with other documents examined by the English judge and which, according to the petitioner, could foil the documents filed by its opponents by providing a global vision of the trials only part of which had been retained.

[2.17] The fact that the Board of appeal had not referred to the decisions and trials in its preliminary communication cannot possibly characterize a violation of the right to be heard. On one hand, article 17(2) of the Rules of proceedings of the Boards of appeal (RPBA) points out that the communication cannot bind the Board. The communication expresses a preliminary opinion that the Board holds at a certain moment in time but which the Board may reconsider if the arguments made, in particular in response to this communication, were able to bring about changes in the case. In this very instance, the Board only gave a list of numbered documents, which was sent before Apotex filed its observations, in order to facilitate the preparation of the oral proceedings. It did not specify at all how the Board considered the case.

[2.18] Finally, as the proceedings were inter partes proceedings, it is clear that the framework of the discussions is also defined by the written submissions of the parties. As the trials had been introduced into the proceedings by a third party, they represented a potential danger for the patent proprietor. It was normally predictable that these documents could be used against it, the English decision being already part of the file.

[2.19] It follows from what has been said that the criticism in reality addresses the assessment by the Board of appeal of what it considered to be elements of proof. Under the pretext of a violation of the right to be heard, the EBA is requested to control the decision as to its substance (au fond), by checking whether the elements of proof which it retained were to be retained, and if they were sufficient or not. However, the choice between the elements of proof that have been filed and the assessment of their probative value fall within the sovereign assessment by the Board and are clearly outside the scope of revision proceedings.

[3] As a consequence of all that has been said above, the petition for review has to be dismissed as clearly unallowable.

You can download the whole decision (in French) here.

Wednesday, 26 May 2010

T 3/07 – Sufficiency Despite Obvious Errors


[7.4.1] Dependent claim 5 refers to the presence of a lotion further comprising an antiviral composition whereby the antiviral composition comprises from about 0.05% to 80% by weight of said lotion and wherein the antiviral composition is a water soluble metal ion.

The [opponent] argued that it is impossible to produce a lotion composition comprising 80% metal ions, which is the antiviral compound, from the metal salts listed in the patent in suit. For example in a salt like copper sulfate only 40% of the weight can be attributed to the copper ion. A composition of 80% by weight of copper ions can therefore not be produced as the composition would have to comprise more than 100% by weight of the sulfate anion. In other words, even if the “lotion” would consist of 100% antiviral composition and the antiviral composition of a 100% of copper sulfate, the amount of copper ions would not exceed 40%. According to the [opponent] the same applies to all the salts mentioned in the patent in suit where the metal ion generally accounts for less than half of the weight of the metal salts, including the presently claimed aluminium salts.

[7.4.2] The Board does not dispute the [opponent’s] calculation. An upper limit of 80% by weight of the metal ion is obviously incorrect when using the claimed aluminium salts. The Board is, however, of the opinion that the person skilled in the art when trying to put the embodiment of claim 5 into practice would readily identify this obvious mistake and know how to correct it. The Board has not doubts that the skilled person is in a position to calculate for a given aluminium salt the maximum amount of aluminium ion, which can be attributed to that particular salt, in the same way as the [opponent] did for the copper sulfate. It would also be immediately obvious to him that this value represents the theoretical upper limit, which cannot be surpassed when formulating a lotion. The obvious error in claim 5 is therefore not considered detrimental to the sufficiency of disclosure.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Tuesday, 25 May 2010

T 1468/08 – How To Recover ‘Lost’ Claims


Following the revocation of the patent under consideration by the Opposition Division (OD), the board of appeal in T 1468/08 set aside this decision and remitted the case to the OD “for further prosecution on the basis of the main request as filed during the oral proceedings before the Board” (which consisted of claim 1 only). The patent proprietor then requested correction under R 140 of the decision, “or other appropriate clarification”, to reflect that granted claims 2 to 10 “remain”.

The Board does not allow this request but indicates another way out of the dilemma.

[1] R 140, which is concerned with the correction of errors in decisions, states that: “In decisions of the EPO, only linguistic errors, errors of transcription and obvious mistakes may be corrected”. A decision contains an obvious mistake if the text thereof is not and obviously cannot be what the Board actually intended (see T 1093/05 [7]). R 140 does not pave the way to re-examination of the factual or legal issues on which a decision was based, nor to reversal of any conclusion derived by the deciding body from a consideration of these issues (see T 367/96 [2]).

[2] In the present case, it was clearly the intention of the Board in the above decision T 1468/08 to decide upon a single claim of a single request, reference being made hereto in the point IV of the Facts and Submissions of said decision, the Facts and Submissions being consistent with the Reasons for the Decision wherein only claim 1 is referred to […], and with point 4 which refers to remittal to the OD for further prosecution on the basis of “the claim according to the main request”. Thus, there being no obvious mistake in the decision, there is nothing to correct.

[2.1] In the minutes of the oral proceedings (OPs) held before the Board […], said minutes having been sent to the [patent proprietor] with a communication dated 28 December 2009, the final request of the [patent proprietor] as stated by the Chairman according to Article 15(6) RPBA before declaring the debate closed, was confirmed by the [patent proprietor] and recorded as being “that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be maintained on the basis of the main request as filed during the OPs before the board”. Said main request as filed during the OPs before the Board consisted of a single claim, namely claim 1 as indicated under the section entitled “Documents presented” on page 1 of the minutes. Thus the decision T 1468/08 is based on the request as filed at OPs before the Board, as reflected in the minutes thereof.

[2.2] The principle of party disposition as enshrined in A 113(2) allows the Board to decide only on a request submitted or agreed by the Proprietor of the patent. In the present case, the Board was thus only empowered to decide on the request as filed during the OPs before the Board, as this was the only pending request submitted by the [patent proprietor], as reflected in points IV and VII of the Facts and Submissions of the above decision T 1468/08 [IV] specifying that said request superseded all previous requests.

With regard to the [patent proprietor’s] statement in its letter […] that it was illogical and procedurally incorrect that the granted claims 2 to 10 should have been deleted, the question of deletion of claims does not arise. The principle of party disposition requires any party to identify in a positive manner those issues and objects it wants the deciding body to take a decision upon. In the present case, the [patent proprietor] identified the issues and objects as being claim 1 according to the main request as filed during OPs before the Board. Should the [patent proprietor] had wished to have a decision comprising also granted claims 2 to 10, then it fell within the exclusive competence of the [patent proprietor] to formulate such a request. It was thus logical and procedurally correct that the above decision T 1468/08 discussed only claim 1, said claim being the only claim submitted to the Board in the request as filed during the OPs before the Board, said claim being the only claim under review by the Board and the only claim decided upon in the above decision of the Board (see points [2.2] and [3.6] of the Reasons for the Decision).

[2.3] Therefore, the reference in point [IV] of the above decision T 1468/08 to “The only claim” correctly reflects the facts of this case. Having decided on the sole pending request as a whole, the Board thus sees no reason to correct its decision in this respect.

[3] With regard to the [patent proprietor’s] “belief” that the remittal should have referred to further prosecution also on the basis of the description, figures and claims 2 to 10 as granted, even if this “belief” were understood to be a request, this cannot be a request for correction under R 140, since the amendment desired would amount to a modification to the substance of the decision, such a modification not qualifying as a correction under R 140 […]. In any case, the Board notes that the description and figures never formed part of the [patent proprietor’s] request. As such, they could not be decided upon and therefore could not be reflected in the Order, as the [patent proprietor] apparently now wishes.

[4] With regard to the [patent proprietor’s] request for other appropriate clarification with regard to the status of granted claims 2 to 10, the Board may not explain its decision, which has to be taken at face value. The department of first instance, during further prosecution, is bound only by the ratio decidendi of the Board’s decision pursuant to A 111(2), the Board’s decision in this case being directed solely to claim 1 of the main request filed during OPs before the Board. Thus the Board notes that independent of the decision taken, during further prosecution of the case before the OD the [patent proprietor] may submit requests containing one or more of granted claims 2 to 10 as appropriate. Since limitation of claims during inter partes proceedings is regarded as a formulation attempt to respond to the objections raised rather than implying an irrevocable renunciation of subject-matter claimed, the [patent proprietor] thus still has every opportunity to submit such claims during the further prosecution of the case.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Monday, 24 May 2010

T 149/07 – Sophisticated Obviousness


The present decision gives a useful reminder concerning “common general knowledge”. It has also retained my attention because it concludes on lack of inventive step based on a rather sophisticated combination of documents. In a recent post, we have seen that the Boards do accept demonstrations of lack of inventive step based on more than two documents. Here the claim (effective date: 1995) was rejected as obvious over a combination of prior art D1 (1979) and D3 (1988), complemented by common general knowledge (for which D7 (1985) was considered to provide evidence). The fact that D7 also disclosed the drawback of the claimed alternative (its complexity) was considered to have been made obsolete at the date of the claim as a result of ongoing technical progress.

[...] D1 discloses a Fairchild-Automatic-Intercept-and-Response-System (FAIRS) which comprises a central command station controlling fixed or mobile transportable remote sites. The system is intended for carrying out signal surveillance, monitoring, direction finding and accurate location of hostile transmitters.

It was not disputed that D1 represents the closest state of the art showing a system of surveillance according to the precharacterising part of claim 1. [3.1]

The [opponent] considered claim 1 as including a mere aggregation of features independent from each other. In particular, the group of features concerning activation/deactivation and operation mode of the cells ([h], [j] and [k]) could be regarded separately from that pertaining to TOA measurement ([l] and [m]).

This view is convincing. A combination invention would imply a functional relationship between features or groups of features resulting in a combinative effect beyond the sum of the individual effects. Such a combinative effect cannot be identified in the present case at least with regard to the groups of features referred to above. In particular, claimed characteristics of a cell concerning activation, deactivation, communication with the information centre and loading of parameters, on the one hand, and features for determining the bearing of a phenomenon on the basis of a time-of-arrival measurement, on the other hand, are functionally not so linked together that a synergistic effect results from their combination. Thus, when assessing inventive step, each group of features may be considered per se. The [patent proprietor] objected that this approach resulted in a mosaic combination of different features out of their context. This objection, however, is not conclusive in view of the foregoing. [3.2]

[…] D1 is considered to disclose not only the precharacterising part but also feature [i] of claim 1. [3.4]

[…] D3 discloses feature [h] of claim 1.

In the Board’s view, D3 also discloses feature [j] of claim 1. [3.5]

[…] With regard to feature [k] of claim 1, D1 […] discloses that the receivers at each remote site are commanded from the command centre to scan particular portions of the RF spectrum wherein a threat transmitter is thought likely to operate. As soon as a threat signal is detected, signal recognition is carried out, an alarm is registered, a bearing is taken and the alarm is transmitted to the command centre. Thus, the receiver at a remote site operates in an active mode in response to a command from the command centre and reports to the command centre upon detection of a threat signal in accordance with given criteria.

In the light of this disclosure, the Board finds convincing the [opponent’s] submission that a standardized protocol is necessary for the communication between remote receiver and command centre. Thus, the feature concerning the standardized protocol is either implicit to the disclosure of D1 or trivial for a skilled person. [3.6]

Features [l] and [m] of claim 1 concern a TOA measurement on the basis of two cells with synchronised internal time.

In its interlocutory decision […], the opposition division (OD) considered that documents D1 and D3 did not render obvious the use of two different cells for a TOA measurement. In its view, although TOA measurements were known in the art at the priority date of the present patent, a skilled person got no incentive from the prior art to apply this technique to the system of D1. Even if the skilled person tended to introduce this technique, he/she would not consider the claimed solution of providing the bearing of a phenomenon by comparison of signals of two distant cells. On the contrary, the more straightforward way would be to introduce the TOA technique in the setup shown in D1 […], i.e. to rely on a measurement based on two antennas of the same cell, which could be placed far enough to give sufficiently accurate results. Indeed, the use of antennas of two different cells had the drawback that an accurate time determination in both cells was needed. Such a feature, however, was not disclosed, either explicitly or implicitly, in D1. Rather, the arrangement of D1 was based on a single cell and had the advantage that the accurate time determination was not necessary.

The Board would agree with this argumentation on the basis of the disclosure of D1 only. The OD, however, had no knowledge of textbook D7 filed with the notice of appeal.

D7 […] is concerned with the interception of radar signals, in particular with the issue of how to use various receivers in interception applications. Other major topics concern direction finding and location. Chapter 5, which deals in extenso with the issue of emitter location techniques, presents two major approaches. Emitter location estimation using multiple angle-of-arrival (AOA) measurements is the classic approach, the basic idea of which changed little since the 1940s. The time-difference-of-arrival (TDOA) technique is more complex, and its use is more recent and much less widespread. According to the leading-edge (LE) TDOA technique, the arrival time of the leading edge of a radar pulse is determined at a receiver. The difference between the arrival times of the same pulse at two widely separated ground-based sites gives the TDOA with respect to the baseline between the two receivers. This TDOA measurement establishes an iso-delay line on the surface of the earth that passes through the emitter location. A similar TDOA measurement with respect to another baseline establishes another iso-delay line. The intersection of these iso-delay lines determines the location of the emitter (Figure 5-8).

The [patent proprietor] contested that document D7 reflected common general knowledge […]. Moreover, in its view, the outcome of the present case would not be changed by the consideration of D7 […].

Thus, two issues need to be considered. First, whether D7 reflects common general knowledge. Second, whether a skilled person would consider introducing the leading-edge TDOA technique according to D7 into the system of surveillance known from D1.

With regard to the first issue, the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal has defined the common general knowledge of a skilled person working in a particular technical field as being normally represented by the content of encyclopaedias, textbooks and dictionaries on the subject in question (T 890/02 [2]).

Three aspects have been identified for assessing the common general knowledge of the skilled person (T 890/02 [3]). Firstly, the skills of such a person include not only basic general knowledge of a particular field of technology, but also the ability to look up such knowledge in encyclopaedias, textbooks and dictionaries. Secondly, it cannot be expected that, in order to identify this common general knowledge, the skilled person will carry out a comprehensive search of the literature covering virtually the whole state of the art. No undue effort in such a search can be required from the person skilled in the art. Thirdly, the information found must be unambiguous and usable in a direct and straightforward manner without doubts or further research work.

In the present case, the Board does not have any reason for diverging from this jurisprudence that would lead to the conclusion that textbook D7 represents common general knowledge. In particular, it may be expected that the skilled person, designing systems of surveillance such as the one known by D1, would be aware of a textbook like D7 dealing inter alia with radar emitter location by a TDOA technique that represents an embodiment of the present invention covered by the claimed subject-matter. Thus, contrary to the [patent proprietor]’s view, the Board considers that D7 represents background knowledge.

With regard to the second issue mentioned above, the [opponent] submitted in the grounds of appeal […] that D1 described an operational system. At the publication date (1979) of this document and a fortiori at the time the described system was designed, computers with a computational power sufficient for making TDOA measurements on the basis of two cells with synchronised internal time were not yet available. For this reason, the system of D1 relied on AOA measurements. At the priority date of the present patent (1995), however, a skilled person, knowing from D7 that the TDOA technique could be used in systems like the one known from D1, would immediately consider that such a technique represented an obvious alternative to the AOA measurements on which the system of D1 relied. D7 itself prided support for this conclusion. Indeed, AOA and TOA/TDOA measurements were disclosed as two viable alternatives […] that might even be combined […].

The [patent proprietor] did not dispute that the TDOA technique per se was known. What was relevant, however, was its application in a system of surveillance as claimed. No document on file suggested such an application. On the contrary, the complexity of the TDOA technique, which was acknowledged in D7, played an essential role against its application and should be duly considered when contemplating the combination of D1 and D7.

The [opponent]’s submissions are substantially based on the approach that the skilled person was led by the technical progress to consider alternatives to the AOA technique disclosed by D1. This view is not invalidated by the [patent proprietor]’s argument concerning the complexity of the TDAO technique. Indeed, this drawback would be compensated by the ongoing computer progress, on the one hand, and by the improvement in location accuracy that may be achieved […], on the other hand. The former aspect is clearly at the basis of the development of the more recent TDOA approach […], which may regarded as an alternative to the classic AOA approach, as the [opponent] convincingly submitted. It should also be taken into consideration that D7 […] points out that, in an operational emitter location system, the AOA approach will be needed along with the TDOA approach. In a dense environment of emitters, it will be difficult to determine which pulse is coming from which emitter at separated receiver platforms. By using the AOA approach, only those pulses having appropriate bearings need be considered in the TDOA processing. In the Board’s view, this disclosure gives the skilled person a hint at integrating the TDOA processing in the system of D1 rather than replacing the disclosed AOA technique.

Therefore, D7 represents common general knowledge of the skilled person, discloses features [l] and [m] of claim 1, and incites the skilled person to complement the system of surveillance of D1 with these features. [3.7]

In conclusion, keeping in mind the aggregation character of the features of claim 1 of the maintained patent, as mentioned above, the subject-matter of claim 1 at issue lacks inventive step (A 56) in view of documents D1, D3 and D7. [3.8]

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