Saturday, 22 May 2010

T 358/08 – Let’s Not Change


Does the change of wording between R 64 EPC 1973 and R 99 EPC 2000 have an impact on how a notice of appeal and/or a statement of grounds of appeal has to be drafted? That is the question the Board deals with in the present decision.

If you are happy with a short answer, it’s “No”.

If you want to know why, please read on.

[1.1] Before the OD the appellant requested maintenance of the patent as granted (main request) alternatively maintenance of the patent on the basis of a first auxiliary request. The OD rejected both requests and revoked the patent.

In its notice of appeal filed on 13 February 2008, the appellant stated: “... we hereby appeal against the decision of the OD ... We ask that the decision of the OD be set aside and the patent maintained.”

[1.2] Even when construed in the context of what had taken place in the proceedings, it cannot be determined from the notice of appeal in precisely what form the appellant wished the patent to be maintained. Only when the appellant filed its statement of grounds of appeal did this become clear.

[1.3] R 99 EPC 2000 is applicable to the present appeal. […]

[1.4] The issue which arises is whether the notice of appeal in this case complied with the requirement that it should contain “a request defining the subject of the appeal.” Taken by itself, it is not easy to say what this requirement entails. The words must therefore be construed in the context of the other provisions of the EPC 2000 to discover the true meaning of the expression, but help may also be obtained by examining:
(a) what the position was before the new rule was introduced and
(b) any relevant travaux préparatoires.

The expressions used in German and French texts do not take the matter any further […]

Position before coming into force of the EPC 2000

[2] R 99 is to be compared to the previous relevant rule, R 64 EPC 1973[…].

[2.1] As helpfully suggested by the appellant, the changes can be more easily appreciated by comparing the rules in tabular form:


[2.2] As to what were the requirements of R 64 when it stated that the notice of appeal should contain “a statement identifying ... the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision is requested”, the answer becomes apparent from considering decisions of the Boards of Appeal which dealt with the construction of notices of appeal.

[2.3] As to this, it was recognised that the requirements of R 64 were formal in nature only […] and that a notice of appeal should be construed objectively to determine its content […]. The “extent” to which the impugned decision was requested to be amended or cancelled could therefore often be inferred, even when the notice of appeal contained no express statement in this respect. Thus where, for example, the notice of appeal stated merely “An appeal is hereby lodged,” or words to similar effect, this was often construed in the context of the case as a request to set aside or cancel the decision in its entirety; this was “the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision” was requested. […]

Having reviewed a bunch of decisions, the Board continues:

[2.4] In the great majority of cases, therefore, the requirement to state the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision was requested was somewhat toothless. Almost always the appellant wanted the decision set aside in its entirety and replaced by a different order. It was for this reason that the Boards of Appeal were able to construe very basic notices of appeal as satisfying the provisions of R 64(b). Where, however the decision contained two elements, e.g., an order relating to the patent and an order as to costs, the rule now had real bite. The notice of appeal had to say whether both elements were being appealed or only one, and the course of the appeal proceedings was thereby determined […].

[2.5] At first sight, some cases, including some of the above, might appear to go further, since they also say that such a notice of appeal (e.g., in the form “an appeal is hereby lodged”) also implicitly included a request to grant the last request before the Division below. […]

[2.6] However, the Board does not read into these decisions any statement that the notice of appeal should in fact have contained a request, even if only implicit, as to the order which the Board of Appeal was being asked to make, whether it be a request to grant the last request before the Division below or some other request. The decisions merely say how, in these particular cases, the Board construed the notice of appeal.

[2.7] Such a requirement would have given rise to difficulties, as exemplified by the facts of the present case, where an applicant-proprietor merely requested that the patent “be maintained” and it could not be objectively determined from these words, even in the context of what had taken place at first instance, in what form the proprietor wished the patent to be maintained, in particular, whether the proprietor wished the patent to be maintained as granted or in accordance with its auxiliary request before the Division or on some other basis.

[2.8] That this was not in fact a requirement of R 64(b) is made clear by other decisions of the Boards of Appeal, which are to the effect that although the notice of appeal must specify whether it is being requested that the decision be set aside in whole or in part, in the case of an appeal by an applicant or patentee the precise form in which the patent is requested to be granted or maintained is a matter for the grounds of appeal. […]

Again the Board cites and comments a whole series of decisions. It then continues:

[2.12] The Board therefore concludes that R 64(b) did not require, in the case of appeal by an applicant or proprietor, that the notice of appeal should contain, whether expressly or implicitly, a statement as to the form in which the appellant was requesting the Board of Appeal to grant or maintain the patent. This was a matter for the grounds of appeal. […]

The Board then deals with the travaux préparatoires for the EPC 2000:

[3] The EPC was revised following the Diplomatic Conference of November 2000 in the form a new text adopted by the Administrative Council in June 2001. As regards the time limits and the form of appeals to the Boards of Appeal, minor changes were made to A 108, […]

[3.2] It does not appear from the [declared overall objective of these revisions] that it was one of the purposes of these changes to alter the way in which appeal proceedings were conducted, whether in regard to the contents of the notice of appeal or the grounds of appeal.

The Board then delves into the details of the travaux préparatoires. It comes to the following conclusions:

[3.13] In conclusion, although the travaux préparatoires are not entirely clear:

[3.13.1] They do not suggest that the existing position in relation to the requirements of the notice and grounds of appeal, summarised above, was giving rise to problems or criticisms.

[3.13.2] They do not indicate an intention to make a substantive change in the requirements of the notice or grounds of appeal in this area, a change which would have far-reaching effects for many appeals.

[3.13.3] In general, they show an intention to bring the wording of the rules in relation to notices and grounds of appeal into line with the practice as developed by the Boards of Appeal.

[3.13.4] It appears that the requirement which is now found in new R 99(1)(c) to state “the subject matter of the appeal” was being equated with the former requirement of R 64(b) that the notice of appeal should contain a statement of the extent to which the amendment or cancellation of the decision is being requested as this requirement had been interpreted by the Boards of Appeal.

Finally, the Board gets down to a construction of R 99:

[4] Generally, the requirements as to the notice of appeal under R 99(1) and the statement of the grounds of appeal under R 99(2) must be read together to try and arrive at a coherent and sensible structure. The requirements must also be construed as applying to appeals of all possible types and not just appeals by a proprietor, which is the focus of the present appeal.

[4.1] As a further general remark, the Board takes into account that if it was required that the notice of appeal by an applicant or proprietor should contain a request for the grant or maintenance of the patent in a specified form, it is not clear what the position would be if the appellant later wished to amend this request, whether to broaden the claims or restrict them. On the assumption that the appellant was able to amend the request, then “defining the subject of the appeal” at the outset by reference to a set of claims which later might change would serve no useful purpose. On the alternative assumption that the appellant was not able to amend the request, this would make appeal proceedings extremely inflexible and would also be contrary to the existing practice in appeals.

[4.2] On the contrary, if a proprietor must in the grounds of appeal at the latest specify the form in which the patent is requested to be maintained, the respondent will still know at a relatively early stage in the appeal proceedings what case it has to deal with and can frame accordingly any reply which it chooses to file under A 12(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA). The appeal will then be based on these documents (together with any communication sent by the Board and any answer thereto), subject only to any amendment to a party’s case which is thereafter allowed at the Board’s discretion (Articles 12(1), 13(1) RPBA). This system provides a logical and practical framework for determining such appeals.

[4.3] Turning to the rules themselves, as already pointed out, it is not immediately clear from the wording of R 99(1) what has to be contained in the notice of appeal. If, however, R 99(2) were to make it clear that certain matters are required to be included in the grounds of appeal then this would obviously make it easier to reach a conclusion that it was not necessary to include such matters in the notice of appeal, and thus what R 99(1)(c) means.

[4.4] Unfortunately, the wording of the R 99(2) also raises problems as to its meaning. Broken out, it reads as follows:

“In the statement of grounds of appeal the appellant shall indicate the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned, or the extent to which it is to be amended, and the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based.”

[4.5] The first problem is that in some situations at least […] the rule requires the grounds to state “the extent to which the decision impugned is to be amended”. However, under R 64(b) , what appears to be the same requirement (a statement of “the extent to which amendment ... of the decision is requested”), had been part of the requirements of the notice of appeal, so that at first sight it would appear that this requirement has been moved from the notice of appeal to the grounds of appeal (assuming the requirement has not just been duplicated). As explained above, the requirement in R 64(b), being a part of the requirement to state “the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision is requested”, had been construed by the Boards of Appeal in a limited way as requiring the appellant merely to state whether it was requested that the decision be set aside in whole or part. If this requirement is now a requirement of the grounds of appeal, what is left as regards the requirements of the notice of appeal?

[4.6] Second, the wording of the rule is at first sight also curious because under R 64(b) a distinction appeared to be made between “amendment” of a decision and “cancellation” of a decision (“The notice of appeal shall contain ... a statement identifying ... the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision is requested”), these apparently being alternative forms of order which the appellant could request […]. This distinction appears at first to be perpetuated in the new rule in the form of a distinction between “setting aside” a decision and amending it to some extent, these again being alternatives. But if this is a valid distinction, why should the appellant now be required to indicate the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned, but not any reasons for amending it to any extent?

[4.7] The versions of R 99(2) in the German and French texts do not appear to take the matter any further. […]

[4.8] These considerations are puzzling, not least having regard to the fact that it does not appear from the travaux préparatoires to have been the intention to create a substantive change in the practice in this area.

[4.9] The Board considers that the answer to this puzzle is to be found by considering the forms of order normally made on appeal. When an appeal is successful the order made by the Boards of Appeal is often in the form: “The decision under appeal be set aside and the patent is ordered to be maintained as granted/in amended form/revoked”, etc, and this is also the common form of requests made by appellants. The Board considers that R 99(2) EPC 2000 should be understood in this light, and as requiring the appellant to say, first, why the decision under appeal was wrong and should thus be set aside and then, second, what the appellant wants the Board of Appeal to order in its place (if anything). […]

[4.10] Although it is not decisive for present purposes, the RPBA are consistent with this approach, although the wording is not precisely the same. A 12(2) RPBA provides inter alia that the statement of grounds of appeal shall contain an appellant’s complete case and set out clearly and concisely the reasons why it is requested that the decision under appeal be reversed, amended or upheld. Although the rules do not expressly state that a proprietor/applicant-appellant should state in what form it is requested that the patent be maintained, the rules are of course framed in general terms to deal with all forms of appellants, not just applicants and proprietors. The requirement that an appellant state its “complete case” in the grounds of appeal can be understood as requiring inter alia a proprietor/applicant-appellant to indicate the extent to which the decision under appeal is to be amended, if this is not already clear.

[4.11] The reason why R 99(2) is framed as it is, as compared to the R 64 , can perhaps be understood on the basis that it was apparently considered, as appears from the travaux préparatoires considered above, that the wording of R 64(b) (“The notice of appeal shall contain ... a statement ... identifying ... the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the decision is requested.”) was not satisfactory, even though it had been interpreted by the Boards of Appeal in a relatively restrictive way that was not in fact giving rise to problems or objections. At the same, it was apparently felt that it was unsatisfactory that the rules did not expressly say anything about the grounds of appeal, even though the Boards of Appeal had developed an interpretation of what was required which again was not giving rise to problems or objections. R 99 was no doubt an attempt to restate the position using clearer language. The requirement that the notice of appeal should contain a request “defining the subject of the appeal” was no doubt thought to be a better description of the requirement that the notice should indicate whether the decision should be set aside in whole or part, since the effect of such a request was in fact to define the subject (the “extent” or “scope”) of the appeal. Again, it was no doubt thought that the requirement that the grounds of appeal should indicate the extent to which the decision was to be amended was an appropriate formulation of the requirement that the appellant should, where appropriate, state what order the appellant wanted the Board of Appeal to make in place of the order of the first instance department.

[4.12] This conclusion means that in the case of an appeal by an applicant or proprietor who wishes to have the patent maintained in a different form than that ordered by the first instance department, the grounds of appeal are required to contain a statement as to (“shall indicate”) the form in which the Board of Appeal is being requested to maintain the patent and thereby to alter the decision of the department of first instance.

This then also means that such a requirement cannot also sensibly be part of the requirements of the notice of appeal under R 99(1)(c), so that whatever the expression “a request defining the subject of the appeal” in R 99(1)(c) means (and it is not necessary for the Board to say precisely what it does mean), it cannot be understood as requiring this.

[4.13] The Board also does not have to consider how precise the indication in the grounds of appeal of “the extent to which [the decision] is to be amended” has to be, because in the present case it is not in doubt that the grounds of appeal contained a sufficiently precise indication, namely a request that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be maintained as granted or alternatively on the basis of sets of claims according to the first to third auxiliary requests which were filed with the grounds of appeal.

Summary and conclusion

[5] In the end, and taking all of the above matters into consideration, the Board concludes that the change in the wording in the Implementing Regulations has not altered the previous law as to the requirements of either the notice of appeal or the statement of grounds of appeal as regards the nature of the appellant’s requests. R 99(1)(c) is satisfied if the notice of appeal contains a request, which may be implicit, to set aside the decision in whole or (where appropriate) only as to part. Such a request has the effect of “defining the subject of the appeal” within the meaning of R 99(1)(c).

In the case of an appeal by an applicant or proprietor, it is not necessary that the notice of appeal should also contain a request for maintenance of the patent in any particular form. This is something which relates to “the extent to which [the decision] is to be amended”, and which is therefore a matter for the statement of grounds of appeal under R 99(2).

[5.1] The notice of appeal in the present case contained the statement “... we hereby appeal against the decision of the OD ... We ask that the decision of the OD be set aside and the patent maintained.” In accordance with the principles set out earlier in this decision this is to be interpreted as a request to set aside the decision of the OD in whole. This request defined the “subject of the appeal” within the meaning of R 99(1)(c). The request “to maintain the patent” was not inconsistent with this but otherwise added nothing. [… T]he grounds of appeal contained an adequate indication under R 99(2) of the extent to which the decision was being requested to be amended.

[5.2] The appeal is therefore admissible.

To read the whole decision, please click here.

NB: This decision has already been commented on Laurent Teyssèdre’s blog.

Interpretative Spotlight: “added”


From time to time I shall dedicate a small bonus post to interpretative issues. Of course, these questions are strongly linked to their context and could be answered very differently in other cases. There is nothing like precedent in this domain. Nevertheless, I sometimes find it interesting to see to which conclusions the Boards come when putting claims under the microscope.

Claim 8 of the patent as granted read (in its English translation):

Process for the manufacture of a solution of dialkyl peroxydicarbonate in which the alkyl radicals contain 2 or 3 carbon atoms, characterized in that, in a first stage, a dialkyl peroxydicarbonate in which the alkyl radicals contain 2 or 3 carbon atoms is manufactured by reacting, in water, appropriate quantities of alkyl haloformate with an inorganic peroxide in the presence of an inorganic salt added (French original: ajouté) in sufficient quantity to increase the density of the aqueous reaction mixture and, in a second stage, the dialkyl peroxydicarbonate manufactured is isolated by extraction by means of a water-insoluble solvent in order to produce a solution of dialkyl peroxydicarbonate in this solvent.

The word “added” was not present in the corresponding claim of the application as filed. The opponent pointed out that this addition was a violation of A 123(2). The patent proprietor argued that by inserting this term it had limited the claim to situations where the inorganic salt was added voluntarily, in contrast to in-situ production.

Here is what the Board had to say:

[3.2] The argument of the [patent proprietor] according to which the claimed addition of inorganic salt is limited to situations where the operator voluntarily adds [the salt] but does not include addition by in-situ production is not convincing. As a matter of fact, in the absence of any specification (précision) in the claim and in the patent under consideration, this term is to be interpreted in its broadest possible meaning. It, therefore, covers all forms of adding inorganic salt that are conceivable in the context of the claimed processes.

The Board came to the conclusion that A 123(2) had not been violated, but the claim was interpreted broadly and found to lack novelty over the prior art.

To read the whole decision T 1374/06 (in French), please click here.

Friday, 21 May 2010

T 2016/07 – Two Is Not A Magic Number


At the end of the oral proceedings before the Board, the patent proprietor requested that the following question be referred to the Enlarged Board of appeal:

Can inventive step be negated if more than two documents have to be combined [in order to come to this conclusion] and if one claim feature is not at all known from the state of the art?

[9.4] According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal, the assessment of inventive step is usually carried out in accordance with the methodology provided by the problem-solution approach.

In doing so, the first step is to determine the state of the art that is closest to the claimed subject-matter. Based on the effect of the features that distinguish the claimed subject-matter from the closest state of the art (distinguishing features) it has to be established whether and, if applicable, which technical problem is solved by the claimed subject-matter.

When assessing whether the claimed solution is obvious, prior art other than the closest state of the art, including the common general knowledge, may have to be taken into account.

In doing so, it has to be checked in each individual case to which extent there is an incitation to take into account such prior art in combination with the closest state of the art. Thereby it can be ensured that the assessment of inventive step is not based on hindsight resulting in further prior art being taken into consideration based on knowledge of the claimed subject-matter and combined with the closest prior art.

The number of documents to be taken into account when the problem-solution approach is applied is not limited and depends on the circumstances of the individual case. In addition to the complexity of the claimed subject-matter, one has to take into account, for instance, whether the claimed subject-matter solves one or several problems and whether these problems are independent with respect to each other. The same holds true for the features of the claimed subject-matter solving the corresponding problems. The same also applies to the prior art that is taken into account when providing evidence for the existence of alternative solutions.

[9.5] Therefore, the question formulated by the [patent proprietor] concerns an aspect that depends on the circumstances of the individual case under consideration, i.e. the combination of features of claim 1 under consideration and the prior art that is to be taken into account, which aspect concerns facts underlying the present proceedings only.

Thus the question to be referred can only be answered by taking into account the facts underlying the present proceedings. In contrast to the requirements laid down in A 112(1) it does not contribute to ensuring uniform application of the law, nor is it a point of law of fundamental importance.

[9.6] This is also true for the aspect of the question to be referred according to which a feature of the claim under consideration is not at all known from the prior art.

The abovementioned application of the problem-solution approach requires that also for such a feature – as a feature of the claim under consideration – it has to be established whether it has the alleged technical effect. Based on this it needs to be examined, taking into account the problem attached to such a distinguishing feature, to which extent this feature, in combination with the other features of the claim to be examined, can be considered to involve an inventive step.

Therefore such a feature has no special status for the assessment of inventive step. The same applies for the assessment of the request for referral under consideration.

In addition it should be noted that it is not unusual to consider claimed subject-matter as obvious although not all features are known from the state of the art to be taken into consideration and which contains several documents. For instance, the skilled person to be taken into account also possesses knowledge and know-how that is common in the technical field [under consideration].

Therefore, the request for a referral to the Enlarged Board is to be dismissed.

NB: This decision (see in particular point 6.5 of the reasons, 4th and 5th paragraphs) also contains some interesting statements concerning the use of industrial designs (Geschmacksmuster) as closest prior art. The patent proprietor argued that the outward appearance of the claimed container could not possibly be rendered obvious by the container disclosed in industrial designs O1 and O1’. The Board rejected this argument by pointing out that the skilled person knew that in an industrial design the outward appearance was prominent and that the industrial design precisely had the effect of making the skilled person aware that providing and arranging grooves was a possibility for obtaining an aesthetic design. In other words, the industrial design could be an incentive for creating and modifying the outward appearance.

To read the whole decision (in German), please click here.

Thursday, 20 May 2010

T 31/08 – An Exception To An Exception


[2] The request as amended during the oral proceedings (OPs) is admitted into the proceedings. The single independent claim of this request consists in the combination of claim 1 as granted combined with the features of dependent claim 17 as granted. Claim 17 as granted refers to subject-matter that had not been attacked in the opposition.

[2.1] Article 13 of the Rules of Proceedings of the Boards of appeal (RPBA) leaves it to the discretion of the Board not to consider any amendment to a party’s case after it has filed its grounds of appeal in particular if the complexity of the new subject-matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy speak against it. According to the Board the new subject-matter submitted is not too complex, nor do the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy speak in favour of dismissing the request. The Board is of the opinion that this request is an adequate reaction to the preliminary opinion of the Board as exposed in the summons, wherein the patentability and the admissibility of all requests pending at that time was questioned.

[2.2] The Board cannot endorse argument of the [opponent] according to which the request filed during the OPs also violated Article 12(4) RPBA. Article 12 explicitly and exclusively refers to the notice of appeal and any reply. In the notice of appeal at first the patent was defended as granted. The [patent proprietor] then again submitted the request which it had withdrawn during OPs before the Opposition Division (OD), in the form of auxiliary request III filed together with the notice of appeal. Later on, the [patent proprietor] has withdrawn this request during the appeal proceedings, for reasons the Board can understand, and has filed a new request which is not identical with auxiliary request III filed together with the notice of appeal and not even a subset of this request. This request has been submitted first during the OPs. Therefore, the Board only has to decide, in the exercise of its discretion under Article 13 RPBA, if the request is admitted, having taken into consideration the complexity of the new subject-matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy.

[3] According to decisions G 9/91 and G 10/91 [10] the examination of an opposition is limited to the extent to which the patent is opposed in the notice of opposition. If the opponent limits the opposition to particular subject-matter (einzelne Gegenstände), the residual subject-matter is not subject to any “opposition” within the meaning of A 101 and A 102 EPC 1973 nor are there “proceedings” within the meaning of A 114 and 115 EPC 1973 in existence concerning such subject-matter. However, according to the Enlarged Board, there is one limitation of this principle: “even if the opposition is explicitly directed only to the subject-matter of an independent claim of a European patent, subject-matters covered by claims which depend on such an independent claim may also be examined as to patentability, if the independent claim falls in opposition or appeal proceedings, provided their validity is prima facie in doubt on the basis of already available information” (point 11 of the reasons).

[3.1] In the present case the opposition is not directed against the subject-matter of the single independent claim only, but also against the subject-matter of several of the claims dependent from this claim. According to the notice of opposition, the opposition is directed against the patent as granted within the scope of independent claim 1 and claims 2 to 9, 11, 12, 25, 26, 28, 31, 33 and 34 that depend from this claim. The [opponent] explained during the oral proceedings that the opposition was in fact not directed against claim 17 as granted.

The features of claim 17 define a wedge mechanism (Keilgetriebe) that is provided in order to produce the movement of the pivotal element. Claim 13, which has not been opposed either, also claims a wedge mechanism for restraining certain parts. Claim 18 provides that the same wedge mechanism serves for displacing the pivotal element and for restraining. Claims 19 and 20 describe a motorised drive driving the wedge mechanism. None of the claims against which the opposition was directed deals with such a mechanism or its drive. Therefore, the Board is of the opinion that the opponent has limited the opposition to particular subject-matter (einzelne Gegenstände) cited in the notice of opposition, whereas other claims, among which the claims defining the wedge mechanism and its drive, have not been referred to and, therefore, are not subject to any “opposition” within the meaning of A 101 and A 102 EPC 1973 nor are there “proceedings” within the meaning of A 114 and 115 EPC 1973 in existence concerning such subject-matter.

[3.2] Considering the fact that the opponent has not attacked the single independent claim only but also some of the dependent claims, the exception provided in G 9/91 and G 10/91 [11] cannot be applied in the present case. Therefore, the principle exposed by the Enlarged Board in these decisions (point 10 of the reasons) concerning the legal and factual framework, within which the substantive examination of the opposition shall be conducted, is to be applied. Thus the Board is not free to perform a substantive examination of present claim 1 which is a combination of claims 1 and 17 as granted. […]

[4] The patent is to be maintained as amended.

The Board thus confirms the approach taken in T 653/02 and T 646/02.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

Wednesday, 19 May 2010

T 600/07 – Working In The Forbidden Area


Once upon a time there was decision T 256/87 [17], which stated that “all that is necessary is that the skilled person reading the specification be put in the position of being able to carry out the invention in all its essential aspects and of knowing when he is working within the forbidden area of the claims”. As this decision was mentioned in the Case law book and as most attorneys devour the Case law book (at least) when preparing an appeal, this way of looking at sufficiency of disclosure became quite popular. Some decisions confirmed the approach (e.g. T 387/01, T 252/02, T 611/02), but in most cases the Boards did not follow this path and considered that the question of the forbidden area rather concerned clarity (e.g. T 960/98, T 619/00, T 943/00, T 452/04, T 466/05). T 608/07 [2.5.2] pointed out that “care has to be taken that an insufficiency objection arising out of an ambiguity is not merely a hidden objection under A 84”. The present decision concurs.

[2.2.1] The [opponent] considered it to be problematic that there was neither a basis nor a measurement method for the claimed size of the carrier material. As different results are obtained depending on whether the indicated particle size is the modal value, the median value or the mean value, and a number-average or a weight average, respectively, and also depending on the measurement method used, the skilled person does not know when he is working within the forbidden area covered by the claims (im verbotenen Schutzbereich).

Therefore the invention could not be carried out over the whole claimed range and did not comply with A 83 and A 100(b).

[2.2.2] This argument is not persuasive because, in the opinion of the Board, the use of an undefined expression in the claims is a problem under A 84 (see also T 1886/06 (*)).

A 84 requires, among other things, that the claims define the matter for which protection is sought.

During opposition and appeal proceedings, this leads to the consequence that for the purpose of assessing novelty and inventive step one has to take into consideration prior art corresponding to all technically reasonable possibilities of interpretation of an undefined expression because this expression cannot delimit the area covered by the claims (Schutzbereich) of the claims. If such an expression has no concrete meaning at all, it completely loses its limitative effect with respect to the prior art that has to be taken into consideration.

However, A 83 does not deal with the scope of protection of the claims of the patent or the patent, respectively. This provision only requires that the patent discloses the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.

The question of whether a competitor can know when it works within the forbidden area covered by the claims is at best [equivalent to] the question of whether the claims have the clarity required to satisfy A 84.

Therefore the Board has come to the conviction that the objection of lack of sufficiency of disclosure is not justified. The requirements of A 83 are considered to be satisfied.

(*) There is a post dedicated to this decision.

To read the whole decision (in German), please click here.

Tuesday, 18 May 2010

T 600/07 – Dangerous Markush


Here is another example of an extremely severe application of A 123(2) by the Boards of appeal.

Claims 1 and 4 to 7 as originally filed read:

1. Detergent and cleaner additive comprising
a) 40 to 98.9% by weight of carrier material with an oil absorption capacity of at least 20 g/100 g
b) 1 to 50% by weight of one or more binders which are liquid at temperatures up to 40°C
c) 0.1 to 40% by weight of a detergent and cleaner ingredient from the group of enzymes, pH extenders, fluorescent agents, dyes, foam inhibitors, antiredeposition agents, optical brighteners, greying inhibitors, colour transfer inhibitors and corrosion inhibitors and mixtures thereof.

4. Detergent and cleaner additive according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the detergent and cleaner additives comprise one or several substances taken from the group of polyethylene glycols and polypropylene glycols, glycerol, glycerol carbonate, ethylene glycol, propylene glycol, propylene carbonate as well as perfume oils, paraffins, silicon oils and ethoxylated fat alcohols as binders which are liquid at temperatures up to 40°C.

5. Detergent and cleaner additive according to one of Claims 1 to 4, characterized in that it comprises the carrier material in amounts of from 50 to 95% by weight, preferably from 55 to 85% by weight and in particular from 60 to 80% by weight, in each case based on the additive.

6. Detergent and cleaner additive according to one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the binder(s) which are liquid at temperatures up to 40°C are used in amounts of from 5 to 47.5% by weight, preferably from 7.5 to 45% by weight, and in particular from 10 to 40% by weight, in each case based on the additive.

7. Detergent and cleaner additive according to one of Claims 1 to 6, characterized in that it comprises the detergent and cleaner ingredient from the group of enzymes, pH extenders, fluorescent agents, dyes, foam inhibitors, antiredeposition agents, optical brighteners, greying inhibitors, colour transfer inhibitors and corrosion inhibitors and mixtures thereof in amounts of from 1 to 15% by weight, preferably from 2 to 10% by weight and in particular from 2.5 to 5% by weight, in each case based on the additive.

Claim 1 of the main request filed by the patent proprietor read:

1. Detergent and cleaner additive comprising
a) 55 to 85% by weight of carrier material with an oil absorption capacity of at least 20 g/100 g and a particle size of less than 200 μm,
b) 10 to 40% by weight of one or more binders which are liquid at temperatures up to 40°C, taken from the group of polyethylene glycols and polypropylene glycols, glycerol, 4-hydroxymethyl-l,3-dioxolan-2-one, ethylene glycol, propylene glycol and 4-methyl-l,3-dioxolan-2-one and perfume oils,
c) 2 to 10% by weight of a detergent and cleaner ingredient from the group of enzymes, pH extenders, fluorescent agents, dyes, foam inhibitors, antiredeposition agents, optical brighteners, greying inhibitors, colour transfer inhibitors and corrosion inhibitors and mixtures thereof.

The Board comes to the conclusion that A 123(2) has not been complied with:

[1.2] In claim 1 according to the main request […] the detergent and cleaner additives now comprise 55 to 85% by weight of carrier material, 2 to 10% by weight of small component ingredients as well as 10 to 40% by weight of one or more binders which are liquid at temperatures up to 40°C, the latter being chosen from the group of polyethylene glycols and polypropylene glycols, glycerol, 4-hydroxymethyl-l,3-dioxolan-2-one, ethylene glycol, propylene glycol and 4-methyl-l,3-dioxolan-2-one as well as perfume oils.

[1.3] According to the established case law of the Boards of appeal (see also “Case Law of the Boards of appeal”, 5th edition 2006, Chapter III.A.2) it is decisive for the allowability of amendments under A 123(2) that the amendments are directly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed.

[1.4] According to the [patent proprietor] original claim 6 discloses the range of from 10 to 40% by weight of binder as preferred range and claim 4 discloses the possibility of using one or several of the eleven substances listed therein as binder(s). Therefore claim 4 also disclosed the combinations of selected members of the list of substances, such that claim 1 resulted from the original claims alone, without there being a need to delete or add anything.

[1.5] The Board can follow this argument insofar as original claim 6 discloses the claimed range of from 10 to 40% by weight as particularly preferred variant in addition to two less preferred ranges (5 to 47.5% by weight and 7.5 to 45% by weight).

Original claim 4 also discloses that the eleven substances of said list can be used as binders in detergent and cleaner additives. However, only this single list of eleven substances is concretely disclosed […].

In contrast, the list of eight binders given in claim 1 as amended is not mentioned anywhere in the original application and it is not clear to what extent the selected eight substances are to be preferred over the three substances (paraffins, silicon oils and ethoxylated fat alcohols) that have been omitted. Therefore, the present selection of eight substances does not enjoy any priority.

Hence the [patent proprietor], when defining the subject-matter of claim 1, has selected the preferred range of from 10 to 40% by weight and combined it with a group of eight substances that has been arbitrarily extracted from the list of eleven substances. This subject-matter is encompassed by the original application but not disclosed as such therein.

The Board is of the opinion that for this reason alone the requirements of A 123(2) are not complied with because for the skilled person, in the absence of any indication, the new combination of features is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the original application.

[1.6] In addition, the two other ranges for the carrier material and for the small component are also disclosed in the original application but not as particularly preferred ranges (cf. original claims 5 and 7 and the corresponding part of the description) and never in combination with the preferred range of from 10 to 40% by weight for the binder(s).

Among the six examples originally present, which all were covered by the original combination of ranges, two (examples 3 and 5) are not encompassed by the new combination because they either have too little (0.5% by weight) or too much (13% by weight) small components. There is no indication of any preference for the remaining four examples in the original application.

[1.7] Thus for the skilled person the specific combination of more or less preferred ranges is not directly and unambiguously derivable from the original documents, and even less so in combination with the now reduced list of binders.

[1.8] Therefore, claim 1 of the main request [...] does not satisfy the requirements of A 123(2) and cannot be granted.

This decision shows that extreme caution has to be taken when combining basic, preferred and particularly preferred ranges. Moreover, it raises the question of how to interpret a Markush claim. Is a Markush claim nothing but a convenient and concise way of merging a certain number of claims into one? If so, selecting only some of the elements of the list and omitting the others should not be a problem, because (if we let aside the question of claims fees) the same objective could have been reached with drafting one claim per element. (And as far as I know, nobody has ever argued that the mere deletion of claims could violate A 123(2).) However, the present decision appears to say that things are more complicated: taking some elements from the Markush claim and leaving the others is understood as a selection, with tough consequences for the patent proprietor.

To read the whole decision (in German), please click here.

Monday, 17 May 2010

T 143/07 – The Draughtsman’s Freedom


Is it possible to base amendments of claims on features that are found in drawings only? No, say the French courts. Yes, says the EPO (e.g. T 169/83). But even the EPO does not accept any amendment just because the feature may appear in a drawing. The Guidelines C-VI 5.3.2 state that “care should be taken when amendments are based on details which may only be derived from the schematic drawings of the original application. The manner in which a particular feature is depicted in the drawings may be accidental”. The present decision comes to a similar conclusion, although via a detour: by invoking a mysterious person very seldom encoutered in the caselaw: the draughtsman.

The patent as granted claimed a probing member (90) for use in an apparatus for determining surface topology of a teeth portion, […] in the form of an elongated transparent body having a front face, and end mirror (95), and top, bottom and side walls extending therebetween […], said front face being inclined relative to said top wall so as to ensure that light beams incident on the front face perpendicularly thereto impinge said top wall at an angle providing their total internal reflection therefrom and further bouncing, by means of total internal reflection, between the top wall and […] the bottom wall towards said end mirror (95) to be redirected thereby […].


The Opposition Division (OD) revoked the patent. It found that the structure and the function of the feature “light beams incident on the front face perpendicularly thereto” as such was not clearly, unmistakably and fully derivable from the schematic figures 2A and 2B as filed because: no incident light beams were represented in the figures 2A and 2B; no symbolic indication was given for a perpendicularity of the beams (99) in the figures 2A and 2B; the measurement of the schematic figure 2B did not precisely lead to an angle of 90°; and only light rays which bounce off the walls of the probing member at an angle in which the walls are totally reflective and finally bounce onto mirror (94) and reflect from there out through the sensing face (97) for a particular but unknown incidence angle were disclosed. Finally, no explicit indication was given in the rest of the application as filed to support the view that the given angle should be 90°.

The patent proprietor filed an appeal. It pointed out that the figures were “constructional-like” rather than schematic and that the skilled person would have derived the claimed feature from the drawings.

Here is what the Board had to say:

[2.1] The parties did not disagree with the OD that there was no explicit disclosure in the description and claims as filed of the feature “so as to ensure that light beams incident on the front face perpendicular thereto impinge said top wall at an angle providing their total internal reflection”. The board will refer to this feature as the “perpendicularity feature” in the following.

[2.2] Turning to the disclosure of the drawings, in particular Figures 2A and 2B of these Figures, particularly Figure 2B, light rays inside the probing member [90] and exiting therefrom are, to use the wording of the description, “represented schematically”, but “light beams” incident on the front face are not represented at all, which is consistent with the description of Figure 2B […] reciting “depicting also some exemplary rays passing therethrough”. In other words, the drawings too provide no explicit disclosure of the “perpendicularity feature”. Of course, there must be some incident rays, the board concluded that the OD was correct in considering there is a disclosure thus of incidence of the rays but not of angle of incidence.

[2.3] In the board’s view, a significant disclosure is contained in the original documents […], namely “Three light rays are 99 are represented schematically. As can be seen, they bounce at the walls of the probing member at an angle in which the walls are totally reflective and finally bounce on mirror 94 and reflected from there out through the sensing face 97.”

[2.4] As the incident rays onto the probe are not mentioned, this explicit disclosure is just what the draughtsman represented in Figure 2B […] and is also consistent with the description of the drawings “light rays passing therethrough”. An element of draughtsman’s artistic freedom or licence is, in the view of the board, involved in portraying the ray paths shown in Figure 2B. The draughtsman had only to illustrate the bouncing on the walls then mirror and exit from the probe, choosing to show the latter as a straight line. The incident ray path was left open. The board therefore considers the refracted ray path actually shown in the probe as not to be a reliable indication of the angle of incidence.

In a way, the [patent proprietor] confirms this assessment of draughtsman’s artistic freedom or licence of the draughtsman by referring to the Goldmeier effect that small angles cannot be differentiated by the human eye, i.e. implying the path shown is unreliable, and to “assuming perpendicular incidence”, i.e. the draughtsman left it out.

[2.5] Significantly, there is no teaching at all in the description, of how the paths shown give an indication that the relationship between the wedge angle and perpendicular incidence is pertinent to meeting the bouncing and exiting constellation as set out in point [2.3] above. The situation concerning this relationship is not therefore unlike that set out, for instance, in decision T 666/07 [3.4] – “... relationship introduced ... has been singled out from amongst equally feasible other features, which selection is an arbitrary one as there is no basis for it in the originally filed application ...”.

[2.6] The board cannot therefore agree with the [patent proprietor] that the skilled person would draw any conclusion about the relationship between wedge angle and perpendicular incidence as applied to the path through and exiting the probe. In fact, the approach of the [opponent] appears persuasive in arguing that the skilled person would simply ensure the angle of the ray impinging on the top wall is smaller or the same as the critical angle and the inclination range of incident angle on the front face takes account of refraction. Thus, even if the board accepts the interpretation of decisions T 261/90 and T 748/99 (sic) advanced by the [patent proprietor], i.e. the drawings are constructional like drawings in relation to wedge angle which can be seen to be more than 45°; this does not imply any disclosure beyond that argued by the [opponent].

[2.7] Supposing, arguendo, that the Figures are taken to give a specific teaching of ray path, then since Figure 2B does show a slightly off-perpendicular refracted ray path in the probe, this is what the skilled person is taught. While, as the [patent proprietor] argued, there are many possible angles of incidence, there is no reason in the documents as filed with the wedge angle drawn then to consider any refracted ray path other than that disclosed as necessary to provide the path through and exiting in a straight line from the probe exactly as shown. In particular, the wedge angle does not define perpendicular incidence in the drawings. Where is then the direct and unambiguous disclosure that the angle of incidence is modifiable with the knock-on effect of changing the path through the probe and exit angle?

Thus, while the board would not dispute that the skilled person could, as a kick-off criterion, choose perpendicular incidence and dimension the probe accordingly, this choice is simply not disclosed in the documents as filed.

Similarly, even if the skilled person can deduce that the wedge angle shown is greater than 45°; this still offers no reason to modify the ray path. Whether the probe would be larger for off perpendicular incidence may play a role for instance in respect of fitting and space criteria, but it does not compel the skilled person to assume perpendicular incidence nor to add the missing disclosure to the documents as filed. […]

[3.2] The board can only concur with the remark of the [opponent] at the oral proceedings that the disclosure simply does not go far enough to provide the reference to perpendicular.

As a consequence, the Board rejected the request on the ground of non compliance with A 123(2).

To read the whole decision, please click here.

Saturday, 15 May 2010

T 1673/07 – No Retraction From Removal


Readers interested in ‘surprising’ new case law only should not read on as the present decision is not of the surprising kind. Its main interest lies in the fact that it applies the established case law concerning the withdrawal of applications to the “removal” of designations.

In the course of the examination proceedings the designated contracting states were restricted to DE, FR and IT. In response to a communication of the Examining Division (ED), stating that claims on file were allowable for IT, the applicant filed separate claims for FR and DE. Subsequently, the applicant’s representative wrote to the Office (April 5, 2005):
Further to our communication today concerning the above-captioned application, please be informed that Applicant requests that Germany and France be entirely removed from the present application. Accordingly, Applicant requests the Examiner to expedite the issuance of the communication under R 51(4) for the above-captioned application for Italy.
With reference to that letter the Formalities Officer responded as follows (April 12, 2005):
I hereby confirm that designated states Germany (DE) and France (FR) have been withdrawn from the above mentioned patent application. Italy (IT) is the sole remaining designated state.
Then the communication under R 51(4) indicating IT as the sole designated state was issued (June 10, 2005).

The applicant filed a divisional application designating DE and FR (September 20, 2005) and expressed its approval to the grant (October 11, 2005):
... we would like to confirm that the applicant approves the documents intended for grant.... We herewith request that the Decision to Grant be issued ....
Later on (December 29, 2005) the applicant’s representative requested confirmation that the communication of April 12, 2005 confirming withdrawal of the designations of DE and FR was issued in error and that the divisional application had been correctly filed. In support of that request it was submitted that in a telephone consultation with the Examiner (April 5, 2005) the latter insisted on the removal of DE and FR before the allowable claims for IT could proceed, thereby forcing the applicant to confirm “removal”. It was understood that the applicant wished to maintain the rights for DE and FR and that “removal” did not prejudice those rights. Accordingly, the applicant had still been under the impression that he would be able to obtain a single patent with two sets of claims.

Here is what the Board has to say:

[2] A valid notice of withdrawal which has been received at the EPO is binding on the applicant. It should only be accepted without question if it is completely unqualified and unambiguous (see J 11/87 in respect of a request for withdrawal of a EP application). Where there is even the slightest doubt as to the applicant’s actual intent such a declaration should be construed as a declaration of withdrawal only if the subsequent facts confirm that such has been the true intent.

[3] The requests in the letter dated 5 April 2005, namely that “Germany and France be entirely removed from the present application” and that “the issuance of the communication under R 51(4) for the above-captioned application for Italy” are clear and unambiguous. They leave no room for interpretation, either in view of the wording or in the given procedural context: Also where use was made of the possibility of having different sets of claims under R 87 EPC 1973, first alternative, the grant procedure continued to be a single one for the application concerned, so that only one communication under R 51(4) EPC 1973 and one single decision to grant were issued. Given this, it was a not uncommon course of action by applicants to withdraw the designation of states which gave rise to contentious prior art issues pursuant to A 54(3) EPC 1973 in order to obtain a swift grant for the other designated states.

[4] Even if the Office, for whatever reason, had or should have had any doubt as to whether the applicant really wished to abandon the designations in question, any such doubt would have been removed by the subsequent events, in that the applicant did not react to the communication dated 12 April 2005 in which the Office explicitly informed the applicant of its understanding that the letter of 5 April 2005 constituted a notice of withdrawal; rather, following the communication under R 51(4) EPC 1973 which again explicitly indicated IT as the sole Contracting State, an unqualified approval of the documents intended for grant was given and grant itself was requested - again an unambiguous and also plausible procedural declaration consistent with the earlier withdrawals of the designations of DE and FR.

[5] The appellant further argued that it should be allowed under R 88 EPC 1973 (which corresponds to R 139 EPC 2000) to resile from the withdrawal of the designations, since it had been made under an erroneous assumption. However, according to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, one precondition for such a retraction is that the relevant request is made before the withdrawal has been officially notified to the public (see e.g. decisions J 15/86 and J 25/03). This is in the interest of legal certainty and balancing the interests of the applicant and of third parties, in particular in being able to rely on information officially published, and is an objective criterion which applies irrespective of the true intentions or mindset of the person who made the relevant statement. In the present case the withdrawal was published in the EP Bulletin 21/2005 of 25 May 2005, i.e. about half a year before the validity of the withdrawal of DE and FR was contested for the first time by letter of 29 December 2005.

[6] In conclusion, the withdrawal of the designation of DE and FR was valid and cannot be retracted.

To read the whole decision, click here.

T 1261/06 – Important But Not Essential


[2.5] The board notes that the definition of the matter for which protection is sought in claim 1 is somewhat broader than the preferred embodiment of the invention. In particular, the claim does not specify that the first information is “important information” as in the case of the preferred embodiment […]. Likewise, the definition of the modulation scheme in the claim is not limited to the 8PSK scheme illustrated in Fig.2. However, in the present case the board judges that these generalisations of the claimed subject-matter are permissible when due account is taken of the disclosure as a whole.

[2.5.1] Although the first information is designated as “important information” in the preferred embodiment of the invention […], the board judges that this is not an essential technical feature of the invention. It is noted in this regard that the description states more generally that the information to be placed on the first and/or second bit of the group of bits is “information selected from all information to be communicated” […] and, likewise, that the specification “important information” does not in itself imply any particular technical limitation in respect of the first information.

Moreover, as may be inferred from the description, the recited placement of bits of the first information on bit positions which are less susceptible to errors results in an optimal error rate characteristic for the first information […]. This in turn implies an inherent prioritisation of the “first information” over the “second information”. On this basis the board concludes that an explicit specification to the effect that the first information is “important information” is not necessary.

[2.5.2] Concerning the definition of the modulation scheme it is noted that claim 1 specifies that a first and a second bit position of each group of bits are less susceptible to errors than the remaining bit positions and that the bits of the first information are placed on the first and/or the second bit position of each group of bits associated with a modulation symbol.

The board is satisfied that the skilled person would be able to infer from the specific example of the preferred embodiment that the invention can be practised more generally as long as the modulation scheme is such that a first and a second bit position of each group of bits are more reliable (i.e. less susceptible to errors) than the remaining bit positions. Provided that the modulation scheme fulfils this criterion, the technical effect on which the invention is based, i.e. providing an optimal error rate characteristic for the first information, can be achieved by selectively placing the bits of the first information on the more reliable bit positions. Therefore, in the board’s judgement, it is not necessary to limit the definition of the modulation scheme to the specific example of the 8PSK scheme illustrated in Fig.2.

[2.6] In view of the foregoing, the board is satisfied that claim 1 now provides a definition of the matter for which protection is sought which expresses the essential technical features of the invention with adequate clarity and in a manner supported by the description. On this basis, the claim is found to comply with the requirements of A 84.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Friday, 14 May 2010

T 170/07 – Fatal Step


The present decision concerns an invention in the field of haemodialysis. It deals with the question of whether a claim comprising a step which is formulated in terms so general that it includes configurations where a therapeutic effect is obtained, may be held patentable. In other words, is the presence of a step that is potentially (but not necessarily) therapeutic sufficient to exclude a method from patentability?

Claim 1 as granted read:

Method of determining a parameter (D, K, Kt/v, Cbin) indicative of the effectiveness of an extracorporeal treatment of blood, consisting in making a patient’s blood and a treatment liquid flow one on each side of the semipermeable membrane of a membrane exchanger,
characterized in that it includes the steps of:
  • making a treatment liquid flow through the exchanger, a treatment liquid having a characteristic (Cd) which has an approximately constant nominal value (CdOin) upstream of the exchanger; 
  • varying the value of the characteristic (Cd) upstream of the exchanger for a time tc–ta, at the end of which the characteristic (Cd) is returned to its nominal value (CdOin) upstream of the exchanger; 
  • measuring and storing in memory a plurality of values adopted by the characteristic (Cd) of the treatment liquid downstream of the exchanger in response to the variation in the value of this characteristic (Cd) caused upstream of the exchanger;
characterized in that it includes the steps of:
  • determining the area (Sout) of a downstream perturbation region bounded by: 
    • a baseline passing through two values given by the characteristic (Cd) at two times flanking the perturbation, at which times the characteristic (Cd) is not, or respectively is no longer, influenced by the perturbation; and   
    • a curve representing the variation with respect to time of the characteristic (Cd), established from the values of the characteristic (Cd) which are measured downstream of the exchanger between two times t1 and t3 flanking the perturbation, at which times the characteristic (Cd) is not, or respectively is no longer, influenced by the perturbation; and
  • calculating the parameter (D, K, Kt/v, Cbin) indicative of the effectiveness of a treatment from the area (Sout) of the downstream perturbation region and from the area (Sin) of an upstream perturbation region bounded by: 
    • a baseline consisting of the nominal value (CdOin) of the characteristic (Cd), and 
    • a curve representing the variation with respect to time, over the period tc–ta, of the characteristic (Cd) upstream of the exchanger.
[2.1] A 53 lists certain exceptions to patentability. Its paragraph c) points out that European patents shall not be granted in respect of methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body.

In its opinion G 1/04 [6.2.1], the Enlarged Board of appeal has studied the question from which point on a method had to be considered as a diagnostic method practised on the human body. In this context, it has stated that methods for treatment of the human body by surgery or therapy practised on the human body [sic] had to be distinguished from diagnostic methods and that a method could fall under the exclusion provided by A 53 c) if only one of its steps were to be considered as surgical or therapeutic.

[2.2] The fundamental question under consideration is whether the method of determining a parameter claimed in the opposed patent includes a step that has to be considered as being of therapeutic or surgical nature. 

The wording of claim 1 as granted does not explicitly comprise a surgical step. Therefore, the Board has concentrated on the question of whether one of the steps that are explicitly claimed had to be considered as being of therapeutic nature.

[2.3] The claimed method is a method of determining a parameter indicative of the effectiveness of an extracorporeal treatment of blood. A method of extracorporeal treatment of blood consists in making a patient’s blood and a treatment liquid flow one on each side of the semipermeable membrane of a membrane exchanger such that there is an exchange of liquids and of substances between the patient’s blood and the treatment liquid through the membrane. The treatment liquid has a composition chosen such that the composition of the patient’s blood is modified in a predetermined way. A haemodialytic treatment that allow to treat the blood of patients suffering from renal deficiency is such an extracorporeal treatment of blood. In fact the unique embodiment of the invention in the opposed patent is such a haemodialytic treatment. The dialysis liquid has several properties, and in particular a certain sodium concentration for a given conductivity.

The idea underlying the invention is to vary one of the properties of the dialysis liquid, such as the sodium concentration, upstream of the exchanger, to measure the perturbation induced downstream of the exchanger in order to be able to mathematically deduce a parameter indicative of the effectiveness of the treatment from the perturbations measured upstream and downstream of the exchanger. The practitioner or the physician then changes (or does not change) the ongoing treatment in view of a predetermined therapeutic objective as a function of the value of this parameter.

The decisive step in claim 1 under consideration thus consists in “varying the value of the characteristic (Cd) upstream of the exchanger for a time tc–ta, at the end of which the characteristic (Cd) is returned to its nominal value (CdOin) upstream of the exchanger”.

[2.4] First it has to be noted that the wording of this step does not give any information concerning the amplitude, the duration or the frequency of the induced variation. In other words, all amplitudes, durations and frequencies suitable for serving the determination of the given parameter are covered by the scope of the claim.

It is also useful to consider the teaching of D1 published in December 1994, i.e. three years before the priority date of the opposed patent. This document concerns a device that allows to avoid the problems related to hypotension which are observed for certain patients during the dialysis. More precisely, this device allows to automatically deliver a suitable dose of sodium to the patients when the first symptoms of hypotension appear, so that the hypotension is avoided. To this aim the patient presses a button when the symptoms appear and the dialysis machine automatically increases the sodium concentration of the dialysate (for example by 16 meq/l) for a predetermined duration (for example, 10 minutes […]). The increase of the sodium concentration and the duration of the application are variable and adapted to the needs of the patients […]. As a matter of fact, the [patent proprietor] has acknowledged that the injection of sodium was a common means for fighting against hypotension problems observed for certain patients during a dialysis session.

Document D1 shows that for at least certain durations and variations of the sodium concentration (which is a characteristic of the treatment liquid) there certainly is a therapeutic effect that is acknowledged in certain patients. As the wording of the contested step of the method does not contain any range of values, the execution of this step, therefore, necessarily has a therapeutic effect on the patients suffering from hypotension when the characteristic varies in the proportions and during the durations indicated in D1.

The preceding considerations are sufficient for imparting a therapeutic step within the meaning of A 53 c) and, therefore, for excluding it from patentability.

[2.5] The [patent proprietor] has acknowledged that the execution of the claimed method might have a physiological effect on the patient. However, according to it, in order for the method to be considered as therapeutic, there would have to be a therapeutic purpose, as well as a therapeutic effect. In other words, there would have to be an indication of a disease or an ill-being to be avoided or healed and a precise treatment, i.e. the injection of a well-defined component at a well-defined moment for a well-defined duration. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the principle according to which, in a claim “the general covers the specific”. The claim in its generality covers a multitude of treatment liquids, the dose, and injection times. Therefore, it also covers the case in which the chosen treatment liquid, the dose and the injection time will have a beneficial effect on a patient showing the symptoms of hypotension. In other words, the method of determining a parameter such as claimed in claim 1, that is to say, defining an indeterminate value of the variation of a characteristic of the treatment liquid during an indeterminate duration necessarily includes the case in which it will have a beneficial effect on a patient showing the symptoms of hypotension, as disclosed in D1.

The [patent proprietor] has not been able to persuade the Board that the doses and durations of application recommended in D1 could not be used in the claimed method. Quite to the contrary, the doses and durations indicated by the [patent proprietor] are of the same order of magnitude as those needed for the treatment of hypotension.

[2.6] The [patent proprietor] insisted on the fact that the doses required for the measures had no effect on the therapeutic treatment of the patient. Furthermore, the physician of a hospital using several dialysis machines having a system for measuring the dialysance based on the injection of a peak of sodium similar to the claimed one, had confirmed that these peaks of sodium had no influence on the therapy.

On one hand, the [patent proprietor] has not supplied any precise test or proof allowing to corroborate its affirmations. On the other hand, what matters is not whether the machines of the prior art sending a sodium peak to patients for reasons of measurements produce a therapeutic effect or not, nor does it matter whether there are values in the claimed range of values for which there is no therapeutic effect or even a negative effect on the patent. The question is only whether the values or the ranges of values that lead without any doubt to a therapeutic effect are covered by the wording of the claim.

As for the passage in the description of the opposed patent according to which the patient is exposed to a treatment liquid different from the prescribed treatment liquid for a very short period of time, it does not allow to affirm that no therapeutic effect is obtained. It rather indicates that if the time or exposition (cumulated or not) is badly chosen, it will necessarily have a negative influence on the ongoing haemodialysis. Moreover, the duration is not specified in the claim under consideration.

[2.7] The [patent proprietor] considers that it should not be hindered from obtaining a patent for a method including one single step that could be therapeutic because this would prevent it from suing a possible infringer whereas a physician reproducing only the critical step could not be sued for infringement anyway because he would not reproduce the method as a whole.

Even if one admits that the purpose of the exclusion under A 53 c) is to avoid that the medical corps be hindered in exercising its functions, the Board is bound by the text of the EPC. The Board is forced to recognize that through the wording of A 53 c) the legislator has not chosen to exclude only the methods that could be prescribed by a physician for a therapeutic purpose, but, more generally, methods for treatment of the human or animal body by therapy practised on the human or animal body.

To this aim, as has been stated by the Enlarged Board of appeal in its opinion G 1/04, the presence of one single therapeutic step is sufficient for excluding a method practised on the human body from patentability. Thus a method practised on the human or animal body and claimed in general terms, as in the claim under consideration, and which originally has no declared therapeutic purpose but which, under certain circumstances, inevitably generates a therapeutic effect when executed, falls under the exclusion according to A 53 c).

[2.8] The [patent proprietor] argues that A 53 c) does not contain any wording such as “relative to a therapeutic treatment” or “which are useful for the purpose of a therapeutic treatment”, which means that the claimed method should not be excluded from patentability.

The method claimed in the opposed patent cannot be considered as being merely “relative to a therapeutic treatment” as it inevitably produces a therapeutic effect in patients having symptoms of hypotension. A method for the production of one of the components of the dialysis liquid would, for instance, be a method “relative to a therapeutic treatment”. Nothing of that kind is claimed here.

[2.9] The [patent proprietor] has also pointed out that the EPO had already granted a great number of patents concerned with the determination of a parameter during a therapeutic treatment and that the Office had to remain coherent with itself and thus grant a patent.

As provided in A 23, the members of the Boards of appeal are independent in the exercise of their duties. In particular, A 23(3) states that in their decisions the members of the Boards shall not be bound by any instructions and shall comply only with the provisions of this Convention. The existence of patents granted for methods that are similar to the method claimed here, therefore, could not possibly bind the Board, even in the case where the Board departed from the interpretation or explanation of the Convention in an earlier decision of one of the Boards (see Article 20 RPBA).

To read the whole decision (in French), click here.

Thursday, 13 May 2010

G 3/08 – The Right To Differ


There are farewell gifts you’d rather not receive. I cannot help thinking that Mrs Brimelow would have preferred another answer to her last referral to the Enlarged Board of appeal (EBA). In substance, the EBA found this referral inadmissible because the alleged divergences in case law were inexistent or of a kind that cannot justify a referral to the EBA. Welcome back to square one. 

Although this outcome is not unexpected, the opinion is not without interest because the EBA dwells on how case law is elaborated and what sort of divergences may arise in the process before convergence is finally reached.

[7] The key to assessing the referral’s admissibility is determining the meaning to be assigned to the undefined legal term “different decisions” / “abweichende Entscheidungen” / “décisions divergentes” in A 112(1)(b).

Do decisions differ if for example they come to the same verdict on different grounds? What about two decisions that are far apart in time? In such cases, does a Technical Board clearly stand by earlier case law cited in support of a difference, or has it explicitly or implicitly abandoned it in the meantime? What if the claimed differences are the result of long-term legal developments affecting the patentability assessment of new subject-matter? How do different decisions relate to other case law of the Boards?

[7.1] The meaning to be assigned to the key term “different decisions” as this expression is used in A 112(1)(b) must initially be determined on the basis of the provision’s wording in all official versions of the EPC, these all having equal status (A 177(1)).

Yet the wording does not seem to give a clear answer. The English, German and French terms used (“different”, “abweichend” and “divergent” respectively) do not appear to have entirely the same connotations. Cassell’s English-German Dictionary, 1978 edition, translates “different” with German words such as “anders, verschieden, andersartig, abweichend, ungleich, verschiedenartig”, whereas according to Harrap’s Shorter Dictionary French-English (1988 Reprint) the French term “divergent” equates to “divergent” in English, not “different”, and in German is according to Larousse Grand Dictionnaire Allemand- Français, 1999 edition, equivalent to terms like “divergierend, auseinanderlaufend, abweichend”. This results in variations in semantic content (abweichend/different/divergent) between the three language versions. “Different decisions” could apparently be ones that are far apart in time, regardless of whether they actually still have a claim to validity in view of intervening changes in case law. “Divergent decisions” by contrast would suggest ones which do not take the same line, which in other words vary in their substantive content, while being close together in time. Thus a clear answer cannot be derived from the wording of the provision alone.

[7.2] Ambiguous wording in international treaties, including industrial property conventions, has to be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose (Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) whose rules for the interpretation of treaties are to be applied to the EPC (see G 5/83 [3 ff.]; G 2/02 and G 3/02 [5.2 ff.]; G 1/07 [3.1]; G 2/08 [4]), and if we consider the object and purpose of A 112(1)(b) in the context of the EPC, there is much to suggest that it means divergent decisions in the second sense mentioned in paragraph (a) above […].

[7.2.1] According to current constitutional thinking, the predictability and verifiability of all state action are indispensable elements of a democratic legal order based on the separation of powers, the rule of law and respect for human rights including fundamental procedural rights. These principles have been subscribed to in substance at national level by all the EPC contracting states, despite differing constitutional traditions and despite several reservations made by different states. As a democracy is prohibited from signing an international treaty which would undermine its citizens’ constitutional guarantees, the EPO must therefore support these fundamental principles either explicitly (e.g. A 113) or implicitly (e.g. liberty, equality) (see for example G 3/98 [2.5.3]; G 2/02 and G 3/02 [7.2]; T 377/95 [33-36]; T 1193/02 [10]; T 190/03 [10]).
The European Patent Organisation is an international, intergovernmental organisation, modelled on a modern state order and based on the separation of powers principle, which the sovereign contracting states have entrusted with the exercise of some of their national powers in the field of patents. Thus the EPC assigns executive power to the Office to grant patents and to its President to manage the Office in organisational respects (A 4(3) and A 10 ff.), while to the Administrative Council it assigns limited legislative powers restricted to lower-ranking rules (A 33), along with financial and supervisory powers. Finally, the Boards of Appeal, which in their decisions are bound only by the EPC (A 23(3)), are assigned the role of an independent judiciary in this patent system (A 21 to A 23; see also G 6/95 [2 ff.]), even if for the present, pursuant to A 4(2) and to EPC Part 1 Chapter III, they are not an independent organ of the Organisation but structurally integrated departments of the Office under A 15.

[7.2.2] Like the judiciary of any democratic entity based on the separation of powers principle, the EPO’s Boards of Appeal as an independent judiciary guarantee the due process of law within the Organisation. They are also assigned interpretative supremacy with regard to the EPC in terms of its scope of application (see also A 23(3)). Under A 21(1) they are responsible for reviewing decisions taken by the Office in grant and opposition proceedings. Their interpretation of the EPC is the basis for the practice established by the Office for the examination of patent applications and oppositions to granted patents. Otherwise there would be no need for the President’s right of referral.

On the other hand, the interpretation of the EPC or equivalent national regulations by the courts of the Contracting States has no direct consequences for Office departments; but that does not mean that in interpreting the Convention the Boards of Appeal should not take account of relevant national decisions on harmonised European patent law, in keeping with normal practice. This is implied by the harmonisation philosophy behind the EPC.

[7.2.3] Another essential element of a democratic legal order is the principle that a public authority is bound by law and justice. This is supplemented by the principle of uniform application of the law. Both principles are designed to ensure predictability of jurisdiction and hence legal certainty by preventing arbitrariness. Those subject to the law, in the case of the EPC the parties to proceedings before the Office, but also the public, must be able to expect that the Office as patent granting authority and consequently the Boards of Appeal will settle cases of the same nature in the same way and will apply comprehensible arguments and methods to justify any substantive differences in such decisions. For the stated reasons, these principles also constitute essential precepts for administration and jurisdiction in the European patent system as codified in the EPC. Ensuring compliance with them is ultimately the task of the Boards of Appeal, including the EBA, the latter though only in the context of referrals by the Boards of Appeal and the President under A 112(1) and concerning petitions for review (A 112a).

[7.2.4] In keeping with these principles, A 112 - like corresponding provisions in the legal orders of the Contracting States - defines the conditions in which legal uniformity within the European patent system may be established by means of a referral to the EBA of Appeal. It requires the Boards (A 112(1)(a)) or the President (A 112(1)(b)) to deem the referral necessary in order to ensure uniform application of the law or if points of law of fundamental importance arise, and a further admissibility criterion for a referral by the President is that two Boards of Appeal must have given different decisions on the question referred. Hence the EBA does not rule on abstract points of law, but only ever on real issues arising from the cited differing decisions, as well as on specific legal questions adduced in the referral […]. It is to be noticed that the President is not a party in a referral procedure because she or he can not be adversely affected by answers given by the EBA.

[7.2.5] Thus it is clear that the interpretation of the EPC is primarily the responsibility of the Boards of Appeal. As a rule they have interpretative supremacy with regard to the EPC because their decisions are subject to review only under the narrowly defined conditions of A 112(1) and A 112a(2). It is only when these apply that the EBA has the last word. The fact that the EBA takes action only on a referral from the Boards of Appeal or the President (with the exception of petitions for review under A 112a, which however concern procedural matters and have a very narrow scope) and thus does not constitute a further instance ranking above the Boards of Appeal within the EPC judicial system is a clear indication of the extent of its significance for legal uniformity. The exhaustive list of admissibility criteria for a referral under A 112(1)(a) and (b) implies that the EBA takes decisions on specific legal questions and that neither the Boards of Appeal nor the President are authorised to consult it whenever they so wish in order to clarify abstract points of law. For that purpose the President can call upon a separate Legal Department within the Office.

[7.2.6] On the same restrictive grounds, A 112(1)(b) as an additional constraint for a referral by the President as opposed to one by a Board of Appeal requires there to be differences in the rulings of two Boards of Appeal (in the sense already discussed) on a point of law. The “different decisions” criterion would appear to show that the President is only intended to be allowed to refer a question to the EBA when there is a divergence or, better, conflict in the case law making it difficult if not impossible for the Office to bring its patent granting practice into line with the case law of the Boards of Appeal. It is of course immaterial whether the initiative behind the referral comes from a third party, as long as there is objective evidence of divergent applications of the law.

[7.2.7] Given its object and purpose, the right of referral does not extend to allowing the President, for whatever reason, to use an EBA referral as a means of replacing Board of Appeal rulings on CII patentability with the decision of a putatively higher instance. For example, a presidential referral is not admissible merely because the European Parliament and Council have failed to adopt a directive on CII patenting or because consistent Board rulings are called into question by a vocal lobby […]. Even the essentially commendable desire for harmonisation expressed by Lord Justice Jacob in the Aerotel/Macrossan judgment can be taken up by the EBA only to the extent possible under the EPC, even if his suggestion might significantly advance the cause of legal uniformity in Europe. When judiciary-driven legal development meets its limits, it is time for the legislator to take over.

[7.3] The notion of legal development is an additional factor which must be carefully considered when interpreting the notion of “different decisions” in A 112(1)(b), as has occasionally been pointed out in the literature […] and various amicus curiae briefs.

[7.3.1] Development of the law is an essential aspect of its application, whatever method of interpretation the judge applies, and is therefore inherent in all judicial activity. In that light an element of legal development can even be seen whenever a specific case is subsumed under an abstract regulation. That is especially true of Anglo-Saxon law, where a decision on an individual case has far greater implications as a precedent than judgments in continental civil law. Consequently, legal development as such cannot on its own form the basis for a referral, only because case law in new legal territory does not always develop in linear fashion, and earlier approaches may be abandoned or modified. Otherwise the “different decisions” feature of A 112(1)(b) would lose its meaning. While the development of the law may superficially appear to give rise to different decisions within the meaning of that provision, on its own it cannot justify a referral to the EBA. A referral is justified only if at least two Board of Appeal decisions come into conflict with the principle of legal uniformity. The object and purpose of A 112(1)(b) is to have an EBA decision re-establish legal uniformity when it has clearly been disrupted, not to intervene in legal development. This is discussed in more detail in the following.

[7.3.2] The EPC as it stands assigns interpretation of the EPC with its numerous undefined legal terms ultimately to the Boards of Appeal (see [7.2.5] above). They are responsible for defining how the law is to be applied and where appropriate adapted to developments in patent law. To a greater or lesser extent the issue in every case is whether or not the situation is covered by an abstractly formulated regulation. Thus over time case law has given e.g. the notions of invention, novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability increasingly precise meanings with which the Office and other patent system stakeholders can align themselves in their daily practice. Hence in view of the direction that patent law has taken by means of the Boards’ case law, appeals against decisions of the Examining and Opposition Divisions mostly operate within legally secure bounds.

[7.3.3] Particularly in the field of new technologies, the Technical Boards often have to subject their established case law to critical review, applying accepted judicial procedure and general legal principles to decide whether the often broadly formulated undefined legal terms in the EPC are applicable to the specific nature of the new field, i.e. in particular whether the existing widely accepted case law also yields acceptable solutions in the new field. It is entirely conceivable that the interpretation of undefined legal terms in the light of the EPC’s purpose and principles will necessitate drawing further distinctions which, depending on what they include or exclude, may determine whether a patent is granted or refused in a specific case.

[7.3.4] Where jurisprudence enters new legal territory, caution is required to avoid making statements that will prove untenable in the very next case to arise. Yet it cannot be ruled out that repeated amendments will be necessary in the course of time if legal solutions that the Boards initially deem correct prove to be mistaken in new situations and cease to be convincing jurisprudence. Such changes of direction in legal development are a normal part of judicial activity, and there is no need to speak of different decisions within the meaning of A 112(1)(b) simply because departures from earlier practice are deemed necessary when homing in on the right solution to a specific case […].

[7.3.5] Thus even a radical shift in jurisprudence need not necessarily be construed as a different decision within the meaning of A 112(1)(b) vis-à-vis earlier case law, provided that the Board corrects itself and - mostly in explicit fashion - declares its earlier practice to be no longer relevant. The President does not acquire the right of referral simply because he prefers the earlier decision […]. Such corrections are a normal part of the application and development of the law and do not constitute a difference that could be corrected by means of a presidential referral to the EBA, overriding the interpretative power of the Boards. In fact, shifts of this kind when identified as such leave the Office as patent granting authority in no doubt how the EPC is to be interpreted according to the Boards’ latest findings. This may entail altering the Examination Guidelines, but not having the case law reviewed by the EBA. It is another matter if the Boards themselves see a need to refer points of law to the EBA in the light of a change in their practice.

[7.3.6] The same should apply where the Boards’ case law has developed over an extended period and in the course of several decisions has gradually arrived at solutions which clearly and justifiably move away from the initial premise, even if the public and the patent granting authority have found earlier solutions acceptable. In that way, too, legal development has followed a course which, while not entirely linear, as long as it is transparent does not justify speaking of different decisions that could be grounds for a referral.

[7.3.7] Legal rulings are characterised not by their verdicts, but by their grounds. That is the only way of assessing the courts’ opinion, and the ability to assess that is in turn the key to legal certainty. The EBA has already taken this line in its decision G 3/93 [2], where it took obiter dicta into account in examining a divergence […].

[7.3.8] The conclusion that must be drawn is that the EBA cannot develop the law in the same way as the Boards of Appeal, because it does not have to decide on facts of pending appeals, but only in specific instances and only in the aforementioned context of points of law referred to it under A 112(1). This applies a fortiori to referrals by the President, which do not even arise from a specific appeal. If, as required for a referral by the President, there are different decisions on points of law, the EBA may follow the legal approach of one of the decisions and reject the other as inappropriate, or it may find a third way appropriate. Thus the only way it can influence the assessment of individual issues is by breaking with previous practice and pointing in a new direction or by confirming the approach adopted by a Board. In the process however the EBA must also consider whether the divergent decisions might not be part of a constant development, possibly still ongoing, in jurisprudence on recent patent law issues, in the course of which older decisions have lost their significance and so can no longer be considered in connection with newer decisions. Such putative differences do not justify presidential referrals, legal development being one of the principal duties of the Boards of Appeal, in particular in new territory.

Hence the President has no right of referral under A 112(1)(b) simply in order to intervene, on whatever grounds, in mere legal development if on an interpretation of the notion of “different decisions” in the sense of conflicting decisions there is no need for correction to establish legal certainty.

You can download the whole decision here.

NB: I owe the knowledge of the publication of the opinion to Laurent Teyssèdre’s blog twitter. Meanwhile most patent related blogs have spread the news.