tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2352189175211648260.post5463397157528898727..comments2023-10-24T14:45:41.342+02:00Comments on K’s Law: T 1068/07 – It’s All In Thereorhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07992102028406713066noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2352189175211648260.post-49393462468183857712012-08-01T00:10:41.277+02:002012-08-01T00:10:41.277+02:00I find this decision very surprising.
In the firs...I find this decision very surprising.<br /><br />In the first decision, the Board found the main request and the first auxiliary request to infringe Art. 123(2). The proprietor withdrew those requests, and maintained the requests that was the reason for the referral.<br /><br />In the referral decision, the EBA answered the referred questions in the strictest possible way. Any narrower interpretation of Art. 123(2) than that given in G 2/10 is simply inconceivable. It is not conceivable that if "the remaining subject-matter" (i.e. the very subject-matter claimed by the claim) is disclosed, the claim could somehow not comply with Art. 123(2).<br /><br />Now the Board, taking into account G 2/10, decides that the request that was the reason for the referral does comply with Art. 123(2)! The Board considers that "the remaining subject-matter" is disclosed by the application as filed. This is very strange. It means that the referral has never been necessary to decide the appeal, because the Board should have reasoned that even in the "worst case" (for the proprietor) the claims would still have complied.Myshkinnoreply@blogger.com