Wednesday, 12 May 2010

T 384/08 – A Frozen Business


Yesterday we have seen how the transfer of opponent status relates to the question of reformatio in peius. The substantive questions related to the transfer under consideration are also of interest, as we will see today.

[11] According to the established case law (see G 2/04), an opponent status is not freely transferable. It does however move to the successor in title in case of universal succession such as a takeover or merger of legal persons. Furthermore, it may be transferred or assigned to a third party as part of the opponent’s business assets, together with the assets in the interests of which the opposition was filed (see G 4/88). In this context, the term “business” has to be understood in a broad sense as describing an economic activity which is or could be carried on by the opponent and which constitutes a specific part of his business assets (G 4/88 [5]).

[12] When the original opponent Protogene filed its opposition in October 1999, it was conducting scientific research and development in the field of micro-arrays. The company had been founded in 1996 by Dr Brennan and Dr Molinari. Dr Brennan was its chief scientist until August 2000, a member of the board of directors and its major shareholder. […] Dr Molinari was Protogene’s Chief Executive Officer from 1996 to 1999 and vice president from 1999 to April 2000. He was appointed to the board of directors in April 2001 […].

[13] During the first few years of its existence, Protogene funded itself by forming R&D partnerships with other companies interested in utilizing or co-developing Protogene’s technology. Protogene did not manufacture and sell its own micro-arrays. However its R&D efforts resulted in several granted patents and pending patent applications […].

[14] The appellant has argued that at the time when Protogene filed its opposition there was no appropriate economic activity upon which a relevant legal interest could have been based. If, however, such an economic activity existed at all, it could only have been the envisaged chip development collaboration with the corporation Incyte Pharmaceuticals, in the context of which Protogene was encouraged to file the opposition.

[15] The board does not find these arguments persuasive. Since the subject-matter of the opposed patent concerns high-density arrays of nucleotide or amino acid sequences, the patent fell squarely within Protogene’s core activity of scientific research and development in the field of micro-arrays. The opposition was directly connected to this economic activity which, in accordance with the decision G 4/88, qualifies as the “business” in the interest of which the opposition was filed. As the term “business” has to be understood in a broad sense, it also encompasses the economic activities of a biotechnological R&D firm in a development stage. Thus there is no basis for the proposition that Protogene’s opposition was not linked to any business at all or that it was exclusively linked to one specific joint collaboration project.

[16] After Protogene had filed its opposition, its business situation worsened. Dr Brennan left the company in late 2000, but he remained a majority shareholder and developed a plan to start a new company that would continue Protogene’s work on a smaller scale […]. Protogene lost money at an increasing rate until the company was running on bridge loans from its investors in early 2001. In April 2001, the board of directors ordered the company to lay off approximately 60% of its employees […].

[17] During the summer of 2001, Dr Brennan, on behalf of a newly formed company Creogen, began negotiating with Protogene’s board of directors to purchase all of the equipment and technology necessary to enable Creogen to continue Protogene’s custom oligonucleotide arrays and array PCR business […]. In September 2001 the board of directors voted to restructure the company which involved winding down the day to day operations and selling off certain physical assets, in order to make the company a more attractive takeover or merger candidate. On 1 November 2001 an auction took place where most of the equipment was sold to over one hundred different parties […]. However, in accordance with an understanding reached before the auction took place, laboratory equipment necessary for the microassay R&D business was set aside in view of its future sale to Creogen […].

[18] The board considers that while the auction led to the transfer of many tangible assets owned by Protogene and generated a considerable amount of money, it did not involve a transfer of business. It is noted in particular that the physical assets were sold to many different persons and that the auction did not concern intangible assets such as Protogene’s patent portfolio. Thus none of the buyers at the auction acquired Protogene’s micro-array business or a specific part of it.

[19] Creogen was reincorporated as Metrigen in July 2002 […]. On 20 December 2002 an Asset Purchase Agreement (hereafter: “the Agreement”) was concluded between Protogene as the seller and Metrigen as the buyer and became effective on 21 December 2002 […]. In the introductory part of the Agreement it is stated that the seller is engaged in the business of DNA micro-arrays, methods to perform highly parallel experiments on micro-arrays, single nucleotide polymorphism genotyping, and other drug discovery products and services and that the buyer desires to purchase from the seller certain assets of the business.

[20] […] The purchased assets inter alia include
  • all tangible personal property listed on a schedule 2.1(a),
  • all IP listed or described on a schedule 2.1(b) together with 
    • (i) all of the seller’s IP rights associated therewith, 
    • (ii) goodwill associated therewith, 
    • (iii) licenses and sublicenses granted and obtained with respect thereto, 
    • (iv) rights thereunder, 
    • (v) remedies against infringements thereof, and 
    • (vi) rights to protection of interests therein under the applicable laws of all jurisdictions,
  • all causes of action, lawsuits, judgments, claims and demands of any nature available to or being pursued by the seller with respect to the seller’s personal property, seller’s IP, or contracts, including the seller’s EPO opposition against the [opposed] patent, it being acknowledged that the opposition constitutes an inseparable part of the seller’s IP and the assets.
[21] Schedule 2.1(a) lists the laboratory equipment which was set aside during the auction in November 2001 […]

[22] IP rights are defined in Article 1 of the Agreement as including, inter alia, all trade secrets and other rights in know-how and confidential or proprietary information. Schedule 2.1(b) contains a list of 40 patent applications and patents related to the results of Protogene’s research and development.

[23] […] Certain assets are excluded from the Agreement, in particular contractual employment arrangements as well as cash, cash equivalents, marketable securities and accounts or notes receivable of the seller.

[24] While the Agreement explicitly refers to Protogene’s opposition against the European patent in suit as “an inseparable part of the Seller Intellectual Property and the Assets”, this as such is not sufficient for a transfer of opponent status since according to the established case law oppositions are not freely transferable (see point 11 above). Rather, in accordance with decision G 4/88, it has to be ascertained whether, by means of the Agreement, those business assets of Protogene in the interests of which the opposition was filed were transferred to Metrigen.

[25] The appellant takes the view that, at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement, Protogene had no business activities any more. All the business terminated in autumn 2001 so that by the end of 2002 Protogene had neither customers nor employees. The appellant in particular relies on a declaration […] which reads as follows: “Protogene had ceased on-going commercial efforts and was no longer selling product, remaining management attention being completely focused from then on at providing liquidity to investors by selling business assets as part of the shut down.”

[26] With respect to Protogene’s patent portfolio, the appellant argues that the holding of IP rights should not be equated with a business as an economic activity since patents are only negative rights and do not give a positive right to use the claimed invention. Furthermore, since all the employees had already left the firm, trade secrets which have to be regarded as a key component of any business and as being of significant importance for R&D businesses could not be transferred any more.

[27] The board does not agree with this line of argument. Even a firm which has closed its day-to-day operations and is going to be dissolved in view of financial difficulties has a business as long as there are business assets which allow the carrying out of a business activity connected with them. While in such circumstances one may possibly speak of a business “in a frozen state” or a “residual” business, there is nevertheless still a business (see decision G 4/88 [5]: “an economic activity which is or could be carried on” [emphasis added by the board]).

[28] In the present case, when the Agreement was concluded, Protogene still owned valuable tangible and intangible property relating to its business as defined in the introductory part of the Agreement. Furthermore, the plan of the company’s majority shareholder Dr Brennan was to continue Protogene’s work on a smaller scale within a new company […]. In accordance with this plan, certain laboratory equipment was set aside in the auction of November 2001 with the purpose of being later transferred to the new company (see point 17 above). Therefore the board concludes that Protogene still had a business that could be transferred when the Agreement was concluded.

[29] The next issue to be decided is whether the opposition division (OD) was correct in holding that the Agreement had the effect of only transferring certain items of property and did not result in the transfer of Protogene’s business or a specific part of it.

[30] The board accepts that according to the case law of the boards of appeal there may well be situations in which a transfer of industrial property rights is not sufficient for accepting the claimed transfer of opponent status, in particular where the relevant business activity is continued by a person different from the assignee of the industrial property rights (see T 659/92 [3.2]). On the other hand, the mere fact that certain assets are explicitly excluded in an assignment contract is as such not sufficient for concluding that the contract did not result in the transfer of a business or a specific part of it (see T 799/97 [2.4]).

[31] In the present case, the board is convinced that, following the plan conceived by Protogene’s majority shareholder and former chief scientist Dr Brennan, the Agreement was executed for the purpose of transferring to Metrigen all the business assets considered to be relevant for continuing Protogene’s core business, i.e. research and development in the field of microarrays. It is noted in particular that the Agreement related to the selling company’s patent portfolio and to essential laboratory equipment. […]

[32] It is true that, as correctly stated by the OD and the [patent proprietor], the Agreement did not encompass all of Protogene’s assets without exception. However, these exceptions concern assets which, as persuasively explained by [the opponent], were of no importance for continuing the micro-array business. For example, it is perfectly understandable that Metrigen did not see any need to acquire Protogene’s remaining trademarks which could be regarded as valueless since no commercial sales had been generated or even as having negative connotations in the marketplace in view of Protogene’s lack of success […]. The [patent proprietor] was unable to point to any asset remaining with Protogene which could be reasonably considered as relevant, let alone as essential, for continuing the micro-array business.

[33] When taking into account the intentions of Protogene’s majority shareholder and of Metrigen’s CEO […], the provisions of the Agreement and Protogene’s economic situation in December 2002, there is nothing to suggest that Protogene intended to retain and revitalize its microarray business or any part of it after the conclusion of the Agreement. What remained of Protogene afterwards was an empty shell.

[34] The board therefore comes to the conclusion that the business assets in the interest of which the original opponent 02 Protogene filed its opposition were validly transferred to Metrigen. This has the consequence that, following Metrigen’s corresponding request and its submission of appropriate evidence in the course of the proceedings before the OD, the opponent status has validly been transferred from Protogene to Metrigen. Thus Metrigen is the correct respondent I in the present appeal proceedings.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Tuesday, 11 May 2010

T 384/08 – There Is An End To The Prohibition


The CAFC may have Pauline Newman, we have Ursula Kinkeldey. I know neither of these ladies personally, but I do know that the patent world owes them lots of decisions well worth reading. Whenever I see a decision by a Board chaired by Mrs. Kinkeldey, (or a dissenting opinion by Mrs. Newman) I look forward to some stimulating and well-argued statements. The present decision is no exception. It deals with interesting aspects of a transfer of opponent status. Can the Board be hindered from examining the allowability of a transfer by the prohibition of reformatio in peius?

[1] An issue in the present proceedings is whether the status of opponent was transferred from the original opponent Protogene Laboratories, Inc. (“Protogene”) to Metrigen, Inc. (“Metrigen”). As a matter of principle, the boards of appeal have to examine the question of party status ex officio before dealing with the substance of the cases (see G 2/04 [3.2.5], specifically addressing a procedural situation where there is uncertainty about the validity of a transfer of opponent status). However, the appellant takes the view that the board is precluded from examining the transfer of opponent status since the transfer was not accepted by the opposition division (OD) and neither Protogene nor Metrigen appealed the decision. The core of appellant’s argument is that its own appeal does not concern this part of the decision (which was favourable to the appellant) so that the issue of the transfer of opponent status remains finally determined and cannot be decided differently without infringing the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius.

[2] According to the established case law of the boards of appeal, the doctrine of reformatio in peius does not apply separately to each point or issue decided, or to the reasoning leading to the impugned decision (see T 149/02 [3.2.1]). This case law finds a basis in a passage in decision G 9/92 [11] according to which a non-appealing party as a respondent has the opportunity to make what it considers to be appropriate and necessary submissions in the appeal proceedings to defend the result obtained before the first instance [emphasis added by the board].

In decision T 327/92 [1], the board stated the following:
“In the present case the patent was revoked so there is nothing the Board can refuse the Appellant which the OD has not already denied it. The doctrine of reformatio in peius cannot be extended to apply separately to each point decided by the OD. Rather the Board of Appeal must examine all material before the OD [...] as to its relevance to the grounds of invalidity raised in the opposition, and then decide for itself on the requests made on appeal.”
The same view was taken in the decision T 401/95 [2]:
“If an appeal is lodged against an adverse decision of the first instance about the main request, then the whole request is before the Board of Appeal and within its jurisdiction (see decisions T 327/92 [1], T 583/95 [2]). It is the Board’s power and duty pursuant to A 111(1) and A 102(3) to decide for itself upon each matter and each issue with regard to the main request and the Board is not bound by any finding of the decision under appeal. Thus, the Board is empowered to reopen and decide upon matters which have been an issue before the OD [...].”
[3] The above principles apply independently of the nature of the issue decided by the OD in favour of the appellant, i.e. also where the issue concerns the status of a party or the admissibility of an opposition. On numerous occasions, the boards have held that the admissibility of the opposition is an indispensable procedural requirement for the substantive examination of the opposition submissions at every stage of the proceedings (see also G 3/97 [6]). Thus even where an opponent is the sole appellant, the admissibility of its opposition has to be ascertained by the board of appeal on its own motion (see e.g. T 289/91 [2]; T 960/95 [2]). As illustrated by decision T 28/93, this may have the consequence that a decision which rejected an opposition on substantive grounds is set aside and the opposition rejected as inadmissible.

[4] Furthermore, decision T 1178/04 [24] has taken the view that where what is at issue is the admissibility of an opposition or a person’s right to be a party, the principle of no reformatio in peius is of no application. In that case, the OD had considered the transfer of opponent status to be valid, and only the new opponent had appealed the substantive decision. The board considered it to be its duty ex officio to examine the validity of the transfer of the opposition and concluded that this duty arises whether or not the issue has been raised by the proprietor and whether or not it has already been the subject of a decision by the OD. It also followed that it was irrelevant whether or not the proprietor could have appealed or had in fact appealed (see T 1178/04 [34-36]).

[5] The appellant referred to decision T 898/91. In that decision the present board in a different composition was confronted with the situation that the OD had rejected one of several oppositions as inadmissible and had revoked the opposed patent on the basis of the other oppositions. Only the patent proprietor appealed. The board came to the conclusion that the opponent whose opposition was held inadmissible should have appealed that part of the decision if it wished to remain party to the appeal proceedings. In the absence of such an appeal, that part took full legal effect and was not touched by the suspensive effect of the patent proprietor’s appeal (see T 898/91 [1]).

[6] The board understands the approach adopted in decision T 898/91 as resulting in an exception from the general principles set out above (see points 2 to 4 above). If this approach were to be followed, a distinction with respect to the binding effect of findings of the department of first instance would have to be made between a situation where the admissibility of an opposition was accepted by the OD and a situation where it was not accepted: whereas in the first situation the board of appeal is not prevented from reconsidering the issue of admissibility even if the opponent is the sole appellant (see T 289/91, T 28/93 and T 960/95), in the second situation it would be prevented from reconsidering the issue unless the opponent concerned has also filed an appeal.

[7] The board has difficulties in finding a legal justification for such a distinction. Furthermore, the approach adopted in decision T 898/91 leads to the rather unfortunate consequence that one of several opponents whose opposition was rejected as inadmissible but who is fully satisfied with the substantive outcome of the opposition proceedings (e.g. revocation of the patent) would have to file an own appeal merely in order to safeguard its status as a party in appeal proceedings possibly initiated by the proprietor. This would amount to a kind of precautionary appeal which, in the view of the board, is conceptually foreign to the EPC. In addition, awkward procedural situations might then arise if the proprietor does not file an appeal himself. Dealing with the only appeal of one of several opponents whose opposition was held inadmissible if the proprietor does not appeal against the revocation decision, might amount to a legal conundrum: whereas the patent would have to be regarded as finally revoked, the board would still be concerned with the question whether the appealing party was correctly denied its party status.

[8] The board furthermore notes that the procedural situation in the present case which concerns the refusal of a requested transfer of opponent status is not wholly identical to the situation underlying the decision T 898/91 where the relevant issue was the admissibility of one of several oppositions. If in the present case the board considered itself bound by the OD’s determination of the issue of transfer, it would have to treat the original opponent Protogene as respondent and would be barred from examining whether Protogene had lost its opponent status due to a transfer. The board would thus be obliged to accept a person as a party to the proceedings which upon examination might reveal itself as not having a proper status.

[9] The [patent proprietor] has also pointed to the provision of A 106(2), according to which a decision which does not terminate proceedings as regards one of the parties can only be appealed together with the final decision, unless the decision allows a separate appeal. The argument is made that it would follow from this provision that if proceedings for one of the opponents are terminated by the department of first instance, an appeal can be taken from that part of the decision, even if the decision did not make termination a separately appealable matter and even if the decision resulted in the revocation of the patent. The board is unable to see why A 106(2) should be given such an extensive reading. The provision is concerned with the admissibility of appeals against interlocutory decisions. In the present case the OD dealt with all the formal and substantive issues it considered necessary to address in its final reasoned decision. The decision included the issue of transfer of the status of opponent and no separate reasoned decision was taken on this point. Thus there is no need to consider what the procedural consequences would have been if the OD, before taking a final decision, had decided on the issue of transfer of opponent status in a separate reasoned interlocutory decision.

[10] In view of the reasons set out above, the board comes to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the fact that neither Protogene nor Metrigen appealed the OD’s decision, it has to examine the question of the transfer of status of the opponent ex officio before dealing with the substance of the case. The board has noted the appellant’s request to refer, in the context of this issue, three questions of law to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA). However, such a referral is considered to be neither necessary nor appropriate for reaching a decision in the present case. The principles developed by the decisions of the EBA (see in particular G 9/92, G 3/97 and G 2/04) and by the case law of the boards of appeal give a sufficiently clear guidance to the board for determining the issue itself.

To read the whole decision, click here.

NB: This decision has already been reported on the Blog du droit européen des brevets.

Monday, 10 May 2010

T 836/09 – The Lady And The Box


What would a patent attorney be without his/her assistant? Unfortunately, on a case law blog, assistants are mentioned only when they make mistakes (see my recent post) or even go crazy (another recent post). The present decision is no exception. It deals with a request for re-establishment following an error by Mrs P. who inadvertently sent a statement of grounds of appeal to the German patent office (DPMA) instead of sending it to the EPO. Some time ago (until December 1, 2005), there was an Administrative Agreement between the EPO and the DPMA which would have avoided any loss of rights, but the President of the EPO was criticized for having exceeded his powers when signing this Agreement and the Agreement was terminated.

The whole decision is worth reading, but it is the part dealing with the admissibility of the request which I found most interesting.

[4.1] Compliance with the two-month time limit

Pursuant to R 136(1), first sentence, the request shall be filed within two months of the removal of the cause of non-compliance with the period, but at the latest within one year of expiry of the unobserved time limit.

In its decision in T 315/90 [6] (recently affirmed by T 1465/08 [2.1]), the board held that the date of the removal was the date at which the appellants should have discovered the committed error if they had taken all due care, due care being a permanent obligation. In that case, the date of removal was not necessarily the date of receipt of the communication notifying a loss of rights. More generally, holding that due care was an obligation extending over the whole of the proceedings, the case law of the boards of appeal recognises that the cause of non-compliance may be removed already at the point in time when a representative taking all due care would have become aware that the time limit had been missed, even though in reality he or she had become aware thereof at a later stage only (cf. T 1561/05 [2.1.3] and the cases cited there).

In the present case, the appellant’s representative, Mr K., was unable to observe the deadline for filing the statement of grounds of appeal, which expired on 16 March 2009. As set out above, non-compliance with that period was the consequence of the fact that his assistant, Ms P., inadvertently put the statement of grounds into the DPMA outbox, which, as evidenced by the indications on that statement, ultimately led to its being delivered at the DPMA on 13 March 2009 and at the EPO on 23 March 2009. According to the credible statement by Ms P., the error was discovered in the appellant’s patent law firm on 15 April 2009, when the acknowledgment of receipt returned by the EPO was received. That date of receipt is also evidenced by the “Received” stamp of the law firm on that document. The question arises whether 15 April 2009 is also the date when the cause for non-compliance with the time limit for filing the statement of grounds was removed or whether the representative or Ms P. should have become aware of the error earlier on.

The representative submitted that, where an acknowledgment of receipt could not be stamped by the EPO’s filing office because it was delivered after office hours, such acknowledgment would usually be returned by post in the following days. In the present case however it was more than one month after delivery of the statement of grounds intended for the EPO that the acknowledgment was received by the patent law firm. The question therefore is whether, under the principle of due care, the representative was under an affirmative duty to inquire with the EPO whether they had received the statement of grounds, as no acknowledgment had yet been received, or to check receipt in the EPO’s online register, and within which maximum time frame such an inquiry or check would have had to be made. Should it have had to be made within a matter of days from 13 March 2009 (the date when the statement of grounds was dispatched) and in any case in less than 12 days from that date, i.e. before 25 March 2009, then the appellant, in filing the request for re-establishment on 25 May 2009, would not have respected the two-month time limit.

In the board’s view it was not necessary for the representative to make an inquiry about the whereabouts of the statement of grounds with the EPO, nor even to check in the EPO’s online register whether it had been added to their electronic file. The board considers that the due care requirement, if it applies in the context of compliance with the time limit of two months of the removal of the cause of non-compliance following the case law cited above (in the second paragraph of the present section 4.1), does not include an obligation to seek confirmation by the EPO in whatever way of the receipt of documents directed to them. An acknowledgment of receipt enclosed with the documents sent and returned with a confirmation by the EPO makes it easier for the sender to prove the filing of those documents with the EPO should a document go astray. An acknowledgment of receipt stamped by the EPO is however not the only way to prove receipt. Evidence to that effect can be furnished by any appropriate means; see, for instance, the decisions of the boards of appeal cited in the EPO publication “Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO”, 5th ed. 2006 at VI.K.4.3.6.

Therefore taking all due care does not require a party to attach to documents intended for the EPO an acknowledgment of receipt for return by the EPO nor to make an online inspection of the file. As a consequence, any failure to monitor timely return of an acknowledgment or check the contents of the electronic file in the EPO’s register cannot amount to a failure to take all due care either.

Thus, in the case before the board, the representative was under no duty to take such steps. As there is no suggestion from the documents on file that the appellant or anyone in its patent law firm could have become aware of the error before receipt of the acknowledgment on 15 April 2009, the cause of non-compliance with the time limit was removed on that date.

Consequently the period of two months from the removal of that cause was complied with by the request for re-establishment of rights received on 25 May 2009.

This request was also filed within one year of expiry of the unobserved appeal time limit of 16 March 2009.

[4.2] […] The request for re-establishment is consequently admissible.

The request was also found allowable and was, therefore, granted.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Saturday, 8 May 2010

T 990/07 – Enough Said


In a recent post, I have cited a decision stating that there was no mandatory requirement for an example under the EPC and that the sufficiency of disclosure with regard to claimed subject-matter had to be judged on the basis of the whole disclosure in a patent and not only on that given by the examples. The present decision confirms this approach and provides some complementary considerations.

[3.1] R 27(1)(e) EPC 1973 requires the description to “describe in detail at least one way of carrying out the invention claimed using examples where appropriate and referring to the drawings, if any”. The only concrete examples disclosed in the present application are those of Figures 7, 8 and 11 which, however, do not embody the claimed subject-matter. Moreover, even if there is no doubt that these Figures are erroneous, their correction and the correction of the corresponding passages in the description is not permitted under R 139 (former R 88 EPC 1973). Such corrections would only have been allowable if it had been immediately evident what the correction should have been. Since, however, a multiplicity of distinct configurations describing single loops exist, this condition cannot be fulfilled, several different corrections being possible. Moreover, the selection of one specific configuration and the inclusion of the details necessary to define this configuration would necessarily contain fresh matter and thus contravene A 123(2).

In the absence of any other example actually embodying the claimed invention, the Board has to decide whether a request which fulfils the requirements of A 83 EPC 1973 should nevertheless be rejected on the basis of R 27(1)(e) EPC 1973.

[3.2] It has already been decided that where the application disclosed the claimed invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art, it then necessarily disclosed “at least one way of carrying out the invention claimed”, as required by R 27(1)(e) EPC 1973, with the necessary details being derivable from the description including the prior art referred to therein (cf. T 389/87 [5.3-4]; T 561/96 [4.3]). Although the case underlying decision T 561/96 differs from the present situation in that the description and the drawings were not erroneous (cf. [4.2]), the Board also held in this decision that in cases where examples were not indispensable, their omission did not contravene R 27(1)(e) EPC 1973 which only required the insertion of such examples “where appropriate”.

The jurisprudence of the boards of appeal draws thus a clear distinction between the concepts of “way of carrying out the invention claimed” and “examples” referred to in R 27(1)(e) EPC 1973.

According to this jurisprudence, the detailed description of one way of carrying out the invention claimed has to be interpreted in the light of A 83. It constitutes a condition to be met by the description as a whole and is clearly mandatory. In contrast, the presence of examples would only be indispensable if the description would otherwise not be sufficient to meet this requirement.

Hence, the purpose of the “examples” evoked in R 27(1)(e) EPC 1973 appears primarily to be to complete an otherwise incomplete teaching.

In the case underlying decision T 134/82, relied upon by the ED in its refusal of the present application, the Board held that a misleading example or the absence of example was not appropriate and eventually refused the application. This decision was the consequence of the finding that crucial information for carrying out the invention was actually missing in the application.

The conclusion reached in decision T 134/82 is thus consistent with the case law referred to above in that it applied the same criterion, namely, whether sufficient information for reproducing the invention could have been gathered from the application as a whole.

The present case differs however from the situation underlying decision T 134/82 in that the examples of Figures 8 and 11, although erroneous, are not as such misleading since the skilled person would have undoubtedly been able to appreciate that they contained errors and would have realised how they should have been adapted to describe a (single) loop in the sense of independent claim 1.

The description of the connection structure contained in paragraphs [0035] to [0042] of the published application makes it clear that the antenna wiring portions are connected into a loop form by means of vias and intralayer wiring. The Board considers that this passage - although it relates to erroneous drawings - describes in detail one way of carrying out the invention in that the skilled reader is provided with the teaching necessary to enable the connection of the antenna wiring portions.

[3.3] Consequently, since the present description contains sufficiently detailed information to carry out the invention, as set forth above under section 2, the Board concludes that it is not necessary to include an example embodying the invention and that the requirements of Rule 27(1)(e) EPC 1973 are therefore met.

To read the whole decision, click here.

NB: This decision has already been reported on Le blog du droit européen des brevets.

Friday, 7 May 2010

T 448/07 – Much Talk About A Mute Witness


Need for a hearing

[1.1] Together with the notice of opposition the opponent has filed a written declaration by Mr. Mandrioli. The declaration was based on annexes 1 to 7. Annexes 1 to 4 concern a prior use by sale of a device without any obligation of confidentiality. Annexes 5 to 7 are leaflets and manuals concerning further prior uses. As far as the latter are concerned, Mr. Mandrioli gives details including the serial number but does not use any of the evidence and does not indicate how he obtained knowledge on these further prior uses.

[1.2] The [opponent] has offered the hearing of Mr. Mandrioli as a witness. In the communication of the Opposition Division (OD) dated September 5, 2006, which was enclosed with the summons to oral proceedings (OPs) the OD has told the parties that it was of the opinion that a hearing of Mr. Mandrioli was not necessary.

Together with its submission of December 5, 2006, and during the OPs before the OD the [patent proprietor] has pointed out that there were loopholes in the evidence and contradictions between the Annexes.

In the reasons for the contested decision the OD considers that Annex 1, which is an invoice from 1992 constitutes proof for a prior use by sale of a G.D. 2001 device.

[1.3] When answering the question as to which features this device had, the OD bases its reasoning on the pictures in Annex 4 which apparently have been taken at some time in the year 2000, i.e. after the priority date. It implicitly follows Mr. Mandrioli’s declaration because he has indicated the date at which the pictures were taken and affirmed that the condition of the device had not changed since its delivery in 1992.

According to the contested decision, the pictures show a G.D. 2001 device having the same serial number as mentioned in the invoice. The OD further states that the pictures show that the device has remained substantially unchanged over the years and, therefore, corresponded to the condition of the device sold in 1992. Moreover, the OD believes to be able to perceive the content of the box from the pictures, i.e. that it is a control box.

[1.4] As to the argument of the [patent proprietor] that the alleged box was of different colour than the other parts of the device, the OD has objected that both colours looked as if they had the same age and that all the colours were “soiled in the same manner by age and use”.

However, the decision does not state how it came to this conclusion.

[1.5] When asked whether the device had not been modified over the years, Mr. Mandrioli has declared that in 1995 the device still had had its original configuration, as could also be seen in the pictures taken at a later time. Mr. Mandrioli having not been heard, it is not known why he was able to declare this, for instance how he had known the original configuration.

[1.6] The Board comes to the conclusion that the OD based its reasoning on the declarations of Mr. Mandrioli at least for determining the object of the alleged prior use.

[1.6.1] In a case where a patent is revoked or maintained in amended form on the basis of the declaration of a single person, it is necessary to very carefully examine the evidence, including as a rule the hearing of this person as a witness if such hearing is – as in the present case – offered.

Such a hearing is indeed necessary in order to find out how the witness remembers the alleged facts and to receive an impression concerning his/her credibility. As the [patent proprietor] has explained, it was initially essentially limited to pointing out possible loopholes and contradictions in the evidence. As a rule it is necessary to hear the witness in order to confirm or eliminate such loopholes and contradictions.

[1.6.2] It results from the present evidence that the contradictions alleged by the [patent proprietor] could indeed be real.

For instance, the different colours of parts of the device constitute such a contradiction. During the OPs before the OD there were, according to the minutes, only declarations by the representative of the opponent and his accompanying person that this was usual and did not indicate a subsequent modification. Only the accompanying person but not the representative was present – as asserted – when the pictures were taken. However, neither of them was heard as a witness concerning this fact.

The Annexes 2 and 3 and the declaration by Mr. Mandrioli also contain such contradictions. Annex 2, page 2, contains a “note” according to which an instruction manual (“libro istruzioni”) was provided in the Italian language. However, on page 4 of Annex 2 there is a reference to documents for the customer (“documentazione per cliente”) which concerns a manual in the Italian language (“Manuali istruzioni copie : 1 ITA). Annex 3, which, according to the declaration by Mr. Mandrioli, “corresponds’ to the instruction manual, is, however, written in the English language. Also the fact that Mr. Mandrioli has not declared that Annex 3 was supplied with the device, but only that it corresponds to the documents supplied with the device only allows to suspect what has exactly been supplied.

The presence of such contradictions or loopholes can under certain circumstances render moot the whole evidence so that it is as a rule necessary to clarify them in order to be able to correctly appreciate the evidence.

[1.7] Moreover the declaration by Mr. Mandrioli concerns a series of further alleged prior uses. It is not clear which of these facts Mr. Mandrioli can personally attest and which of them are only based on information provided by third parties, such as his colleagues. The need for determining which facts Mr. Mandrioli has learned from third parties and which he can personally attest is another reason for hearing Mr. Mandrioli as a witness.

[1.8] The Board therefore comes to the conclusion that a hearing of the witness Mr. Mandrioli is necessary.

Procedural violations due to not hearing the witness

[2.1] The [patent proprietor] expressed the opinion that it had implicitly required a hearing of the witness Mr. Mandrioli during the opposition proceedings. There was no explicit request, as the [patent proprietor] admitted during the OPs before the Board.

[2.2] Mr. Mandrioli was offered for a hearing together with the notice of opposition. In its response dated March 11, 2004, the [patent proprietor] did not request his hearing as a witness but has only dealt with the evidence by pointing out: that Annexes 2 and 4 were not to be taken into account because Annex 2 was post-published and the pictures of Annex 4 were taken after the priority date of the impugned patent; that there was a contradiction between Annexes 2 and 3 concerning the language in which the instruction manual was written; that there was no evidence for the affirmation that the G.D. 2001 device had been delivered without any secrecy obligation; and that in any case it was not clear that the control box units of this device had received monitoring and steering organs. The missing features were in none of the documents of the prior art and, therefore, justified novelty and inventive step. In order to be understood as an implicit request for a hearing of witnesses, this submission would have to have only this interpretation. However, the above submission can also be understood to mean that the [patent proprietor] limited itself to excluding certain evidence from the proceedings, to attacking certain alleged facts and to affirm that they, even if they were real, could not cast doubt on the novelty and the inventive step.

[2.3] In its communication accompanying the summons to OPs, the OD has stated that it would not hear Mr. Mandrioli as a witness. […] At this moment at the earliest [sic] the [patent proprietor] knew that it had to explicitly request a hearing if it considered such a hearing to be necessary. This is all the more true as the [opponent], in its letter dated October 6, 2006, again inquired whether Mr. Mandrioli was summoned as a witness. Then the OD had called it and informed it that the OD did not intend to do so. The corresponding minutes were sent to the [patent proprietor] on November 24, 2006.

[2.4] In its letter dated December 5, 2006, the [patent proprietor] then again only dealt with the evidence, which leads to the same result, i.e. that this reaction cannot be understood as an implicit request for a hearing of the witness. Quite to the contrary, the [patent proprietor] has requested that the declaration of Mr. Mandrioli not be taken into account.

[2.5] During the OPs at the latest the [patent proprietor] should have realized that its written submissions were not understood as an implicit request. Nevertheless, it has not filed a request for a hearing of the witness and there is no indication in the minutes that it had pointed out the necessity for such a hearing in any other form.

Therefore, the Board cannot share the opinion of the [patent proprietor].

[2.6] The [patent proprietor] has also explained that the OD has not complied with its duty to act of its own motion, by not deciding to summon and hear the witness.

However, the [patent proprietor] fails to see that the witness had been offered by the [opponent], in order to corroborate its declarations, and not by itself, and that the OD had considered the question and has made use of its discretion under A 114(1) such that it came to the conclusion that it could allow the requests of the [opponent] without any hearing. If the position of the [patent proprietor] were adopted, it would lead to the situation where the OD would have to accept any offer of a witness and, therefore, lose its power of discretion.

[2.7] The [patent proprietor] has also cited decision T 474/04. The facts underlying this decision differ from the facts of the present case in that the concerned [patent proprietor] had filed an explicit request for a hearing of the witness offered by the [opponent] already during the opposition proceedings, which had been ignored or overseen by the OD. In the present case there has not been any explicit or implicit request. Therefore, this decision is not relevant.

[2.8] For the above mentioned reasons the Board does not see any procedural violation on behalf of the OD.

The Board then remitted the case to the OD. The patent proprietor had asked the Board not to do so, but the Board rejected this request because the required hearing would transform the appeal proceedings into first instance proceedings. It pointed out that the patent proprietor had contributed to the long delay caused by the remittal, by not requesting a hearing of the witness during the opposition proceedings.

To read the whole decision (in German), click here.

Thursday, 6 May 2010

T 564/07 – Extrinsic Illumination


The Guidelines (C-III 4.14) explain that “where a claim in respect of a physical entity (product, apparatus) seeks to define the invention by reference to features relating to the entity's use, a lack of clarity can result. This is particularly the case where the claim not only defines the entity itself but also specifies its relationship to a second entity which is not part of the claimed entity (for example, a cylinder head for an engine, where the former is defined by features of its location in the latter) […]”. Does this reasoning apply when a claim refers to a feature (such as a given frequency or wavelength) that is not inherent to the object itself? That is the question which T 564/07 and T 614/04 try to answer.

In T 564/07, Claim 1 of the application read:

A surface acoustic wave (SAW) identification tag, comprising: a piezoelectric substrate having a SAW transducer located thereon for generating a signal having a known frequency that travels down the substrate as a SAW; a number of reflectors […] arranged to reflect a portion of the SAW back to the transducer […], wherein for the known frequency each reflector is positioned at one of predetermined allowable positions, each allowable position being associated with a predetermined time shift and phase, wherein the phase has a phase step relative to a phase associated with an adjacent allowable position, to enable discrimination of overlapping reflected portions of the SAW.

[…] By specifying that each reflector is positioned at one of predetermined allowable positions and by defining said allowable positions by reference to a “known frequency” generated by the transducer, the relationship existing between adjacent allowable positions has been clarified in both independent claims 1 and 8.

Although these allowable positions do not constitute, as such, structural elements of the claimed tag, the relationship which is to exist between said positions leads by reference to concrete limitations as to the distribution of the reflectors on the substrate. It follows from the description that the distribution of the reflectors indeed constitutes the key element in order to permit discrimination between reflected portions of the SAW in case such reflected signals would overlap; such overlap would namely result from the proximity of reflectors in view of the pulse width of the signal generated by the transducer.

Although the “known frequency” or “given frequency” referred to, respectively, in claims 1 and 8 does not constitute an inherent feature of the transducer since the bandwidth of the signal generated depends, inter alia, on the interrogation signal generated by an external reader, the Board is satisfied that the requirements of A 84 EPC 1973 as to clarity are met.

As ruled in decision T 614/04 [2.4], concerning the examination of clarity, “the aspect whether a device having the concrete features of claim 1 and used with a wavelength not fulfilling the mentioned conditions falls within the scope of claim 1, is irrelevant during the examination of a patent application. [...] The Board considers that in an optical device comprising features dependent upon wavelength it is appropriate to introduce this dependence in a generalised way, e.g. by definition of a grating period as a function of wavelength...”.

Applied to the present case, this teaching implies that the fact that a tag having the concrete features of claim 1 could possibly be used with an external reader generating a signal with a frequency for which the relationship between the reflectors on the substrate and consequently the associated discriminating effect would not be provided, is not a valid criteria to justify a lack of clarity of the claimed subject-matter.

As stressed in decision T 614/04, it is essential that “if a predetermined wavelength is selected, the remaining features can be adapted to provide the required function...”, which is the case for the SAW identification tag of claim 1: the knowledge of the frequency permits to determine, for a selected phase step, the allowable positions and accordingly the position of the encoding reflectors. [3.1]

As the reasoning of the Board is essentially based on the findings of T 614/04, I had a look at this decision. It dealt with a rejection for lack of clarity concerning a reference to a predetermined wavelength:

[…] Claim 1 defines an optical device comprising inter alia a pair of low and high refractive index layers disposed on a multilayer mirror and a diffraction grating in the high refractive index layer. From mathematical relations indicated in the claim it can be derived that for a predetermined wavelength λ and suitable materials having at this wavelength a low and high refractive index, respectively, the period of the diffraction grating Λ is determined in dependence on the wavelength λ and the effective refractive index ne of the high refractive index layer for the polarisation mode for which the reflectivity of the multilayer is lowered. This is due to a phase shift of π occurring when this polarisation mode is coupled by the grating in the high refractive index layer […]. Therefore this definition is sufficiently clear for the skilled person to understand for which invention protection is sought. [2.1]

The ED agues in its decision that conditions in claim 1 to be fulfilled critically depend on the wavelength which is not part of the claimed subject-matter, and only apply to normal incidence. In this context reference was made to the Guidelines C-III, 4.[14]. Moreover, a claim for a device seeks protection for the device per se irrespective of the use to which it may be put. In the present case a device having the concrete features of claim 1 would fulfil the conditions in claim 1, when used with one wavelength, but not when used at other wavelengths. [2.2]

The Board however finds this argument unconvincing. The wavelength in the mentioned conditions serves to define the claimed device in terms of functional features. If a certain wavelength is selected, the remaining features can be adapted to provide the required function, i.e. the materials of the layers and the grating period can be chosen, accordingly. Expressed the other way round, for a completed device the appropriate wavelength can be determined. Normal incidence is implicit, since equation (2) in claim 1 does not contain a factor depending on the angle.

Point C-III 4.[14] of the Guidelines mentioned above is related to the “definition by reference to use or another entity”. It is stated there that a lack of clarity can result where a claim seeks to define an invention by reference to features relating to the entity’s use. This would particularly be the case where a claim not only defines the entity itself but also specifies its relationship to a second entity which is not part of the claimed entity. In contrast to that, the present claim specifies an optical device working at a predetermined wavelength, which is evidently not a use of the kind discussed in the Guidelines cited. [2.3]

In the Board’s view the aspect of whether a device having the concrete features of claim 1 and used with a wavelength not fulfilling the mentioned conditions falls within the scope of claim 1, is irrelevant during the examination of a patent application. A 84 requires that the matter shall be defined, for which protection is sought.

The Board considers that in an optical device comprising features dependent upon wavelength it is appropriate to introduce this dependence in a generalised way, e.g. by definition of a grating period as a function of wavelength as in the present case. Such a definition is evidently clear. It is in the present case also supported by the description, as is further required by A 84. Any other definition, e.g. based on absolute dimensions, would lead to undue restriction. [2.4]

To read the whole decision, click here.

Wednesday, 5 May 2010

T 1437/07 – Amendments Based On Disclosed Speculation


[5] Furthermore, the [opponents] rely on decisions T 158/96, T 715/03 and T 630/04 and put forward the following argument: In the three above-cited decisions the boards have ruled that “speculative” or “hypothetical” disclosures do not anticipate claimed subject-matter. Therefore, in analogy to the rationale of these decisions, Example 9 of the patent cannot be used as a basis for an amendment because it is “speculative” or “hypothetical” as well, since it has not actually been carried out.

[5.1] In decisions T 158/96 [3.6-3.6.2] and T 715/03 [2.2] the boards regarded it as “speculative” to infer from the information that a medicament is undergoing clinical phase evaluation that a particular therapeutic effect has been achieved. In T 630/04 [2.2.1-2.3] a statement in a document was denoted as a “hypothetical speculation” in the sense that it could not be interpreted as disclosing the claimed subject-matter. Thus, in the three cited decisions the teaching in a document was considered as “speculative” or “hypothetical” because it was not clearly and unambiguously derivable from the document. Hence, in contrast to what is implied by the [opponents’] argument, the boards’ reason for accepting novelty in the cited decisions was not that the subject-matter in the prior art documents was not disclosed in an enabling manner. Consequently, decisions T 158/96, T 715/03 and T 630/04 do not help the [opponents’] case.

[5.2] With regard to the [opponent’s] view that a “hypothetical” example cannot be used as the basis for an amendment, the board considers that the question of whether or not the disclosure in an application is sufficient to enable a skilled person to carry out the claimed invention is not relevant for the assessment of whether or not the requirements of A 123(2) are fulfilled. This is so, because the basis for amendments is the “content” of the application, i.e. what the skilled person would have clearly and unambiguously derived from the written disclosure as a whole. For the determination of the mere information content of a document it is not relevant whether or not what is disclosed has in fact been carried out.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Tuesday, 4 May 2010

T 1437/07 – When A Title Entitles


[1] The issue is whether or not the skilled person would clearly and unambiguously derive the subject-matter of claim 1 from the disclosure in the parent application or the application as filed, in particular, from the heading of example 9.

[2] The description of the parent application and the application as filed are identical. Thus, Example 9 (i.e. the first of two examples each entitled “Example 9”) of both applications reads: “

“Example 9 The Use of Botulinum toxin Types A-G in the Treatment of Muscle Spasms and Control of Pain Associated with Muscle Spasms in Smooth Muscle Disorders Such as Gastrointestinal Muscles

[0061] A female, age 35, with spastic colitis, is treated with 1-100 units of Botulinum toxin divided into several areas, enema (1-5 units) delivered in the standard enema volume, titrate dose, starting with the lowest dose. Injection is to the rectum or lower colon or a low dose enema may be employed. Cramps and pain associated with spastic colon are relieved in 1-10 days.”

[3] The [opponents] argue that a heading could not provide a basis for a claim because the purpose of a heading is merely to structure a text and therefore it could not be considered as “disclosing” anything. It is submitted that the special character of a heading becomes evident when considering that the title of a patent could be amended by the EPO without informing the applicant or patent proprietor.

[3.1] However, the only titles that may be amended by the EPO are those printed on the cover sheet of a patent application (for the amendment procedures, see the Notice dated 13 March 1991 concerning the amendment of the title of the invention in European patent applications, OJ EPO 1991, 224; Guidelines, A-III, 7.2).

This “title of the invention” is also part of the abstract (R 47(1)). Both the abstract and the title of the invention serve for information and documentation purposes. In decision T 246/86 [2.2], the board found that the abstract does not form part of the disclosure for the purposes of A 123(2). Consequently, the title of the invention may not be used as a basis for any amendments of a claim as well.

[3.2] In contrast, amended claim 1 is based on a heading which is not on the cover sheet, but which is within the description of the application as filed. According to A 76(1) and A 123(2) the allowability of an amendment is judged on the “content” of the application. The term “content” relates to the parts of a EP application which determine the disclosure of the invention, namely the description, claims and drawings (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 5th edition 2006, III.A.1.1, first paragraph). Thus, headings that are situated within any of these parts form part of the disclosure content of an application and therefore amendments may be based on them.

[4] The [opponents] further maintain that, even if the heading of Example 9 was regarded as a “disclosure”, the skilled person would have considered it to be limited to the content of the specific disclosure which follows.

[4.1] However, the disclosure content of a document is to be determined on the basis of the document as a whole. In the present case, in the paragraph bridging pages 4 and 5 the invention is described in general terms: “The present invention provides a method for relieving pain, associated with muscle contractions, [...], and a method for treating smooth muscle disorders, including, but not limited to, spasms in the sphincter of ...”. On page 9, lines 18 to 19 it is stated that the invention “will now be illustrated by reference to the following nonlimiting examples”.

In the board’s view, these passages convey to the skilled person that the invention is not limited to the specific examples. This is also what the skilled person would derive from the Examples part of the description. Each of the twelve examples has a title disclosing in a "claim-like" manner a particular concept of use which is followed by a specific disclosure which illustrates it.

Not much to be said, except that this is the first time that I realize that the title of an application is part of its abstract. You never stop learning.

We shall come back on this decision tomorrow.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Monday, 3 May 2010

T 512/07 – Deadly Decibels


The applicant filed an appeal against the decision of the examining division (ED) refusing a European patent application because the invention was not disclosed in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a skilled person (A 83 in combination with R 27(1)(e) EPC 1973).

[3] During the appeal proceedings, the appellant has extensively amended the application documents. Objections under A 83 may under some circumstances be overcome by amending the claims, since thereby the “invention” referred to in A 83 may be so changed that it no longer depends on the insufficiently disclosed aspects of the application for its realisation. However such objections cannot be overcome by amendment of the description and drawings, since the amendment would then add subject-matter to the application as filed. In general, the presently claimed subject-matter has to be examined for compliance with A 83 on the basis of the application documents as originally filed.

In the present case the objection raised by the examining division concerned the disclosure of how to determine the powers of the ACK and NACK signals. This determination remains essential to carrying out the invention as defined in the independent claim of each of the present main and auxiliary requests.


Fig. 1 of the application

[4] The appellant essentially argued that in original figures 1 and 2 the y-axis pointing upwardly from 0(DTX) showed the power level on a linear scale for the transmission power to be used for ACK signals. Similarly, the y-axis pointing downwardly from 0(DTX) showed the increasing power level on a linear scale for the transmission power to be used for NACK signals. The transmission power of the ACK and NACK signals was of opposite polarity. In the introductory portion of the specification it was explained with regard to figure 1 that the background art receiver utilized one bit to transmit the response signals […]. In general the term “one bit signal” […] was used to refer to the digital signal which could have the logical value “0” or “1”. Thus, ACK could be represented as “1” (or “0”) and NACK could be presented as “0” (or “1”). Further, the first paragraph on page 3 indicated that the ACK/NACK signals were transmitted as “+1” or “-1”, referring to the analogue form. In contrast, the first paragraph on page 16 of the description as filed was argued to be related with the logical or digital value of the acknowledgment bit that did not refer to the analogue or physical form […].

[5] However, the board finds these arguments neither clear nor convincing and agrees with the reasoning of the appealed decision that the application considered as a whole does not describe in detail at least one way of carrying out the invention claimed, as required by R 27(1)(e), and does not disclose the invention sufficiently clearly and completely for it to be carried out by a skilled person, as required by A 83. In particular, the teaching of figures 1 and 2 as originally filed, even if interpreted in the light of the corresponding parts of the description […], does not allow a skilled person to carry out the invention, for the following reasons.

[5.1] The y-axis of original figures 1 and 2 shows the power level in a logarithmic decibel (dB) scale […] according to which a power level P=0 equals minus infinity. According to the original description […] the actual DTXsignal (Discontinuous Transmission, i.e. no response) occurrence is “to occur at 0 power level”. On a logarithmic scale, the reference “0(DTX)” would therefore have to be indicated at minus infinity on the y-axis. This, however, is not the case. “0(DTX)” is shown somewhere in the middle of the y-axis, which rather leads the skilled reader to the interpretation that DTX denotes a transmission signal of zero power on a linear scale. This, however, causes the problem that the power level for a NACK-signal, which according to original figures 1 and 2 is lower than the DTX level, would have to be negative, which is not technically possible since power is always greater than or equal to zero.

There is no indication in the application documents as filed that the power levels for ACK signals and for NACK signals shown in figures 1 and 2 are mirrored at 0(DTX) forming a lower and an upper graph with a common x-axis as argued by the appellant. The skilled reader would at least expect a hint in the description or in the drawings for such an unusual interpretation which, however, is not found. The board agrees with the argument presented in […] the appealed decision that the decision regions for ACK and NACK signals, indicated on the right hand side of the graph, suggest that there is only one graph and only one decision region threshold applying to all (logarithmic) power levels from minus infinity to plus infinity. […]

[6] The appellant pointed to the corresponding granted US patent. As the appellant conceded the grant of a patent in the USA is not binding for the EPO granting procedure. In addition, the parallel US patent specification is not identical to the European application, in particular figures 1 and 2 are different with regard to the logarithmic scale, so that the US patent is based on a different disclosure.


Fig. 1 of the U.S. application

The requirements of A 83 are not fulfilled if the invention disclosed in the European Patent application can only be carried out with the knowledge of a family member. Thus, the appellant’s argument […] does not convince. […]

[10] In the light of the above identified problems with the disclosure of the invention the board concludes that the requirements of A 83 and of R 27(1)(e) are not fulfilled for the main request.

To read the whole decision, click here.

Saturday, 1 May 2010

T 1423/07 – Double Patenting And Internal Priority


The present decision deals with the refusal of an application on the ground of unallowable double patenting. I owe the knowledge of this decision – which is not yet available on the DG3 site – to the EPLaw Patent Blog.

[2] In the present case, the double patenting arises from a European application (= contested application) which claims priority from an earlier European application which was granted (= document D1). The claims of the two documents are identical and all the Designated Contracting States of D1 are also designated in the contested application.

[2.1] The examining division (ED) refused the application on the basis of the Guidelines. The relevant passage C-IV, 6.4 (June 2005) reads as follows:
“The EPC does not deal explicitly with the case of co-pending European applications of the same effective date. However, it is an accepted principle in most patent systems that two patents cannot be granted to the same applicant for one invention [emphasis added by the board]. It is permissible to allow an applicant to proceed with two applications having the same description where the claims are quite distinct in scope and directed to different inventions. However, in the rare case in which there are two or more European applications from the same applicant definitively designating the same State or States (by confirming the designation through payment of the relevant designation fees) and the claims of those applications have the same filing or priority date and relate to the same invention (the claims conflicting in the manner explained in VI, 9.1.6), the applicant should be told that he must either amend one or more of the applications in such a manner that they no longer claim the same invention, or choose which one of those applications he wishes to proceed to grant. Should two applications of the same effective date be received from two different applicants, each must be allowed to proceed as though the other did not exist.”
The EPC does indeed not contain any explicit provision which would prohibit double patenting. By invoking an “accepted principle in most patent systems that two - patents cannot be granted to the same applicant for one invention”, the above passage of the Guidelines makes reference to A 125 as a basis for not allowing double patenting. Therefore what has to be evaluated is whether a European application can be refused for double patenting on the basis of A 125.

[2.2] A 125 stipulates that 
“in the absence of procedural provisions in this Convention, the EPO shall take into account the principles of procedural law generally recognised in the Contracting States”. 
This means that in order to base the refusal of a European application on A 125, each of the following criteria must be met: 

(a) it must be a matter of procedural law;
(b) the principles of general law invoked must be generally recognised in the Contracting States;
(c) there must be an absence of procedural provisions in the EPC.

Re (a): 

[2.2.1] In decision T 587/98, which concerns double patenting arising from a divisional application, the board concluded that A 125 was not applicable, as prohibition of conflicting claims would be a’ matter of substantive law rather than a matter of procedure (see [3.6] of the reasons). However, double patenting also comprises procedural aspects. Reference is made to the minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference of 1973, M/PR/I, point 665, page 62, which confirm the procedural aspects of double patenting. The relevant passage reads as follows:
“In connection with A 125, it was established at the request of the United Kingdom delegation that there was majority agreement in the Main Committee on the following: that it was a generally recognised principle of procedural law in the Contracting States that a person can be granted only one European patent for the same invention in respect of which there are several applications with the same date of filing.”
The board concludes that refusal of a European application for double patenting comprises both procedural aspects as well as matters of substantial law so that A 125 is applicable.

Re (b): 

[2.2.2] The evaluation of the principles of general law generally recognised in the Contracting States reveals that the majority of the Contracting States do not allow double patenting in a situation where there is both a national patent and a European patent designating the same Contracting State. Thus, section 73(2) of the UK Patents Act 1977 reads:
“If it appears to the comptroller that a patent under this Act and a European patent (UK) have been granted for the same invention having the same priority date, and that the applications for the patents were filed by the same applicant or his successor in title, he shall give the proprietor of the patent under this Act an opportunity of making observations and of amending the specification of the patent, and if the proprietor fails to satisfy the comptroller that there are not two patents in respect of the same invention, or to amend the specification so as to prevent there being two patents in respect of the same invention, the comptroller shall revoke the patent.”
In France, this situation is governed by Article L 614-13 of the Code de la Propriété intellectuelle:
“Where a French patent covers an invention for which a European patent has been granted to the same inventor or to his successor in title with the same filing date or the same priority, the French patent shall cease to have effect at either the date on which the period during which opposition may be filed against the European patent expires without opposition having been filed or the date on which the opposition proceedings are closed and the European patent is maintained. However, where a French patent has been granted at a date later than either of the dates, as appropriate, laid down in the foregoing paragraph, such patent shall not take effect. The subsequent lapse or annulment of the European patent shall have no effect on the provisions of this Article.”
Most Contracting States have provisions similar to the French law, i.e. the national patent ceases to have effect in case of double patenting with a European patent. These Contracting States include Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey. Double patenting in this situation is also not allowed in Ireland where, as in the United Kingdom, the national patent is revoked in such a case, and in Macedonia as well as in Lithuania. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Sweden, simultaneous protection by a national patent and a European patent is not excluded (see National law relating to the EPC, 14th ed., table X).

In view of the fact that double patenting involving a national patent and a European patent is not possible in the great majority of the Contracting States (27 out of 35), it has to be concluded that this principle of law is generally recognised in the Contracting States.

However, this exclusion of double patenting concerns a very specific situation in the post-grant procedure, i.e. a situation where, as mentioned above, a granted national patent and a granted European patent claim the same invention. It does not relate to double patenting in the pre-grant stage involving a patent already granted and a patent application going through the grant process.

A European patent application can be refused under A 97(2) or, as in the present case, under A 97(1) EPC 1973 if it or the invention to which it relates does not meet the requirements of the EPC. If therefore the application is refused for double patenting, the absence of subject-matter already claimed in a granted European patent by the same applicant must be a requirement that the European application must meet in order to be granted. The refusal of a European patent application based on A 125 therefore requires the existence of principles of law generally recognised in the Contracting States which refer to the pre-grant procedure and which allow the refusal of a national patent application for double-patenting. 

Such provisions exist in Ireland and in the United Kingdom: 

Section 31(5) of the Irish Patents Act 1992 reads: 
“Where two or more patent applications for the same invention having the sane date of filing or the same date of priority are filed by the same applicant or his successor in title, the Controller may on that ground refuse to grant a patent in respect of more than one of the applications.”
Section 18(5) of the UK Patents Act 1977 reads:
“Where two or more applications for a patent for the same invention having the same priority date are filed by the same applicant or his successor in title, the comptroller may on that ground refuse to grant a patent in pursuance of more than one of the applications.”
However, no further patent convention in the Contracting States could be found in which the refusal of a patent application for double patenting is provided for. The German patent law does not contain such a provision either. However, case law does exist in Germany for not granting patent applications in case of double patenting on the ground that there is no legitimate interest (see BPatGE 21, 223). Thus, the headnote in case BPatGE 21, 223 reads:
“There is no legitimate interest in granting several patents arising from applications from one and the same applicant with identical contents and priority dates.” [translation by the board]
[2.2.3] To summarise: There is a general principle of law generally recognised in the Contracting States for not allowing double patenting arising from a granted national patent and a granted European patent, but this does not provide a basis for refusing a European application under A 97(2) or Article 97(1) EPC 1973 at the pre-grant stage. In view of the fact that only two national patent conventions of the Contracting States and the case law of a third Contracting State provide a basis for refusing a patent application for double patenting, there is no principle of law generally recognised in the Contracting States for refusing a European patent application on the ground of double patenting.

[2.2.4] In the present case, where double patenting is caused by internal priority, the number of Contracting States providing a basis for refusing an application for double patenting is further reduced to two, as the German case law, which denies a legitimate interest, does not apply for the following reasons:

[2.2.4.1] A 63(1) stipulates that “the term of the European patent shall be 20 years from the date of filing of the application”. The relevant date for calculating the 20-year term is not the priority date but the filing date (see in this context also Article 4bis(5) of the Paris Convention). This means that the refusal of the contested application deprives the appellant of almost one year of protection, since the starting date for calculating the 20-year term is shifted from 21 July 2003 (filing date of the contested application) to 25 July 2002 (priority date of the contested application = filing date of D1). Therefore, the appellant has a legitimate interest in the grant of the contested application. In this context it is noted that the presence of two identical sets of claims in a granted patent and in a patent application of the same applicant is not a sufficient reason for denying a legitimate interest. All the rights arising from these documents, including the period of patent protection, have to be taken into consideration. As a consequence, the German case law is not relevant in the present case.

[2.2.4.2] According to the German patent law, an earlier application from which a subsequent application claims priority is deemed withdrawn with the declaration of priority according to § 40(5) . This means that double patenting arising from an internal priority cannot occur according to German law, as the earlier application cannot proceed to grant. It is important to note that it is the earlier and not the subsequent application claiming priority from the earlier application that cannot proceed to grant. In this way, the legitimate interest of the applicant in terms of the period of protection is guaranteed.

[2.2.5] As a consequence, irrespective of whether or not the EPC lacks procedural provisions in connection with double patenting […], A 125 does not provide a basis for refusing a European application on the ground of double patenting.

A 60

[2.3.1] In decision T 307/03 […], it was decided that A 60 provided a basis for refusing a European application for double patenting. A 60 stated that “The right to a European patent shall belong to the inventor or his successor in title”, from which it could be deduced that under the EPC the principle of double patenting applied, as the inventor or his successor in title had a right to the grant of one and only one patent from the EPO for a particular invention as defined in a particular claim. Once a patent had been granted, this right to a patent had been exhausted and the EPO was entitled to refuse to grant a further patent to the inventor or his successor in title for the subject-matter for which he had already been granted a patent (see [2.1] of the reasons). The fact that the EPC did not contain any specific provisions relating to double patenting was not decisive, as the legislator could not be expected to have made provisions to regulate what would on grounds of economics alone be a very rare occurrence. The board could recognise no legitimate interest in anyone having two or more identical patents with the same claims and the same priority dates (see [2.3] of the reasons). A 60 is integrated into Chapter II of Part II of the EPC, which concerns “Persons entitled to apply for and obtain a European patent - Mention of the inventor”, and it is the purpose of A 60 to define to whom the right to a European patent belongs. This board cannot see how A 60 could serve as a basis for refusing a European application under A 97(2) for double patenting, it cannot agree that A 60 can be interpreted such that the inventor or his successor in title has a right to the grant of one and only one patent from the EPO for a particular invention, with the consequence that claims comprising subject-matter included in the claims of an already granted patent of the same applicant are refused no matter whether or not the applicant has a legitimate interest in the grant of the subsequent application. Contrary to the reasoning applied in decision T 307/03, this board is convinced that the fact that the EPC does not contain any specific provisions relating to double patenting is decisive: in the absence of such provisions, a refusal of a European patent application for double patenting is not possible irrespective of whether or not double patenting is a rare occurrence.

[2.3.3] It could be argued that in such a case the rights to the patent granted on the basis of the earlier application could be given up. However, this argument is futile, as the EPC does not provide a basis therefor: the priority right of the EPC does not include a provision corresponding to § 40(5) of the German law, which would prohibit the grant of the earlier application and thus prevent double patenting in a case of internal priority in the first place (see [2.2.4.2] above). Furthermore, there are no means of forcing an applicant to abandon an already granted patent as a prerequisite for granting the subsequent application either.

[2.3.4] As a consequence, the contested application cannot be refused under A 60 for double patenting.

[2.4] Double patenting as understood in this decision requires that the parties of the conflicting patents or patent applications are identical. In the present case, the patentee of D1 is Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GmbH (BIP). BIP also filed the contested application as international application WO 2004/011006 on 21 July 2003, which entered the European phase as EP 03 771 064.7 on 12 January 2005. In the Declaration of Assignment dated 27 April 2007, BIP assigned, transferred and set over the entire right, title and interest in and to the above-mentioned protective rights, including priority rights of EP 03 771 064.7 to Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH. The transfer was registered by the EPO on 4 May 2007. No transfer was effected in connection with D1. In view of the above transfer, the patentee of D1 and the applicant of the contested application are no longer identical. As a consequence, the present case resembles the situation described in the last sentence of the paragraph of the Guidelines mentioned above, which explains that where two applications of the same effective date are received from two different applicants, each must be allowed to proceed as though the other did not exist. Formally, therefore, double patenting as defined above no longer exists.

The board is aware that such a unilateral transfer of rights might in certain Contracting States not be allowable under all circumstances. Thus, Article L 614-14 of the French Code de la Propriété intellectuelle reads:
“Where a French patent application or a French patent and a European patent application or a European patent have the same filing or priority date, cover the same invention and belong to the same inventor or to his successor in title, those parts which are common may not be transferred, pledged, mortgaged or their exploitation rights assigned independently of each other on pain of nullity.”
However, this is a question of the subsequent national phases, for which the board is not competent. As a consequence, the application cannot be refused for double patenting, as the parties of the conflicting patent documents are not identical.

Decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06

[3] According to Article 21 RPBA a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) shall be made if a board considers it necessary to deviate from an interpretation or explanation of the convention contained in an earlier opinion or decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal. In point [13.4] of decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06, the EBA accepts that the principle of prohibition of double patenting exists on the basis that an applicant has no legitimate interest in proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter if he already possesses one granted patent therefor. However, point [13.4] of said decisions concerns double patenting in connection with divisional applications. With divisional applications the filing date and, as a consequence, the 20-year term according to A 63(1) are the same as with the earlier application(s) on which the divisional application(s) is/are based. Therefore, the present case differs from this situation in that it concerns double patenting arising from internal priority where the conflicting documents have different filing dates. As a consequence, the board concludes that the present decision is not in contradiction with decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06, so that a referral to the EBA according to Article 112(1) (a) is not necessary.

Reimbursement

[4] The ED, being bound by the instructions given by the Guidelines, acted correctly in refusing the present application. Nevertheless, the application was refused under A 97(1) EPC 1973 for non-compliance with a non-existent requirement of the EPC. The refusal therefore infringed the applicant’s fundamental right that there should be a legal basis for any requirement relied on to invoke A 97(1) EPC 1973. Since the appellant was obliged to file the present appeal to overcome this refusal, the board judges it to be equitable that the appeal fee should be reimbursed.

This is a major decision; it would definitely deserve a publication in the OJ. I am particularly happy to see that the A 60 argument is refuted. Basing the prohibition of double patenting on the wording of A 60 is seriously questionable from the exegetical point of view.

To read the whole decision, click here.